PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000300080006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 30, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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USIB /IRAC-D-22, 1 /20
30 July 1974
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE
MEMORANDUM FOR USIB Principals
IRAC Member s
C
SUBJECT Perspectives for Intelligence
a.
USIB /IRAC-D-22, 1 / 18, 18 June 1974
b.
USIB-M-671, 27 June 1974, Item 6
Pursuant to the discussion at the USIB meeting of 27 June
(reference b, ), the attached final version of the Perspectives are
forwarded herewith for information, Copies have also been provided
to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the
members of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee.
Executive Secretary
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DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Perspectives for Intelligence
1975-1980
Secret
July 1974
USIB/IRAC D 22.1/20
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE
1975 -1980
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction
1
Part I-Major World Problems .
General ..................... .......... .. ... 1
The USSR 2
China ....... .................
2
Western Europe ... ................. ... ..... .. ...... 3
3
......
3
New Powers ..............................
4
The Third World .......................
............. 4
Social Change
4
The Acceleration of Events '.
5
Part II-The Role of Intelligence ........
5
General .................. .......... ... ....... .. ..
5
The USSR ............................
6
China ......................... ........................ .......
6
Europe .................... ............... .... ...
6
Economics .............................................. ......
7
Other Priorities
7
Part III-Implications for Intelligence Planning .....
g
General ...... .................................. 8
Collection vs. Exploitation .................. .......... 8
Demands vs. Resources ...................... ..................... 9
Technical Systems ................................................ 10
Requirements and Evaluation ................. . .................... 11
Manpower Implications ....................... ....... ....... 11
Security ............................................... .. l2
i
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Introduction
1. These Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980 are issued by the Director
of Central Intelligence to provide general guidance for planning for all elements
of the Intelligence Community for the next five years. They are particularly
designed to stimulate early action on programs requiring long-term. research,
development, or planning-such as complex technical systems, language train-
ing, skills augmentation, etc. They are designed to influence Fiscal Year 1975
decisions whose effects will be felt only after several years. For Fiscal Year 1975,
near-term guidance is provided in the Director's Objectives submitted to the
President, which include both Substantive Objectives (further detailed in Key
Intelligence Questions) and Resource Management Objectives. The Director's
Annual Report to the President on the work of the Intelligence Community will
include comment on steps taken during FY 75 to meet future requirements.
2. These Perspectives open with a general overview of the political, economic
and security environment anticipated during the coming five years (Part I) . This
is followed by an overall statement of the anticipated role of intelligence in these
situations during that period (Part II) . Finally, more specific guidance is given
with respect to activities which should be planned or initiated in order to meet
the needs of the period ahead (Part III) .
3. The Perspectives are focused primarily an major national intelligence prob-
lems and guidance. They recognize but do not deal extensively with three addi-
tional categories of important problems:
(a) Continuing lower priority national responsibilities which must be
satisfied with a limited allocation of resources;
(b) Departmental or tactical .intelligence support of civilian and mili-
tary elements of the United States Government. This will also require con-
tinuing investment of attention and resources;
(c) Unexpected problems or crises which can pose major political, eco-
nomic or security problems to the United States. To the extent that these
requirern.ents cannot be met by reallocation of resources from less urgent
activities, some reserve capability must be included in planning to meet them.
Part I-Major World Problems
1. General. The balance of power between the US and USSR is unlikely
to change fundamentally. Perception of the balance, however, may change im-
portantly in either Moscow or Washington, or both. Beyond this, many other
nations will play major roles in the international arena. Additional nations possess-
ing nuclear weapons or having significant control over critical economic resources
will be capable of seriously upsetting the international equilibrium. The chang-
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ing balance between the world's supply of and demand for natural resources will
strain the world's political, economic, and social institutions. Thus the US will be
confronted not only with the steady-state Soviet threat to US national interests
but turbulence in other world relationships as well.
2. Th.e USSR. Notwithstanding the probable continuation of detente and an
absence of armed conflict, the USSR will remain the principal adversary of the
US during the next five years. It will regard the US as its major security threat,
and act accordingly. In foreign policy, its continued efforts to expand its inter-
national influence will bring it into conflict with US interests. This will include
political action in Western Europe, the Near East, and South Asia, and, to a some-
what lesser extent, Latin America. In its economic policy, Moscow will continue to
give high priority to the kinds of growth which increase national power and its
projection abroad.
The circumstances which commend detente to the USSR, however, have com-
plicated this picture. These are: the need to control local crises lest they lead to
general war; the burden of the Sino-Soviet conflict; and the desire for economic
and technological assistance from the West. The Soviets will have to deal in the
coming years with a number of dilemmas as they attempt to square traditional
attitudes with the requirements of a detente posture.
