(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000200010012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 28, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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T~E DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Community Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
ICS 77-2202
28 March 1977
Director a Performance Evaluation
and Improvement
SUBJECT Issues for SCC Subcommittee on PRM-11,
Task 2
FROM I
1. On 1 April 1977 at 1.500 the DCI is scheduled to hold
a second meeting of the SCC Subcommittee on PRM-11, Task 2,
to discuss key issues expected to emerge from the PRM-11,
Task 2 report on the DCI's role. The attached package iden-
tifies eight key issues that are likely to merit Presidential
attention and, therefore, to reappear in Task 3 of PRM-11,
to be chaired by Dr. Brzezinski. Six of these issues are
discussed in :brief papers aimed at focusing the 1 April
meeting.
2. Pursuant to guidance from the first subcommittee
meeting, these papers reach forward toward the contending
opinions and possible decision options that might be developed
in Task 3. This is to stimulate discussion only. It is not
intended to display the final. content of the Task 2 report,
or to prejudge issues to be confronted in Task 3. Seven
additional issues judged to be of intra-Community character
are also identified, but no issue papers supplied.
3. Given the press of time, any comments, additions,
rebuttals, or cries of distress must reach me by clo
business 29 March 1977 to be assured of inclusiczn in the
issue papers.
OGC Has Reviewed
Attachment: '
Issue Papers for 1 April meeting
MORI/CDF Pages _all bi.
36.
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Distribution:
NSA
NSC S. Hos inson)
State (E. Brown)
OSD (T. Latimer)(P. Doerr)
OSD (D. McGiffort)
JCS (B. Inman)(W. Meukow)
DDCI
D/DCI/IC
D/DCI/NI
DDI
DDS&T
DDO
O/Compt
OGC
OLC
D/OPP/ICS
D/OPBD/ICS
C/OPEI/ID
C/OPEI/SD
C/ OPEI/ HRD
C/OPEI/PAID
ICS Registry
D/OPEI Chrono
OPEI PRM-11
SA-D/DCI/IC
SA-D/DCI/IC
AD/DCI/IC
EO/ICS
Executive Registry
D/OPEI:I
(3/28/77)
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?W,
Issues for Meeting of SCC Subcommittee
on PRM-11, Task 2, 1 April
Front Piece
Among the issues confronted in examining the DCI's role,
responsibilities, and authorities, the following eight can be
identified at this point as deserving Presidential guidance
or decision. All are likely to reappear as issues for atten-
tion in Part 3 of PRM-11.
1. The DCI's power and Community structure
for managing national intelligence resource
allocations
2. Enhancing the relevance and quality of
intelligence products
3. The DCI's role in wartime,
4. Intelligence and non-intelligence foreign
information gatherers of the government
5. Net assessment and "Blue" information needs
6. DCI responsibilities to Congress [incomplete]
7. Intelligence security [forthcoming]
8. National counterintelligence policy and
coordination [forthcoming]
Brief papers on each issue are at Tabs 1 through 8, each presenting:
Issue
Discussion
Possible conclusions of the PRM-11 Task 2 Report
Possible Decision Options'for the President
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The DCI, the intelligence agencies, and the Community
as a whole face many other issues, problems, and challenges
that must be addressed in PRM-11. By and large, however,
these are matters that the DCI and other intelligence
authorities should resolve as part of their jobs. Under-
standing of these issues at the Presidential and NSC levels
can be helpful, but decisions or guidance-from those levels
is unlikely to be required. Among the more important of
them are:
a. Assuring an effective collection guidance
and requirements system.
b. Assuring an effective process for preparing
national intelligence estimates.
c. Creating systems for measuring the performance
of intelligence collection and production entities.
d. Creating mechanisms in the Intelligence
Community for accomplishing evaluation, planning,
programming, and budgeting (assuming a prior defini-
tion of the DCI's role and powers).
e. Striking the proper balance between current,
analytical, and estimative intelligence; and between
production, collection, and processing.
f. Assuring a functioning crisis support mechanism
for the Intelligence Community.
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g. Developing Community personnel policies or goals
that assure the availability of necessary technical,
linguistic, and analytic talent over the long term.
