WHITE HOUSE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000800030004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 67
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 12, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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12 December 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM Richard Lehman
SUBJECT White House Request for Assistance
1. Yesterday afternoon, at Mitch Rogovin's
request, I went to see Mike Duval.- He asked that
we provide presentational advice and editorial and
graphics assistance in preparing the "package on
intelligence issues" he is assembling for the
President. He is fully aware that using CIA in
this particular circumstance might be subject to
criticism, but is willing to take the risk.
2. I believe a favorable response to this request
would be proper for CIA and recommend you approve. If
you do so, I will provide Duval with some ideas, and
make available to him the DDI's editorial and graphics
services.
RICHARD LEHMAN
Copy furnished:
Mr. Rogovin
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SUBJECT: White House Request for Assistance
APPROVED:
DISAPPROVED:
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CIA-RDR 06VA0 003q / 7~ VI-7.S f
Organization and Management
I. Reasons why this is an immediate issue
A. Congressional interest
B. Certainty that changes in National Security
Act will be considered offers an opportunity
that may not come again soon.
II. Reasons why O. and M. issues can be considered
separately from oversight and secrecy issues.
III. First decision is whether major change is desirable.
A. Goals to be sought
1. Primary is best quality product. This
in turn is a function of:
a. Close liaison between ultimate user
and intelligence producer.
b. Responsiveness of collection to
producer's needs.
c. Minimum of compartmentation and
sensitivity barriers.
d. Imagination, innovation,. and flexi-
bility among both collectors. and
consumers.
e. Good people, and kk~~
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2. Secondary, but important, is efficiency
(including control of costs). Here you
should seek:
a. More orderly decision-making.
b. A better balance between analysis
and collection. a,
i. Collection is relatively expensive,
analysis cheap.
ii. Duplication and competition in
analysis of major issues is desir-
able; duplication in collection is
desirable only when it greatly
increases the likelihood of acquir-
ing essential intelligence.
c. Closer linkages between user and producer,
producer and collector (as in la and lb)
to reduce collection and production of
the irrelevant.
d. Increased use of national assets to
meet tactical requirements, and vice
versa. (This in itself is a highly
complex issue).
e. A freerer flow of information through
the systems (as in lc).
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B. Reasons for making major changes now.
1. The structure built upon the Act of 1947
has taken about all the load of change it
can carry. There are so many Committees,
boards, informal working arrangements,
ad hoc solutions to overtaken problems,
scars of old bureaucratic wars1that the
system has become muscle-bound. It is
difficult to track lines of responsibility,
and the decision-making process is anything
but orderly.
2. Resources are increasingly constrained.
3. Technological change has made obsolete
the traditional distinctions between
national and tactical intelligence. New
organization forms are needed to deal with
the dual capabilities of real-time collec-
tion systems
4. Congress is likely to propose simplistic.
solutions to-highly complex problems. It
would be desirable to have a 'more sophis-
ticated package as a basis for Legislati-QUi-
Executive dialogue.
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5. Announcement of a major reorganization
would have political advantage.
C. Reasons for not making major change now
1. With all its warts, the system works
pretty well. It reflects bureaucratic
equities which will be extremely diffi-
cult to adjust.
2. The disruption in ongoing operations
is not worth marginal gains in effi-
ciency.
3. The machinery is so intricate that any
change can have unforeseen and perhaps
dangerous side-effects. Long and care-
ful study is needed before decisions.
4. While the Select Committees are talking
change, there will be strong resistance
in the Standing Committees to major
departure from present arrangements.
5. There.is no public pressure for improved
efficiency of intelligence.
IV. If you decide you want to make major change, you
should approach it in real and not theoretical
terms. That is, you should recognize that the
key relationship in the intelligence structure
is that between the DCI and the Secretary of
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Defense. For a number of reasons, the relation-
IIse$~0/O~F1~3$~M~09fbdC?2
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A. CIA view (passage from Taylor report)
B. DOD view (papern to be provided)
(C. Independent view?)
