HUMAN RIGHTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000100030020-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: September 7, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS September 7, 1977
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
ALSO: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Management
and Budget
The United States Representative to the
United Nations
The Administrator, Agency for
International Development
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, U. S. Information Agency
SUBJECT: Human Rights
Attached is the completed response to PI M.-28 on human rights. Request
you forward your comments to Jessica Tuchman by COB Tuesday,
September 13, 1977.
Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary
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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM/NSC 28: HUMAN RIGA'S
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Definition of U.S. objectives in the area of
Page
Number
human rights .....................................1
A. Overall objective ............................1
(1) Definition of Human Rights ............... 1
(2) 'imeframe ................................ 3
B. Reasons for Pursuing the Overall Objective ...4
C. Intermediate Objectives ......................5
D. Specific Objectives ..........................5
E. Recognizing the Costs of a Human Rights
Policy And Relation to Other Foreign Policy
Objectives ................................... 6
F. Strategies for Pursuing Our Human Rights
objectives ................................... 8
(1) Western Democracies ...................... 9
(2) Third World Nations, .....................9
(3) Communist States .......... ..............10
(4) Gross Violaters of Human Rights .......... 12
II. Identification of "a Consistent Pattern of Gross
Violations of Internationally Recognized Human
Rights" ........................................... 1
IIL Evaluation Actions Which U.S. Could Take to
Improve Human Rights Conditions .................. 13
A. Diplomatic Actions, Public Statements,
and Various Symbolic Acts ..,..................14
B. Changes in Levels of Security and Economic
Assistance and Food Aid.... ................. 15
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Number
(1) Security Assistance ... .................17
(2) Bilateral Economic Assistance ........... 19
(3) Trade and Investment Programs ........... 21
C. Initiatives in International Financial
Institutions ................................. 2.3
D. Use of Overseas Broadcast Facilities and
Cultural and Educational Programs ............ 26
(1) USIA ............. .....................26
(2) Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty (RFE/RL) ........................ 27
(3) Cultural and Educational Exchange ....... 27
E. Improved Access to the U.S. for Refugees
and Dissidents ............................... 27
F. Substantive and Procedural Initiatives
the U.S. Could Take in Various Inter-
national Forums ...............................28
(1) The United Nations ....................... 29
(2) Organization of American States .......... 30
IV. National Security Aspects of U.S. Policies
on Human Rights .................................. 30
V. Action to Promote Integration of Human Rights
Considerations into U.S. Foreign Policy .......... 30
VL A Strategy to Improve the Administration's
Relations with Congress in the Human Rights
Area ............................................. 32
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PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM/NSC-28: HUMAN RIGHTS
This study is submitted in response to the NSC
memorandum of May 20, 1977, requesting a review of United
States foreign policy with respect to human rights. The
major sections of the study are keyed to the NSC memo-
randum.
This study takes as its starting point the human
rights policy articulated consistently by the President
since his inauguration. Decisive actions have been taken
to advance this policy both by the President and by the
Secretary of State. Reactions have occurred around the
world.
Day-to-day decisions which must be taken to advance
the cause of human rights will require a careful weighing
of the circumstances in individual countries. The study
refines the overall thrust of our policy, evaluates the
instruments at our disposal to carry it out, and considers
costs, risks, and tradeoffs.
I. Definition of U.S. Objectives in the Area of Human
Rights.
A. Overall Objective.
The overall objective of our human rights policy is
to increase observance of human rights by governments.
1. Definition of Human Rights.
Generally accepted expressions of these rights
are found in the United Nations Charter and the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United
Nations in 1948. To maximize our effectiveness, our
policy should be directed to the most fundamental and
important human rights, as set forth below, and should
include the right to enjoy them without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion:
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First, the right to be free from governmental
violations of the integrity of the person: such viola-
tions include torture; cruel, .inhuman or degrading treat-
ment and punishment; arbitrary arrest or imprisonment;
denial of fair public trial; and invasion of the home
("the first group").
Second, economic and social rights: the right
to be free from government action or inaction which either
obstructs an individual's efforts to fulfill his vital
needs for food, shelter, health care and education or fails
adequately to support the individual in meeting basic needs
("the second group"). Fulfillment of these rights will
depend, in part, upon the stage of a. country's economic
development.