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Issue No. 1
Defining the DCI's responsibilities and powers, and
the appropriate Intelligence Community structure for managing,
planning, programming, and budgeting national intelligence
resources, especially with relation to the responsibilities
and authorities of the Secretary of Defense.
Since World War II, a complex community of organizations
has been created to produce national intelligence. These
organizations are lodged in numerous departments of government,
most of them in the Defense Department. Since the late 1960s,
all Presidents and, increasingly, the Congress have looked to
the DCI to lead and to manage this Community. Emphasis on
the importance of Community resource management has steadily
grown. The President and Congress expect the DCI to assure
that resource allocations are optimally balanced across
intelligence activities for the best product at the least
cost. In the presence of vague or overlapping definitions
of "national," "departmental," and "tactical" intelligence,
Congress has tended to press on the DCI more responsibility
for the latter classes of activities.
Defining and empowering this DCI responsibility has
been studied intensely several times in recent years. To
date, each round of decisions has resulted in giving the
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DCI Community management mechanisms that have been essentially
collegial in nature. That is, DCI responsibilities and powers
overlapped or conflicted with those of other officers, notably
the Secretary of Defense, requiring a negotiating forum to
reach decisions. President Ford's Executive Order 11905
created such a forum for resource management matters in the
Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), now called the
Policy Review Committee (Intelligence).
Several of the elements of the Community are primarily
national by charter and mission: CIA, NSA, Special Air Force,
and Special Navy. Only CIA is directly subordinate to the DCI.
Other elements, such as DIA, other components of the General
Defense Intelligence Program, State/INR, and the intelligence
elements of Treasury, FBI, and ERDA, exist primarily to serve
departmental needs, but secondarily play a vital role in
national intelligence collection and production.
Current operations of technical collection entities
are coordinated by the DCI through a Community committee
structure. Such a clearing-house approach to current tasking
is necessitated by the nature of the intelligence process;
under any Community structure, a variety of data consumers
with varying needs must be served by a variety of collectors.
In the areas of Imagery and SIGINT, these mechanisms
for establishing current requirements are formal, relatively
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effective, although beset by the frictions attending any
committee process. Users of SIGINT reporting, moreover,
frequently complain about the nature and timeliness of NSA
reporting on collected data. Because it embraces many infor-
mation gatherers outside intelligence, the committee for
human resource coordination is as yet far less influential.
The question before the house is whether and how well,
via present collegial mechanisms, the DCI can accomplish
effective resource management in the Community, especially
as regards planning and programming for the future.
During the past year the first fully consolidated
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and budget were
developed under the provisions of E.O. 11905. This was a major
accomplishment. But it was accompanied by persistent struggle
over conflicting authorities and substantive judgments between
the DCI and the Department of Defense. Moreover, it was waged
largely over new initiatives proposed by program elements or
issues imposed from the outside. Much less was accomplished
in examining fundamental resource balances among the collection
disciplines, intelligence processing, analysis and production,
of the sort implied by "zero base budgeting."
The achievements of the past year were attended by
growing tension between the two management roles of the DCI:
head of the Central Intelligence Agency and leader of the
Community. Some argue that he should be divested of the.
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former so as to be "neutral" in executing the latter role.
Others contend that this alone would only create a weaker
DCI, with no executive base,.and simply place another, weaker
authority between CIA and the President. To be a strong
Community leader, the DCI needs, not less authority over his
only operating base, but more over other key Community elements.
Possible Conclusions of the PRM-11, Task 2 Report
One may reach the following divergent conclusions on
the present Community management mechanism:
Opinion 1:
The present system did not work too badly for the
first year. A learning curve will show improvement. Moreover,
whatever the cost in bureaucratic struggle, it is essential
that the future programs and budgets of the main national
intelligence entities be thrashed out in a forum where a
diversity of needs and views are authoritatively represented.
