REORGANIZATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000200010003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REGULATION

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WA3HINGTON
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Presidential Directive/NSC-
The Secretary crate
The Secretary a efense
The Attorney General..
The Director of central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Reorganization .the Intelligence Community
I have reviewed the results of the-PRM/NSC-Il studies relating to
organization of the Intelligence- C t.munity..'and subsequent S'CC
Committee, chaired by the DCI and to include the. Secretary
of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Treasury,
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
and other attendees as deemed appropriate by the chairman,
will meet as an intelligence requirements committee. The
primary function of the PRG intelligence requirement
meetings will be to define. and prioritize substantive
intelligence requirements. and. evaluate analytical
product performance. The PRC will submit semiannual
reports to the NSC on its activities.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence will have during
peacetime full tasking responsibility and authority for
translating PRC-validated national intelligence requirements
into specific intelligence collection objectives and. targets
and assigning these to intelligence collection organizations.
For these purposes a National Intelligence Tasking Center
jointly manned by civilian and military personnel will be
established under the direction of the DCI to task all national
intelligence collection systems. The Tasking Center will also
deliberations and have reached the following conclusions:-
1. The National Security Council will continue to act as the
highest organizational entity that provides guidance and
direction to the development and formulation of national
intelligence activities. To this end, the Policy Review
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be responsible for ensuring that the resulting intelligence
flow is routed immediately to relevant components and
commands. In periods of crisis or during war the power
to task collection facilities may be delegated to the Secretary
of Defense upon the :express direction of the President.
The Director of Central Intelligence will have full and exclusive
authority for approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
(NFIP) budget prior to its. presentation (through usual procedures)
to the President, for its presentation.to Congress, reprogramming
of NFIP funds and monitoring program implementation. In
response to DCI guidance,, the departments and agencies of the
NFIP will submit their proposed national program budgets to
the DCI and assure that the DCI has all information necessary
to perform his budgetary responsibilitids. The National Foreign
Intelligence Board will advise the DCI' on all of his budgetary
responsibilities in the same manner as it does on national intelligence
production and other activities of common concern. Department
heads will retain the right to reclama DCI budget decisions to. the
President.
The DCI will be provided with adequate staff support to ensure
his full access to relevant information and the capability to carry
out program audits and evaluation.
5. The Director of Central Intelligence will continue to act as the
primary adviser to the National Security Council and the
President on substantive foreign intelligence and to have full
responsibility for production of national-intelligence in
appropriate.consultation with departmental analytical centers.
He will retain all other powers provided to him under relevant
statutes and executive orders.
Apart from the foregoing, line authority will remain with the
heads of the relevant Departments and Agencies. All other
organizational and operational arrangements and responsibilities
assigned under existing statutes and executive orders shall remain
in full effect. Personnel administration, management and support
activities, operational implementation of DCI tasking, and audit/
inspector general functions will remain as presently assigned
under departmental arrangements.
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The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall
draft an Executive Order to implement the above decisions for review
by the NSC Special Coordination Committee and my approval This
willprovide the basis for consultation with Congress on the development
of appropriate charter legislation.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Line authority implies responsibility, legal
authority, and accountability. It includes (but is
not limited to):
--responsibility and legal accountability for
the activities undertaken by an organization,-
--legal authority to issue orders and ensure that.
they are carried out.
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Line Authority
- Hire/Fire/Promote
- Control over development of budget and flow of funds.
- Make policy governing agency operations
- Oversight responsibility/authority
- Plan for agency future
Residual Line Authority - Where
Agency must serve. two. masters--one having dominant interest in
structure, the other in operations and product.
DOD
Residual Line Authority
- Determine budget requirements
- Fiscal accountability
- Day-to-day management of security,
training, personnel ceilings,
operations'
- Establish internal priorities
DCI
Operations Line Authority
- Final word on cross program
tradeoffs
- Disburse funds
- No direct control
- Final word on priorities
relating-to community
interest policy
- Control dissemination policy
within DOD
- Control dissemination
outside DOD
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Full Line Authority - means an agency is ultimately subordinate
to the decision of the Director/SecDef on issues of money, personnel,
operations and interagency relationships.
Exercise through these mechanisms:
1. Determination of budget format and control over
flow of funds;
2. Final word on program approval;
3. Financial audit authority;
4, Hire/fire authority over principal appointees;
5. Determination of personnel ceilings and division of
labor;
6. Establishment of operational priorities and goals;
7. Oversight through Inspector General;
8. Determination of intragency policy and rules of
dissemination.
