NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000900010012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 1, 1976
• Content Type: MF

Ahz
SUBJECT : National Intelligence Production
Background
1. In 1973 the Director of Central Intelligence abolished
the Board and Office of National Estimates and set up. the National
Intelligence Officers in their place. This action began a debate 5 aM
ti
b
th
th
i
at con
nues
o
ons
on the relative merits of the two institut
t Yv~.
inside and outside the Community. In 1976, as a result of E.O.
11905, the DCI must again address the question of national esti-
mative intelligence. This memorandum analyzes the strengths and `v
weaknesses of each system as they have emerged from the debate,
and suggests ways which the stronger elements of each might be
combined.
2. The Office of National Estimates consisted of a Board
of generalists supported by a drafting staff of specialists. The
NIO's are themselves area or functional specialists, and are
charged with drawing their drafting assistance from the analytic
elements of the Community. On the other hand, the NIO's have
greater responsibilities than did 0/NE. Not only do they produce
a broader range of national intelligence than did 0/NE, but they
also serve individually as staff officers to the DCI in their areas
of specialization.
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3. There are at least seven identifiable functions that
have been performed by one or both of these institutions. Both
were concerned with the management and review of national pro-
duction, and 0/NE with production itself. The NI0's are directly
charged with consumer liaison, with liaison across Community col-
lection and production, and with serving as an energizer of the
intelligence effort in new ways and directions; 0/NE played a much
larger role in these activities in its earlier years than it did
in its later ones. The Board collectively advised the DCI on
major subst.-antive issues; as noted, the NI0's serve individually
as his substantive staff. The next few paragraphs discuss each
of these functions and how it has been handled.
Functions of a National Intelligence Staff
4. Consumer liaison: active measures to maintain close
contact with the consumer; definition of his needs for intelli-
gence; transmission of those needs to the production manager and
the analyst, including the policy context in which they occur;
facilitating policy-intelligence dialogue; securing consumer reac-
tion to intelligence assessments.
Comment: There is virtually uni-
versal agreement that the NI0's have been
successful in consumer liaison, far more
so than any previous effort. A much closer
link has been established between the pro-
ducer and the consumer, and the product is
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clearly more responsive. They have
not been any more systematic than their
predecessors, however, in general assess-
ment of consumer acceptance. 0/NE, par-
ticularly in its later years, was severely
criticized for an "ivory tower" attitude.
It waited for the tasks to come to it
and insisted on answering the questions
it thought worth answering; as a result,
few questions were asked and fewer answers
were relevant.
5. Management of production: development of terms of
reference; assignment of tasks; arrangements for assembly, co-
ordination and review; editing and mechanical aspects of pro-
duction.
Comment: 0/NE managed production
efficiently, largely because it was itself
responsible for the production it was man-
aging and because it had a structured system
for the process. The NI0's are less efficient.
This is partly because the range of pro-
duction tasks is broader, but it is also
because their arrangements tend to be ad hoc
and because these arrangements often run
athwart the lines of command of the pro-
ducing agencies. The analyst must serve two
masters.
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6. Production itself: organization; drafting; assembly
and synthesis of contributions; defense of drafts under coordi-
nation and review; preparation of resulting final drafts.
Comment: Under 0/NE, production was
carried out by the 0/NE staff. As noted
above, this was a relatively efficient process,
but the staff was to some extent isolated
from and aloof from the working analysts.
The result was a product that was smooth and
literate, but which sometimes did not face
up to the facts or to the hard analytic
questions. Under the NI0's, the production
is done by the analysts responsible. This
has paid great dividends in a product
soundly based on analysis and data, as
well as in analyst morale. Analysts in all
disciplines feel the need to participate much
more directly in preparation of intelligence
assessments for senior policy officers. The
product tends, however, to be somewhat rougher
than under the previous system.
7. Review:
a. Internal for: organization; coherence;
accuracy; completeness; vigor of argu-
ment; validity of judgment; responsive-
ness to stated requirement.
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b. External for: relevance to policy
concerns; responsiveness to ques-
tions that should have been asked;
broad topics not addressed; counter-
arguments not considered; wisdom
of judgment; the "experience fac-
tor"; general quality in the sense
of the factors listed under internal
review.
Comment: Internal review should be
integral to the management of production.
