TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000500040009-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 8, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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TALKING POINTS FOR DCI CONFERENCE, 15 MARCH, WITH THE
DIRECTOR, INR/STATE
Basis for the "Saunders" positions in the following comments is his letter of
1 March 1976 to Mr. Bush, responding to the DCI invitation to USIB
principals to submit comments about the future of USIB and its committees.
TOPIC SAUNDERS
SUGGESTED COMMENT
USIB Strongly for follow-on Comments from all of the
Would call it "Intelligence USIB principals support
Community Board" continuation of USIB. Only
Saunders proposed a specific
new title.
Continue present USIB
functions but involve Board
in estimates process much
earlier (approve subjects,
identify the-key questions,
consider issues before
final drafting)
SIGINT
COMIREX
Human
Resources
Continue, with full-time
chairmen, reduced sub-comm-
ittee structure, and enhanced
professional staffs
National Foreign Intelligence
Board title suggested by ICS.
This would make USIB follow-on
a super Board of National
Estimates.
Only other USIB principal to
suggest change in present
USIB role re production was
Gen. Keegan, who proposed
NIOs be directly subordinate
to USIB.
DCI has not yet decided upon
organizational arrangement for
national intelligence production.
Saunders' idea is interesting.
All USIB principals favor
continuation of committees.
Planning includes full-time
chairmen for these committees.
ICS is proposing they be members
of IC Staff.
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 TOPIC
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SUGGESTED COMMENT
Critical
Collection
Problems
Comm.
Technical
Committees
Proposes new committee of An interesting idea.
chairmen of these collection
committees, headed by Planning for reorganized
D/DCI/IC "to ensure better ICS could accommodate this
coordination" within the IC Staff arrangement.
CIA also has proposed
elimination. Seems like a good
idea, Dropping CCPC is being
considered in planning now
underway.
WSSIC "Invaluable" to State. No question as to their
JAEIC Must continue, can assess continuation.
STIC collection systems They have strong support
throughout the community.
Warning Needs committee-style Since Watch Committee was
attention, abolished, "Big-W" warning
(attack on US) a function of
Special Assistant to DCI
(Gen. Faurer) and his warning
staff at DIA.; "Small-W warning"
( crises not posing direct
threat to US) a function of
current intelligence offices.
How best to handle warning is
one of considerations in
on-going review of production
organization for national
production.
Economic Not mentioned EIC has been considered of
Intel. importance to State.
Committee Might ask how State views role
and importance of EIC
2
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TOPIC SAUNDERS
SUGGESTED COMMENT
"Inestimable value" in Treasury also proposes NIOs
giving "outsiders" one place be strengthened.
in CIA to relate to and cut
across compartmented Careful consideration being
organization given to role and organizational
position of N10 s in ongoing
review to determine how best
to handle national intelligence
production mission of DCI
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REPORTS TO
THE DCI THROUGH
FUNCTIONS
COMMITTEES
ORGANIZATIONS
USIB
SUB-COMMITTEES
The creation of a second deputy makes it necessary to re-arrange
the various elements below so they match up vertically in some
workable way. But it makes no sense to work on the bottom layers
until the top ones are settled.
DCI
SP STAFF
OGC, OLC, ETC
AGENCY DEPUTY
CFI FUNCTIONS
OTHER DCI FUNCTIONS
NAT1
OTHER
AGENCY
PROD FUNCTIONS
FUNCTIONS
DCI
COMMITTEES?
DCI STAFF
COMI
REX
SIG
COM
HRC
IHC
COM
EX
DEF
COM
SEC
COM
JAEIC
EIC
WSSIC
STIC
SMG
The recommended approach is to allocate the national production
function. Then the rest, in particular those DCI responsibilities that
lie between the two deputies, will begin to fall into place.
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 THE DECISION SEQUEN
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CFI HANDLES RESOURCES
AND MANAGEMENT
OPTION I
ADAPTATION
OF PRESENT SYSTEM
L-------
HOW TO ALLOCATE MISC. FUNCTIONS
AND ORGANIZE DCI STAFF (IG, OLC, ETC.)
1. THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED BY
EXECUTIVE ORDER
DCI RESPONSIBLE FOR
EVERYTHING ELSE
2. DCI NOW CAN ALLOCATE NATIONAL
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS AMONG
- HIS SUBORDINATES
OPTION II
NATIONAL BOARD
I-
- S. DCI CAN THEN DECIDE:
OPTION III
NATIONAL PRODUCTION
UNDER
AGENCY DEPUTY
HOW TO ORGANIZE NATIONAL PRODUCTION
MANAGEMENT
4. DCI CAN THEN DECIDE:
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Location of the National Production Function
- The decision to be taken now is only on location, not
how the system is to work (NIOs, Board of Estimates, etc.).
No weight should therefore be given to the words (NIO, etc.)
in the production box.
- However, a decision on location does have organizational
consequences at lower levels, and 'these must be considered in
making it.