Third, civil and political liberties: these
include freedom of thought, of religion, of
speech, of the press; freedom of movement both within and
outside one's own country; and freedom to take part in
government (,'the third group").
The President and the Secretary of State have
expressly included the second and third groups within
the general purview of the Administration's human rights
policy. The rationale and the implications of including
these rights merit discussion.
Incorporation of the second group of rights in
our policy has particular implications for its application
to the Third World. A policy which subordinated these
rights would not only be inconsistent with our humanitarian
ideals and efforts, but would also be viewed unfavorably in
those countries where the tendency is to view basic economic
and social rights as the most important human rights of all.
As for the third group --- civil and political
rights -- a policy that ignored them would be so narrow
in construction as to sacrifice overall coherence. It
would also be untrue to our heritage and basic values.
We do not accept the charge that by promoting these rights
we seek to impose eighteenth century, Western ideas on
non-Western societies where they have no roots or
relevance. These rights have been espoused in principle
by virtually all governments and are of worldwide
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significance as a matter of practice. There is no
necessary inconsistency between political and civil
rights on the one hand and economic development on the
other.
Reliable and lasting protection against: viola-
tions of the first and second groups can only come with
the development of institutions that protect broadly
defined civil and political liberties. To stop the
torture of one person or to alleviate hunger in one
family is important. To build institutions that safe-
guard against torture and provide a steadily improving
standard of living must be our long-term goal. In espousing
the third group of rights, there is a particular need,
however, to avoid parochialism. Our goal is to enhance
basic human rights in diverse societies; we do not seek
to destabilize governirncnts or remake societies in our image.
The three groups of rights should be considered
equally important. However, that does not mean that, as
a practical matter, they will be pursued in the same way
or over the same time span. In countries where the first
group of rights is denied or threatened, the protection
of those rights has obvious priority, since human life
and fundamental human dignity are threatened. In countries
where the first group of rights is generally observed, but
political and civil-rights are abridged or non.--existent,
our policy should emphasize our support for those rights.
Promotion of economic rights 7.s, for the U.S., primarily
a matter of helping to stimulate economic development.
This includes cooperation with and contri_buti_on to bilateral
and multilateral foreign assistance efforts as well as other
measures (e. g. , in trade and finance) designed to strengthen
the world economy. We should also encourage other countries
to follow policies which will advance their economic and
social development.
2. Ti_meframe.
In seeking greater respect for all these rights
we must keep in mind the limits of our power and the
intractability of the problem. Our ability to change
human rights practices in other societies is limited,
even if we exert substantial efforts. Thus, our expecta-
tions mus L- be realistic, and we nziust concentrate on
encouraging the maximum possible evolutionary movement.
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There will, of course, be certain exceptional circumstances
in which we will seek dramatic improvements, as in our efforts
to promote majority rule in Rhodesia.
Realistic timeframes will differ by country and
by the type of human rights violation involved. The time-
frames within which to expect: improvements in group one
rights should, in general, be considerably shorter than
those in groups two and three.
Reasons for Pursuing the Overall Objective.
There are sound reasons, based in national interest
as well as our moral tradition and legal obligation, for
encouraging an increase in the respect that governments
accord to human rights. Pursuit of this objective:
(a) helps fulfill a moral obligation that we have
incurred by virtue of our heritage and values and our legal
obligations under the United Nations Charter;
(h) strengthens the rule of law and respect
for agreements by promoting the authority of the human
rights recognized in the United Nations Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki
Final Act and other international instruments and by
furthering the goal contained in U.S. laws authorizing
foreign assistance that our foreign policy promote in-
creased observance of internationally recognized human
rights by all countries;
(c) substitutes, in determining our attitude
toward Third World governments, a standard based on
governmental behavior toward people for an increasingly
outmoded Marxist---non-Marxist standard, and assists in the
philosophical debate with the Soviet Union over the type
of society worth developing;
(d) strengthens domestic support for our foreign
policy by reflecting the moral and ethical values of our
people;
(e) promotes the fundamental long-term American
interest in a world of nations whose systems of government
and societies reflect individual freedom and dignity.
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C. Intermediate Objectives.