These dilemmas may take an acute form in the strategic field. While con-
tinuing to modernize its ground, naval, and tactical air forces, the USSR is vigor-
ously pursuing the opportunities left open by SALT I. Except to the extent re-
strained by arms limitation agreements, the Soviets will make substantial improve-
ments in their missile forces, including MIRVing, improved accuracy, increased
throw-weight, and better survivability. At the same time, they will continue to
maintain and to improve their defenses. They will be working to develop effective
weapons and supporting systems in such areas as ASW, satellites, and lasers. Ex-
pecting strategic equality with the US, the USSR gives indications of angling
further for a measure of strategic superiority, if that can be obtained at reason-
able risk.
Domestically, the pressure for modernizing reforms of the Soviet system, and
particularly its economic administrative structure, will grow. Prolonged detente
may also eventually have some effect on the Communist Party's ability to wield
its authority effectively in all areas of public life. But these are long-term possi-
bilities, and over the next five years the essentials of the Soviet domestic system
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5. Eastern Europe. While Eastern Europe will continue to be under Soviet
control, recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties with Moscow will compli-
cate the picture. The five-year period could see an explosion from within one
or more East European countries against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would
quickly reestablish its hegemony (by force if necessary) , whatever the price
in terms of other policies. Internal discipline may be alleviated somewhat in
these countries so long as they adhere to Soviet guidance in diplomatic and
security matters. Economic relations with the West and with the Third World
will grow in quantity and in independence from Soviet control. The passing
of Tito could open an arena of difficulty and contest over the succession in-
ternally and over the future orientation of Yugoslavia externally.
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7. New Powers. During the coming years, a number of nations will increase
in absolute and relative strength and become at least regional great powers, plus
playing more substantial roles in world international forums. An example is
I3razil, whose economic and political power is increasingly felt in Latin America.
Another is Iran, whose Shah is determined to build that country's relative strength
in the region so as to play a fiill great power role there. Nigeria and Zaire could
also develop this sort of role in Africa. Aside from these, several nations having
considerable influence within regions will display greater independence from
the close US relationship which has characterized them in the past. This will
be particularly prevalent in the economic field, but it will also occur in various
international relationships. Examples of such powers are Canada, Mexico, Aus-
tralia, Thailand, and Saudi Arabia, phis several South American nations such as
Venezuela, Panama, and Peru.
8. The Third World will present a varity of problems. A number of local
disputes will preoccupy not only the leaders of individual countries but the
international community. Examples are relationships between India and Paki-
stan, between black and white Sub-Sahara Africa, and within Southern Arabia
and the Persian Gulf. Several existing disputes will continue to be a matter of
concern to the international community and will sow the seeds of potential larger
scale involvement (Arabs and Israel, North and South Vietnam, North and South
Korea, Taiwan and China) . A number of Third World countries will become
increasingly antagonistic toward the great powers and their local presence in
the economic, political and cultural spheres, e.g., in Africa, Latin America and
South Asia. In this respect some identity of interest may grow between nations
divided by the Cold War, developing into collaboration against both superpower
complexes, e.g., the Arab nations, the rising black nations of Africa, and the
nations of the Malay Archipelago. Internally, many Third World nations will
suffer serious damage from tribal and regional differences, economic extremism,
and ideological zealots (India, Cambodia, Ethiopia, et al ). Some of the Third
World will find an outlet for its frustrations in self-defeating assaults on great
power economic relationships and in hamstringing the effectiveness of a variety of
international forums.
9. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly create power vacuums
in a number of areas. These will stem from increased expectations and a percep-
tion of the growing economic gap between less developed countries (and classes
within countries) and the developed world. Areas particularly susceptible to
this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain other Arab states such as Morocco,
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India, possibly Indonesia, the Philippines, and, in Latin America, Peru, Ecuador
and Bolivia. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by some au-
thoritarian governments, particularly those benefiting from increased oil revenues,
but these will have difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term
and transferring power to successors. The resulting turbulence can present
temptations to neighboring states to exploit long-standing differences or to great
powers desirous of extending their influence. Such turbulence will also exist
within advanced nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or regional minorities
turn to violence and terrorism to press their claims against more and more deli-
cately tuned and interdependent societies.
10. The acceleration of events will be characteristic of the years ahead.
This will come from improved communication and transportation, sharply re-
ducing the time available to reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international
problems. It will also raise many local events to international prominence and
inflate national or political pride, posing further handicaps to successful ne-
gotiations. There will be a resulting tendency towards shorter attention spans
for individual situations and a need for simultaneous perception and manage-
ment of a multiplicity of international relationships. Many national or interna-
tional institutions are simply not structured to cope with accelerating change.
