STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000800020002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 11, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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11 February 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
SUBJECT Structural Changes and Institutional
Reforms
1. Over the past several months, many have engaged
in discussion and thought (often more of the former than
the latter) about structural or organizational changes
in the intelligence community. The basic decisions may
have already been made, hence several of the suggestions
outlined below may have been overtaken by events; but I
thought you might find these observations of some interest
and use.
2. Structure should be keyed to function. The DCI
has three major sets of continuing responsibilities --
clearly interrelated, but nonetheless both distinguishable
and distinct:
a. Being the Government's senior substantive
intelligence officer and advisor.
b. Being the Government's principal advisor
on intelligence resources.
. c. Managing the CIA.
3. Each of these three sets of responsibilities has
its own complexities.
a. Being the fount of national intelligence is
clearly the DCI's primary responsibility, since
establishing such a fount was clearly the 80th
Congress' primary objective in passing Section 102(d)
of the National Security Act of 1947.*
Jha -Congress wanted was a mechanism through which all of the
information available to the US Government bearing on national
security problems (with a foreign dimension) could be collated
andA tec lEarJReiiras r2OOSIOB/b6atI-2bP$1MO6ObRR 0 b2 3ontro1 of
any cabinet department or military service.
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-- The primacy of this set of responsi-
bilities is further underlined by the fact
that the DCI's other major responsibilities
(advising on resource allocation and managing
the CIA) really have to do with the mechanisms
which enable him to discharge this function
of being the Government's principal substantive
intelligence officer and fount of national
intelligence.
-- The DCI's broader substantive responsi-
bilities logically evolved from this statutory
base, including his present responsibilities
for providing a broad range of current intelli-
gence reports and assessments and for providing
national estimates.
- The key aspect of this set of responsibilities
is the latter's national scope. As applied to
intelligence, "nazi naltt has come to mean intelli-
gence which draws on all information available
to all components of the Government, is assessed
by the best analytic talent available throughout
the Government, and is presented to the President
and his senior advisors with a reflection of
significant dissenting judgments where the latter
exist and are of material consequence.
-- Over the last year or so there has been a
rising amount of debate over the extent of the
DCI's responsibility for providing substantive
intelligence support to the Congress. This
added complexity, however, does not alter his
clear obligation to provide support to the
President and the NSC, or his primacy as the
Government's principal foreign intelligence
officer.
b. The resource "advisory" role was only implicitly
adumbrated in the 1947 Act. It has evolved by pragmatic
precedent and was explicitly stated in President Nixon's
November 1971 letter. The precise dimensions of that
role,-however, and the DCI's degree of authority in
resource matters are still vague, and disputed
(especially in the Department of Defense).
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c. The CIA is an instrument set up to help
the DCI discharge the responsibilities with which
he was vested by statute.
-- Over time, it was given -- under the
DCI's management -- certain other institu-
tional responsibilities, notably the covert
collection (espionage) function (a "service
of common concern"), the covert action
function (one of those "other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting
the national security" directed by the NSC),
and certain responsibilities for the
development and management of technical
collection programs (ditto).
-- Despite the language of the 1947 and
1949 Acts and the pragmatic precedents of
almost three decades, there is still some
debate within the Executive Branch -- and
within the Intelligence Community -- over
what CIA is, and what it is not. In part,
this debate is rooted in what may sound to
to a layman like a philosophical connundrum:
whether there is (or is not) a valid dis-
tinction between "national intelligence"
and "non-departmental intelligence". CIA's
production -- i.e., the published output of
the DDI and parts of the DDS?IT -- is clearly
"non-departmental", since CIA is not under
the control of any cabinet department. Many
CIA analysts -- and managers -- would and do
argue that, ergo, what CIA produces is
national intelligence. This contention,
however, is by no means universally accepted
throughout the rest of the Intelligence
Community or the Executive Branch, where it
is argued (often stridently) that reports/
assessments/appreciations/estimates are not
national intelligence unless and until they
reflect (and, in some cases, clearly identify)
the views of all concerned components of the
Intelligence Community, not just those of CIA.
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-- This debate, in turn, is at the
root of what some, indeed many (outside
CIA), perceive as an inherent conflict
of interest in the dual roles of the
DCI (as his office is now structured)
as the Government's senior substantive
intelligence officer (the fount of national
intelligence) and -- simultaneously the head of one of the Intelligence
Community's analytic and production com-
ponents, i.e., the CIA.
4. In addition to the three sets of continuing
responsibilities outlined above, the DCI also has a fourth
set of responsibilities which are latent or intermittent:
providing intelligence support to national decision-making
in times of crisis. These are clearly related to his con-
tinuing responsibilities, but have several special features.
-- They bring into sharp focus the ambiguities
in the relationship between and responsibilities
of (on the one hand) the DCI and (on the other)
the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They also bring the complex "national/
tactical" question into sharp focus.
-- They give added intensity to the debate
over the role and functions of the CIA.