V. it is apparent from these discussions that you are
dealing with a rought and constantly changing
balance of equities between the Secretary of Defense
and the DCI in the intelligence field. Again,
speaking in real and not theoretical terms:
A. The DCI's prower is build upon his control
of CIA, which gives him:
1. A strong analytic capability, independent
of departmental positions, and valued as
such by Congress.
2. A capability for action beyond diplomacy
and short of war, which makes his presence
essential in, for instance, WSAG.
3. A strong voice in the management of NRO.
B. The Secretary of Defence's power in intelli-
gence is built upon:
1. His operational and budgetary control of
NRO and NSA.
2. The unquestioned primacy of DOD's needs
in time of war.
3. His overall clout as head of a major
department.
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VI. It follows that any significant change must
provide a different basis for the DCI-SecDef
relationship. Along with such a change might
come:
A. Reduction" of the power of CIA, or of the
DCI's authority over it, in favor of
Defense, or
B. Reduction of Defense's budget and perhaps
operational control over NRO and NSA in
favor of the DCI.
VII. A working group of the ICG has been developing
options for you in the organizational field.
The study group has done an excellent job in
isolating the issues, but none of these options
as it stands has been fully staffed. Presented
for you below are its findings, not for decision,
but to illustrate your range of choice.
A. Transfer of primary authority to Defense
(Ogilvie Option 3).
B. Transfer of primary authority to the DCI
(Ogilvie option 1)
C. Strengthened collective management, no change
in equities (DCI Option).
D. Strengthened collective management with
increased authority for DCI (Ogilvie Option 2)
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VIII. In essence, your choices are
A. Strengthen Defense.
1. Advantages
2. Disadvantages
B. Strengthen DCI
1. Advantages
2. Disadvantages.
C. Neither, but strengthen central management.
1. With some element of A or B above
2. Without
IX. Within each of these broad approaches there are
in turn a range of interrelated choices. For
this reason, we recommend that at this time you
decide only on a broad approach (as outlined in
Section VIII), and that you then direct that
specific options to implement this decision be
prepared for your consideration.
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THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
II
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(NSC)
INTELLIGENCE
40 COMMITTEE NSC SUBSTRUCTURE
COMMITTEE
OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET
(OMB)
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
(PFIAB)
UNITED
STATES
INTELLIGENCE
BOARD
INTELLIGENCE
RESOURCES
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
DIRECTOR OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES ASSISTANT SECRETARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE EXCOMS OF DEFENSE
(DCQ (DCI) (ASO!I) INTELLIGENCE
(ASDII)
(USIR) (IRAC)
CIA OMB
JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFFS
INR ASOA CENTRAL NATIONAL NAVY NATIONAL ARMY NAVY
NSA CIA INTELLIGENCE RECONNAISSANCE SPECIAL SECURITY
AGENCY PROGRAM AGENCY
OIA INR (CIA) (NRP) PROGRAM (NSA)
ERDA
FBI
TREAS.
MIL. SERS.
AIR
FORCE
DEFENSE BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY AND RESEARCH
(DIA) (INR)
REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION COLLECTION AND COLLECTION MANAGER AS WELL AS OTHER COLLECTION
AND ESTIMATES ADVICE COVERT ACTION COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION
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RESOURCE AUTHORITY
II
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(NSC)
OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET
(OMB)
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
(PFIAB)
INTELLIGENCE
40 COMMITTEE NSC SUBSTRUCTURE
COMMITTEE
OF DEFENSE OF STATE
~~ I (I
DIRECTOR OF
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES ASSISTA
NT SECRETARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
EXCOMS OF
DEFENSE
(O
CQ
(DCI)
(AS011) INTE
(
LLIGENCE
ASCII)
UNITED
INTELLIGENCE
STATES
RESOURCES
INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY
BOARD
COMMITTEE
(OSIB)
ORAC)
CIA
OMB
INR
ASCA
CENTRAL
NATIONAL NAVY
NATIONAL
AIR
FORCE
DEFENSE
BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
RECONNAISSANCE
SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE
NSA
CIA
AGENCY
SPECIAL
PROGRAM
AGENCY
AGENCY
AND RESEARCH
DIA
INR
(CIA)
(NRP) PROGRAM
(NSA)
(CIA)
(INR)
EROA
FBI
TREAS.