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2 7 JUN 1977
Summary of DoD Position on PRM 11
Statement:
According to the DoD paper, "Option A includes nine significant
charges to the current system.
Continent :
Restructuring of system for setting priorities:
Responsibility for setting intelligence requirements and priorities
would be separated from management policy, operating policy and
budget decision-making by setting up a 'new committee of consumers.
It would include the Vice President, the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, and ether user departments who would be
represented on a rotating basis. This priorities committee
would be supported by the NSC staff."
This is basically a good idea, and we have proposed a similar
arrangement. DCI should be represented on this committee.
Statement:
The DoD paper says, "New tasking procedure: Responsibility for
tasking collection facilities during peacetime would be explicitly
delegated to the DCI. He would seek the advice of committees of
consumer and producer representatives. Tasking decisions could be
appealed by consumers to the priorities committee, there to be finally
decided."
Comment:
Making the delegation to the DCI explicit will do little; everyone
agrees that the DCI is in charge of tasking. Absent is the authority
to ensure that the tasking is carried out by Intelligence Community
collectors not under DCI's authority. DCI has responsibility without
authority.
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Statement:
The DOD paper says, "In crisis or war, power to task collection
facilities would be delegated to the Secretary of Defense."
Comment :
We agree, as the statement appears here. Later in the paper,
however, it is stated that the SecDef should have the authority to
decide when a crisis warrants his taking control. This is absolutely
unacceptable--the President should make this decision.
Statement:
The DOD paper states, "Expanded access to data: Access to the
data produced by each collection facility would be specifically
authorized for each production facility."
Comment:
This is a critically important issue; we and Defense apparently
agree that it is a problem area. We believe, however, that progress
on this issue, which has resisted solution for 30 years under the
present structure, is extremely difficult unless the various components
which help to create the problem--in CIA as well as Defense--are under
unified control. In short, the goal is laudable, but we do not
believe that the means to achieve real progress can be developed
within the existing structure.
Statement:
The DOD paper proposes, "IC staff members designated by the DCI
would have explicit authority for direct access to program managers,
with information copies of requests to a designated point within
the department concerned."
Comment :
This is fundamental to the IC Staff function and is a capability
they should now have. This statement illustrates the difficulty
the DCI has had in getting access to information from components
not under his control.
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Statement:
The DoD paper suggests, "Revised budget procedures: Responsibility
for preparing budget requests for each of the intelligence entities
would rest with the department or agency with line authority over
the entity. Those budget requests would be submitted to, reviewed
and amended by the PRC(I), chaired by the DCI and supported by the
IC staff. Appeals would be directed to the NSC. The PRC(I) would
submit a consolidated intelligence budget to the President."
Comment:
DCI with the PRC(I) mechanism now has the capability to review
and amend budgets submitted to him by Community components. Presently
his decisions, or more correctly recommendations, can be appealed
to the NSC by the SecDef or Secretary of State. This portion of the
DoD's Option A is not a change from existing authorities.
Statement:
The DoD paper says, "The budget approved by the PRC(I) would be
"fenced" from departmental or DCI changes. Reprogramming decisions
requiring Congressional action would be made by the PRC(I) and below
that level by the departments."
Comment:
Decisions or recommendations by the DCI in his PRC(I) capacity
are now fenced by Congressional refusal to allow funds over a certain
level to be reprogrammed. In essence the DCI is given the authority
to "fence" PRC(I) fund allocation decisions that are now fenced
anyway by Congress by the need to seek reprogramming approval.
Statement:
The DoD paper suggests, "The IC staff would have explicit authority
to verify program and budget implementation by the departments."
Comment:
Again the access to information when the IC Staff wants it is
the essence of the problem. Explicit authority to verify program
and budget implementation by the departments is only effective if it
can be implemented routinely. Access to information would need tacit
DoD concurrence. The DCI's only appeal for noncompliance would be
to the President. Thus there is a built-in area of friction between
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the DCI and SecDef with the President the only arbiter. Not very
workable.
Statement:
The DoD paper proposes, "Improved safeguards against abuse:
The DCI would be divested of current responsibilities for ensuring
strong inspector generals community-wide. In order to avoid conflict
of interest, these responsibilities would be transferred to the IOB."
Comment:
It is organizationally sound to give the IOB its own ability to
monitor intelligence activities and to investigate reported abuses.
However, it is probable that the DCI would also want an IG capability
to oversee the intelligence activities taking place under his authority.
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Must integrate with, not separate from NSA, NRO. Today
DDO charges off to do the whole job.
Also close to analysts.
