COMMENTS ON PROPOSED DCID NO. 1/19

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900020003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 19, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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19 April 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
Edward W. Proctor
Acting CIA Member, USIB
SUBJECT : Comments on Proposed?DCID No. 1/19
1. This is in response.to the request for comments on the
proposed DCID 1/19 circulated at the USIB Meeting of 15 April 1976.
2. - As Acting CIA Member of USIB, I have one serious problem
with the proposal: the designation of the Deputy to the DCI for the
'Intelligence Community as the Vice Chairman of the new National
Foreign Intelligence Board.
3. A review of the function of the NFIB clearly shows that,
the Board is to deal almost exclusively with the substance of -
intelligence.~ It is to coordinate national intelligence; improve
relations with consumers; establish substantive requirements,
priorities and objectives; provide operational guidance for collection
systems; deal with the protection of sources and methods; and
develop policies regarding liaison with foreign governments. None
of these responsibilities is the primary concern of the Community
Deputy. Below the level of the DCI himself, all are the primary
concerns of the CIA and other production and collection elements.
4. If the Community Deputy is the Vice Chairman, there
are some very practical considerations. First, the proposed staffing
pattern for the Intelligence Community Staff does not provide for a
staff to provide substantive support to the Community Deputy on the
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functions enumerated in the proposed DCID. If he is to draw his
support from his staff, then it would have to be expanded greatly
and would duplicate capabilities which already exist in other
arts
. p
of the Community. If he is not to draw on his staff for this su
ort
pp
,
the question remains as to how this will be done and where it will
come from.
5. Furthermore, there is the question of how wide a scope of
activity any Community Deputy will be able to 'handle. His Primary
res
onsibiliti
p
es are clearly concerned with tasks like the allocation .
of resources, preparation of the budget and proposals for large and.
costly new projects. Even if the procedures for these tasks were
fully developed and had been operating for several years, these
tasks would be very demanding. But as things stand now, he has
to develop these procedures and implement them. He should not
be diverted to other kinds of tasks. .
6. J n terms of the congruence of the functions of the Board
and the primary responsibilities of his position, the logic of the
situation would be to designate the CIA Deputy as the Vice Chairman
of the NFIB. There would be no need for any special arrangements
or increased staffing, if the CIA Deputy is the Vice Chairman.
7. On this basis, the Acting CIA Member of USIB, with the
full agreement of the four Deputy Directors of CIA, recommends
that the Deputy to the DCI for CIA be designated the Vice Chairman
of USIB.
r~
Distribution:
Original -
Director
- DDCI
1 -DDA
1 -DDO
1 - DDS& T
1 - DDI
1 - Mr. Lehman
1 - DDI Chrono
1 - rlr1T T"W' rrl r; i ,.
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 18
D/DCI/ IC
D/DCI/NI
Compt .-
D/Pers
pros ed for.,
Wqo~oow
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0 5 APR 1976
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE USIB FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE, 5 APRIL
Title of the Group
USIB
-National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB)
Something else
Functions of the Board
#Cmparable to the present USIB
Production review only,
L,,-'Addition of consumer interface
Membership of the Board
ipAs at present
As at present, with NRO added
As at present plus military intelligence chiefs as full members
Very restricted (CIA,DIA,INR - the production elements)
Vice chairmanship of the Board
D/DCI/IC or. DDCI/CIA
Designation of committees
J USIB Committees (or committees of what title the board has)
DCI committees
Committee structure
As at present
Add a committee of Inspector Generals (to respond to Oversight Board)
Disestablish the CCPC
COmmittee supervision
All committees monitored'by D/DCI/IC
Some committees located in DCI office and outside D/DCI/ overview
(IG andSecurity Committees have been suggested)
Location of the secretariat
In the ICS
In the office of the DCI
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OPTIONS FOR USIB REORGANIZATION
Introduction
There is a consensus among USIB members and observers that a
USIB-like board is both desirable and necessary. The following options
and discussion of more radical approaches to USIB organization, e.g.,
approaches requiring more basic organizational changes, were prepared
after careful review of comments by USIB principals and a preliminary
meeting with the DCI on the subject.
The purpose of this paper is to provide the Director and his
immediate advisors with further guidance on this issue. The subject of
USIB reorganization has been tentatively scheduled for the USIB agenda
on 8 April 1976.
The two options presented, Option I, "The Modified USIB Option",
and Option II, "The Two Board Option", are conservative approaches to
USIB reorganization requiring only minor changes in organization and/or
the current procedures of USIB.
The discussion of more radical approaches to USIB reorganization is
not offered in an optional context. This is not because the organi-
zational ideas possess any less validity than the more conservative
options; it is because the more radical approaches will require more
detailed organizational development and implementation.planning should.
any of them be chosen for further consideration.
An examination of the USIB reorganization issue also raises the
question of the necessity for any reorganization at the present time.
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Unless the Director feels it is imperative for policy reasons to
provide a "new look" to DCI affairs in this area sooner rather than
later, there appears to be good reasons to defer any major actions.