MIL. SERS.
REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION COLLECTION AND COLLECTION MANAGER AS WELL AS OTHER COLLECTION
AND ESTIMATES ADVICE COVERT ACTION COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION
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THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
PI
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(NSC)
OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET
(OMB)
INTELLIGENCE
40 COMMITTEE NSC SUBSTRUCTURE
COMMITTEE
7 SUBSTANTIVE PRODUCTION
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
(PFIAB)
DIRECTOR OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES ASSISTANT SECRETARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE EXCOMS OF DEFENSE
- - - - (OCIJ (OCI) (ASD11) INTELLIGENCE
(ASO/l)
I
UNITED INTELLIGENCE
STATES RESOURCES
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
BOARD COMMITTEE
(USIB) (IRAC)
CIA OMB
11
INR ASDA CENTRAL NATIONAL NAVY NATIONAL ARMY NAVY
NSA CIA INTELLIGENCE RECONNAISSANCE SPECIAL SECURITY
AGENCY PROGRAM AGENCY
DIA INR (CIA) (NRP) PROGRAM (NSA)
ERUA
FBI
TREAS.
MIL. SERS.
INFORMATION RESOURCE PRODUCTION SATELLITE COLLECTION
REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION COLLECTION AND COLLECTION
AND ESTIMATES ADVICE COVERT ACTION
AIR
FORCE
DEFENSE BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY AND RESEARCH
(D IA) . (INR)
SIGINT SIGINT COLLECTION PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTION
MANAGER AS WELL AS OTHER COLLECTION
COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION
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1 11
II
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(NSC)
INTELLIGENCE
40 COMMITTEE NSC SUBSTRUCTURE
COMMITTEE
OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET
(OMB)
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD
(PFIAB)
RESOURCE AUTHORITY
SUBSTANTIVE PRODUCTION
-F-F--
SECRETARY SECRETARY
UNITED
STATES
INTELLIGENCE
BOARD
INTELLIGENCE
RESOURCES
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
DIRECTOR OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES ASSISTANT SECRETARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE EXCOMS OF DEFENSE
(OCI) (DCI) (ASDN) INTELLIGENCE
(ASDII)
(USIB) (IRAC) I I
CIA DMB
INR ASDA CENTRAL NATIONAL NAVY NATIONAL ARMY
INTELLIGENCE RECONNAISSANCE SECURITY
NSA CIA AGENCY PROGRAM SPECIAL AGENCY
DIA INR (CIA) (NRP) PROGRAM (NSA)
ERDA
FBI
TREAS.
MIL. SERS.
OF DEFENSE OF STATE
I I
JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFFS
I I I I I
NAVY FARCE DEFENSE BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY AND RESEARCH
(OIA) (INR)
INFORMATION RESOURCE PRODUCTION SATELLITE COLLECTION SIGINT SIGINT COLLECTION PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTION
REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION COLLECTION AND COLLECTION MANAGER AS WELL AS OTHER COLLECTION
AND ESTIMATES ADVICE COVERT ACTION COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION
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COMMITTEES OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
AND INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE
DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Committee on Imagery
Requirements and Exploitation
(COMIREX)
Intelligence Information
Handling Committee (IHC)
Critical Collection Problems
Committee (CCPC)
r Committee (EIC)
Guided Missile and
Astronautics Intelligence
Committee (GMAIC)
L Human Sources Committee
(HSC)
Joint Atomic Energy
Intelligence Committee
(JAEIC)
Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Committee (STIC)
USIB Committee Membership:
CIA, DIA, State, NSA, Treasury, ERDA, FBI,
Army, Navy, and Air Force
in addition to above membership, these committees have associate
members or observers representing non-USIB member agencies.
**SALT Monitoring Group membership- DDCI, CIA, DIA and STATE.
Special Assistant to the
DCI for Strategic Warning
L- Committee on Exchanges
Intelligence Research B
Development Council
Defense Research & Engineering
Advanced Research Projects Agency
U/Sec AF U/Sec Navy
D/ASDI Navy (R&D)
Army (R&D) Air Force (R&D)
NSA CIA
DIA
Telecom & Comm & Cant Sys.
