AGENCY EO 11905 IMPLEMENTATION WORKING GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000600010005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 11, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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AUG 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant for Information, DDA
FROM Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security
SUBJECT . Agency BO 11905 Implementation
Working Group
Attached are comments and suggestions from the
Office of Security offered in connection with the
current study of the subject Group.
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OBSERVATION
Section 4(a)(5) deals with the requirement to
report to the Attorney General that information which
relates to detection or prevention of crimes by any
person. Problems associated with a literal and very
roa interpretation of this provision have, in large
measure, been relieved by guidance which limits reporting
responsibility to matters involving Title 18 of the U.S.
Code. However, to legalize this interpretation, it is
believed advisable to present clear guidelines as to the
exact intent of the mandate.
RECOMMENDATION
7 Section 4(a)(5) be revised in a manner to read
,
" eport to the Attorney General, information, allegations,
or complaints of violations of Title 18 of the United
States Code involving any Government officer and employee,
in compliance with 28 U.S.C. 535."
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Sect
responsibi
the I.C. to e
declassificati
ty of the DCI and the senior offi
tablish and monitor the down
When computers a
grading or declass
at best would be ext
system retrofit. Unt
new systems are develop
fication to be cost effe
realistic to impose a
involved will be dec
romptly."
Se ion 3(c)(1)(viii) be amended to rea "Conduct
a con nuing review of all classified material iginating
la1lth n 1.;r n~+.. .. .. ..__~ - 1 ,
u ~assilying such material consistent with Executive
0
ons 4(a)(9) and 3(c) (1) (viii) deal wit
of foreign intelligenc
d micrographics are j
fication may no
emely cost
curre
the
als of
tiding and
information.
volved, down-
e feasible and,
in time, effort, and
systems are modified or
ich would allow declassi-
ve or feasible it is un-
quirNment that the material
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OBSERVATION
Section 5(b)(1)(ii) concerns physical surveillance
of a United States person in contact with the subject of
an authorized inquiry, "but only the extent necessary
to identify" such a person. The term "identify" might
be clarified, since the process of identification will
vary if such factors as an alias or false address are
involved.
RECOMMENDATION,
Section 5(b)(1)(ii) be revised to read: "a United
States person, who is in contact with either such a
present or former contractor or employee or with a non-
United States person who is the subject of a foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence inquiry, but only to
the extent of establishing positive identification of
such United States person."
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OBSERVATION
Section 5(b)(2) limits electronic surveillance
within the United States to testing of equipment under
procedures approved by the Attorney General consistent
with law. The area of audio countersurveillance was
carefully reviewed from a legal standpoint during imple-
mentation of EO 11905, and it has been determined that
if there is no intent to eavesdrop electronically, and if
no use is made of information picked up during testing,
there is no conflict with the letter or spirit of the
Order. However, the Order does not specifically authorize
emanations security testing.
RECOMMENDATION
An addition be made to the Executive Order which would
specify that the prohibition against electronic surveillance
does not preclude the use of countermeasures to detect
electronic surveillance mounted against the Central
Intelligence Agency, when conducted under procedures
approved by the CIA General Counsel.
~1.~` ) /\ f -~ ' -x 1~'Y~ f _ Q om. J., t.! E r;
b
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C,5
fteigglL Suggestions
(10) Office in other departments and agencies
who are design ted to be the pint of contact on
Rationale: The N
now being drafted
tional Hsuman Resources Plan (NHRP)
'
,ll
rve as a framework for the
coordination and gu
involved in foreign
Certain departments
"Intelligence Com
officers to func
gence-related
officers, and
close intel
internatio
the Arms
be enco
intell
which
e of all government elements
ormation gathering activities.
agencies outside of the
nity"
ion as a
may be asked to designate
tters. It
oint of contact on intelli-
s intended that these
others from us
ence support su
al terrorism, the
ontrol and,Disarmamenc Agency etc
will
.,
aged to participate dir~ tly in interagenc
y
'gence activities which concern them or tn
entities receiving
h as those countering
ug Enforcement Agency,
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Page 9, paragraph (vii) (B):
Insert the words. . band information gathering I between
intelligence and activities. The sub-paragraph would then
read:
"(B) providing leadership, guidance and technical
assistance to other government depafr ents and agencies
performing foreign intelligence and-Knfoormation
gathering activities; and" ~ a
Rationale: Most non-intelligence agencies which collect
and report foreign intelligence or information would not
acknowledge that they are "performing foreign intelligence
activities", and the added words would broaden the scope of
the paragraph more clearly to include such agencies (which is
believed to be the intent of the drafter).