These good reasons involve:
a. the organization and stabilization of CFI procedures;
b. the organization of the national production mechanism;
c. the reorganization of the IC Staff;
d. the DOD intelligence reorganization;
e. the organization of the Office of the DCI.
In view of these factors and the flexibility of the current USIB
structure to review and/or advise on any matter of likely concern to
the DCI or of mutual concern to the members, the position recommended
in this paper is to defer any action and continue with the current
arrangement or implement Option I.
Traditional Approaches to Reorganization
Each of the options presented below are designed to cope with the
five primary functions which need to be served by the Board or Boards
which replace USIB. These are as follows:
a. Coordination of the National Intelligence Production
Effort
The DCI needs an advisory group of Community members to review
and coordinate on major substantive national intelligence products and
output activities. This includes national estimates, selected interagency
studies, and the information flow and dialogue on the Intelligence
Community's warning and crisis network (e.g., alert memorandums).
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b. Substantive Requirements and Priorities Generation
The DCI requires a mechanism for the initial statement and
prioritization of substantive requirements to serve as guidance to
intelligence production and collection operations and planning. At
the present time the KIQs, DCI Perspectives, and DCID 1/2 Attachment
serve this function. All are currently subject to USIB review.
c. Collection Systems Requirements Coordination and
Operational Guidance
Each collection organization must expand, translate, and
reprioritize substantive requirements based upon operational variables
to achieve the most effective information return. Under the USIB, the
COMIREX, SIGINT Committee, and Human Resources Committee were charged
with this function pursuant to USIB guidance and review. Additional
functions in this area have to do with arrangements with foreign govern-
ments for intelligence purposes, which is a DCI responsibility.
d. Producer/Consumer Relationships and Consumer Research
and Assessment
Executive Order 11905 stressed the need for more formal
Community action in this respect and assigned the DCI the specific
responsibility of consulting with the users and producers of intelligence
to ensure the timeliness, relevancy, and quality of the intelligence
product.
e. Protection of Sources and Methods and Other Support
Functions
The DCI requires an advisory group of senior Intelligence
Community members to coordinate appropriate programs developed to
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properly protect intelligence sources, methods, and analytical procedures.
With the heavy emphasis to downgrade and declassify intelligence infor-
mation consistent with Executive Order No. 11652 for wider dissemination,
functions and procedures to ensure the protection of sources and
methods must be constantly researched to ensure proper implementation
of both activities.
Additional support functions such as take place in the
information Handling Committee and the Committee on Exchanges are also
currently reviewed by USIB, and their continued review is envisioned
in the options.
Membership
The alternatives for membership in any reorganized USIB structure
should be designed to provide the broadest participation by members of
the Intelligence Community. Although each of the options provided
suggests a specific membership preference which was judged preferable
in the case of that option, other membership alternatives can be applied.
For example, the view can be taken that membership of a single
USIB-like committee should consist of all of those organizations
designated as being part of the Intelligence Community in Section I of
Executive Order 11905. Another alternative suggests that the current
membership and participant practices of the USIB be maintained. Other
alternatives suggest a select permanent membership such as CIA, DIA,
and State with all others having membership in an "on call" basis
participating only when items of direct interest to those agencies are
involved. (All of the current USIB members and observers would most
certainly object to the latter alternative.)
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Committee Reorientation
In the two options presented for USIB reorganization, the present
committees would continue to function. They have been renamed DCI
Committees in order to emphasize the need for flexibility with respect
to their tasking for a wide variety of Community support purposes,
including the CFI and the national production mechanism.
Although such committees as WSSIC, JAEIC, EIC, and STIC are often
referred to as "production" committees, their chairmen are quick to
point out that their activities cover all five of the functions discussed
above. To a lesser degree the same can be said of the "collection"
committees, SIGINT, COMIREX, and HRC. The remaining committees, CCPC,
IHC, COMEX, and Security have more specialized support responsibilities.
The DCI's memorandum of 28 January 1974 recognized the necessity to
coordinate the workload and priorities of these committees and assigned
the D/DCI/IC with this responsibility. Such coordination will continue
to be a necessity if the flexibility and effectiveness of these committees
is to be maintained.
A general reorganization of the committee structure is not con-
sidered in this paper. Since 1972, the Security Committee, STIC, WSSIC,
SIGINT, COMIREX, and EIC have all undergone reorganization of various
sorts. It is expected that the DCI Committees will continue to undergo
such changes as the DCI and. Community management environment necessitates.
Option I: The Modified USIB Option
Option I creates a National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB)
chaired by the DCI and recommends that all Community members participate
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The NFIB will be responsible for:
a. final coordination and review of the national intelli-
gence product;
b. coordination and review of national substantive require-
ments and their priorities, e.g., KIQs, DCI Perspectives, Attachment to
DCID 1/2;
c. review of collection system requirements and operational
tasking guidance;
d. review of Community policies and activities with respect
to protection of sources and methods, and other Community support
functions;
e. planning and conducting designated meetings on consumer
problems with the various agency and departmental members addressing
the consumer views of those agencies and departments;.
f. all other items of mutual interest to the Intelligence
Community which the DCI may desire to have brought before the Board or
which may be recommended to him by Board principals.