Opinion 2:
The present system leaves the DCI with limited
power over entities other than CIA to achieve what is expected
of him, a fundamental rationalization of resource allocation
among the major national intelligence organizations and
activities. He does not have the power, except throuqh the
PRC(I), to investigate, call up well-supported program
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alternatives on, experiment with changes to, and, in the face
of divergent views, conclusively resolve disputes on the major
national intelligence programs whose integration he is charged
to accomplish. In addition, line command of CIA along with
collegial leadership of the Community imposes tension on both
jobs. The Community suspects the DCI and his Community officers
of favoring CIA. CIA fears loss to the Community arena of its
senior protagonist and only link to the President. To be
a true Community manager, in his own right without reliance
on the PRC(I) mechanism, the DCI must have line authority
and budget control over at least the "commanding heights"
of the Intelligence Community: CIA, NSA, and Special Air Force.
Opinion 3:
Emphasis on the resource management aspect of the
DCI's Community role is misplaced. It is based on the
assumption that there is substantial fat in the system or
that improvement is to be found by trading off resources
among programs and activities. The real problem is that
national intelligence budgets are too lean overall. Initia-
tives are being starved and the system is getting over-
bureaucratized. The most important part of the DCI's
Community resource management role is to sell growth programs
to the President and Congress. Further search for efficiencies
through resource trade-offs will lead to dangerous shortfalls.
Hence, it is folly to predicate Community reorganization on
such a search.
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Possible Decision Options for the President
The following schematic presents possible options on
DCI authority and Community structure that could be developed
for Presidential consideration by Task 3 of PRM-11:
1. Status quo of E.O. 11905
2. Amend E.O. 11905 to give the DCI direct access
to data from and programming authority over:
- Variant A: NSA, Special Air Force, possibly
Special Navy
- Variant B: All NFIP elements
3. Separate the DCI from direct operational and
substantive responsibility for CIA. Subordinate the
head of CIA to the President and the NSC for operational
and substantive matters, to the DCI (as Intelligence
Community manager) and Chairman, PRC(I) for resource
programming and budgeting.
4. Place NSA, Special Air Force, along with CIA,
in line subordination to the DCI:
- retain PRC(I) for coordination of other
NFIP elements, influence on DCI management
,- retain NFIB as collegial element for tasking
and estimative judgments
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5. Create new National Intelligence Agency (NIA)
combining present elements of CIA, NSA, Special Air
Force
retain PRC(I) for coordination of other
NFIP elements, influence on DCI management
retain NFIB as collegial element for tasking
and estimative-judgments
6. Create broad national intelligence authority
along lines of SSCI (MMiller) draft pill.
7. Create a separate national intelligence analytical
center under NSC, place major national collection pro-
grams in variants as follows:
- All national imagery, SIGINT, and clandestine,
collection under a national foreign intelli-
gence collection authority.
- All such collection under Department of Defense.
- All technical collection in Department of
Defense, clandestine service in Department of
State, coordinated at NSC level.
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Enhancing the quality and relevance of intelligence
products to consumers through improved producer-consumer
relationships and, possibly, institutional separation of
analysis and production from collection.
Discussion
Delivering high-quality and relevant finished intelli-
gence to policymakers is the purpose of intelligence. It is
the DCI's main responsibility as an agency head and Community
leader.
The quality of intelligence products has been criticized
increasingly in recent years by congressional committees and
selected figures in the Executive branch. Some criticisms.
cancel each other out (some want more hard data, others more
speculative analysis); some reflect the unlimited appetite
of consumers for more information.
A frequent criticism is that producing entities are
given too little guidance by policymakers aslo what their
real intelligence needs are, and that producgrs are too
reluctant or lethargic about seeking such gu,dance.
Community experience shows that form .l mechanisms
for involving consumers in establishing production priorities
and needs run a high risk of non-use. The defunct NSC
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Intelligence Committee met twice and disappeared. The most
important consumers tend to be too busy and distracted to
articulate their intelligence needs thoughtfully.
Intelligence production entities find that informal
means of keeping in touch with consumer needs and views are
more productive. Often the best way to determine what the
consumer needs is to find out what he is trying to accomplish,
i.e., to understand policy goals.