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IRAC Working Group
D/DCI/IC OMB
ASDI State
CIA NSA
DIA NSC staff
Air Force Navy
Information Working Group
D/DCI/IC ASDI
OMB NSA
CIA DIA
State Air Force
04-2
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OPTION I
FROM THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SECRETARY DIRECTOR SECRETARY
OF STATE OF INTELLIGENCE OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENTAL
INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENTAL
INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE
PROGRAM
DEPARTMENT
OF
INTELLIGENCE
CIA PROGRAM NRP CCP NATIONAL
LESS INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION
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OPTION II
FROM THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
PRESIDENT
I
NSC
I
SECRETARY --- COMM. --- OGI -------1
OF DEFENSE I
1 DICIA
1--- --- - - - - - - - ----I I
1 1 1 I
r-T- -171 1 1 NIO STAFF
NRP GDIP CCP I CIA PROGRAM
NIEs
OPTION IIA
SECRETARY --- COMM. --- DGI
OF DEFENSE 1
1 I
1 1 IC
STAFF
NRP GDIP CCP
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCTION
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
CONSULTATION
RESOURCE CONTROL
REPORTS TO NSC THROUGH DGI
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NIEs
CIA PROGRAM
LESS
INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCTION
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OPTION III
SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
COORDINATION OF NIEs
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
- - - DFI INFLUENCES RESOURCE DECISIONS
D/CIA REPORTS TO NSC THROUGH DFI
- - - DFI PROVIDES INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
TO PRESIDENT THROUGH NSC
DFI
rl~
IRAC NIO IC
STAFF
------------ ------------
NRP GDIP CCP NIEs D/CIA
INCLUDING MOST
CIA SIGINT
INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCTION
OPTION IIIA
SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
- PRESIDENT
I
NSC
I
DFI
IRAC NIO IC
STAFF
--------- ------ ----------
SECRETARY
OF STATE
INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCTION
PLUS CIA
PRODUCTION
ELEMENTS
INTELLIGENCE NRP CCP NIEs DICIA
PRODUCTION INCLUDING MOST MINUS
PLUS CIA CIA SIGINT PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION ELEMENTS
ELEMENTS
FROM THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
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OPTION IV
FROM THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
NSC
SECR
ETARY
SECRE
TARY
-
------------
DCI
OF DEF
ENSE
~
I
ST
C N
AFF
OF STATE
IO
I
INR
NIE
GOIP
N
RP
I
CCP - - - EXCOM -
I
D
DIR
EPUTY
ECTOR
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
I
I
I---------- EXCOM --
- - - - DCI INFLUENCES RESOURCE
DECISIONS
MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
NATION OF NIE
s
COORDI
ORTS TO PRESIDENT
DCI REP
THROUGH NSC
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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS*
Rest of the World
25%
Soviet Strategic
Threat
~CS _ t1
and Capabilities
Threat
*This chart is the estimate that was used by the DCI in presenting
the intelligence budget for Fiscal Year 1976.
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 ed For Rm~eas ,O 4/D8/1 4-~D"69JRM008000304
Dramatic demonstration of the reassertion of
Presidential responsibility and leadership
in the intelligence field.
Assuring the public that their rights and_;
privacy are protected through adequate
supervision.
1. rJ
D /'7r
Assuring the public that national security is
protected by an effective intelligence community.
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PROGRAM A-- COMPREHENSIVE ACTION THROUGH LEGISLATION
Organization and Management
Legislative initiatives.
Create a new intelligence agency, headed
by a Director of Intelligence, with
resource and line control over all national
programs, military and civilian.
Further option: separate covert action
and possibly clandestine collection
from new, intelligence agency.
Oversight and Restrictions
Legislative initiatives
Statutory restrictions on FBI and foreign
intelligence community.
Give CIA intelligence role, domestic and
foreign; limit FBI to investigation for
prosecution only.
Create a community-wide Inspector-General.