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Page 10:
Add a Section (xvi) as follows:
"(xvi) Maintain, consult and establish liaison arrange-
ments with departments and agencies other than those
specifically in the Intelligence Community, as defined
in Section 1.(b), to assure that any foreign intelli-
gence information gathered by these organizations is
incorporated into the national intelligence product."
Rationale: The Executive Order fails to provide guidance
for foreign intelligence contribution of non-intelligence
departments and agencies involved in foreign affairs activity.
This paragraph would help overcome that failure.
I~ RJ
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Page 17; Sec. 4, (c) The Department of State, (5):
Shorten subparagraph (5) by placing a period after
the word abroad, thus deleting "and provide guidance
for their collection effort." The subparagraph
would then read:
(51 Transmit reporting requirements of the
Intelligence Community to our Chiefs of Missions
abroad.
Rationale: The point of this subparagraph is that
the Department of State is the Intelligence Community
action element for communications between Washington
and the Intelligence Community representation abroad.
In this role State is brokering for the Intelligence
Community. The clause "and provide guidance for
their collection effort" introduces a different
subject not germane to this subparagraph. In addition,
when taken separately the wording of this clause
implies that "The Secretary of State shall: provide
guidance for (their?) collection abroad." This is.
confusing as regards collection guidance responsi-
bilities of collection managers in departments and
agencies other than State.
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n, ,c
AUTHORIZATION
Section 4 (g) (4)
Observation: The FBI is permitted under Section 4(g)
(4) of Executive Order 119.05 to disseminate foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence information to
appropriate Federal, State and local law enforcement
agencies "and cooperating foreign governments."
Under Section 4(b) which relates to the Central In-
telligence Agency, there is no such explicit State-
ment of permission for CIA to disseminate foreign in-
telligence and counterintelligence information to "co-
operating foreign governments." Under E.O. 11905
sections that apply to other named members of the In-
telligence Community, there is no implicit or explicit
permission to pass information of the described type
to foreign governments. If anything, the tenor of the
language in the appropriate sections seems to restrict
dissemination to "within the United States Government."
Section 4(b) associates the National Security Act of
1947, the CIA Act of 1949 as amended, "and other laws,
regulations, and directives" with the provisions of
E.O. 11905. The Executive Memorandum that sets policy
for furnishing "classified defense information" of the
U.S. Government to foreign governments is dated 23
September 1958 and has as an attachment a document
titled "Basic Policy Governing the Release of Classi-
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fied Defense Information to Foreign Governments."
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That document, in turn, prompted pertinent CIA issuances
including the current I The cited
Executive Memorandum does not explicitly authorize CIA
in terms comparable to those of E.O. 11905 as applicable
to the FBI to convey intelligence information to foreign
governments. Moreover, the opening sentence of the same
Section 4(b) of E.O. 11905 expressly states that "all
duties and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall be related to the foreign intelligence
functions outlined below." This sentence, of more recent
date, could be construed in a limiting manner because the
dissemination of intelligence information to foreign
governments is not, as in the case of the FBI, explicitly
sanctioned. "It is possible that authority for CIA to
pass intelligence information to foreign governments is
implicit in Section Section 4(b)(2) which authorizes the
Agency to "develop and conduct programs to collect" but
in an epoch when implications or assumptions based on
interpretations are being questioned, an explicit state-
ment may be preferable despite the fact that many foreign
governments do not wish to acknowledge that they are co-
operating with CIA in the Agency's collection effort. In
any event, CIA is now actively engaged in giving intelli-
gence information to "cooperating foreign governments."
(The FBI is as well but presumably on a less broad scale.)
2
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Suggestion: That an amendment of E.O. 11905 or
congressional legislation expressly authorize CIA
to disseminate information to foreign governments.
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Section 3(a)(3), fAge.'/
Observation:' The statement regarding "semiannual review of
intelligence policies and of ongoing special activities in
support of national foreign policy objectives" is not specific
as to whether all or selected "ongoing special activities" are
to be reviewed; it does not accommodate planned activities as
opposed to ongoing activites. Finally there is no mention of
how or if NSC decisions/directives ecommendations will be
imparted-to the appropriate com vent(s) of the Intelligence
Cornmitni tv
Suggestion:
The National ecurity Council shall conduct a semiannual
review of i elligence policies and of all ongoing or planned
special a ivities in support of national foreign policy
.objecti A. NSC decisions/directives/recommendations
result hg from those reviews will be specifically stated
and-forwarded to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence.
