NATIONAL PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900020002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 22, 1976
• Content Type: MF

Approved For R,e.lease!i0,Q8f/ T 8& DP91 M00696R00090
CENTRAL INIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers 22 April 1976
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
SUBJECT : National Production
1. Attached for your consideration
is a memorandum on the national production
process prepared jointly by my colleagues
(who can, and do, operate more collegially
than is often recognized). We thought it
might serve as a useful basis for Friday's
discussion.
2. The attached memorandum has been
shown to and discussed with Dick Lehman,
who made some appreciated suggestions for
improvement. It does not, however,
necessarily reflect his views. Indeed,
there are portions of it with which he (and
others) will doubtless disagree.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officer
Georg A. Carver, Jr.
cc: Mr. Duckett
Mr. Proctor /
Mr. Lehman,
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-
 Approved For ?ase 20W6l/28: ?-~FA4iDtf9006900900020002-4
22 April 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM The National Intelligence Officers
SUBJECT A DCI-Oriented. Approach to National
Production
1. Much of the discussion of the future of the
national intelligence production system has been framed
in terms of concerns over the purity of the chain-of-
command., the centrality of the CIA, and other narrow
structural issues. Such an approach does not focus on
the real question of how a national intelligence production
system can best be fashioned to serve the DCI's basic
objectives.
2. The signals from the Executive, the Congress, and
the informed-public are strong and congruent: they point
to a mandate for the DCI to lead, manage, and exercise
resource authority over the entire Intelligence Community.
Central to such responsibilities is his cognizance and
command of the national intelligence production process.
The product of that process is the Community's principal
reason for existence and the requirements of that product
should drive both management and resource decisions.
The focus of the DCI's decisions, in other words, ought
to be on the product as much as on the process.
3. By what criteria will the adequacy of product and
process -- and, hence, the effectiveness of the Intelli-
gence Community's performance under the DCI's leadership --
be judged?
-- The product will clearly be assessed in terms
of its analytic quality, timeliness and
objectivity -- and hence its usefulness to
the national decision level.
25
Approved For Release/Aa/ f-'I ] 0020002-4
LL
~
 0 P41
`Approved For ease 2005/07/28: CIA-RDh 006961&0900020002-4
-- The process will be evaluated in terms of the
perceive impartiality, equity, and even-
handedness of the arrangements under which the
Community elements participate in what is truly
a common endeavor -- and hence their willing-
ness to accept and respond to central leader-
ship.
The current debate does not focus clearly on these two
fundamantal DCI objectives of assuring a high-quality
analytic product and creating a process that will elicit
willing cooperation rather than active or passive resistance
from the Community.
4. If these DCI objectives are taken as a point of
departure, what should a national analytic and estimative
intelligence production process seek to accomplish? Five
key functions stand out:
- Management of an analytic and estimative
system that will assure relevance, respon-
siveness, effective Community participation,
and fair reflection of uncertainties and
judgmental differences'-- including differences
between government departments or Intelligence
Community components and, sometimes, significant
differences of informed opinion within
departments or Community components.
- Development of improved analytic capabilities
throughout the Community, especially with
longer-term needs in view.
- Nurturing of the intelligence production base
of CIA as a service of common concern for the
whole Community (and the nation) and a
recognized source of impartial analysis (i.e.,
no departmental policy or budgetary axes to
grind).
-- Interaction between producers and consumers
to enhance policy relevance of the analytic
product.
- Provision of sharply focused guidance to the
whole range of collection systems, based on
awareness of critical gaps and producer and
consumer needs.
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : ZCIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
7
!t%i-I..1'[I'd L
 e
~O i\ t i % i ' r ?i3'iy
Apploved For FGase 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP91 M00696*0900020002-4
5. What institutional arrangement is best designed
to perform these functions? It is our view that the
existing NIO system, while far from perfect, can provide
the basis of a production mechanism able to perform this
particular mix of activities.
Being responsible directly to the DCI and
operating under his authority, the NIOs are
optimally positioned to cut. across organiza-
tional barriers to focus Agency-wide and
Community resources on production tasks;
they also serve the DCI as his own substantive
analytic advisory staff, viewing his needs
and problems from his perspective.
Their expertise and analytic bent, unfettered
by line responsibilities, sensitizes the NIOs
to the system's critical dependence on human
talents -- they are able to alert the DCI to
key needs for qualitative improvements and to
energize the Community in anticipation of
policy needs. Furthermore, since they work
directly for the DCI, their discharge of
these tasks can be free of concern for
institutional equities or institutional
positions.
Their heavy dependence on CIA as a main
repository of the Community's analytic
resources makes the NIOs strongly protective
and promotional of CIA's needs and problems.
The NIO-CIA relationship should be mutually
supportive; in fact, symbiotic. It is not,
in any way, an adversary relationship or zero-
sum game.
Being in continuous close contact with both
producers and consumers under the DCI's
mandate, the NIOs are well equipped to
strengthen the vital interaction between
intelligence and the policymaker.
