PRM-11 DRAFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000200010008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 26, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers 26 May 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Bowie
SUBJECT: PRM-11 Draft
Attached is my suggested revision to the portion
of the PRM-11 draft (pp 22-23) dealing with "Arms
Control Monitoring and Verification." I proposed
that this section be included in the PRM in order to
call attention to two issues: (1) DCI's responsibi-
lities in monitoring arms control agreement, and
(2) Intelligence Community's relationship with ACDA.
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26 May 1977
Proposed Revision to "Arms Control Monitoring and Verification" Portion
of PRM-11 Draft (pp 22-23):
Arms Control Monitoring and Verification: Since the early 1960s, arms
control has been an institutionalized aspect of US foreign policy. Accumulating
agreements, ongoing negotiations, and consideration of new arms control options
within the US Government have added new responsibilities to the Intelligence
Community.
In general, the task of collecting and producing intelligence for arms
control planning and for monitoring compliance with agreements is shared'
throughout most of the Intelligence Community. Major technical collection
systems are relied on heavily for this purpose, and their role is recognized
as legitimate by both the US and the USSR under the term "national technical
means" of verification. Other collectors contribute materially to the total
intelligence picture relative to the activities limited by treaties. Most
intelligence agencies of the Community have a general or specialized interest
in substantive intelligence issues in arms control planning and in monitoring
compliance with agreements. CIA, DIA, the Services, and INR are concerned with
a broad range of arms control topics. ERDA has special interests in the areas
of nuclear test bans and non-proliferation.
The role of the DCI in monitoring compliance with arms agreements arises
from his several functions as advisor to the President, producer of national
intelligence, and source of leadership on Community collection and resource
management. Although the DCI has been given a prominent role in the monitoring
of strategic arms limitation agreements, his responsibilities and authority
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for monitoring all arms control agreements should be made explicit. The DCI
is typically called upon to provide the President, the NSC and, as appropriate,
the Congress with his assessment of the capabilities of intelligence to
monitor arms agreements. Moreover, the DCI and other Community managers must
consider the needs of arms control in developing future intelligence collection
capabilities.
The DCI is not a final authority on verification. All members of the
NSC have the ability and the responsibility to develop their own views on
verification issues. Moreover, the President and the Secretary of State in
the past have reserved the right to reach a final judgment, as a political
matter, as to whether a foreign state has violated a formal agreement.
The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is required to
advise the Secretary of State, the President, the NSC, and the Congress on
arms control matters including the verifiability of agreements. The Senate
recently has considered a law obliging the Director of ACDA to report to
Congress on the verifiability of each proposal for arms control agreements
submitted to and by the US, and on the numbers of people engaged throughout
the Government (including the Intelligence Community) on verification matters.
ACDA has a strong interest in all intelligence bearing on arms control,
but it lacks a self-standing competence outside intelligence to monitor arms
agreements. ACDA has found its formal involvement in Community affairs inade-
quate to its needs. In the area of verification, it sees itself as more than
one of many customers, and finds the interface provided by State's INR to be
insufficient. ACDA has sought more direct involvement in Community production,
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in current collection strategies, and in program and resource management bearing
on verification. One step ACDA has proposed has been formal membership in the
NFIB and on appropriate DCI committees.
In view of ACDA's statutory obligations in the verification area, the
question continually arises as to the proper relationship between the Intelli-
gence Community and ACDA. This needs to be addressed and clearly defined.
Past DCIs have resisted formal affiliation by ACDA with the Intelligence
Community in the belief that only intelligence collectors and producers should
be so affiliated and that less formal producer-consumer relationships should
satisfy ACDA's needs. Currently, the Intelligence Community treats ACDA as a
major consumer of intelligence separate from the Department of State, and DCI
committee chairmen have been encouraged to invite ACDA observers to participate
in committee deliberations on subjects of special interest to ACDA.
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