With the exception of the formal statement of the responsibility
in item e. above, the Option I organization would differ from the
current USIB only in the change of name and the addition of the military
services and the NRO as members.
The pros of Option I are:
-- Retains a single board of all Community members providing
a forum where mutual problems can be discussed.
-- Provides continuity in the coordination of national
production and the mechanism for working out dissents and
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-- Provides minimum disruption of USIB mechanism and
procedures.
-- Provides new impetus for consumer research and assessment.
The cons of Option I are:
-- Has the appearance of little or no change from USIB,
abolished in Executive Order.
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OPTION I
National Production
Mechanism
--- - ------ ----------------- -------
National Foreign Intelligence]
Board (NFIB)
(Functions 1-5)
Intelligence Community
Staff
DCI Committees
WSSIC
STIC
Etc.
Function 1. Coordination of the National Intelligence Production Effort
Function 2. Substantive Requirements Generation and Priorities
Function 3. Collection Systems Requirements Coordination and Operational Guidance
Function 4. Producer/Consumer Relationships and Assessments
Function 5. Protection of Sources and Methods and Other Support Functions
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Option II: The Two Board Option
Option II creates two national intelligence boards under the
chairmanship of the DCI.
The National Foreign Inteligence Board (NFIB) would be responsible
a. final coordination and review of the national intelli-
gence product;
b. review of collection system requirements and operational
tasking guidance;
c. review of Community policies and activities with respect
to protection of sources and methods and other Community support
functions.
All Community members would participate as members of the NFIB.
The National Intelligence Review Board (NIRB) would be responsible
a. coordination and review of substantive requirements and
priorities, e.g., KIQs, DCI Perspectives, Attachment to DCID 1/2;
b. review and assessment of producer/consumer relationships.
The NIRB would have three permanent members, the production chiefs
of CIA, DIA, and INR, with an on-call participating membership of other
members of the Intelligence. Community plus additional agencies and
departments such as ACDA, whose participation would from time to time
be appropriate.
The purposes of the dual board arrangement in Option II are:
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a. to emphasize the importance of the consumer/producer
relationship and the assessment problem;
b. to tie the above function directly to the generation of
national substantive requirements, both current and planned, and their
priorities;
c. to broaden the participation in the NIRB to include other
important consumers outside of the Community;
d. to limit meeting participation of the NIRB to participants
who have a direct interest in the subject matter under discussion.
The pros of Option II are:
-- Provides a board of all Community members for coordination
and review of all primary substantive and support matters
of Community interest.
-- Provides a more specialized board with broader but
selective participation to concentrate on producer/consumer
relationships and the coordination and review of national
substantive needs.
The cons of Option II are:
-- The dual board increases meeting load of DCI.
-- The dual board will tend to increase staffing requirements.
-- Membership arrangements in the NIRB are likely to be opposed
by NFIB members.
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More Radical Approaches to USIB Reorganization
Most radical approaches to USIB reorganization tend to take on
the form of greater functional specialization with respect to the
matters being advised upon and/or reviewed. These types of approaches
also tend to allow for more specialized membership arrangements related
to the form of specialization.
A. One approach suggests the creation of a special board or
steering group (associated or non-associated with a USIB-like board)
devoted to the concerns of whatever form the national production
mechanism takes.
One variation of the above arrangement includes the responsibility
for consumer assessment and substantive requirements generation in the
same board (e.g., the function of NIRB in Option II above).
Another variation of the production board suggests the division of
the substantively oriented board into political, military, and economic
panels. This approach tends to be criticized for greater disciplinary
division where the demand is for greater interdisciplinary concerns.
Another variation suggests a dedicated committee structure
composed of geographically oriented committees headed by the NIO for
that area. Such committees would serve to coordinate NIO activities
related to production and requirements.
B. Another approach suggests the creation of dual boards; one
board devoted to national foreign intelligence operational matters -
production and collection operational requirements, as well as the
generation and prioritization of current national substantive require-
ments. The second board would be devoted to the generation and
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prioritization of national foreign intelligence planning requirements
and their translation into a planning base for programming operations
and new investment in a budget-year-plus-five fashion. This second
board, it is argued, would serve to tie the substantive concerns to the
matters of primary CFI concern, and would bring the Community members
closer to playing a meaningful cross-program role in the CFI input,
thereby compensating for single manager inputs to CFI and potential IC
Staff domination of cross-program matters.
C. One radical approach tends toward greater non-specialization
of the board. It argues that the board structure should not be con-
fused by sub-boards, committees, and steering groups. It points out
that the current committee structure predated current trends in the
Intelligence Community Staff, national production mechanism, and the
CFI. Thus, it argues for: a single, authoritative and active board
with the Director and members more directly in control of agenda and
meeting frequency; abolition of the production committees and the
incorporation of their activities in the new national production
mechanism; greater reliance on the Intelligence Community Staff and
"normalization" of day-to-day Community coordination and administration;
and, recognition that an ax is essential if outdated bureaucracy is not
to be prolonged.
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