Approved For Release 200~$~ TA #j6_9i1i:M 0696R000900020002-4
1'ti1 IJ~..~` ~ z1-_
 ~~ll { ! i ~~ ~`, { ? A ,
^~Fpproved For Fuse 20~5~~/~~8 : ?CIFPC ~Ft~dp~~'1~100698~0900020002-4
-- Because of their knowledge of the value of the
various collection systems to the national
intelligence product, and the gaps in that
product which specific collectors can fill,
the NIOs can add a critical substantive dimen-
sion to the DCI's resource allocation decisions.
6. The NIOs' ability to perform these functions does
not appear to be basically in question. The debate seems
to turn more on what are perceived as inherent weaknesses
in the NIO system, or tensions inevitably created by its
operation. A degree of tension is probably unavoidable
in any event in so complex a structure, and may in fact
be desirable in the interest of creativity. The larger
an organization or conglomerate -- such as the Intelligence.
Community -- the more obvious is the.need for order. But
if order is made the chief desideratum, it crowds out inno-
vation and flexibility. Routine becomes an enemy of quality.
Moreover, what are perceived as weaknesses and some of the
tendons can be readily alleviated by certain changes in
the present structure and procedures.
7. ti9hat are the weaknesses and tensions and how might
they be alleviated?
-- "The NIOs are criticized-for undercutting and
running athward lines of command by commandeer-
. ing analytic talent at subordinate .levels.
Our impression is that such instances are an
exception rather than the rule. While NIOs
do organize activities across the vertically
structured intelligence organizations, they
are under standing instructions to pass their
tasking through normal command channels. Never-
theless, some line managers feel that they do
not always share equitably in responsibility
for projects conducted under NIO auspices.
The following guidelines -- which tighten what
are supposed to be current procedures -- would
do much to alleviate this problem.
-- NIOs should make a point of levying tasks
through the chain of command in order to
minimize any element of interference with
the management of production elements of the
Community. All line managers should under-
stand that this is the way things are supposed
to be done and should be encouraged to raise
objections with the NIO in question, with
the D/DCI/NIO, or -- in extreme cases --
with the DCI if this rule is not followed.
Approved For Release 2005/07/28-:4CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
f;~~~~-~~~~~:~ ~ ~~11
 '~ippr6ved For Fuse 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 ~f00696~0900020002-4
NIOs, line managers, standing NFIB committees,
and ad hoc working groups should all be
responsible for assuring time for ade-
Quate review of projects conducted under
NIO auspices.
Line managers should nat consider them-
selves to be relieved for their responsi-
bility for the Quality and timeliness of
projects undertaken under NIO auspices;
but should realize that they are given
maximum opportunity to raise their
institutional viewpoints, criticisms,
suggestions for improvement, etc., during
the Community-wide coordination phase of
the production process rather than in
initial drafting phase carried out under
NIO supervision.
What are frequently perceived as unscheduled
NIO production demands are often resented by
line elements of the Community, whose scheduled
production may be disrupted. The NIOs, how-
ever, do not invent these demands. The
demands are imposed by urgent consumer needs.
It is a virtue of the NIO system that it
provides a flexible means of receiving these
demands and spreading the resulting work
throughout the Community.
Nevertheless, there is doubtless room for
improvement in meshing major requirements
with the ongoing work of the Community.
One way to do so would be to make greater
use of steering groups consisting of
appropriate production managers from CIA,
DIA, and INR, to consider major inter-
agency projects, advise on their priority,
and make recommendations as to the
distribution of the analytic and drafting
work. (Exceptions would be necessary
for obviously high-priority crash
projects.) This would allow production
managers more voice in projects :that
involve use of their resources.
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
s ~' a s
 v3
'"approved For Fuse 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696~0900020002-4
The quality of Estimates, it is alleged, could
be improved through a collegial review process.
A review process could indeed prove useful,
especially at the time an initial draft is
completed, before it is circulated through-
out the Community for coordination.
(Review at the end of the production cycle,
i.e., when a coordinated paper is ready
for submission to the NFIB, would be much
more cumbersome and do less to improve
quality.)
The current lack of formal collegial review
within the NIO system is in part a function
of the heavy present workload for most
NIOs. This workload could be eased by a
combination of measures tailored to the
special needs of individual NIOs -- some
internal reallocation of tasks, some
addition of assistants, some modest staff
or drafting support -- which would free
NIO time for collegial revieta.
Such review would be most helpful in the
case of the broader military-political-
economic Estimates -- those which cut
across geographic or functional lines or
involve new and unfamiliar problems and
hypotheses going beyond the conventional
wisdom.
Reviews of such Estimates could be further
enhanced by the establishment of an exter-
nal critique and review panel composed of
several dozen broad-gauge specialists
enlisted from the governmental, academic,
business and journalistic communities.
The panel could be drawn upon selectively
(two or three for each paper) for parti-
cipation in particular NI0 collegial
reviews. This would be a cost-effective
way of providing a useful scholarly
refereeing and advisory service and of
offering some public assurance of
Approved For Release 200~~~ ~. ~f~IP~9~1~~0696R000900020002-4
 "'~Apprdved For Lase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696~0900020002-4
impartiality. It would certainly be
preferable to any attempt to superimpose
a permanent additional coordinating body
or board upon the system.