No evidence fragmented authority provides better insurance
against abuse.
Agencies with two bosses play one against the other.
Oversight bodies and a single individual they can hold
responsible are the preferable route.
Congress
IOB
Process - NSC/Cabinet/President
Fact that one man is in charge does not free him from
criticism within system.
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BASIC STATEMENT
I. Fortunate Harold's clear statement brings us close to agreement
on what problems are:
? 1st Item - Establish priorities - agree.
? Next 2 Items - Tasking - needs centralized control - differ
how obtain.
? 3 More Items - DCI access data - agree problem - not solution.
? 2 More on - DCI budget influence - again agree it's a problem
not solution.
Finally 1 Item - Accountability.
? Lump problem areas of access to data, tasking and budget controls
because all amount to same issue - what corrective action will suffice..
0 Option A relies on restatement of DCI's right of access and tasking.
I say "restatement" because DCI right of access, for instance, was
clearly stated in NS Act of 1947 and even more clearly 11905.
Yet as Option A indicates - still have a problem - I agree. I
would go so far as to say that we are almost as vulnerable today
to a failure to exchange intelligence data as we were in December.1941.
Do not think problems of access to info, tasking or budget control
all be solved by words - directives - DCI must have enough clout to
get info - to ensure his tasking is carried out.
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? I thought and hoped that some compromise such as Option A would
suffice. The process of developing PRM-11 persuaded me that this
would not be possible. The irrationality and emotion which that
exercise evoked was indicative of the strong and unhealthy under-
currents beneath what we would like to believe is a community.
Rather than a community we have'an organization 'of separate,
independent and fiercely competitive agencies.' Examples of lack
of cooperation; of protection of position; of withholding of
information are rife. These are dangerous in themselves. The
Congress is beginning to use them to exercise executive type
control over us. I feel a strong sense of need a desire within
the intelligence organizations for strong central leadership.
? Centralized control will also improve accountability. The committee
approach does not ensure quality of work or prevention of abuse.
There is not adequate control. The present system has been tried
for the past 30 years. It failed to prevent abuses.
? Essentially, this is the same struggle that we went through in
1947 when the DoD was carved out of the Army and the Air Force.
That act was also an effort to compromise - to fractionalize
control - it failed miserably and had to be replaced within two
years. In both '47 and '49, there were dire predictions that
that centralization would emasculate our services beyond usefulness.
Not so.
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Intelligence has progressed almost as much as Defense in 30 years -
terms importance - terms capabilities.
? Authority to produce intelligence not improved commensurately.
? Unique opportunity - coincidence Executive, Legislative and Public
interest - not moment for another in 30 years of partial biting of
bullets.
? Looked hard for middle ground -
Avoid placing President Jiff position.
Instance in which instinct that must be middle ground may not
be correct.
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POINTS IN REFUTATION OF SECDEF STATEMENT
1. The SecDef statement avers that we have an intelligence
community and that this is preferable to an intelligence "czar."
In fact, rather than a community we have an organization
of separate, independent and fiercely competitive agencies.
I though and hoped that some compromise step such as Option A
would suffice. The process of developing PRM-11 persuaded me that
this would not be possible, The irrationality and emotion
which that exercise evoked was indicative of the strong and
unhealthy undercurrents beneath what we would like to believe
is a community. Examples of lack of cooperation; of protection
of position; of withholding of information are Iife. These
are dangerous in themselves. The Congress is beginning to
use them to exercise executive control over us. There is a
need and a desire within the intelligence organizations for
strong central leadership.
2. It is clear from the fact that three of the nine changes
proposed in Option A relate to providing more complete access to
data within the IC, that the National Security Act of 1947 and
Executive Order 11905 of 1976 have failed in this regard. The Act
of 1947 made these same three "changes" 30 years ago. The
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Executive Order reaffirmed that a year and a half ago,, There
is no greater probability that a simple restatement of this
requirement today will be any more effective. We are almost
as vulnerable, today to a failure to exchange intelligence
data as we were in December 1941,
Quote - Section 3(4)
Quote NSA 1947
3. Centralized control will improve accountability. There
are already adequate checks & balances; there is not adequate
control. The so-called checks & balances system has been tired
for the past 30 years. It failed.
4. Essentially, this is the same struggle that we went through in
1947 when the DOD was carved out of the Army and Air Force. There
were dire predictions that that centralization would emasculate
our services beyond usefulness.
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Mr. Bowie --
Attached from Admiral Turner - for
the PRM 11 meeting at 5:00 p.m. today.
Alyce
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