NOTE(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000600010009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: FORM

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516NATURE
Remarks
Attached are the DDO/Ops Staff suggestions for
revisions to Executive Order 11905. They are
only preliminary but can serve as a jumping off
point for discussions at our next meeting.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM:
AME, ADDRESS AND PHONE MO.
DATE
N
I1NC~ASSIEIED COitiFIDEIVTIAL
'SECRET
 Approved Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP91 MO~R000600010009-1
AUTHORIZATION
Section 3(d)
Observation: There is no statement that gives the
DCI clear authority to coordinate the clandestine
collection of foreign intelligence abroad. This
authority exists in NSCID #5.
Suggestion: That Section 3(d)(1) additionally in-
/('
clude terminrology such as: "Coordinate foreign in-
telligence and foreign counterintelligence activitiesa~
`abroad"
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AUTHORIZATION
Section 3 (d) (I) (vii)
Observation: Provision is made in this Section for
protection of information against disclosure by present
or former employees, contract personnel and organiza-
tions associated with the Agency. Additionally, infor-
mation provided by the Agency to other federal depart-
ments or agencies merits comparable protection. The
DCI's authority in this respect should be made more
explicit in the E.O.
Suggestion: That the following appear as paragraph (vii)
(B): "Devising procedures and issuing regulations to
protect intelligence information, including information
{~~`.,A;
i
which may reveal sources and methods, which receives
dissemination to ,federal departments and agencies or
their contractors within the United States"; and, that
the present paragraphs (B) and (C) become (C) and (D),
respectively.
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Section 4 (g) (4 )
Observation: The FBI is permitted under Section 4(g)
(4 ). of Executive Order 11905 to disseminate foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence information to
appropriate Federal, State and local law enforcement
agencies "and cooperating foreign governments."
Under Section 4(b) which relates to the Central In-
telligence Agency, there is no such explicit state-
ment of permission for CIA to disseminate foreign in-
telligence and counterintelligence information to "co-
operating foreign governments." Under E.O. 11905
sections that apply to other named members of the In-
telligence Community, there is no implicit or explicit
permission to pass information of the described type
to foreign governments. If anything, the tenor of the
language in the appropriate sections seems to restrict
dissemination to "within the United. States Government."
Section 4(b) associates the National Security Act of
1947, the CIA Act of 1949 as amended, "and other laws,
regulations, and directives" with the provisions of
E.O. 11905. The Executive Memorandum that sets policy
for furnishing "classified defense information" of the
U.S. Government to foreign governments is dated 23
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September 1958 and has as an attachment a document
titled "Basic Policy. Governing the Release of Classi-
fied Defense Information to Foreign Governments."
That document, in turn, prompted pertinent CIA issuances
including the current
25
Executive Memorandum does not explicitly authorize CIA
in terms comparable to those of E.O. 11905 as applicable
to the FBI to convey intelligence information to foreign
governments. Moreover, the opening sentence of the same
Section 4(b) of E.O. 11905 expressly states that "all
duties and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall be related to the foreign intelligence
functions outlined below." This sentence, of more recent
date, could be construed in a limiting manner because the
dissemination of intelligence information to foreign
governments is not, as in the case of the FBI, explicitly
sanctioned. It is possible that authority for CIA to
pass intlligence information to foreign governments is
implicit in Section 4(:b)(2) which authorizes the Agency
"develop and conduct programs to collect" but in an
epoch when implications or assumptions based on inter-
pretations are being questioned, an explicit statement
may be preferable, despite the fact that many foreign
governments do not wish to acknowledge that they are
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cooperating with CIA in the Agency's collection effort.
In any event, CIA is now actively engaged in giving
intelligence information to "cooperating foreign govern-
ments." {The FBI is as well but presumably on a less
broad scale.)
Suggestion: That a paragraph be inserted in Section
4(b), logically after the present subparagraph (2), to
read:
"Disseminate to cooperating foreign govern-
ments, as appropriate, foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence information which
it acquires."
k '.
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AUTHORIZATION/DEFINITION
Section 5
Observation: The opening sentence of this Section
gives the impression that information about other
governments is all that is essential in the foreign
intelligence field. Actually, other entities and
individuals engage in activities and have capabilities
and intentions that are of comparable interest.