8. In sum, we believe that the NIO system, as originally
conceived in Bi11 Colby's charter of October, 1973 (a copy
of which is attached), and with the kinds of modifications
suggested above, will come closer to realizing the DCI's
key objectives -- a~high quality product and an equitable
process -- than any alternative solution so far proposed.
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 "~'~D S'~'t1.TES ~1T~~Cz~i~Tt;~ Fflt~iD
Approved For Fuse 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00696~0900020002-4
-OrfIC~ OF 7NF CI-IAIiZa~AN
3 October 1973
1/IEiViORFiNDUM FOR USI$ PRINCIPALS
SUBJEC'T' National Intelligence Officers
1. Effective 1 October 1973, Mr. George A. Carver, Jr. is
appointed Deputy to the Dzzector of Central Intelligence for National
Intelligence Officers (DfDCIJNIO).. Nationsl Intelligence Officers
will be appointed by the DCI for such geographical axeas or func-
tional subjects as the DCI may deem necessary from time to tune.
Each National Intelligence Officer will be the Director's personal
representative and will repoxt directly to t,~ie DCI on his area of
responsibility. Any tasking the NIOs levy on othex elements of the
.Intelligence Community will be subject to the DCI`s approval and tivill
pass through the noxmal command channels of USIB rnember agencies.
It is my hope, however, that the NIOs will maintain exter_sive informal.
direct contacts with the elements of USIB rnember agencies and others
in the official a.nd private sectors cognizant of the NIO` s area of respon- .
sibility. ~ - .
2. The primary function of an NIO will be to provide contact -
laterally on his su'Aject acxoss the functionally organized Intelligence
Community and with customers and outside consultants as requixed_ .
Each NIO will be responsible to the Directox fox pxoviding Intelligence -
Community coordinated products (using such panels of experts or -
ad hoc committees and arranging USI13 consideration as may be needed)
to satisfy requirements for NIEs, NSSM responses, DCI briefings,
etc. Each NIO will assist the Director in identifying customer needs
for National Intelligence, evaluations of product and program effective-
- ness, uncertainties requiring collection guidance, analysis or production,
Exempt from general declassification
schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption -
category 5B(2). Automatically
declassified on: date impossible to
determine.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 CONFIDE~ITI~.
Approved For Fuse 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00696~0900020002-4
and national policy problems on which Nati ar>al Intelligence nZig'nt
offer assistance. Each NIO will maintain close personal contact with
the NSC Staff and other principal intelligence consumers ar_d contri-
butors at the department level. Every NIO will be charged with
presentir_g for the Director's review fully objective presentations of
alternate views and interpretations.
3. The Deputy to the Dixector of Central Inielligence for the
National Intelligence Officers ~D/DCI/NIO) is assigned administrative
and coordinating authority over thA NIOs and will chair meetings of ,
the NIOs for discussion of production standards, work schedules,
quality control, and product review.
~. Tlie NIOs will replace the present Board and Office of National
Estimates, the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, and other
units as appropriate.
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 :CIA=R~P91 M00696R000900020002-4
r- n rT ~ s n ~ 1~ T T tt T .:
 R -
A ~ Approved For Lase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M0069~0900020002-4
F
T
Operation of the NIO's Under Option III
1. The sole purpose of Option III is to vest in the DD/CIA
as the DCI's Executive Agent line (or one-man) responsibility for
the production of all forms of national intelligence, as called for
by Executive Order 11905. Maintenance of the NIO's in their staff
role is an integral part of this option. Because the~DD/CIA is the
DCI's executive Agent, the NIO is working for him as well as for the
DCI and may therefore have a somewhat broader scope than at present.
While Option III limits the NIO's role in the management of production,
it in no way inhibits his other activities, including those as trouble-
shooter, collection expediter, etc.
2. Under this Option the NIO continues to be the DCI's customer
I
representative. Through these contacts and through his knowledge of
Community assets, he is able to recommend how and by whom .a project.
should be carried out, and what its scope and content should be. Ne
brings these requirements and recommendations to the DD/CIA as the DCI's
Executive Agent.
3. The latter will usually accept both requirement and rec-
~ ommendation, but is authorized to modify and will in a few cases want
to reject them. When it is decided what the paper should include
and how it should be done, it becomes his responsibility to produce
the paper, to incorporate contributions from other agencies, and to
shepherd it through whatever external review process may be appropriate.
This is not,. however, the end of the NIO's involvement in support
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 R Approved For ~ase 2005/07/28: CIA=RDP91 M0069~00900020002-4
A
F a
T
of the Executive Agent. In.papers or contributions assigned by the
Executive Agent to agencies other than CIA, for instance, the NIO
acts for him in arranging for participation or unilateral production
by thase agencies. DD/CIA can and often will find it appropriate
to designate the NIO himself as Chairman of a National Estimate. Even
incases involving CIA alone, DD/CIA might want to use the NIO in
a staff capacity.
