PRM/NSC-11, TASK 2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000200010007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 25, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Intelligence Community Staff 25 May 1977
FROM
erector o Performance Evaluation
and Improvement
SUBJECT PRM/NSC-11, Task 2
1. The Director of Central Intelligence will chair a
meeting of the SCC Subcommittee on Task 2 of PRM/NSC-11 from
1300 to 1400 on Friday, 27 May 1977, in Room 6W02 of the
Community Headquarters Building, 1724 F Street.
2. The purpose of the meeting will be to review the
subject report (Tab B) and to provide guidance for final
revisions.
3. Also attached (Tab A) is a proposed agenda of
specific topics meriting review and guidance by the sub-
Attachment:
Tab A - Proposed Agenda
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upon removal of Tab B. SECRET
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PRM/NSC-11, Task 2
SCC Subcommittee Meeting
27 May 1977
"The Roles of the DCI and US Intelligence:
An Organizational Analysis"
Proposed Agenda of Topics for Guidance
1. FORWARD (Page iii)
The FOREWARD makes the point that the tasked subject
(focused on the DCI) and the drafting assignment of this
report prevented full justice being done to the interests
of other major authorities over US intelligence, particularly
the Secretary of Defense. Is this caveat necessary or
adequate? The Department of Defense has a short, but compre-
hensive paper on the views and concerns of the Secretary of
Defense that might well serve as a parallel submission to
this report.
2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Pages iv-x)
This is new material, not previously reviewed by
Subcommittee representatives.
11
3. SECTION II, Basic Criteria for Organizational Judgment
(Pages 5-11) (See footnote on Page 5.)
Is this section necessary or useful? The Department of
Defense believes not.
4. Arms Control Monitoring and Verification (Pages 22-23)
This new, previously unreviewed, subsection covers a gap
in earlier drafts. It has been suggested that a clearer
distinction should be drawn between monitoring, which is an
intelligence function, and verification, which is more a
matter of political judgment and, therefore, the responsi-
bility of the President, the National Security Council, and
the Director of the Arms Control. and Disarmament Agency.
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5. Requirements, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
Intelligence for the Future (Pages 35-41); and
parallel text submitted by the Department of Defense
for this subsection (Pages 4la-41d)
The Intelligence Community Staff draft, partly responsive
to Department of Defense comments, tends to focus critically
on the structural problems presented to the DCI by arrangements
before and after Executive Order 11905. The Department of
Defense draft tends to be less critical, emphasizes the poten-
tial of pre-Executive Order 11905 arrangements and the role
of DCIs' personal proclivities, and the disadvantages of
giving the DCI greater resource management responsibilities
that may conflict with his other roles and intrude on depart-
mental responsibilities. Subsection IV. C. 2_.=-of the Assessment,
pages 74-81, returns to these issues.
6. ANNEX: Figures, following Page 81.
Ten previously unreviewed figures are provided largely
to present organizational and other data to the less informed
reader that would otherwise burden an already lengthy text.
Only Figure 6 should be contentious; it attempts to depict
differing levels of DCI authority in Community management.
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Copy No.
The Roles of the DCI and
U.S. Intelligence:
An Organizational Analysis
F OREWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i i i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
T . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Basic Criteria for Organizational Judgment. . . . . . . 5
III. The Roles of the DCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. Principal Advisor to the President and the
National Security Council on Foreign Intelligence
Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Producer of National Intelligence . . . . . . . . . 16
1. National Intelligence Vehicles . . . . . . . . 16
2. Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
C. Leader of the Intelligence Community. . . . . . . . 28
1. Current Collection Management: The
Requirements and Priorities System . . . . . . 29
2. Requirements, Planning, Programming and
Budgeting Intelligence for the Future . . . . . 35
D. Head of CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
E. Protector of Intelligence Sources and Methods . . . 48
F. Participant in.U.S. Foreign Counterintelligence
Policies and Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
G. Guarantor of Propriety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
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H. Coordinator of Liaison with Foreign Intelligence
Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
I. Spokesman to Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
J. Public Spokesman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
IV. Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A. Propriety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
B. Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C. Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
1. Current Collection, Requirements,
Priorities and Tasking . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2. Assembling Resources for the Future:
Programming, Budgeting, and Other
Management Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
ANNEX (Figures 1 through 10)
ii
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30 June 1977
NOTE FOR: Jim Taylor
1. I have made a few annotations on your draft. Herewith two
additional points:
1) A thread which runs through several of your
points is the definition of the DCI's authority. In
the paper itself, the crux of this is in the short
passage which talks of the check and balances provided
by the right of appeal. In fact, this language is so
permissive that it would permit any element in Defense
to block, delay, or obstruct any initiative by the DCI
that did not take its fancy, however small. What is
needed is language explicitly stating what issues can
be appealed at what level, and setting firm time limits.