Under 0/NE, this was the case. Under the
NIO's, it is often not clear whether the NIO
or the production organization is responsible,
and the product suffers accordingly. The pro-
duction manager at branch or division level
loses control of his analysts when they are
doing a task for an NIO. Such a paper will
receive considerably less management attention
than would one for which the manager is fully
responsible. The NIO is usually too busy and
sometimes not qualified to give drafts the
intensive review they require. The NI0's so-
lution is sometimes to draft a reviewer from
among the production managers. This results
in a further distortion of the chain-of-command;
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in the extreme case, it can keep a senior line
officer away from his assigned job for as much
as six months at a time.
The Board of National Estimates was at
its strongest in providing external review.
Because it worked collegially, it was able
to provide the broadly-based overview that
NI0's acting individually cannot. In addition,
it was able to contribute an additional dimen-
sion drawn from its collective experience and
wisdom. The NI0's, on the other hand, have
been criticized for the unevenness of pro-
duction and for a fall-off in quality. In
effect, because of NIO specialization, the
broader overview can now be provided only by
the DCI himself.
8. The "stimulus" function: examination of the nation and
the world to identify new questions for intelligence; review of
intelligence product to identify weaknesses and gaps in collection
and production; identification of new sources, approaches, and
methodologies; advice to the DCI on how to deal with the above.
Comment: 0/NE was more active in
energizing the intelligence apparatus in
the 1950's than in later years. This is
more a criticism of the way the system was
manned than of the system itself. The
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performance of the NI0's in this function
has been spotty. Some have been active in
collection, and others in identifying gaps
in production. Generally, however, the
absence of generalists among them and
their focus on short-range policy support
received less attention than narrow ones.
9. Community liaison: action across organizational,function-
al, and disciplinary lines to focus analysts and organizations on
priority problems; maintenance of cross-Community contact and
knowledge among intelligence offices in the same or related fields;
similar activities in relation to external expertise, private or
academic.
Comment: 0/NE, as a closed society,
was relatively inactive in Community liaison.
It drew on various organizations for con-
tributions (which it often ignored) but
made little attempt to draw together
analysts of various agencies and disciplines
or collectors and producers. In sharp con-
trast, this has been an area where the NI0's
have done outstandingly well. They have
made the individual analysts, and par-
ticularly those in obscure fields and
peripheral functions, feel much more a part
of the team. They have encouraged discussion
has meant that the broader questions have
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across functions and disciplines, and
have brought the analysts themselves
more into the substantive debate on
estimative issues. In the past, this
debate tended to be conducted by rep-
resentatives two or three echelons re-
moved from the working analyst.
10. Substantive staff for the DCI: advising him on consumer
needs and intelligence capabilities; ensuring that his own sub-
stantive needs are met; representing him in certain fora; focusing
Community attention on special projects that cross functional lines;
trouble-shooting.
Comment: Except in a very limited
sense, (e.g., on National Estimates) the
members of the Board of National Estimates
did not serve as advisers to the DCI. In
fact, until the NIO system was created,
DCI's did without any substantive staff
bridging directorates, much less bridging
agencies of the Community. The usefulness
of such a function was demonstrated by the
coordinating activities of the Special.
Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, and it
was on that pattern that the staff role of
the individual NI0's was designed. Here
again, they have made a substantial con-
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tribution. It should be noted, however,
that their utility in this capacity de-
pends to a great extent on the way each
DCI chooses to do business.
Evaluation of the NIO System
11. It is clear from this review that the great strength
of the NIO system is that it involves the consumers at one end of
the process and the analysts at the other end more directly in
shaping the product. It has also provided for the DCI valuable
services not previously available to him. On the other hand, while
the product has been improved in the sense of relevance and in ad-
dressing difficult analytic issues, it has suffered in other ways.
The responsibility for review has been fragmented by the operation
of the NIO's across organizational command lines, and the advantages
of a collegial review have been lost. Similarly, while the NIO's
have been effective as energizers of the Community on short-range
questions, their preoccupation with immediate policy support and )
the lack of collegial interaction means less attention given to
the longer range.
12. It would therefore appear that the problem areas lie
in the relationships between the NIO's and the line production
organizations, and in the absence of the broader view provided by
a collegial board. There are, however, additional problems that
are not directly brought out in the analysis above.