4. Once a project is set in train, the NIO is free, in fact is
expected, to monitor it from beginning to end. He cannot direct it
unless the Executive Agent designates him to.do so, but his influence
over the process is strong. He advises the DCI, and he will be a
principal actor in whatever review process the paper undergoes after
I
the responsible production organization has completed its work. For
this reason, the producer has every reason to respond to the NIO's
advice during the production process. If the producer has reason to
differ, however, it is his responsibility to do so and to defend his
views when the paper is reviewed. The producer is responsible until
;'
he is overridden by higher authority, and the chain of command remains
intact.
5. The position of the NIO is changed by Option III in another
important way. Under it the Executive Agent becomes responsible.
.for the requirements; priorities, and evaluations developed by the
analytic organizations that the DD/Comm and his staff need for the
CFI. He has the staff and organization to prepare these papers on a
Approved For Release 2005/07/28-~C1A-RDP91M00696R000900020002-4
 D
R
q ~ Approved For Lase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M0069~0900020002-4
F
T
systematic basis; the NIO's have had broad responsibilities in
this field but are not structured to meet them. They thus are
unburdened of an onerous task while retaining their ability to .monitor
it in a staff capacity.
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIS-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 R ? Approved For Lase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M0069~0900020002-4
A?
Operation of the NIO's Under Option III
1. The sole purpose of Option III is to vest in the DD/CIA
as the DCI's Executive Agent line (or one-man) responsibility for
the production of all forms of national intelligence, as called for
by Executive Order 11905. Maintenance of the NIO's in their staff
role is an integral part of this option. Because the DD/CIA is the
DCI's Executive Agent, the NIO is working for him as well as for the
DCI and may therefore have a somewhat broader scope than at present.
While Option III limits the NIO's role in the management of production,
it in no way inhibits his other activities, including those as trouble-
shooter, collection expediter, etc.
2. Under this Option the NIO continues to be the DCI's customer
representative. Through these contacts and through his knowledge of
Community assets, he is able to recommend how and by whom .a project.
should be carried out, and what its scope and content should be. He
brings these requirements and recommendations to the DD/CIA as the DCI's
Executive Agent.
3. The latter will usually accept both requirement and rec-
ommendation, but is authorized to modify and will in a few cases want
to reject them. When it is decided what the paper should include
and how it should be done, it becomes his responsibility to produce
the paper, to incorporate contributions from other agencies, and to
shepherd it through whatever external review process may be appropriate.
This is not, however, the end of the NIO's involvement in support
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 D
R Approved For ~ase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M0069~0900020002-4
A
F ~
T
of the `Executive Agent. In papers or contributions assigned by the
Executive Agent to agencies other than CIA, for instance, the NIO
acts for him in arranging for participation or unilateral production
by those agencies. DD/CIA can and often will find it appropriate
to designate the NIO himself as Chairman of a National Estimate. Even
in cases involving CIA alone, DD/CIA might want to use the NIO in
a staff capacity.
4. Once a project is set in train, the NIO is free, in fact is
expected, to monitor it from beginning to end. He cannot direct it
unless the Executive Agent designates him to do so, but his influence
over the process is strong. He advises the DCI, and he will be a
principal actor in whatever review process the paper undergoes after
the responsible production organization has completed its work. For
this reason, the producer has every reason to respond to the NIO's
advice during the production process. If the producer has reason to
differ, however, it is his responsibility to do so and to defend his
views when the paper is reviewed. The producer is responsible until
he is overridden by higher authority, and the chain of command remains
intact.
5. The position of the NIO is changed by Option III in another
important way. Under it the Executive Agent becomes responsible
for the requirements, priorities, and evaluations developed by the
analytic organizations that the DD/Comm and his staff need for the
CFI. He has the staff and organization to prepare these papers on a
-2-
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 ~. D
R < Approved For fuse 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M0069~0900020002-4
A
F
T
systematic basis; the NIO's have had broad responsibilities in
this field but are not structured to meet them. They thus are
unburdened of an onerous task while retaining their ability to monitor
it in a staff capacity.
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : C~ia-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 A ~ Approved For ~ase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M0069~0900020002-4
F
7
Operation of the NIO's Under Option III
1. The sole purpose of Option III is to vest in the DD/CIA
as the DCI's Executive Agent line (or one-man) responsibility for
the production of all forms of national intelligence, as called for
by Executive Order 11905. Maintenance of the NIO's in their staff
role is an integral part of this option. Because the~DD/CIA is the
DCI's Executive Agent, the NIO is working for him as well as for the
DCI and may therefore have a somewhat broader scope than at present.
While Option III limits the NIO's role in the management of production,
it in no way inhibits his other activities, including those as trouble-
shooter, collection expediter, etc.
2. Under this Option the NIO continues to be the DCI's customer
representative. Through these contacts and through his knowledge of
Community assets, he is able to recommend how and by whom .a project:
should be carried out, and what its scope and content should be. He
brings these requirements and recommendations to the DD/CIA as the DCI's
Executive Agent.