For instance:
a) The DCI's orders will be binding on
all elements of the Community if an appeal has
not been made and sustained as follows:
-- In resource matters by the Secretary
of Defense through the 0MB to the
President, within 30 days. (This
goes with your Point 7.)
-- In requirements matters to the
"consumer-producer union," within
one week.
-- In tasking matters to the Assistant
to the President for National Security
Affairs, within 24 hours.
2) At various points in the paper it refers to physical
separation of the production elements from CIA, organizational
separation, legal separation, and de facto separation. Or-
ganizational and de facto are practical and in fact the DCI
has already decided to do so. Legal and physical have all
kinds of traps in them and the latter would be extremely
expensive and time consuming. The less said on those two
subjects the better.
Richard Lehman
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1. It is important to focus on thee storical background to the
issues we are discussing today. Congress in 1947 created the DCI as the
nation's senior intelligence officer. It did not, however, define what his
role in wartime should be. This omission is the fundamental reason for our
being here.
2. It is generally agreed that the DCI is responsible under the President
for the production of national intelligence, and for the coordination of the
collection and analysis effort that underlies that intelligence, in peacetime.
It is also generally agreed that the Secretary of Defense is responsible under
the President for the direction of the armed forces in wartime and for the
maintenance of the necessary military capabilities in peacetime. But those
military capabilities include many of the same intelligence capabilities that
are essential to the DCI doing his peacetime job.
3. The Secretary of Defense is only doing his duty when he insists on
the maximum control of these. intelligence capabilities in peacetime, because
only then can he be. assured that they are properly organized and trained to
carry out their wartime mission. The DCI is only doing his duty when he insists
on the maximum control of these capabilities in peacetime because only then
can he meet the national needs as he perceives them. It is only natural under
these circumstances that there would be rivalry between their subordinates in
CIA and DoD, and in fact, such a rivalry has persisted for decades.
4. With the maturing of the intelligence business, with the constantly
increasing demands on it for more and better intelligence and intelligence on
new and unfamiliar subjects, and particularly with the development of complex,
centrally controlled technical collection systems, what had been a tolerable
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condition of fiction at the margin developed into sometimes bitter guerrilla
A
warfare. In recent years, the increasing cost of these systems and the increasing
constraints put on intelligence spending by successive administrations and by
Congress have raised the conflict to the level of trench warfare on a broad
front. This escalating rivalry has blocked the creation of a single coherent
national intelligence collection system, one capable of serving both peacetime
and wartime needs1for many years. But is is because we need to manage complex
systems, to control costs, to produce better intelligence the creation of such
k
a system is a national task of high priority.
5. In saying this, I have not yet alluded to our great present vulnerability,
the fact that we have no coherent way of moving from peace to war. Indeed,
while we have. not been tested since our coordination problems became acute,
I believe-that conflict would be greatly exacerbated during a crisis leading up
to war and could seriously weaken our response to it. Under crisis conditions,
the pressures from Defense for taking exclusive control at the earliest possible
time will be greatest when the demands on the DCI for intelligence are also at
a maximum and when judgment that encompasses other than military factors will
be of utmost importance if war is to be avoided.
6. A single system, under single management, devoted to the continuum of
peacetime, crisis, and wartime needs, stands a much better chance of meeting all
of them efficiently than the present hodgepodge of committees, ad hoc arrange-
ments, and bureaucratic conflict. I submit that it is time to cut this Gordian
knot,
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 EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
I
DCI
2
DDCI
3
D/DCI/IC
4
DDS&T
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
D/DCI/NI
GC
10
LC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/ Pers
14
D/S
15
DTR
16
A/DCI/PA
17
AO/ DCI
18
C/IPS
19
DCI/SS
20
21
22
Remarks;
Pleats to se aitt' ty tale s a dd I t A
11-1p . 06
Executive Secretary
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