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PROGRAM B - INTERMEDIATE-RANGE ACTION THROUGH LEGISLATION
Organization and Management
Legislative initiatives
Create a Director General of Intelligence
with control over allocation of resources,
but without line control.
Further option: Separate production from
collection by creating a new national.
analytic capability.
Oversight and Restrictions
Legislative initiatives
Combination of statutory and administrative
restrictions on FBI and foreign intelligence
agencies.
. Create a community-wide inspector General.
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PROGRAM C - COMPREHENSIVE REORGANIZATION BY ACTION OF
THE PRESIDENT
Organization and Management
Non-legislative initiatives
One of the following:
.. Strengthen analytic and production capability of
each agency in-community.
Oversight and Restrictions
Non-legislative initiatives
Creation of Director of Foreign Intelligence
(in White House),separated from operations,
who would coordinate intelligence activities.
but have no voice in allocation; or
Give OMB authority to act as bridge between
producers and consumers of intelligence; or
Strengthen authority of NSC over allocation
of resources; or
Strengthen authority of DCI over allocations
of resources.
. Issue Executive Order restricting foreign
intelligence agencies, except FBI.
Issue Executive Order restricting FBI..
Upgrade (or create) Inspector, General in
each agency.
Delegate oversight authority for intelligence
community to Attorney General.
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PROGRAM D - COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL THROUGH ACTION BY
THE PRESIDENT
Organization and Management
Non-legislative initiative
Create a second Deputy Director of Intelligence,
to handle management and administration of the
CIA.
Oversight and Restrictions
Non-legislative initiatives
Issue Executive Order restricting domestic
activities of foreign intelligence agencies.
Presidential announcement of CIA Commission
recommendations already implemented by DCI.
Issue Executive Order authorizing PFIAB to
act as Executive Branch oversight body.
Announce new membership of PFIAB.
Direct Attorney General to issue regulations
restricting FBI.
Presidential call for a joint select Intelligence
Committee of Congress to assure secrecy and
continuity-,.particularly with respect to covert
actions.
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Goals for the Intelligence Community
- Eliminate abuses
- Improve organization and management
- Improve quality
- Protect secrecy, including intelligence sources and
methods
- Establish more effective relations with Congress
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To Achieve Goals:
- Public confidence must be restored
- In the Community
- The legitimacy of its role
- fie -adherence to law
- Decisions should be taken comprehensively
- System is complex
- Issues are interrelated
- First opportunity since 1947 to deal with the
Community as a whole
- Times and public demand it
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Key Overall Problems
Question as to adequacy of charters for key agencies
- NSA; DIA; JO, FBI, CIA
- Ambiguities
- Absence of guidelines
- Problem of Congressional responsibility
Relationship between Executive and Congress
- Recent investigations highlighted Executive Privilege issues
- Problem of covert actions
- ~in.~~Bm of wpr,2z //ery G/s%C~Gp~f/~
- Congressional oversight of Executive management
Questions have been raised about responsibilities within Executive Branch
- Role of DCI
- Between DCI and Defense
- Between Community and Executive Office of President
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Guideposts for decision-making:
Community needs a strong and independent head
SrAf4JG!#.:T
111s1,1"11 Ski
Leader should have bibabi
ej
Competition in analysis (production) of intelligence, with
good coordination, should be preserved
- The President should have direct access to an
intelligence official without major foreign affairs
or defense duties
- Organizational changes should promote
technological creativity (U-2, Glomar)
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r-.
APH- FOB 3NTRr ODTION- ?^
1PF SE CTIC9A E?AT--~GR SSIOWL-tE-L"AT
PRINCIPLES IN DEALING WITH CONGRESS
1. Authorizing a limited number of Congressmen to act for all.
2. Limiting the number of oversight committees.
1. Limiting access to sensitive information -by committee
rules and strengthening penalties for disclosure.
4. Avoiding the imposition of statutory requirements that
the committees be "fully and currently" informed.
5. Encouraging non-statutor ., understandings rather than
statutory requirements.
6. Separating oversight of law enforcement f . from foreign
intelligence.
7. Keeping the foreign intelligence community out of partisan
politics.