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1
-- The duties assigned to the individual
NIO are so broad that no one individual can
do them all well. In fact, on the more active
accounts that involve large elements of the
Community, it is difficult for an NIO and an
assistant to do them at all. The result has
been a great unevenness of performance. Each
tends to specialize in those functions to
which he is most comfortable. Moreover,
since each acts as an individual, no common
discipline is imposed upon them.
-- Production resources are not infinite.
When one tracks down through the structure, one
often finds that the entire resources of the
CIA or DIA on a specialized subject of some
importance are the part-time efforts of one
man. The NIO's have first call on these re-
sources, but have no responsibility for justi-
fying them or managing them. There is no reg-
ulating mechanism to protect the long-range
plans of the production manager who must think
in terms of research to answer next year's
questions as well as quick response to those
of this year.
-- Related to this problem is the ten-
dency of some NIO's to over-sell the product.
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They will volunteer to have papers pre-.
pared that the consumer would agree would
be "nice" for them to have, as well as those
that are truly required. It is difficult
for the production manager to identify and
to resist this kind of task.
-- Some NIO's are responsible for
problems, such as strategic weapons, which
involve all agencies and a large commitment
of resources across the Community. Others,
however, work on problems that have a low
V /Priority in Community resource terms. The
former have a genuine Community role to
perform. The latter find that the only
resources upon which they can draw are
those of CIA. In effect, they duplicate
the responsibilities of the corresponding
CIA officer. This raises the question as
to whether all NIO's should be full-time.
Proposals for Change
13. A number of suggestions have been made of ways to im-
prove or change the present system. They break into three cate-
gories, under each of which a broad range of suggestions have been
made. These are: ways of providing better review of production,
centering around the establishment of some sort of collegial board;
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changes in the system for managing production to provide clearer
lines of authority; changes in the responsibilities of the NIO's
themselves. While these categories overlap, they can be con-
sidered, and changes can be made, independently of one-another.
14. Collegial Review
-- Restoration of the Board of National
Estimates. Under this approach, the Board
would consist of, perhaps, eight or nine
generalists chosen largely from outside the
Intelligence Community. It would be advisory
to the DCI, and would review national pro-
duction for him and provide the stimulus
function for the Community. The NIO's would
continue in their present role; the Board
would be a level of review imposed above
them. The advantages of such an arrangement
are that it provides the maximum of indepen-
dent advice to the DCI and provides his product
with a certain prestige deriving from the rep-
utation of the Board and its members. Such a
Board would also be useful to him in resisting
3
external pressures of a political or policy
nature. The practical disadvantages of this
approach, however, are very great. It inter-
poses another layer in an already complex pro-
cess. The Board's relations with the NIO's .
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and with the production elements of the
Community would be difficult to manage. In
effect,'there would be too many senior officers
answering to the DCI and stumbling over each
other to get at production resources. Another
practical consideration is that the NI0's al-
ready have more GS-18 positions than the entire
CIA production apparatus. Imposing a Board
in addition to the NIO's would make the system
top-heavy indeed.
-- A second approach is to create a
Board composed of the NIO's. This by far is
the simplest approach, in that it would re-
quire only that the present group act
collegially on major papers. On the other
hand, it would not help much. The individual
NIO's are already too busy to pay a great
deal of attention to other NIO's papers.
25X1
involvement of USIB in national estimates is
really a proposal that that USIBbe Board of -?,,'''~~
National Estimates. In theory, this is an
attractive idea. In practice, USIB members
have neither the time nor, in some cases, the
Moreover, as specialists themselves, the
added insights they can provide are limited.
J
proposal for a greater
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personal characteristics required for
this kind of independent review. The
sheer volume of national production is
such that detailed review at the USIB
level. would have to be reserved for only
the most important of papers. It is,
however, something that can be experi-
mented with in particular cases without
disturbing any other changes that might
be made.
-- Yet another suggestion is for a
part-time Board consisting of the senior
ly
officers at, say, the Office Chief level
in the various producing agencies. The
NIO system would continue as before, but
these officers as a group would be asked
to review a paper before it was transmitted
to the DCI. This again is a relatively
simple fix, one that has the advantage
of involving the officers whose analysts
have prepared the paper and who themselves
are substantively capable of reviewing it.