-.To this end, the Option charts show some of the logical
consequences. These are illustrative, however, and certain
features of one could be adapted to another.
- Organizational elements not relevant to this problem
are not shown. No attempt is made to show the organization of
the IC Staff. The boxes represent generalized functions only.
One major question is the USIB Committees; it is quite possible
to visualize the production Committees (EIC, etc.) hanging on
NFIB, and the collection Committees (COMIREX, etc) hanging on
CFI, but it is premature to face this question. The "NFIB Sec-
retariat" function therefore remains to be defined.
- None of these Options preclude some sort of personal
substantive staff for the DCI.
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Option I
- Sets up Community Deputy as responsible for all Community
matters except production
- Creates National Foreign Intelligence Board, advisory to
DCI, with Agency Deputy as Vice-Chairman. Community
Deputy is responsible for support of NFIB and its Com-
mittees
Makes Community Deputy a member of NFIB
Continues NIOs in their present role
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OPTION I
Deputies Divided
Community-Agency
National Production Separate
CFI
DCI Chm
DDCIIC V-Ch
DDCIIC Exec Secy
CFI Support
IC STAFF
OTHER PRODUCERS
NFIB
DCI Chm
DDCI/A V-Chm
DDCIIC Member
DDCI/C Exec Secy
COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
CIA MANAGEMENT
- - - PRODUCTION- EVALUATION INTERFACE
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Option I
PRO's
- National intelligence given strong emphasis
- DCI's Community role clearly defined
- DCI has close access to substance
COLA's
- NIOs must rely.on, and will be viewed
as, an element of CIA
- The affairs of all three subordinates
of the DCI are entangled
- Disruption of CIA chain-of-command
- Some downgrading of CIA
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Option I I
- Replaces NIOs with a Board of National Intelligence, chaired
by the Agency Deputy but reporting independently to the DCI
- Makes Agency Deputy Vice-Chairman and Executive Secretary of
NFIB. Community Deputy remains a member
- Transfer NFIB support responsibility to DDCI/A
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OPTION II
National Board
CFI
DCI, Chm
DDCI/C V-Chm
DDCIIC Exec Secy
DCI
Board of National Intelligence
DDCI/A Chm
CFI Support
- COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
CIA MANAGEMENT
- - PRODUCTION- EVALUATION INTERFACE
NFIB
Secretariat
NFIB
DCI, Chm
DDCI/A V-Ch
DDCII C Member
ODCIIb' Exec Secy
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Option II
PROs
- Maximum emphasis on national production
- Community Deputy no longer tangled in Agency
Deputy's business
- DII's Community role distinguished from
Agency
- DCI has close access to substance
CIA's primary role better recognized
CON's
- Dual role of Agency Deputy administra-
tively awkward
- His association with Board somewhat
obscures its ecumenical image
- CIA chain-of-command still affected
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Option III
- Agency Deputy becomes Deputy for National Intelligence and
is responsible for day-to-day management of Agency
- Divides DCI's responsibilities between his two Deputies on
the general basis of resources to one, substance to the
other
- Recognizes institutionally DCI's need to be impartial in
resource matters and his close link to CIA in substantive
matters
- NIO successor organization placed under DDCI/NI
- NFIQ arrangements same as in II
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Deputies divided
Management-Substance DCI
CFI
DCI Chm
DDCIICM, V-Chm
DDCIICM, Exec Secv
NFIB
OR Chm
DDCIINI V-Ch
DDCI/CM Member
DDCIINI, Exec Secy
NIO
or Successor
NFIB
Secretariat
COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT
NATIONAL INTEWGENCE OTHER PRODUCERS DDI DDS IT
CIA MANAGEMENT
PRODUCTION- EVALUATION
INTERFACE
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Option III
PRO's
- National intelligence continues primary
- CIA role recognized
- Balanced responsibilities of deputies and
clear separation of their roles
- Makes possible clear chain-of-command for
production
CON's
- Not as Community-oriented as other Options
- Can be criticized as "CIA in disguise"
- DCI one step further removed from production
- DDCI/NI will give less attention to. Agency
management
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II. Decisions
A. Division of responsibilities between Deputies
B. Location of national intelligence staff function
under DCI
C. Nature and functions of such a staff
D. Disposition of USIB (more or less agreed)
E. Allocation of staff responsibility for DCI functions
(partially agreed)
F. Subordination of IG, OLC, OGC, etc. (partially agreed)
G. Disposition of USIB Committees
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On the Execution of DCI Duty xv
1. Executive Order 11905 includes among the duties of
the Director of Central Intelligence:
(xv) Consult with users and producers of
intelligence, including the Departments of State,
Treasury, and Defense, the military services,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy
Research and Development Administration, and
the Council of Economic Advisors, to ensure the
timeliness, relevancy and quality of the intelligence
product.
2. A related provision [Sec. 3. (a)(3) ] of EO 11905 states:
The National Security Council shall conduct
a semi-annual review of intelligence policies. . .