In the past three years, numerous experiments and
innovations have sought to improve product quality by, among
other things, improving producer-consumer contact. The DCA's
NIOs and DIA's DIOs have this responsibility. In some
components, middle management and analysts are encouraged to
seek out consumer contacts. Other managers find this trouble-
some and threatening. Defense intelligence has created a
Defense Intelligence Board to link producers and consumers
in the Pentagon.
Evaluation of intelligence product has been emphasized
in the past two years. E.O. 11905 stipulated that the NSC
would meet twice annually to consider a report on intelli-
gence product quality submitted by the DCI. The President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) has been active
in criticizing intelligence product and promoting experiments,
such as competitive analysis, to improve it.
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Intelligence professionals, especially in CIA, harbor
strong reservations as to the impact of close producer-
consumer relations on product quality. They fear that too
close a tie would tend to draw intelligence analysis into
the policy process directly and jeopardize the objectivity
of intelligence product. Some would cite the experience of
intelligence support to SALT negotiations, which created a
very close intelligence-policy relationship, as refuting this
fear. Others would cite the SALT experience as confirming
its validity.
Concern about the quality of intelligence analysis
has several possible implications for Community management
structure:
- Some argue that analysis and production are
starved for resources relative to collection
and processing. Modest resource shifts from
the latter to the former would, supposedly,
yield major benefits. While intuitively
persuasive, this cannot as yet be proved t
the satisfaction of all authorities involved.
In any case, it would take strong central
leadership in the Community to accomplish a
meaningful shift of this sort.
- Some maintain that major improvements in
product quality can only be achieved by break-
ing intelligence analysis away from organizations
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that are dominated by collection and related
intelligence activities. A self-standing
national intelligence analysis organization is
required, in this view, to allow its management
to concentrate on analysis, to make persuasive
claims for resources, and to maintain academic
and foreign contacts that are now inhibited by
identification with collection, especially CIA's
clandestine service.
- Others would argue that separation of analysis
from collection is dangerous and counterproductive.
Collection can only be focused efficiently if it
is directly responsive to the information require-
ments of analysts. In turn, analysis must be
based on a thorough awareness of source capabilities.
Attention to the quality of intelligence products and
the involvement of consumers in establishing production
priorities has lately been given new impetus by President
Carter's expressed interest.
Possible Conclusions of the PRM-11, Task 2 Report
Full satisfaction of consumer desires for intelligence
is not possible because needs are theoretically unlimited
and constantly growing in practice. Major improvements require
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steady effort at many levels of the Community. No single
innovation will be a panacea.
Because there are so many different kinds of consumers
with different needs, diversity of intelligence service at
the "output end" is required. Although uneven in effective-
ness, the Community has such diversity today in several major
departmental production entities and one major national
production organization -- CIA. They can serve a diversity
of consumers and also be brought together for a national
judgment on vital issues. The challenge is to make this
system work better.
Closer producer-consumer relations are probably
desirable. But fears for their impact on objectivity are
not baseless. Formal mechanisms are less promising than
steady management attention within the Community, and a more
thoughtful attitude on the part of consumers.
Possible Decision Options for the President
Task 3 of PRM-11 may present the President with
options such as the following on ways to improve intelligence
quality:
- Explicit exhortation to consumers and intelli-
gence managers to pursue many paths toward
improvement; emphasis on product evaluation
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by Community elements, consumers, and the NSC
(as in the NSC Semiannual Review); use of the
PFIAB for product evaluations.
- Creation of formal mechanisms, like the NSCIC,
to establish production goals and quality criteria.
- Giving added authority to the DCI to manage
Community resources, permitting shifts of such
resources in favor of analysis and production.
- Separation of analysis from collection and other
intelligence activities. (See Option JF, under
Issue No. 1.)
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Issue No. 3
Defining the role and authorities of the DCI in
wartime:
The role of the DCI in wartime is left exceedingly
vague by present law and executive orders. No statute implies
that the role of the DCI in war should be substantially dif-
ferent from that in peacetime. Several executive instruments
and agreements stipulate that specific assets managed by the
DCI in peacetime should come under the Secretary of Defense
or military commands in wartime. NPIC becomes subordinate
to the Secretary of Defense in wartime under NSCID No. 8.