3. The latter will usually accept both requirement and rec-
ommendation, but is authorized to modify and will in a few eases want
to reject them. When it is decided what the paper should include
and how it should be done, it becomes his responsibility to produce
the paper, to incorporate contributions from other agencies, and to
shepherd it through whatever external review process may be appropriate.
This is not,. however, the end of the NIO's involvement in support
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 D
R ~ ~ Aplroved For ~ase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M0069~00900020002-4
A
F
T
of the Executive Agent. In papers or contributions assigned by the
Executive Agent to agencies other than CIA, for instance, the NIO
acts for him in arranging for participation or unilateral production
by those agencies. DD/CIA can and often will find it appropriate
to designate the NIO himself as Chairman of a National Estimate. Even
incases involving CIA alone, DD/CIA might want to use the NIO in
a staff capacity.
4. Once a project is set in train, the NIO is free, in fact is
expected, to monitor it from beginning to end. He cannot direct it
unless the Executive Agent designates him to.do so, but his influence
over the process is strong. He advises the DCI, and he will be a
principal actor in whatever review process the paper undergoes after
the responsible production organization has completed its work. For
this reason, the producer has every reason to respond to the NIO's
advice during the production process. If the producer has reason to
differ, however, it is his responsibility to do so and to defend his
views when the paper is reviewed. The producer is responsible until
he is overridden by higher authority, and the chain of command remains
intact.
5. The position of the NIO is changed by Option III in another
important way. Under it the Executive Agent becomes responsible
for the requirements, priorities, and evaluations developed by the
analytic organizations that the DD/Comm and his staff need for the
CFI. He has the staff and organization to prepare these papers on a
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 -~fA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 R
A? ~ Approved For Fuse 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00696?0900020002-4
F
T
systematic basis; the NIO's have had broad responsibilities in
this field but are not structured to meet them. They thus are
unburdened of an onerous task while retaining their ability to.monitor
it in a staff capacity.
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : C~-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 ' ~ Approved For R~se 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696~0900020
14 April 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Options for a National Production System
1. We have been discussing the future handling of national
production', since the Executive Order was issued in~February. From
these discussions have emerged consensus on some issues and defi-
nition of others on which no consensus exists. In addition, from
the Executive Order itself come new requirements that must be
accommodated. This memorandum provides a basis for you to reach
a decision on these matters. ~I believe you should do so now,
while your freedom of action is at its maximum.
2. Statutes and Directives
-- The National Security Act of 1947
states that: ..it shall be the duty of
the Agency, under the direction of the
National Security Council...to correlate
and evaluate intelligence relating to the
national security...Departments and other
Agencies of the Government shall evaluate
.[and] correlate...departmental intelligence."
-- E.O. 11905 provides that: "The DCI
will...supervise production and dissemination
of national intelligence...Promote the develop-
ment and maintenance by the Central Intelligence
Agency of sources of common concern...including...
national level intelligence products."
"CIA wi11...produce and disseminate
foreign intelli-gence relating to the national
security...to meet the needs of the President,
the National Security Council, and other
elements of the United States Government."
"Senior Officials of the Intelligence
Community shali...contribute in areas of
[their] responsibility to the national intel-
ligence products produced under auspices of
the Director of Central Intelligence."
ILLEGIB
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
~. ,
 ' Approved For fuse 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00698~0900020002-4
3. It is generally agreed that:
-- National production should be admini-
stratively placed as close to you as possible.
-- You should receive substantive advice
directly, without a requirement that it be
channeled through either Deputy.
-- The NIO's are extremely useful as
staff officers and should continue in this
role. (Their staff functions include: con-
sumer liaison; advice to the DCI on sub-
stantive matters, including intelligence
production; action to develop teamwork among
producers and collectors and among agencies
of the Community; and energizing the Com-
munity to address new problems, fill gaps,
and exploit new sources and methodologies.)
-- The quality of estimative intel-
ligence would be improved by some sort of
collegial review process.
-- The system should provide for a
formal Community role, and should in practice
encourage maximum Community participation
where the product would not suffer ,thereby.
4. There is disagreement over the present management of
national production. In the present system, the NIO's act not only
as staff officers but, with respect to estimative production, as
managers.
-- Line managers of production organi-
zations argue that this system divides and
weakens responsibility for review of product
and. undercuts their authority over their
analysts. They .believe confusion over re-
sponsibility for product means that papers
are issued without sufficient review. They
see the NIO's as having first call on their
resources but no responsibility for justifying
these resources or managing them. They be-
lieve the focus of NIO's on short-range policy
support draws resources away from essential
longer range research. Moreover, the.indi-
vidualistic nature of the NIO system creates
uncertainties within the system and makes for
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 ? Approved For fuse 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M0069~0900020002-4
an uneven product.* The DCI does not have
one manager for national production; he has
a dozen. This leaves him the only generalist
officer in the review process and places on
him too great a burden for ensuring that all
regional and functional interests have been
considered. Finally, the flow of current
intelligence support to the policymaker is
managed separately from the flow of estimative
support.