These reviews shall consider the needs of users
of intelligence and the timeliness and quality of
intelligence products . . . The National Security
Council shall consult with the Secretary of the
Treasury and such other users of intelligence as
designated by the President as part of these reviews.
3. These provisions of EO 11905 represent the two factors--
planning and evaluation- -which are critical to an effective production
function in the Intelligence Community:
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a. A mechanism and procedures to determine
consumer views on and their future needs for intel-
ligence production.
b. A mechanism and procedures to evaluate
the adequacy with which the Community's production
meets these needs.
4. There are, of course, any number of ways these functions
can be carried out. The proposal put forward in this paper is based
on a number of assumptions:
a. That the previous arrangement for determining
consumer needs--the NSCIC Working Group--was
ineffective. Its membership was drawn from consumer
organizations but the members were staff officers with
an imperfect understanding of the intelligence process
and also not actual consumers of the product. The
NSCIC-WG also was not given adequate support by the
NSCIC.
b. That a grouping of producers of intelligence
would have greater equities in actively seeking out
expressions of consumer needs and evaluating the
capabilities of the Community to satisfy them. These
expressions are a major input to the production
manager's determination of his research programs and
priorities.
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c. That the Product Review function should not
be carried out by the producers of intelligence.
d. That the assignment of this responsibility to
the NSC, rather than the CFI, was deliberate, reflecting
an opinion that the CFI should concentrate on Community
resource and management questions.
5. Under this proposal two organizational entities would
have the primary responsibilities for implementing the consumer-
producer interface and product evaluation functions called for in
EO 11905:
a. The first organization dedicated to the
development of producer-consumer relations as
a prerequisite to effective production planning
would be an integral part of the organizational
arrangements implemented by the DCI for the
production of national intelligence.
(1) it would be composed primarily of
intelligence production officers but would
also include a representative from the NSC
Performance Evaluation Staff (discussed
below).
(2) these officers would be senior
representatives from CIA, DIA, and INR.
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(3) the level of representation should
preferably be among those officials directly
charged with production responsibilities, e. g.,
CIA/DDI; DIA/DD PROD; D/INR.
b. The second organization would be a small
Performance Evaluation Staff attached to the NSC Staff:
(1) this group would perform for the
NSC the evaluative functions called for in
Sec 3. a. (3) of EO 11905 by assessing how
well Community producers respond to
consumer needs.
(2) its composition should include some
qualified representation from the Intelligence
Community and from the principal consumer
organizations- -State, Defense, JCS, Treasury.
6. The advantages of this proposal are many:
It requires no expansion of the bureaucratic
structure. The Performance Evaluation Staff
could be staffed with positions from the IC
Product Review Division; the consumer-
producer would obtain its staff support from
the NIB Secretariat.
It puts concern with consumer with those
officers most involved with this problem and
at a level of responsibility where production
is not secondary to other concerns.
Depending upon the DCIP s arrangements for national intelligence
production, this same group, because it would be so involved in the
determination of consumer needs, could serve as the means by which
action responsibility for NIEs and other inter-Agency production was
assigned to Community members.
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It keeps the product evaluation function independent
of the producers of intelligence.
It enables the supporting staff of the CFI to concentrate
its energies on critical resource decisions but does not
deprive them of the evaluative input prepared by the
NSC Performance Evaluation Staff and necessary to
the development of their recommendations on production
programs and resources.
It gives visibility to the DCI' s concern with consumer
relations and to the development of an effective production
evaluation function.
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 Approved For
TMe. Re014J4FRWQp,1aLQ`5000400
General G.J. Eade
Deputy USCINCEUR
APO New York 09055
As you may know, to assist me in the process of
integrating the intelligence community and providing focus
to our collective efforts in support of the President and
his senior advisors, I am in the process of establishing
a panel of National intelligence officers -- each of whom,
in his geographic or functional area of responsibility,
will be my principal staff officer and my personal
representative to the intelligence community and to our
policy-level consumers of national intelligence. One
member of this panel will be the National Intelligence
Officer for Conventional Forces, whose responsibilities
will encompass (among other things) all questions related
to MBFR.
It was mv belief that for a variety of reasons, this
position ought to be filled by a senior military officer,
on active duty. Secretary Schlesinger concurred in this
view and lent a much appreciated personal hand in ensuring
that each service nominated the best candidates available.
The candidates nominated were indeed outstanding.
After carefully reviewing all of them jointly with the
Director of DIA, I have chosen -- with the concurrence of
the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman,
I would appreciate it very much if we could plan
on having Ireport for duty on or about
1 Feb wou also appreciate it if you could
spare for a TDY visit in December to
.assist in_ the se_ec ion of his deputy and in organizing
his new office.
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I regret andapologize for the problem s and inconvenience
that the loss of may cause for you and your
co.nmand. His new duties, however, are ones of great
in ortance and having an officer-of his background and
ability discharge them will, I hope, be of considerable
help to CI21,71CEtJR as well. as to all of us in Washington
.
Sincerely ,
7.87 W. E. CAIb
WE. Colby
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