I NSCID No. 5 provides that CIA clandestine operations
"in or from a theater [of war]" shall, with certain exceptions,
come under the theater commander.
It is explicitly assumed by the Department of Defense
that national intelligence collection assets in the Department
of Defense, notably NSA and the Special Air Force, will be
fully and directly responsive to Department of Defense tasking
and control during wartime, although in peace they derive their
routine requirements and tasking from Community mechanisms
presided over by the DCI.
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Underlying this problem are two divergent. philosophies.
The Department of Defense, especially the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, tend to believe that no intelligence or reconnaissance
asset not directly commanded by defense elements can be expected
in wartime to be available to meet defense needs. Since such
defense needs are clearly paramount in war, Department of
Defense elements have a prima facie case for controlling all
or most national intelligence assets in war, according to this
view.
Past DCI's have tended to acquiesce at least tacitly
to this philosophy, in part to avoid potential conflicts with
the Department of Defense over a condition that was generally
believed either to be unlikely or not practically relevant to
the DCI's peacetime concerns.
Another philosophy holds, however, that the DCI is as
much a leader and manager in war as in peacetime. Two de
facto wars, Korea and Vietnam, saw more or less orderly
adjustment of peacetime arrangements to the conduct of war
without major shifts in authority. In a major conflict, short
of all-out nuclear exchange, in this view, there would be as
much need as in peace for a well-managed national intelligence
effort and autonomous channels of intelligence advice to the
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Lack of clarity in the DCI's wartime role has
- complicated the task of sorting out overlapping
interests and responsibilities with respect to
"national," "departmental," and "tactical"
intelligence in peacetime.
- prevented the DCI from instituting realistic
contingency plans for wartime, e.g., with
respect to location, communications, collection
tasking.
- complicated DCI crisis management planning.
This entire subject tends to product emotional reactions
when directly confronted.
Possible Conclusions of the PRM-11, Task 2 Report
Lack of clarity in the DCI wartime role has'produced
serious problems along lines discussed above.
Complete acceptance of the Department of Defense
philosophy would put the DCI out of business as a Community
leader in wartime
There is a good case that the reasons to have a
DCI-led Community in peacetime are equally valid in war.
But the Department of Defense would have to be assured that
its needs for intelligence at all levels could be adequately
met. This is particularly pressing as national intelligence
assets, notably space systems, acquire more capability to
supply tactical intelligence.
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The Department of Defense's lack of control over -
national reconnaissance systems in space during war might
augur for their acquisition of more specialized wartime
reconnaissance capabilities. But the physical vulnerability
of space systems in war is likely to be a more compelling
motive in this respect.
Possible Decision Options for the President
It is highly likely and certainly would be desirable
that Task 3 of PRM-11 clarify the DCI's role in war. Some
aspects of this problem will have to be left for further study
and detailed planning. Reliance on space assets for tactical
reconnaissance will be a major issue in the prospective PRM
on national space policy. But the President could constructively
decide on the general philosophy to be followed in defining
the DCI's wartime role:
- All Community elements located in the Department
of Defense today, plus CIA, become fully sub-
ordinated to the Secretary of Defense in wartime.
- Some elements, such as NSA, Special Air Force,
and clandestine assets in theaters of war come
under the direct tasking authority of the
Secretary of Defense or his subordinates; the
DCI loses his role in defining requirements.
- The DCI commands the Community in war as fully
as he commands it in peacetime; what changes is
the degree of attention he must pay to military
requirements, as directed by the President.
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Issue #5
Defining the role of intelligence organizations in
analysis that combines intelligence data and judgments with
data and judgments on U.S. policy, capabilities and operations;
e.g., net assessments and crisis situation reporting.
Discussion
U.S. intelligence is continually obliged to analyze
international developments in which the United States is
itself an influential actor. Such problems arise in analysis
of the foreign policy objectives, military goals and capabilities,
and perceptions of other countries. Since the foreign view of
U.S. behavior and capabilities is frequently not complete and
explicit in intelligence sources or may be inaccurate, sound
intelligence judgment frequently requires the inclusion of data
or judgments about the U.S. If such inclusion is not explicit,
it occurs implicitly with the result that conclusions are
unpersuasive or appear biased by subjective, but unrevealed
assumptions.