-- The NIO's do not accept most of these
criticisms. They contend that the ability of
the NIO's to cut across organizational barriers
makes for maximum flexibility in focusing Com-
munity resources on a particular problem. They
agree that this creates some tension within the
system but believe that this is a relatively
small price to pay for producing truly national
intelligence. To them, if intelligence does
not meet policy support requirements, its per-
formance in research will be irrelevant. They
do not accept the argument that the quality of
product has suffered. Rather, they argue that
improved communications with the consumer have
made the product much more useful. Moreover,
they believe that line managers :are too focused
on management concerns to give full attention
to the product. The system is individualistic,
but by design: the requirements facing each NIO
are unique, and he must deal directly with the
DCI in his own way. The NIO's would agree that
the system separates current and estimative
intelligence, but do not consider this a matter
of concern.
5. The Executive Order, in addition to confirming your
authority over the national production system, generates two new
problems you must take into account in considering changes to that
system.
-- The creation of the CFI provides for
the first time centralized resource authority
over the Community. If that authority is to be
used effectively, the IC Staff must be able to
*The Director of Current Intelligence, CIA, must meet the require-
ments of seven NIO's, for three of whom his are virtually the
only supporting analysts available, and has at least peripheral
concerns involving all eleven.
Approved For Release 2005/07/283 CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 ? Approved For Lase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M0069~00900020002-4
provide the CFI with requirements and evaluations
that have been developed by the production organi-
zations and their analysts. A systematic allo-
cation of resources must reflect a systematic
marshalling of analytic judgment. No effective
central management for such a purpose now exists.
-- The trend over recent years toward a
,greater separation of the DCI in his Community
role from the Central Intelligence Agency. has
caused morale problems in CIA, which sees it-
self as being ousted from its "central" role.
Separation of the DCI is institutionalized in
the Executive Order, and in your consequent de-
cision to transfer the Vice-Chairmanship of NFIB
to your Community Deputy. But CIA, after the
travails of the last three years, needs a re-
confirmation from you that it is central and
essential to the nation if it is to recover its
elan. Moreover, it would be desirable for you
to structure relations between your deputies
do that their roles are 1) mutually supporting;
and 2) more or less balanced in responsibilities.
6. We have developed four options for you to consider. Each
assumes that your Community Deputy will be Vice-Chairman of NFIB.
Each links you closely to national production and provides far
substantive advice directly to you. Each retains the NIO's in their
staff role and incorporates the improvements that all agree they
have brought to national intelligence. .Each can accommodate a
collegial review function. (There are several forms such a review
might take, and several variants on how the NIO's themselves might
be constituted; this memorandum does not address these questions.}
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 Approved For R~se 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696~0900020002-4
-- Option I retains the present system,
perhaps with minor modifications. The NIO's
continue to manage national estimative pro-
duction; CIA continues to handle current.
This Option as it stands does not provide
fora strong analyst-based evaluation system.
PRO: Provides maximum Community role
Provides flexible system
System works reasonably well
Least disruption
CON: No single officer responsible for
production
Product suffers from divided respon-
sibility
Violates chain-of-command
CIA downgraded, no longer central
DD/COMM greatly overweighs DD/CIA
NIO's must be integrated into larger
structure and given additional
staff if evaluative-input to ICS
is to be provided
Current and estimative separated
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 'Approved For Fuse 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00696~0900020002-4
Estimative Intelligence
Option I
Present system
DCI
DIA
NFIB
CIA
N 10's
INR
DRAFTS
596758 ADVICE & CONSULTATION
Board?
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 Approved For ~se 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696~0900020002-4
-- Option II transfers the management of
national estimative production to a Steering
Group composed of the production managers of
CIA, DIA, and INR, and chaired by DD/CIA or DDI.
Through them it places the responsibility for
production and review within the line organi-
zations. The Steering Group is charged with.
providing evaluations to the ICS. (See Para-
graph 7 for a discussion of the production
process and the role of the NI0's under Op-
tions II-IV.)
PRO: Maintains strong Community role
Places estimative production in the
hands of line managers
Gives some "centrality" to CIA through
chairmanship of Steering Group
Provides mechanism for evaluative input
CON: No single officer responsible for production
Cumbersome: an additional layer in the process
NIO's will have difficulty relating to the
management system
DD%COMM still out of balance with DD/CIA
Current and estimative still divided
Some disruption necessary
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 Approved For Fuse 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00698~0900020002-4
Estimative Intelligence
Option II
Present system with community production
management separated from NIO's
DCI
N 10's
(and Board
DIA
NFIB
CIA
National
Intelligence
Steering Group
CIA, DIA, INR
INR
DRAFTS
ADVICE & CONSULTATION
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 ' ~ Approved For Lase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00698~0900020002-4
--.Option III eliminates the Steering
Group and makes the Deputy for CIA the DCI's
Executive Agent* for national production,
both estimative and current. He in turn is
responsible for organizing and coordinating
Community participation. The NIO's report
separately to the DCI, as in Option II.