5. The Present Structure. At present, the DCI is
supported by a command structure which was developed during
the tenure of your two immediate predecessors. It includes:
a. A Deputy DCI -- appointed by the President
with the Senate's advice and consent -- who serves
as Acting DCI in your absences, is the CIA member
of the USIB, performs a variety of special missions
and functions, but who (under present arrangements)
is not really in the line of command.
b. Two staff Deputies to the DCI who assist him
in the discharge of his two -- and it is important
to remember that there are two -- sets of community
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responsibilities: substance (the D/DCI/NIO)
and resources (the D/DCI/IC).
c. Four line Deputies -- DDS&T, DDI, DDO
and DDA -- through whom the DCI runs the CIA.
6. The present system runs with the grain of the
DCI's major responsibilities. It is not bad. Actually,
it is fairly good. It does not -- nor can it -- alleviate
the problems engendered by the DCI's limited and ambiguous
authority (especially in the resource field); but apart
from that, it has only one serious flaw: within it there
is no overall, day-to-day manager of the CIA, other than
the DCI himself. This, in turn,
-- Sets up a great drain on the DCI's
time.
-- Compounds the perception of "conflict
of interest" between the DCI's Community
and Agency roles, noted above.
?-- Creates an anomalous and often awkward
situation: when the DCI is wearing his
"Community" hat adjudicating Community
disputes, the CIA has no single advocate to
explain and defend its legitimate institutional
equities.
7. The flaws in the present structure, however, could
be quite easily remedied by either of two. approaches:
a. Changing the present concept of the role
of the DDCI, charging him with being the day-to-day
manager of CIA (and letting him be it), or
b. Re-constituting and perhaps enhancing the
now abolished position of Executive Director.
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8. Thu "Two Deputies" Approach. Another, super-
ficially appealing way to go at the structural problem
is to follow the "two deputies" approach: i.e., give the
DCI one Deputy DCI to manage the CIA and another to handle
the Community. I understand that this is the approach
now being favored downtown; but before any final decisions
are taken (if they have not already been made), careful
consideration ought to be given to the fact that. this
approach would be likely to create more problems than
it solves.
-- This is because the DCI does not have just
one set of Community responisibilities, he has
two: substance and resources.
-- In solving the "CIA problem" It would compound
the "Community problem."
-- If the Community deputy were a
civilian (especially a non-Defense Department
civilian) there would be great -- and under-
standable -- concern within the DOD, the JCS
and the military services that Defense's resource
equities and requirements would not be properly
understood or adequately protected.
-- Conversely, if the Community deputy
were a serving military officer (or a civilian
with a Defense Department background) there.
would be serious, again understandable, concern --
within other componenents of the.Executive
Branch, in the Congress, in the
6
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public (and, for that matter, within CIA)
about the objectivity of national
intelligence production.
-- If the two Community responsibilities -- substance
and resources -- are combined under a single deputy,
one of them would be bound to suffer. Given the
American fascination for the concrete and quantitative --
especially in light of the amounts of money involved --
said single Community deputy would almost inevitably
be inclined to focus primarily on resources, which
would probably soon come to drive substance. 'Hence,
substance -- i.e., the responsibilities the DCI
was primarily set up by statute to discharge -- would
almost inevitably suffer.
-- The chances of serious friction between the two
deputies would be great. Even in the unlikely event that
both were always saints, there would be an inescapable
pecking order problem: one would have to be Acting DCI
on your absence, and he would be seen throughout the
Government, Congress and public as being your principal
Deputy. Giving primacy to the CIA Deputy would generate
one set of unavoidable problems; giving primacy to the
Community Deputy (especially if -- under this arrange-
ment -- he was a military officer) would generate
another.
8. Conclusion. In sum, I believe strongly that the two-
deputy approach is a loser, almost guaranteed to crate more
problems than it solves. Others (including Bill Colby) may and
do disagree, but I am convinced that the present, rather easily
modified framework offers a much more promising line of
approach within which you can fairly easily solve the "CIA
problem" without compounding and conplicating the Community
one.
25X1
Georg A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
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1. The attached graphic is the one we submitted
to Colby and he used to brief the President. You will
remember I deliberately omitted the NIB and the pro-
duction flow in order to avoid committing us to the
NIO role that Colby would have insisted on. The pen-
cilled additions show the way I think it ought to be.
2. Unfortunately, with George present at the
Management Committee meeting that discussed our ori-
ginal proposal (18 December), the game went the other
way. It contains a statement that "The NIO's would
act as the DCI's staff for the NIB. The Board would
be chaired by the DCI, with his Agency Deputy as CIA
Member. The latter would serve as chairman in his
absence." It is the concept of the NIO's as staff
for the NIB that we must jettison, or at least blur
enough to keep the NIO's out of the production line.
3. I see a use for a reconstituted NIO staff
in three ways:
--As a substantive staff for the DCI, bridg-
ing collection and production, troubleshooting,
etc. Half a dozen area-oriented officers would
suffice.