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f % Need for Statutory Charters
Should Intelligence agencies responsibilities (charters) be specified in new
Executive Orders, statutes or left as is?
New Executive Orders
- Foreign policy is Executive responsibility
- President needs flexibility
- "Mixed" charter has worked 30 years
Statutes
- Congress will exercise its will
- Stability and predictable guidelines re-.Sm, ?
- Focus will be on past abuses
As Is (Statute for CIA, Executive Order or Department Directives for others
- No serious problems now
- Absence for some agencies not major issue
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. Future of Covert Action
4,V9-:5hould charters deal with covert action?
- Not necessary or appropriate to have charter
- Can't admit publicly or diplomatically
- Commits President - Executive to responsibility
- Congress may allow only general references
- Abuses must be prevented
- Since actions are necessary, charter is not harmful
- Restores public confidence in Community
- Congress will insist on some references is, leel rS/wf~ea
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(c v . Accountability to Congress
Should Executive be more accountable to Congress?
Yes - Negotiate appropriate relationship
- Congress is of necessity more involved
- Traditional Congressional mechanisms have collapsed
- Leaks and other problems can be handled
- Attention will subside
No - Oppose all efforts
- Constitution gives Executive the responsibility
- Accountability entails control and interference
- Secrecy will be at greater risk
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FBI-CIA Jurisdiction
anwWr
Should the jurisdictions of the CIA and FBI b(&.
R.Iiv Jurisdictions
Y W. o.hrN
- Analysts need access to info4 wherever found
- FBI and CIA have both been criticized on civil liberties
- Better distinction : "intelligence gathering ".4ve. vs;,
''investigation for p ecutionr'
reS
- POeaecution gathering subject to stricter control
- Post-war geographic distinction is artificial
- Duplication not a major problem
Maintain Existing Jurisdiction;:,.
- Abuses not due to jurisdictions
- Geographic distinction is easy to maintain
- CIA with domestic role is controversial
- Some duplication inevitable
- Existing system has proved adequate
?F~C7Y~~Glf C~?~3~c j
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/5's' ue f. FBI Restrictions
What form should restrictions on FBI take?
Justice Department Regulation
- Leaves most flexibility for amendment
- Provides least public assurance
urea
Executive Order
- Provides greater assurance to public
- Similar to treatment of rest of Community
- Appears to assert direct Presidential control over FBI
- Could diminish Attorney General authority
i11eifnes" gib1.
Statute
- Provides greatest assurance to public
- Inflexible
- Could be unreasonable
Less Executive Branch control
Mix of 11 three
- -A. G, le r -ne eguiaticn lies
Eta 444-rds'- ",
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E S. Restrictions on Domestic Activities
Should restrictions order allow gathering information on domestic acti
'`L , nfall+ CMGe a gG.~Gi~
61 s MI
of U.S. citizen
Yes
- Limited to terrorists, narcotics, and collaboration wi.:h
foreign powers or organizations
- Limited to foreign sources or collected abroad
- Recognizes legitimate counter-intelligence needs
- Exception too broad
- Covers any person dealing with foreign corporation
- CIA prohibited from police or law enforcement role
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1: miteel Ci(cw.nsta/tees
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~. Restrictions on Intelligence Sharing
Should restrictions order allow sharing of information on domestic
activities of citizens among agencie
re I" a g t ye
wcb ~ yes
woVAld v%ot be perm,foed to eetket
,w}ioh
- Would permit CIA to obtain info from FBI it is not otherwise
permitted to obtain
- Gives CIA access to needed infors,%4ia.,
- Abuses could be limited by A. G. guidelines
rAy`i1Cr~
- Would allow intelligence agencies to get law enforcement information,
and vice versa
eac ea ykeol'ir/!~ wWe i
Operation CHAOS eoAf /1
- Exception undermines credibility of restrictions order
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t550e ; . (Community Oversight
Is oversight and control within the Community adequate?