Such change will occur most conspicuously in the fields of science and technology,
but the pace there will have substantial effects on the pace of sociological,
industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and economic impacts.
Identification and accurate assessments of such changes and their effects will be
needed on an increasingly rapid or even immediate basi~.~
Part II-The Role of Intelligence
1. General. The primary charge on intelligence during these years will be to
provide accurate and pertinent information and assessments with respect to
the increased range of problems requiring US decision. In particular, the need
will be for advance notifications of forthcoming policy problems and, of course,
for tactical early warning as well. These responsibilities will be especially im-
portant in an era of accelerating events so that diplomacy, negotiation, or other
benign initiatives can head off military confrontations between states or other
disruptive events. The acceleration of events and the explosion of information
will also require a major effort by the intelligence community to identify major
policy and negotiating issues, to process raw information into manageable form,
and to devise adequate techniques to identify for consumers the essential ele-
ments of foreign situations, the reliability of our assessments, and the likely
impact of alternative policy decisions. Intelligence will increasingly be expected
to provide assessments of the intentions and likely courses of action of foreign
powers, in addition to their basic capabilities. To do this will require inter-
disciplinary analysis which melds economic, technological, sociological and
cultural factors with political and military data.
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2. The USSR. The USSR will remain as the major intelligence target. Its
military power, its economic role in the world, and its foreign policies will con-
tinue to pose major problems for American leadership. Intelligence will be ex-
pected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities and economic
activity. It must follow Soviet efforts to acquire advanced scientific and tech-
nological assistance and the potential impact on both military and economic
capabilities. It will be expected also to supply reliable assessments of Soviet
political dynamics and intentions. These must be supplemented by clear and
accurate forecasts of likely Soviet courses of action in the political, economic,
and military fields. While a small percentage of this material will become avail-
able through open exchange and access, vast fields of highly important informa-
tion will be kept by the Soviets within a closed societ re uirin extraordinar
efforts to obtain and understand them.
25X1
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5. Economics. Economic intelligence will increase in importance wor -
wide. This will include economic situations in nations having a major impact
on the world economy and on relationships with the United States, such as the
Arab oil states, major economic powers such as Japan, major suppliers of food
and raw materials, and nations where internal economic chaos can create major
world problems out of sympathy or resonance (e.g., India) . Economic intelli-
gence of value to US policy makers is necessarily international in scope, includ-
ing such topics as the activities of multi-national corporations, international de-
velopment programs, regional economic arrangements, and the working of in-
ternational commodity markets. In some cases, nations with close political and
militar nds to the United States ma become important economic intelligence
targets tc., raising complicated problems
for intelligence coverage.
6. Other Priorities. Intelligence will increasingly be expected to warn of and
explain new situations posing problems to American interests. An example will be
to identify the causes of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism in Third
World countries, so the component elements of these problems can be isolated,
negotiated about or countered with appropriate mechanisms. This may require in-
tensified efforts on our part to understand and communicate the differences
between societies, cultures, and nation personalities. Intelligence will be called
upon more often to assess the threat of terrorists against US installations and
private enterprises abroad and, beyond that, the risk that some terrorists may
acquire nuclear weapons.
7. A few of the major problems which will be either the subject of dispute
or negotiation, or sometimes both, and consequently will be priority intelligence
requirements, can be listed:
(a) Rates of production, consumption, and pricing of raw materials and
energy sources and international commodity arrangements;
(b) Price and non-price restrictions on international trade, including
transportation and communication services;
(c) The international payments mechanism and the coordination of na-
tional fiscal-monetary policies;
(d) National policies with respect to military sales and foreign business
activity and investment, including policies toward multi-national corpora-
tions;
(e) Arms limitation, nuclear proliferation, and crisis avoidance;
(f) Jurisdiction, exploitation, and relationships in the oceans and on
sea beds.
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public's right to information about its Government's activities, This may require
new legislation, the development of new ways of informing the Congress and the
public of the substantive conclusions of the intelligence process and clear standards
for compliance with the Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order 11652
(and their exceptions) in the Intelligence Community.
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Remarks:
SUBJECT: DCI's Perspectives
Attached is a revised version of the
DCI's Pers~icctives for your final review.
As soon as you inform the front office
of your approval, they will be Forwarded
?_~ to the IC Staff for incorporation with
Part III and for printing and dis~xibutio
I Please make your replies to the front
office by 1500 on Wednesday, 1 October.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, AppRES6 AND PHONE NO.
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