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--As a link between the substantive mechanism
lodged in the NIB and the program management
mechanism lodged in EXCOM. We are talking here
inter alia about some humanized version of KIQ-
KEP.
--As a mechanism for product review. These
officers might well serve as the staff for
EXCOM when it wears its NSCIC hat.
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OPTION IV MODIFIED
9
NSC tXCOM (I)
e
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DCI, CHAIRMAN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE,
(INTEL), MEMBER MEMBER
I I a___ 1
(floc:i/A Fie- scy~
a
DDCI/C
EXEC.SECY.
O
D
I NIO
V
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a I e
--~
DIA NSA NRO CIA INR
QPERATIONAL CONTROL
--- POLICY AND RESOURCE GUIDANCE
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
Dona nc-(7ionrPA L /u76LLl~rSNGCS
( iabot7" e+J
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1. Divide between FIC and DCI/NIB on basis of
directive modified by DCI's authority. FIC handles
matters that are management-oriented (resources, pro-
grams, systems, etc), DCI/NIB handles matters that
are substance-oriented (including such things as STIC,
WSSIC, EIC, JAEIC). Deputy responsibilities divides
the same way. This fits with Act: CIA to correlate
and evaluate and perform services of common concern;
management functions assigned to FIC were not envisaged
in 1947.
2. Divide on basis of directive as it stands. FIC
handles present responsibilities of USIB. In this case
Community Deputy responsibilities must extend into
field of DCI/NIB. Agency Deputy would, however, remain
responsible for substantive matters. Could DDCI/C staff
Committees and DDCI/A provide chair for substantive
ones?
3. Divide as in 2, but make Community Deputy
responsible for all Community matters including sub-
stantive ones. DDCI/A would then be confined strictly
to Agency matters.
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OPTION IV MODIFIED
g ET# YR OF DEFENSE
C I I SECRETARY OF STATE
EXCOM (I)
DEPUTY SECRETARY UF UttLNSt
O1 TEL), ?11EMBER
DCI, CHAIRMAN
DDCIIC
EXEC. SECY.
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE,
MEMBER
---.OPERATIONAL CONTROL
-- - POLICY AND RESOURCE GUIDANCE
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.tt Sc I C Ur `..~
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25X1
cTt
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25X1
To me, the present USIB committees (or the activities they represent)
can be most easily aid logically related to your Opti?-a IV (modified) diagram
by separati+,, them into three groups.
--The first group includes just two committees, the Security Committee
and the Critical Collection Priorities Committee. I think tla -se
should berth be associated directly with the EXCOM(I). EXCOM should
face both these issues directly and without intermedi;ry bodies. The
Security Committee has been an emasculated body because it never has
been able to engage the hierarchy of State and Defense directly. New
is an opportunity to put it in a position to do s?, and it should have
a senior membership. The CCPC is in my view a candidate for EXCCM
association because it also needs t;z be able to get the most senior
intelligence body to face up to critic-l Caps and the kinds of programs
required to fill them.
--The second reup wrulw include those committees involved in co^rdinati?x
of community analysis and production on substantive problems. They include
the EIC, SIC, WSSIC, and JAEIC. The forum for their taskixi? and their
reports wuuld logically fall into the chain of command of National Ixtell-
igence production, and I pr-sum!r the National Intelligence Board with the
DCI as Chairman w-uld be the most reasonable reporting point.
Finally, the committees for coordination of community collection! and
tasking wruli lava a -natural locus of activity thrnu. k the DDCI(C) and the
IC Staff mechanism api the policy and resource giidance arm of the DCI.
These committees, or the activities they are involved ix, include the
Sigixt Committee, Couirex, Human Sources Committee, Committee -n Exchanges,
~PyU G Deeetr C'_amittes, and--for the lack *f a better place
to nut it--thee Information Handling Committee.
I thing that about exhausts the group of present committees. The particular
committee names and organizations might usefully be reexamined and rationalized,
but that is a problem you ien't have to face at this point.
Of course, placement of these committees in a wiring diagram greatly over-
simplifies the operational problems. Each of the committees is concerned with
the interface (sorry, no better word comes easily) between collection problems
and analytical problems, but I think the arrangement I spelled out above places
the oversight responsibility in a sensible manner.
You asked me net to make a big production out of th-,is. I didn't even
ask for typing a,-sibiaeee.
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25X1
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EXCOM(I)
Deputy Secretary
of Defense
NIOs as Personal
Substantive and Coord.
Staff of DCI
IC Staff
Deputy Secretary
of State
r
XCOM LEVEL`
OMMITTEES:
Security
CCPC
,Z~ " 1~ ,~, 11~
d?~
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Director of
Central Intelligence
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~ P le, C- --,
C4a -- (i L_...
('?,S.,Y rr a rt
Committees for-
Coord-ination of Community
.Collectio.x.Tasking a*i
Exploitation:'
Sigint
Comirex
..Humax' Sources
Comm. on Exckanges
Def.ec.tor.....Com ..
Inf o.. Handing
i
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