Prevailing professional attitudes within intelligence
organizations, especially CIA, oblige a considerable distance
from U.S. policy matters and a reluctance to pass judgment on
them. This is reinforced by the reluctance of some policymakers,
notably in the Department of Defense, to see intelligence
entities involved directly in policy deliberations. But the
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amalgam of foreign and U.S. perspectives of "Red and Blue"
information must occur anyway. For example, any effort to
assess the capabilities, present and future, of Soviet military
forces must confront the question: Capabilities to do what?
The major concern has to be capabilities to wage war against
present and future U.S. forces. Similarly, any overall assess-
ment of Soviet objectives in world affairs must include an
assessment of the Soviet view of the U.S. Such a view is
impossible to insulate from the analysts' own appreciation of
the U.S. As in all analytical work, the more explicitly such
considerations are treated, the better.
Dilemmas of mixing "Red and Blue" information have been
increasingly acute for intelligence in connection with the
rising demand for net assessments and other comparative analyses
involving the U.S. side. In addition to voicing fears about
being drawn into judgments on U.S. policy and capabilities,
intelligence organizations have complained that they are not
supplied with sufficient information on the U.S. side of most
net assessment problems; nor do they have the requisite number
of trained analysts, e.g., in military operations research, to
meet increased demands for net assessments.
A related problem arises in the area of crisis situation
reporting. Following crises in the Middle East and Southeast
Asia, President Ford instructed the DCI to consolidate into one
authoritative National Intelligence Situation Report (NISR)
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the plethora of crisis "sitreps" that flood the upper reaches
of government from the several departments. He further
stipulated that such reports should include necessary infor-
mation on U.S. actions and events. Procedures have been
devised that would create a single interagency task force
to produce a single NISR. Although not formally promulgated
yet, these procedures were tried out during the Korean "Paul
Bunyan" contingency with favorable results.
The JCS has been very reluctant, however, to see any
operational information on U.S. military actions included in
an intelligence publication, both for security reasons and
to preserve its ability to advise and report directly to the
President. A DCI-JCS-SecDef Memorandum of Understanding has
been under consideration at lower levels to compromise on this
problem. It would provide for inclusion of JCS operational
information in the NISR at JCS discretion and afford the DCI
information on JCS options under consideration for his use in
NSC or SCC discussions, provided that information does not
appear in intelligence publications.
State has been reluctant to participate in NISR Task
Forces, largely for reasons of scarce manpower. State has
also been reluctant to share its version of "Blue information,"
sensitive diplomatic cables, with intelligence elements.
Possible Conclusions of the PRM-ll, Task 2 Report
A large part of the problem with net assessment is
semantic. At one level, net assessment merely comprises a
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set of tools to be used for analytic purposes. To the extent
those tools illuminate the capabilities, perceptions, and
options of a foreign country, intelligence can and must use
them, assembling the data and necessary skills to do so.
Failure to do so detracts from the quality and relevance of
intelligence analysis. Some risk of appearing to pass judgment
on U.S. policies and capabilities has to be run.
The more knotty question arises when the principal
purpose of a net assessment is explicitly to inform selection
among U.S. policy or force capability options. Here, intel-
ligence professionals would prefer to play a secondary,
supportive role, fearing that their credibility would be eroded
and their competence overtaxed by direct involvement in policy
disputes. Some, notably in DoD, approve this reluctant posture.
Others, occasionally found in the NSC and Congress, would like
to see intelligence more deeply involved in policy net assess-
ments as a counterweight to established policy departments.
With respect to crisis reporting, the main requirement
of the Intelligence Community is to design a consolidated crisis
management and reporting system for itself. It is then up to
higher authority to determine if and to what extent that system
should also embrace reporting to the U.S. side of a crisis
situation.
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Possible Decision Options for the President
? Accept the somewhat confused status quo on net
assessment.
? Create a net assessment element under the NSC.