On the other hand, this is hardl in- ( r
dependent review, and the production
Office Chiefs are busy men already.
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-- A fifth suggestion would be to charge
the NI0's with assembly of an appropriate.
panel of reviewers for each paper. This sug-
gestion has considerable merit. The reviewers
could be chosen with regard to the content
of the paper, and could include senior officers
ltI
of the intelligence agencies, individual analysts
or outside experts. The disadvantage is that a
large-scale assembly of such panelists from
among officers who have other commitments might
prove difficult, especially when the novelty
wore off.
-- Finally, there is an idea of combining
a group of NIO's acting collegially with a few
generalists. Such a Board might combine the
best of the' generalists' and specialists' worlds.
An independent review could be provided, and
there would be some Board members who could give
attention to longer-range and cross-disciplinary
problems. A disadvantage, however, is that the
addition of generalists to the present dozen NIO's
would make the Board unwieldy in size and, as
noted earlier, top-heavy in relation to the pro-
duction structure. It would be necessary to
reduce the number of NIO's serving on the Board
in order to accommodate generalists.
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15. Production Management
-- One possibility, strongly advocated
by those who served in the Office of National
Estimates and strongly opposed by virtually
everyone else, is the restoration of a draf-
ting staff similar to that 0/NE. The argu-
ments in favor of this are largely that most
analysts do not have the required drafting
skills and all analysts are too busy analyzing
to give the proper attention to an estimate.
The disadvantages are that the system places
a layer between the analyst who is at grips
with the problem and the national intelligence
product. It creates an element of elitism
and causes unnecessary resentment in the pro-
duction organizations. In addition, the exis-
tence of a drafting staff tends to create
drafts, whether they are needed or not.
-- Another solution, this one extreme,
is to make the production elements themselves
into a national drafting staff for the full-
of national intelligence from the most
range
current to the longer-range estimative. In
practical terms, this would involve redesig-
nating OCI as the Office of National Intel-
ligence and incorporating in it economic and
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military elements able to draw on the
research components of CIA, DIA, and State.
This Office of National Intelligence would,
to the extent possible, be jointly manned
by the three agencies. The NIO's would
become the component chiefs within the
office. A chief advantage here would be
the consideration of one "national" office
under the DCI of a large proportion of the
resources needed to meet national production
needs across their full range. A disadvantage
would be that it would sharply change the
character of the NIO's; it would improve their
ability to manage production, where there are
now problems, but at the cost of weakening them
in what they do best, if only from the demands
on their time. The change would be disruptive,
particularly for the structure of DIA, and it
would be difficult to maintain smooth relations
between the Office of National Intelligence and
the Community research organizations upon which
it would have to depend.
-- In contrast, the least radical change
would be simply to add additional assistants
for a few of the busier NIO's, or a small pool
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of generalist drafters. While this would
relieve some of the pressures on the system,
and in some cases provide better drafts, it
would not help in any way -to resolve the con-
flicts between the NIO system and the.pro-
duction manager. Rather, it would be seen
as the first step back toward an 0/NE-style
drafting staff and would be bitterly resisted
by the production offices. In fact, once the
line was breached, it would be very difficult
to resist pressures for future additions.
-- It would also be possible to return
to the system that was used for the military
estimates in the last years of 0/NE. Under
this system, the NIO's would quest the WI
and o2T to prepare a draft, but would not
be responsible for its production. Rather,
the production offices would be responsible
for organizing Community inputs for drafting
and for Community coordination. This system
worked well, and solved the problem of keeping
responsibility for the quality of production
clearly in the hands of the production manager.
It would be seen today, however, as a step
back toward CIA domination of the production
process.
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-- Lastly, the previous suggestion could
be adapted to broaden the Community's role.
Again, the NIO's would give up the production
management function. A."National Intelligence
Steering Group" would be established under NFIB,
chaired by the DDI and with his opposite members
from DIA and INR as members. This Committee
would be responsible for production management.
It would allocate tasks and develop terms of
reference in consultation with the NIO's, but
it would be responsible to the DCI for the quality
of the product. Such a device would lessen the
burden on the NIO's, leaving them free to do what
they do best, while placing the responsibility
for production clearly within the chain-of-command.
The disadvantages are that the Steering Group
becomes another layer in the process, and that
it might place inordinate demands on the time of
its membership.