;~E-stablish ~ NO+
Community Inspector General
- In line with needs found by Rockefeller Commission
- Could report to DCI
- Would create . antagonism between DCI and agencies
rade)Inspectori!Genera.l
0, e2e~n. _ l Ott
- Action can be taken in each agency
- Recommended by Rockefeller Conisniss.on
- CIA has proposed upgrading both I. G. and General Counsel
- Agency's I. G. 's could report to DCI
- Some action necessary
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Executive Branch Oversight
Should President have independent advisor onproprietu?
The Attorney General
- Already has such responsibilities as chief legal officer
- Require special staff within Justice
Special Counsel to President
- Greatest public perception of change
- Require staff in Executive office
- Focused on problem
e
OWO
Q C "ro4
Government-wide Inspector General
t;
' Al;.
P
;bI
- Not limited to intelligence
- B4%eG s mandate, greater visibility
Lt/~77f' Ti "d PA+i ~t Je-~+~ff G/' r .rs t ~lT
- Now has statutory responsibility
- Conflicts with operational role
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'SS ue; zen Oversight
Should non-governmental oversight be provided.?
Give PFIAB Oversight Re sponsibilitics
- Recommended by Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions
- Reassuring to public
- Difficult for part-time body, even with staff
- Could conflict with traditional PFIAB role OtS n+eL(s east nelvexcede
- PFIAB lacks credibility iit
- Require a PFIAB public annual report
Establish Independent Board
- Could use public reports to reassure public
- Greater public acceptance
- Could duplicate PFIAB staff
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5 SV C. ? Consideration of Covert Actions
How should covert action proposals be considered?
Formal meetings of 40 Committer:>
- Lack of meetings cited as problem
70r ~C
- Reassures public
Designate A. G. as Member of 40 Committee
C
- Bring legal advifie to deliberations
- Add other departments as required
rrah R? G.
- Inconsistent withoversight role
C*w . N 0
NSC gc+Q F:
- Provide analysis of risk and benefits
- Reduce departmental biases
- Involves NSC more deeply in covert operations
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Wit.
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/SS UE: ;;.I-Congressional Oversight
How should Congress exercise its oversight function-?
Through Joint or Separate Committees
- Joint committees hard to structure
- Joint committees would limit risk of disclosure
- Separate committee more normal
- Need separate checks provided by two-house action
- Senate has separate, preeminent foreign policy role
- Separate committee is current Senate Select Committee approach
4a4J Corn w i*eeCS) only
With Oversightw or Oversight and Legislative Jurisdiction
- Adding legislative jurisdiction to new committees raises problems
- Oversight alone is weak
- Oversight alone allows only disclosure remedy
for expressing disapproval
- Armed Services not prepared to share or give up
legislative authority
Curs
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Budget Presentation
.1194
r
How should the intelligence budget be presented to Congress?
Status Qu
- Reveal details and total to pertinent committees
- Details now more widely available to members
-,$wrrt Giamo proposal to reveal defeated
1c,, /, /4?r
- Size is still undisclosed to public
Classified Appendix to Budget
- Available to all members
- Include general, big dollar data
- Could meet needs without undue risk
- Leads to demand for detail
Publish Agency totals
- Make totals only public
- Leads to request for details
- Could dispel needlessly controversial issue
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 Approved For 5kAlQO ?ng3IA D 1 1169 Q 00030004-2
How should substantive intelligence be provided to Congress?
Current Procedures and Availahilit,
- CIA, others brief on specific subjects
- Regular publications sent to Committees
- NIE's not now available
- Congress claims needs not met
Increase Availability
- Sensitive information not likely to be protected 3 @ vAC o,-4d
vv g.TrAs rib* -Separ@bte 4v-ov t #o?a1 vt : wte t+ te64ce
- Congress and Executive will disagree on amount, type, timing, etc.
- Congress will use to oppose policies, criticis:.c agencies, etc.
- Info will be subject to partisanship
w?aMcf be- - Dissent, differences within Community177 1
~'~ of led
A
- NIE's pose problems .-'sae to particular policies contained
- Establish office (under DCI) to serve Congress
- Avoi.1 statutory requirement, work out procedures
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W. / tJE?i 1ZF. Congressional Secrecy Protection
How should Congress protect classified information?