? Direct the policy departments to augment their net
assessment capabilities.
? Direct the DCI to become more involved in net
assessments.
? Direct that the amalgam of "Red and Blue" crisis
data should occur in the NSC Staff, DoD, or State.
? Direct the DCI to take responsibility for all source
crisis reporting.
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Issue #6
Defining the role of the DCI as substantive intelli-
gence advisor and advisor on intelligence operations to
Congress.
In all probability, neither the amiable discretions
of several decades nor the broad but retrospective investi-
gations of the past three years are instructive precedent
for the future relations of U.S. intelligence and Congress.
The character of those relations is just now evolving and
cannot be unilaterally shaped by the Executive Branch. But
at the same time, constructive initiative by the President
and the DCI at this crucial time seems likely to influence
those relations for a considerable period into the future.
The DCI will have basic responsibilities to Congress:
To defend the NFIP and Budget
To give testimony on legislation relating to
intelligence operations, restrictions, structures,
,security, etc.
To inform with respect to sensitive foreign
operations
To provide substantive intelligence relating to
U.S. foreign and national security policy.
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Although the last two roles have long antecedents,
they may prove to be the most troublesome in light of
Congress's determination to exert more influence over
intelligence operations specifically and U.S. foreign and
defense policy more generally. These roles appear likely
to raise important concerns about security and about the
respective prerogratives of Congress and the President in
the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs.
The nature of these relations will depend, of course,
on the number and make-up of Congressional committees with
special oversight responsibilities regarding intelligence,
security rules established, and other modalities.
But much more crucial will be any basic charter
legislation that defines the roles, missions, responsi-
bilities and structures of intelligence entities, including
the DCI or other senior national intelligence functionary of
the U.S.
The draft bill to establish a National Intelligence
Authority '(Miller draft) currently under consideration in
the SSCI gives an indication of the maximalist conception of
DCI responsibilities to Congress some in the Congress hold
reasonable. It would in effect make the DCI coequally
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responsible to the President and Congress. Yet it displays
little willingness on the part of the Congressional committees
to assume responsibility for intelligence operations on
which they demand extensive prior information.
Undoubtedly, the future relations of intelligence and
Congress will be governed by some combination of new law and
evolutionary practice.
Possible Conclusions of the PRM 11, Task 2 Report
Possible Decision Options for the President
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Issue #7
Enhancing the effectiveness of the DCI in the protection
of intelligence sources and methods.
(Forthcoming)
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Issue #8
Establishing national policy and appropriate coordinating
methanisms on U.S. counterintelligence activities.
(Forthcoming)
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X22 March 1977
PRM 11, Task 2
Working Group Discussion
24 March 1977 -- 1400 hours
Room 6 E 0708
The Collection Guidance and Requirements Process
1. The collection guidance and requirements process
is supposed to do three things:
focus collection tasking officially
-- serve as a basis for performance evaluation
-- serve as a basis for programming
How well, in general, is it perceived to work?
2. Is the requirements mechanism responsive specifi-
cally to the needs of the Department of Defense?
Are tactical requirements given adequate con-
sideration in the development of national
collection systems?
-- Where are the major impediments to the rapid free
flow of requirements from the field?
3. Are the collection requirements mechanisms adequately
responsive to departments and agencies other than Defense;
particularly with respect to non-NFIB agencies such as NRC,
ACDA, and Commerce?
4. Do the current DCI collection committee mechanisms
impede or facilitate the development of requirements?
Are they representative of community interests and
responsive to the full range of needs?
Are criticisms of the requirements process funda-
mental to that activity or traceable to collection
limitations?
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Can the requirements system function adequately
during crisis or in war-time?
What are the organizational alternatives to the
present system?
5. Is the process of assessing satisfaction of
requirements (adequacy and cost) effective?
7. Congressional committees have directed much
critical questioning toward the requirements process and
understand it poorly., Many inside intelligence do not
understand it adequately. Why is this so and what might be
done to alleviate the problem?
8. Is the Community knowledgeable about and sympathetic
toward the efforts of ICS/OPP to build a comprehensive
planning system that also embraces the requirements process-
2
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