DD/CIA also becomes Executive Agent for Com-
munity evaluation.
PRO: All production management, current and
estimative, in hands of line managers
One officer (DD/CIA) responsible for all
Community production
DD/COMM and DD/CIA have balanced, com-
plementary responsibilities
CIA role.as central organization reaffirmed
Provides mechanism for evaluative input
Improved efficiency
System worked well on military estimates
1970-73
CON: Some loss in the appearance of Community
participation; the actuality will de-
pend on what mandate DCI gives to DD/CIA
DIA and INR may view. as a step backward
With these additional duties, DD/CIA may
not be able to give. sufficient attention
to management of the Agency
The NIO's will have some difficulty re-
lating to the management system, although
less than under Option II
Some disruption necessary
*DD/CIA might want to retain the Steering Group
to advise him.
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 Approved For ~ase 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M0069?00900020002-4
Estimative Intelligence
Option III
Adaptation of system used for military estimates 1970-73
DRAFTS
ADVICE & CONSULTATION
CONTRIBUTIONS
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 Approved For ~ase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M0069~0900020002-4
-- Option IIIA is similar to Option III
in all but one respect. In matters relating
to production, the DDI reports directly to the
DCI and thus becomes his Executive Agent* for
national production.
PRO: One officer (DDI) responsible for all
Community production
All production management in the hands
of line managers
CIA role as central organization re-
affirmed
Provides mechanism for evaluation in-
put, in which CIA complementary to
ICS
Improved efficiency
DD/CIA would carry less load than under
Option III
One less layer between DCI and producers
CON: Some loss in the appearance of Community
participation; the actuality will de-
pend on the DCI's instructions to DDI
DIA and INR may view as a step backward
The NIO's will have some difficulty in
relating to the management system,
although less than under Option II
Some disruption necessary
*DDI might want to retain the Steering Group
to advise him.
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 Ap~iPOVed Forease 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M0069~00900020002-4
Estimative Intelligence
Option III a
DDI as Executive agent
DIA
DCI
NFIB
CIA
Production
I Matters Only
INR
N 10's
(and Board?)
DRAFTS
ADVICE & CONSULTATION
CONTRIBUTIONS
DDA DDO I DDS&T DDI
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 Approved For ~ase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M0069~0900020002-4
-- Option IV goes a further step. The
DDI/CIA is Executive Agent and becomes in effect
the chief NIO as well. His Directorate remains
administratively a part of CIA,-but he reports
directly to the DCI, not through the Deputy for
CIA, on other matters. This amounts to the
creation of a national production organization
under the DCI. It would be responsible for
managing Community evaluation.
PRO: Integration of NIO's and CIA producers
makes for maximum efficiency
Brings production most directly under
DCI control
All production management in hands of line
managers
One officer (DDI) responsible for all Com-
munity production
CIA role as central organization reaffirmed
Compared with III, reduced load on DD/CIA
Provides mechanism for evaluative input in
which CIA complementary to ICS
CON: Would considerably exacerbate problem of
Community participation noted under
Option III
Would create serious concerns in other
Community agencies
While NIO's would be available to DCI; their
ability to operate throughout the Community
would be reduced
Could be seen as first step toward fragmentation
of CIA
DD/CIA would carry less weight vis-a-vis DD/COMM.
Considerable organizational disruption
Approved For Release 2005/,07/28 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 Approved For ~ase 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M0069t~00900020002-4
Estimative Intelligence
Option IV
National production organization directly subordinate to DCI
DCI
DIA
NF~B
CIA &
N 10's
BOARD?
DRAFTS
ADVICE & CONSULTATION
CONTRIBUTIONS
INR
DDI &
N 10's
Some Rearrangement of
Elements ~
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 Approved For ~ase 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M0069E~0900020002-4
THE PROCESS
1. Estimative
Option I
DCI
ics
2. Estimative
Option II
N 10's
CIA
INR
~' REQUESTS
--~ DRAFTS
---~ CONTRIBUTIONS
N 10's
STEERING
GROUP
DESIGNATED ~-_
AGENCY ----
L------ CIA, DIA, INR 1--------------J
596782
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 Approved For ~ase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M0069~0900020002-4
7. Options II-IV require a change in the production
rop cess, in which responsibility for the finished product rests
more on the .line production managers than it does under the
present system. At the same time, each of these options places
on the NIO responsibilities comparable to those he now carries.
-- In Option II, the NIO (or for
evaluations, the DD/COMM) states his re-
quirement fora paper to the Steering
.Group and recommends which organizations
and analysts should be involved. The
Steering Group decides how the paper is
to be produced (normally accepting the
NIO's definition of the paper and giving
full weight to his recommendation). It
designates which production Agency will
manage the product. That Agency is then
responsible for assembly of contributions,
drafting, coordination, etc., and deliver-
. ing a draft to the DCI. The NIO is re-
sponsible to the DCI for reviewing the
draft and advising him as to its suit-
ability before the DCI finally issues it.