Suggestion: That the term "foreign entities" be
substituted for "other governments" in the opening
sentence of Section 5 and in other sections where it
logically should be employed, assuming acceptance of
the broader concept.
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AUTHORIZATION
Section 5 (b) (2)
Observation: The exemptions in Section 5(e)(2)(ii)
cause some concern because they may be in conflict
with Section 5 (b) (2) .
Suggestion: That Section 5(b)(2) be modified to read:
"provided, that the Central Intelligence Agency shall
not perform electronic surveillance within the United
States, except to take action permissible under Section
5(e)(2)(ii), including the provision of technical as-
sistance, expertise and knowledge to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in CIA's conduct of foreign
counterintelligence operations and foreign intelli-
gence operations, and to test equipment under pro-
cedures approved by the Attorney General consistent
with law.
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AUTHORIZATION
Section 5 (e) (2) ii
Observation: It is unclear from the text whether or
not "technical knowledge" is intended to include as-
sistance of expert personnel.
Suggestion: That paragraph (2) ii be revised. to read:
"provision of specialized equipment, technical knowledge
or the assistance of expert personnel."
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DEFINITIONS
Section 2 (a) (1)
Observation: Foreign intelligence is needed by the
United States Government on subjects that are not re-
lated to the "capabilities, intentions, and activities
of foreign powers, organizations or their agents." We
have major national interests abroad that are not "de-
fense" related. The definition of "foreign intelligence"
under this Section could be interpreted to exclude in-
formation on international narcotics activities, inter-
national terrorism, and international energy and eco-
nomics matters. Later portions of the E.O. mention
these areas of interest. Uncertainty could be decreased
by modification of the definition of "foreign intelli-
Bence."
Suggestion: That in Section 2(a)(1) "foreign intelli-
gence" be defined as that information, other than
foreign counterintelligence, on the capabilities, in-
tentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations)
~''~lar ,.. A'~4
or their agemts~as well~as information required for the
formulation and~e~e-ctrton of eff~o'r~s? -to -a~ch?xeve~majo~~
national foreign policy objectives.
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DEFINITIONS
Section 2 (a) (2)
Observation: In the definition of "foreign counter-
intelligence" in this Section, terrorism is specifically
mentioned. The term is not used in the definition of
"foreign intelligence" yet the major U.S. Government in-
terest in international terrorism is reflected in the
efforts to collect foreign intelligence on this topic.
A more nearly adequate terminology that could encompass
international terrorism, international narcotics, and
international economics and energy topics has been pro-
posed in a separate suggestion.
Suggestion: The definition of "foreign counterintelli-
Bence" should have the words, "assassination or terror-
ism, " deleted.
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DEFINITIONS
Section 2(b)
Observation: Narcotics intelligence or narcotics-
related intelligence is currently of high priority
interest in view of the severe social costs result-
ing from the abuse of drugs supplied by foreign
sources. Many difficulties now result from the fact
that the Drug Enforcement Administration is considered
only an enforcement agency despite the fact that its
activities and programs abroad are really in support of
a foreign policy undertaking. It is advantageous to
the DCI to have clearly defined authority over DEA
foreign intelligence programs and activities.
Su~esti:on: That DEA be included in the membership of
the foreign intelligence community for narcotics matters.
A paragraph (10) should be added:
(.10). Intelligence element of the Drug
Enforcement Agency on all matters
dealing with illicit narcotics
trafficking .
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DEFINITIONS
Section 5 (a) (9)
Observation: A "United States person" is defined so
that restrictions on collection, a subject treated in
this Section, will be clearer. Included in the defini-
tion of a "United States person" are "organizations
incorporated or organized in the United States." .This
terminology, in our view, has the effect of giving pro-
tection to front groups of one type or another.- The
stated limitation on collection could, therefore, be
more inhibiting than intended insofar as front groups,
and particularly those sponsored by foreign adversaries,
are concerned.
Suggestion: That consideration be given to a qualify-
ing phrase so that the portion reads: "Organizations
incorporated or otherwise established in the United
States in accordance with applicable laws."
._
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