16. Changes in the NIO's themselves. Implicit in a number
of the suggestions above are changes in the character of the NIO
system. Some of these could be made independently of other changes,
however, and it seems useful to analyze them separately.
-- A suggestion has been made simply
to abolish the system. Sentiment through-
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out the Community, however, is over-
whelmingly in favor of its retention in 1"b
some form, and there seems little need. to
discuss this further.
-- A more realistic idea, and one
that is built into some of the suggestions
for production management, is that of re-
lieving the NI0's of this management func-
tion. As noted earlier, this would give
the NI0's more time for their staff re-
sponsibilities to the DCI and their con-
sumer and Commmuuniit_r~liaison functions.
It would relieve the pressure to provide
them more staff and might make it possiblel
to reduce their number. Most important, it
would resolve the conflict between them
,and the line production managers. On the
other hand, it would vitiate the original
concept of the NIO's, and might weaken the'
ability to serve the DCI.
-- It has been pointed out that some
NIO's are much busier than others., that some
have broad Community responsibilities while
others.are more narrowly focused and have
few Community resources to support them.
This raises the possibility that some NIO's
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should be full-time and others not. Coupled
with this is the thought that some generalists
might then be added to the NIO group. Part-
time NIO's would combine their NIO responsi-
bilities with management of appropriate pro-
duction elements. In practice, however, these
would have to be CIA officers, and the Community
aspect of the NIO's would be correspondingly
weakened.
-- Finally, it would be possible to go
one step further and make all the NIO's heads
of corresponding production organizations. If
these organizations are those of CIA, this
suggestion amounts to abolition of the system
and return to the concept of CIA as the DCI's
coordinating Staff. If they are those of the
Office of National Intelligence proposed above,
the Community aspect is retained, but NIO's who
are organization managers will have little time
for their staff or liaison roles.
Some Possible Approaches
17. On the basis of this analysis, it is now possible to
assemble the parts into models of working systems. We have developed
five such models, ranging from something resembling the present NIO
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system to.a rather radical change in the way the Community does
business. These models are illustrative only; features of one could,
in many cases, be adapted to another. For simplicity, the diagrams
emphasize the production of National Estimates. A separate. set
shows how current intelligence would be produced.
18. Model I is the present system with minor modifications.
A external review process would be added either by requiring a
collegial review of estimates by several NIO's or by the formation
of ad hoc review panels. Three positions for generalists recruited
externally might be created by elimination of the NIO's for Special
Projects (however useful, is this an NIO function?) and for Economics
(duplicates D/OER) and a consolidation of five assignments to pro-
vide one NIO for East Asia (including Southeast), one for Near East
and South Asia, and one for Africa and Latin America. Each of the
three might be provided an additional assistant and the generalists
an assistant apiece without increasing the size of the NIO organi-
zation.
19. Model I would require little disruption of present
activities. It would meet some of the felt weaknesses of the NIO
system, especially in regard to external review and broad projection.
wuu I u IN I., IIVwCV CI , UV ally l.rl l lly auuU L. l.rlc r.Cy 1.rr uu i Crn V1 u r v r uau
authority.
20. Model II addresses itself specifically to this problem.
The NI0's would be relieved of any responsibility for production
It would establish a better balance among NIO responsibilities. It
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management. This responsibility would be placed in a sub-committee
of NFIB consisting of CIA/DDI, Chairman, and corresponding DIA and
INR members. All requests for inter-agency production would be
addressed to this Steering Group, and it would decide whether the
task was to be undertaken, by whom it was to be drafted, and how it
was to be managed and coordinated. Terms of reference would be
worked out in consultation with the appropriate NIO. Thus line
managers would again become fully responsible for their product.
At the same time the valuable staff and liaison services performed
by the NIO's would continue. The present "production committees"
of USIB would report to the Steering Group.
21. Under this arrangement the NIO's might be reorganized
as in Model I, but with a reduced supporting staff. Their total
number might be reduced by further consolidation or by a system
under which only those with major Community coordinating roles
(Strategic Programs, Conventional Forces, USSR, China, Middle East)
would be full-time. CIA officers in appropriate substantive line
positions would assume the duties of the others.