Authorization
Section 3(c) PA c?
Observation: This section does t clearly state the
relationship of the Operations Advisory Groups (OAG) to the
NSC and the CFI when handling similar issues.
Suggestion:
Authorization
That the relationships among the various Committees
and Groups be included as part of the Section 3.
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AtiutEiorj zati on
St,-:-.iond)(l )(vii)(B)
Ot :.V ion: rk_e statement "technical assis" nce to other
e r._; :1t G p r e.rl"tS and l9encies perfo-r ing foreign
i:~ i ;< c ac t i v i ti' could be interpreted to permi t
a ; .: ~. -,2 to law enforcement actiVi ti es within the U. S.
it:vol'.'ing foreign intellige tern.
Suggestion:
f??}dify the-1,iording to' include reference, to the
restriction'S(e).
of ^ ^?
Authorization.
Section 4 (a)) Pi c.> e j p -
Observation: Nowhere in the document is there a statement that
addresses the need for cooperation and exchange of scientific
and technical information among members of the intelligence
community and bet'jeen the intelligence community and other
government agencies. In fact, a number of government agencies
are spending significant amounts of money on mutually supportive
technologies most of which are in themselves unclassified -- in
general, it is the application that is sensitive. Encouragement
of cooperation could be incorporated as 4(a)(2) with the present
4(a)(2) becoming 4(a)(3) and subsequent subparagraphs also being
renumbered.
Sugg.estion:
Insert a new 4(a)(2) to read approximately as follows:
Insure the exchange of scientific and technical data
bets-;een his organization and other elements of the
intelligence,community and, as practicable, between his
organization and other government agencies.
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Authorization
Section 4(b)(2) Observation: Inclusion of the words "of corron concern"
minediately before the words "not other.ise obtainable,:
would more clearly state the authorization for collection
economic, scientific, technical, military, geographic,
and sociological information of coT-on concern or not
otherwise obtainable, relating to foreign intelligence,
in accordance with directives of the National Security
Council.
Another Observation: This section authorizes the CIA to develop
and conduct collection programs. It does, however, contain
one phrase, i.e., ".....not otherwise obtainable....:," that
is unclear in purpose and meaning. In its strictest interpretation
it could be extremely delimiting and cause for considerable
deliberation. Who determines whether information is ..not
otherwise obtainable....."? The phrase does not appear in other
agencies/departments duties and responsibilities, and the
necessity for its inclusion here is questionable. Recommend
it be stricken from the document or at least modified to "not
directly obtainable."
Authorization
D _ PA c7 c Is
Observation: The CIA is not explicitly given authority or
responsibility in'the areas'of reconnaissance or signal intelli-
gence activities.
Suggestion:
A new paragraph 4(b)(3) be included with the current
4(b)(3) becoming 4(b)(4) and all follo,.ring paragraphs being
renumbered accordingly. The new 4(b)(3) to be substantially
as follows:
Direct, fund,and operate reconnaissance and signals
intelligence activities in accordance with directives of the
National Security Council, the Committee on Foreign Intelligence,
or the Operations Advisory Group, except as otherwise specified
by law..
and would be compatible with sub para (6).
Suggestion:
Change the first sentence to read-
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Authorization
Section 4(b)(3.),
Observation: The sentence should be expanded to include
what CIA responsibilities are for reporting on United States
persons who are reasonably believed to be involved in terrorist.
or narcotic activities in a foreign country.
Suggestion:
Incorporation of appropriate language into the paragraph.
Authorization
4(b)(9)3
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Attachment 1 to
NPIC/D-269/76
Authorization
Section 4 (b)(6) Observation: The term photographic interpretation does of encom ass the
anal imagery derived from such systems
Suggestion: Consideration should be given to change the last phrase of
-on and fr;~nzl
4 b 6 to: . acq uisit' on of foreign 5X1 and the analysis of publications
magery~~
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Restriction
Section 5dJ PAC7z~.
Observation: The limitation on experimentation is limited to that
involving drugs on human subjects. Other types of human testing
could be equally damaging to the test subjects and to the image
of foreign intelligence agencies.
Suggestion:
Insert the words devices or procedures in line three between
the word "drugs" and the words "on human subjects."
Restriction
Section 5e(2)(ii) (i?. o
Observation: The phrase is incomplete, somewhat confusing and
subject to misinterpretation.
Suggestion:
Expand the phrase to read somewhat as follows:
(ii) provisions of specialized equipment or technical
knowledge for use by any Federal department or agency
other than: the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration;
ores expressly authorized by law.
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