SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR CONSIDERATION IN YOUR OPENING STATEMENT TO SSCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000700030034-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: February 14, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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14 February 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Stansfield Turner
SUBJECT . Suggested Topics for Consideration
in Your Opening Statement to SSCI
A good starting point is always in the personal area,
The Committee have your detailed biography, but you may
wish to speak candidly of your professional achievements
and qualifications for the appointment. You will wish to
refer to your considerable experience as a consumer and
occasional producer of intelligence. On balance, we do
not believe that you need to initiate discussion of the
relative merits of civilian and military incumbents of the
Office of Director of Central Intelligence; on the other
hand, the issue of your active-duty status has been publicly
raised, and you may wish to take the initiative in
commenting on this matter. Finally, it will be of interest
to the Committee and to the. Community if you would say some
words about the origins of your appointment; this will help
put on record once again the President's esteem and confidence
which he has expressed in you.
Following I have listed a number of suggested topics for
your consideration, and ultimately, very briefly, some topics
which you may wish not to address on this occasion. All of
these are the result of coordinated input here at Langley.
I am also enclosing copies of Messrs. Bush's and Knoche's
nomination hearings.
Andrew T. a iewicz
Assistant to the Direct r
of Central Intelligence
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Intelligence
First-rate intelligence provides the essential
building blocks of sound policy decision. Whether the
decision is one of peace-keeping, of military strategy,
of economic policy, or of any combination of these,
intelligence must be objective, independent, and must be
the product of the best possible collection and analysis
mechanisms. Since President Truman first determined to
provide a mechanism for coordinating information from
various collection and analysis points by creating the
Central Intelligence Agency, we have made further progress
in maintaining a system which, to the maximum extent
possible, provides the President and the National Security
Council with intelligence that is free of political and
institutional bias. At the same time, since the intelligence
product includes an element of the unknowable, difference
of view is natural and must, as appropriate, be reflected.
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Accountability
The Central Intelligence Agency and the entire
Community share with the other departments and agencies
of the federal government the fundamental obligation
to be accountable to the American people. The statutes
that impose on the Director of Central Intelligence the
legal responsibility for the protection of sources and
methods of intelligence and other valid considerations
of protecting national security and the integrity of
our foreign relations make it impossible for the operation
of the intelligence arm of the U. S. Government to be
subjected to the kind of public discussion that is
customary in our system of government. Furthermore, the
work product of the Intelligence Community must be
submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence to the
President and his advisers in the National Security Council
without being burdened by improper public exposure. For
that reason a relationship of trust, responsibility,
responsiveness, and mutual respect must exist between the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Congress of the
United States, and specifically this Committee which on be-
half of the American people is responsible for the over-
sight of this country's foreign intelligence activities.
The confirmation hearing of an incoming Director by the
Committee is the beginning of this relationship.
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Public Understandinnd Support
Intelligence, as a major component of foreign policy,
does not always have the understanding and support of the
public which it needs for effectiveness and success. The
major difficulty in this area is, of course, the need to
protect the secrecy of those things that must be kept
secret. At the same time there is a continuing challenge
to recognize the obligation that the Intelligence Community
has to the public which can be discharged by a .continuing
effort to make available in unclassified form as much
information as it is possible to handle in this manner,
The development of constructive relationships between the
Intelligence Community and the Congress is absolutely
necess.ary to gain public confidence in the institution of
intelligence and public understanding for the need to
maintain legitimate secrecy in those areas where there is no
alternative to secrecy. Without public confidence, no
institution can succeed. Working within the Executive
Department and with legislative oversight bodies, you will
want to continue the process of re-establishing public
confidence in American intelligence.
The American people will be assured that the Intelligence
Community, and specifically the Central Intelligence Agency,
is committed to the fulfillment of its fundamental purpose
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Public Understanding and Support
and mandate -- the provision of reliable and objective
intelligence to the policy maker while remaining within
the bounds of law and propriety. In carrying out this
principal role, the Director of Central Intelligence will
be guided by a few basic imperatives:
Intelligence cannot assume positions of advocacy.
It cannot surrender to any degree its obligation
to be independent and objective.
Its product and analysis must be made as widely
available as possible to all concerned with foreign
policy matters.
It must reflect an unreserved and complete
commitment to excellence.
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Director of Central Intelligence and the Community
The United States must continue to sustain a foreign
intelligence capability second to none. The increasing
sophistication of collection techniques and technology and,
at the same time, the growing complexity of the analysis
needed to assure excellence of the finished intelligence
product combine into a challenge of intellectual leadership
and resource management facing the Director of Central In-
telligence. He must recognize that the various intelligence
organizations of the United States must truly operate as
a Community in which tasks and. costs are shared.in the
interests of effectiveness. In his role as head of that
Community, he must maintain emphasis on mutual support
and coordination, on improving techniques of evaluating
the effectiveness of the total effort, and on assuring proper
consideration at all times of the needs and problems of all
elements of the Community. To be effective, the Intelligence
Community must do more than provide the best possible in-
telligence on the world as it is and as it is developing.
It must be consistently looking forward as well. It must
anticipate problems before they reach crisis proportions
and assure that the President and his policy advisers are
given timely and reliable warning on matters which could
prove certainly adverse to the United States interests.
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Director of Central Intelligence as the President's Foreign
Intelligence Adviser _____^__
In his role as the President's chief intelligence
adviser, the Director of Central Intelligence must be
prepared to give the President objective substantive
assessments. This means that he must be able to take
positions independent of departmental ones when he deems it
necessary, a requirement that in turn demands that he have
independent analytic resources to assist him in. evaluating
departmental views. It has been the traditional view that
these resources are provided to him directly as head of the
Central Intelligence Agency which by statute is the
organization responsible for the national intelligence
production.
According to this traditional view, one of the complexities
of the DCI-CIA relationship is that he needs the Central
Intelligence Agency to support his substantive independence.
Yet, the more he identifies with any one Agency or department,
the more vulnerable he becomes to the perception of being
the captive of that agency or department.
Ultimately, the President with your advice will have to
decide what that relationship should be. For the purposes
of confirmation, we would suggest that you not commit
yourself to a definitive view. You will want to reach your
own conclusions in working out with the President whatever
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Director of Central Intelligence as the President's Foreign
Intelligence Adviser
you determine the role of the Director of Central
Intelligence should be. Whether you retain the direct tie
to the Central Intelligence Agency or become an "intelligence
czar" without a direct tie to any single agency in the
Community, is a question you can legitimately reserve for
the future -- say the next six months or so.
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Covert Action
You may wish to pre-empt, or at least fairly
anticipate, an almost certain area of enquiry by outlining
your basic view of the principles of covert action in the
opening statement.
In a world where a strong defense capability must be
maintained by the United States, the President must
retain every viable option for the protection of our vital
national interests. One such option, to be used sparingly
in an approved contingency, is covert action. It must
be properly authorized and effectively supervised and
carried out. Thus conceived, covert action constitutes
a legitimate means of defending ourselves and our allies,
providing a middle ground between diplomacy and military
action.
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