Establish Executive-Congressional Board
- Would agree on security classification to items
- Both branches respect agreed designations
- Could handle publication issues
- Could not handle leaks
Case Amendment approach
- Secrecy removed from items only by President
Named Committeeslnly\have access to classified agreements
- Similar to procedure with Pike Committee
- Defeatable by leaks (i. e. Angola and Italy)
- Could supplement other sanctions on members
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-ft
.10
55 0L- 1' Community Leadership
How should Community leadership be improved?
Make NSC more effective
Focuses on political-military aspects of intelligence
responsible for guiding Community.
- Reinvigorate NSC Intelligence Committee
- Create second deputy Assistant to President (for Intelligence)
Make DCI more effective
- Separate from CIA management
- Give DCI resource and line control over national
intelligence programs
- Make DCI independent advisor to President
-,QC-Z- e Aft/;S V mil niT& or,.? 4" C SC
Appoint new White House Special Assistant for Foreign Intelligence
- Pie intelligence^fi NSC QVIZ "' e'er"'
- Highlight
issues such as economics, food, etc.
G~-/`r^~'f'~I'?~~ ~ Xs c ~ . ~ . r G. O ~~ G' G o uc,?-rs r~,l~ y~~
~a'f+c~,-~;al - i N-~roP'l~,~/ W e ~ro +~t c a r ~- S ~a /t.
bvt %v-(ea1e4Lc.e, oar -C$eS .
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01-00
Controlling Resources
.
How should intelligence resources be controlled?
Strengthen OMB
4 U40;0 4Y
President has ultimate c1 tt$, OMB his agent
- OMB is instrument in all other areas of government
- Trade-offs must be made
- Allocation and reprogramming controls needed
Strengthen DCI
- Authority given in '71 Directive has not been used
- DCI's staff would have to be expanded
- "~r[I SFf ct?t*-?_r.* ? Dc /ii-h-:u
-~ -- - ------
4 Lee- De
Consolidate national programs (C,TAX, CCP, NRP) under single manager
j116,6ate.
- Single authority for inter resource trade-offs
- Removes DOD programs from peace-time DOD control
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15,50 .Intelligence Collection
Should intelligence collection agencies (CIA, NSA, NRO, etc) be
consolidated?
Minor consolidation (all oigintr in NSA; allu rsrrti in CIA)
- Minimal impact on reducing competition, duplication
- Affects about $70 mil. of resources
- Little bureaucratic dispute
Major consolidation (CIAO, CCP and NRP in one agency)
- Major bureaucratic upheaval
I
- Reduce duplication, costs
GtMaawl col(etti4N .-~,,,~,~S
- Increase 7/trade-offs zo ee- -getL8de
- Separaterconsumers and possibly analysts from collectors
- Unless in DOD, major problem for military users
No consolidation
- Each agency has particular expertise
- No real problems solved by consolidation
- Coordination improvable without consolidation
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fdopov,
Intelli ence Production
F.55 0 '4.
Should intelligence analysis and production be realigned?
Create independent analytical organization
- Spin-off CIA analysis from CIA
- Independent of collection, operational biases
- No taint from clandestine services
- Provide oSIcy-aaakers with more neutral assessments and estimates
E11;" ';4 #A k i~ oc~t 44.-4;N nof
fpgrao~ e_e isin~ar'--tm to a cnalytical capabilities
- Key estimates still coordinated
- Greater responsiveness to departmental needs
- cr ~s c pe 'ti
- Increase difficulties of DCI to coordinate all except-key
products such a., National Estimates
Build-up existing departmental and central capabilities
- Production is 10% of intelligence budget
- Expansion need not be costly
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12.0000, 1 c
Ue Govert Action
Should covert action (and clandestine activity?) be separated from CIA?
Transfer to State
- Endangers State's overt status
- Contrary to diplomatic practice
Transfer to Defense
Raises public apprehension over accountability ,a'tf C(ew v?"
- - Paramilitary operations properly at DQD
Create separate agency
- Isolates covert activity -Frew7 A e,,ve,r S w +Grv?t #;P 07
Leave with CIA
- Status quo is acceptable
T, e,~.asvt Go s