22. Model II meets most criticisms of the present system
and provides the means for a significantly better product. It
preserves the best factors of the NIO system, notably a substantive
staff directly under the DCI to monitor the full range of.Community
activities. Its major disadvantage would appear to be uncertainty
as to whether the NIO-Steering Group-producing element linkages
would work efficiently. I
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23. Model III is the simplest and most efficient of those 5
Y
of en sts, of a combination), but return to CIA the production
management and coordinating function.
24. As compared with Model II, Model III would provide
roughly the same degree of review. The "Board" could be consti-
tuted in any of the ways suggested. The NIO's could be retained
and could do everything they now do except production mannt.
The change would place the basic responsibility for drafting with
those elements dedicated exclusively to national intelligence.
but it would also
roduce better drafts
eneral
This would in
,
g
p
mean that CIA would be preparing them. The DCI would have to be
willing to defend the concept that CIA is his staff if he wants to
take this route.
25. Model IV is the Board/Staff of National Estimates as it
used to operate. The Senate Select Committee apparently wants a
return to this structure. It would be very difficult to do so,
especially after analysts throughout the Community have been more
deeply involved in production. The consensus is that there are
advantages to a collegial board but that the staff has been over-
taken by the maturing of line analysts. This solution, as noted
above, no longer is a valid one.
26. Model V is the radical solution. In it CIA's Office
of Current Intelligence would be used as the framework for an Office
of National Intelligence answering to the DCI. Such an office,
jointly managed and manned by CIA, DIA, and INR, would be responsible
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ligence, national estimates, and all the forms in between. This
would provide a greater coherence to national reporting. Model V
would provide the maximum centralization of the production function
under the DCI. It also would have the disadvantages of Model IV
in spades: potential elitism, isolation of analysts from drafters,
and drafters from hard facts; NIO's limited in their cross-functional
roles.
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for the full range of intelligence production for policy support,
from the most current intelligence to national estimates. It
would be organized regionally, with the bulk of its analysts
political, but each regional division would have strong. economic
and military.staffs. These would in turn draw on the research
elements of DIA, CIA and INR. The latter would no longer deal
with current support matters, and the new office would be solely
responsible, not only to the DCI, but also to the Secretaries of
State and Defense.
27. A generalist Board of Review might well continue ad-
visory to the DCI, but under thosconcept the NIO's would become
the line officers responsible for production in their areas of
interest, e.g., the Chief, Western Hemisphere, of the Office of
National Intelligence would also be the NIO for the Western Hemis-
phere.
28. Model V would be a real departure in the direction of
Congress' original intent in 1947. It, in effect, reinvents CIA.
It would also be extremely difficult to administer well. In par-
ticular, joint manning could be a problem. The core would have to
be CIA, but neither DIA nor State would readily come forward with
personnel of comparable quality. If they did not, and if the
organization could not be managed as a cooperative enterprise, then
the DCI would have given up effective CIA mechanisms for even more
cumbersome Community coordination.
29. On the other hand, Model V would provide a single source
for intelligence in support of national policy. Thus the same
analysts, using the same sources, would be producing current intel-
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DCI
NFIB
National
Intelligence
Steering Group
CIA, DIA, INR
Estimative Intelligence
Model I
Present system with minor modifications
DIA
CIA
INR
N I O's
Estimative Intelligence
Model II
Present system with production management
separated from NI0's
DIA
25X1
DRAFTS
ADVICE & CONSULTATION
DCI
NFIB
CIA
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INR
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Current Intelligence
Model I - IV Model V
DCI
DCI
Otfice of
National
Intelligence
DIA Ll CIA INR
DRAFTS
CONTRIBUTIONS
DIA
CIA
INR
596715
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 Estimative Intelligence
Office of
National
Intelligence
(Jointly manned)
Research only
r--------1- ----------
1
itMlCIAl[INR
DRAFTS
ADVICE & CONSULTATION
CONTRIBUTIONS
Central communitylcilit
Model V
DCI
NFIB
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 Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDP91 M00696R000900010012-4
Estimative Intelligence Estimative Intelligence
Model III Model IV
Adaptation of system used for military estimates 1970-73 System in use 1951-69
DCI
NFIB
Board of
N I0's
DCI
NFIB
Board of
National
Estimates
71,
DIA I->4 CIA I-E-I INR
DRAFTS
ADVICE & CONSULTATION
CONTRIBUTIONS
DIA
CIA
INR
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