He may serve in this regard as the member
of a collegial board who has primary in-
terest. He is also free to participate in
the process at every stage., but not to di-
rect it. Rather, his influence comes from
the fact that the drafters will have to
defend the piece before the DCI, or the
DCI's board of review, and the NIO has an
independent opportunity to advise the DCI.
It is therefore in the production officer's
interest to take account of the NIO's view,
but he remains personally responsible for
his product from the time he is asked to
prepare it until the time the draft leaves
his organization. His analysts are working
for him.
-- In Option III, one layer is re-
moved from this process. The NIO addresses
his request to the DD/CIA, who is then
responsible for arranging with DIA and INR
for drafts and contributions, and for ar-
ranging coordination. Under this Option,
CIA would usually take the lead, but the
participation of the other agencies would
Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 ' ` Approved For tease 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M0069~00900020002-4
THE PROCESS
3. Estimative
Option III & IV
ICS
EXEC.
AGENT"'
DIA
CIA
*DDICIA under Option III
DDI under Option Illa & IV
4. Current
All Options
ICS
DIA
N 10's
INR
~ REQUESTS
-~ DRAFTS
--~ CONTRIBUTfONS
N 10's
INR
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 :CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 Approved For ~ase 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 M0069~00900020002-4
otherwise be no less. (The DD/CIA will have?
to accept that in these matters the easy
way--turn to CIA--is not necessarily the best
way.) .The NIO then works with the drafters
as fully as under Option II, and his re-
sponsibilities to the DCI are unchanged.
-- Option IIIA differs from Option III
only in substituting the DDI for the DD/CIA,
thus removing another layer. The role of the
NIO remains the same.
-- In Option IV, the NIO`s are inte-
grated into the DDI structure, but still
serve the DCI individually. This is an
efficient arrangement, but under it they
obviously cannot, while they can do the other
things called for under Options II, III and
IIIA, give the DCI independent advice. That
function must fall to a board of review, al-
though an individual NIO might well serve as
an ex officio member of such a board for papers
in his field.
8. The changes under Options II-IV are directed toward
combining the best elements of the various systems used in the
past. The worst faults of the system prior to creation of the
NIO system were communications failures between consumer and
producer and among elements of the Community. These Options
retain the improvements in communication derived from the NIO
system while moving toward more clearly defined responsibility,
and therefore--one hopes--toward quality. Should any of them
be adopted,-there would be no reason to anticipate any loss in
responsiveness if production management responsibility reverts
to line officers. The intelligence production business, like
any bureaucracy, has a number of echelons, but over the last
two decades it has developed a discipline that enables it to
deliver a product to the consumer when he wants it and how he
wants it, wherever the request enters the system. We have
learned not to let our own bureaucratic structure get in the
way of doing the job.
RICHARD LEHMAN
-17-
Approved For Release 2~0^0~5/07/28 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
 SUMMARY TABLE: OPTIO S FOR NATIONAL PRODUCTION
Approved For Release 2005107128 :CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900020002-4
A reed Re uirements Area of
Para 3 Dis~ agreemen~
(Para 4)
~
National
NIO Staff
pTI
Production
Direct
Functions
Formal
Practical
Management
IC-CIA
0
Administratively
Substantive
In Support
Collegial
Community
Community
of
Evaluation
Balance
N
Close to DCI
Advice to DCI
of DCI
Review
Role
Participation
Production
Management
S
Throu h NIO's
e
By NIO's
As at
t
Can be
orated
incor
NFIB with DD/COMM
as Vice-Chairman
Through NIO's
Estimative,
by NIO's
Partly by
NIO's but
CIA further ,
downgraded
ctly
dir
presen
p
__
fragmented
,
NIO's represent
Current by
~
DCI
CIA
~
Through Chair-
By NIO's
As at
t
r
Can be
orated
incor
NFIB, NIO's,
and Steering
Through
Steering Group
Estimative
by line
Ey Steering
Group
DD/CIA or DDI
as Chairman o
man, Steering
esen
p
p
Group
managers
Steering Grou
Group
J
downgrades CI
II
Current by
less than'x
CIA '
Option I
Through OD/CIA
By NIO's
As at
Can be
NFIB and NIO's
DDJCIA
onsible
res
Estimative
and current
By DD/CIA
DD/COMM as
V-Chair NFIB
and
present
incorporated
p
to DCI for
by DD/CIA
is balanced
DD/CIA
maintaining
by DD/CIA
I~
responsibi 1 i ty
for production
,.
Through DDI
By NIO's
As at
Can be
NFIB and NIO's
DDi
onsible
res
Estimative
and current
By DDI
As in
Option III
~'
and
present
incorporated
p
to DCI for
by DDI
but DDI
IIIA
DDI
maintaining
responsible
~,~
.Through DDI
By DDI
As at
Gan be
orated
incor
NFIB
As in
Option IIIA
As in
Option IIIA
By DDI
As in
Option III
supported
present
p
but DDI
,,,, IV
by NIO's
but DDI
~
onsible
res
~
manag~3pro
ed For Release 2005107
8 :CIA-RDP91 M00696
000900020002-4
p
`'~t~
~ ~