In order to attain the overall objective set forth
above, we should seek to achieve the following broad inter-
mediate objectives:
(a) heighten international and national aware-
ness of human rights concerns in order to steadily increase
the norms of acceptable conduct in the human rights field.
efforts;
(b) attract international support for our
(c) demonstrate that countries which violate
basic human rights do so at a cost in their standing in
the international conununity. Conversely, that countries
with positive records or significant improving perfor-
mance benefit tangibly and intangibly from their efforts;
(d) promote and strengthen the efforts of inter-
national institutions as well as non-governmental organi-
zations to protect human rights;
(e) ensure that our own conduct measures up to
the same standards we apply to others;
(f) seek a rapid end to patterns of gross govern-
mental violations of the person, particularly murder, torture,
and lenthy imprisonment for political offenses.
(g) seek to increase U.S. resources available for
alleviating human suffering, particularly with regard to
refugees.
Specific Objectives.
Achievement of the overall objective and the broad
intermediate objectives set forth above will entail
pursuit of specific objectives in particular countries
and international institutions. The identification
of these objectives requires detailed
analysis of the human rights situation, as well as other
relevant factors, in other countries and of the possibili-
ties for action. This effort is presently underway at both
the Department of State and posts abroad.
While certain specific objectives are already apparent
such as an end to the state of seige in Chile, the release
of the Myongdong defendants in Korea, majority rule in
Rhodesia, increased emigration of minorities from Eastern
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Europe -- others will only emerge after additional
analysis. The pursuit of certain human rights
objectives, such as majority rule in Rhodesia and
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, will also
serve to enhance political and other policy goals.
E. Recognizing the Costs of a Human Rights Policy
and Relation to Other Foreign Policy Objectives.
As the promotion of human rights becomes one of our
basic foreign policy tenets, we are faced with the task
of relating human rights policy to our other major foreign
policy concerns. It has been, and will continue to be, a
difficult task. For we are adding an emphasis on human
rights to an already wide range of policy goals, many of
which, in the nature of things, come into conflict with
one another at times.
Day by day, country by country, human rights
considerations are being weighed against other foreign
policy objectives, such as the maintenance of NATO
strength and solidarity, strategic arms limitation,
peacekeeping in the Middle East, control of nuclear
proliferation, and normalization of relations with the
PRC, Vietnam and Cuba.
While there is no necessary inconsistency among these
objectives, they will, on occasion, compete for primacy.
Resolution of the conflict between or among them will
depend on the facts of the situation at hand, which
should be addressed with openness and candor. There
will clearly be instances in which efforts to achieve
our human rights goals will have to be modified, delayed
or curtailed in deference to other important objectives.
But by the same token, making human rights a principal
goal of our foreign policy means that promotion of human
rights will not be viewed as a lesser objective. Even
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when other objectives outweigh human rights, our policies
will be implemented in a manner that promotes human rights
to the extent possible.
Adoption of an affirmative human rights policy will
carry with it a variety of risks, choices, tradeoffs and
potential costs:
-- Our actions and statements regarding human
rights objectives may involve criticism of conditions in
another country, which may be viewed as either offensive
or threatening by the government concerned and, in certain
cases, by some segments of the population. The resulting
strain in our relations with that government may have
a negative impact on other objectives. The sensitivity
of the Soviet Union to our human rights initiatives
represents a manifestation of the possible risks involved,
in this case a strain in crucial East-West relations.
Nevertheless, in many countries, positive responses to
our human rights initiatives have occurred, are occurring,
or are possible. As they do, relations will improve.
-- Since some Western democracies, while supporting
our general principles have not agreed with us on certain
tactics, there is a risk that certain of our initiatives,
if not properly coordinated, could lead to differences
with our NATO allies. These differences could, of
course, be exploited by the Soviet Union.
-- Our criticism of human rights violations may
provoke a greater degree of repression by a government,
either because it fears our initiatives will encourage
dissident groups to act with boldness or because it wants
to demonstrate disdain for our policy. Of course, such
a reaction bears its own internal political cost.
-- Our methods may adversely affect multilateral
institutions or ongoing programs, particularly in the eco-
nomic area, which have their own U.S.-endorsed objectives.
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In particular, using our vote in international financial
institutions to encourage respect for human rights might
lead others to seek to block assistance on other and purely
political grounds. On the other hand, failure to raise
human rights concerns could jeopardize domestic support
for these institutions. More broadly, we will have to
remain alert to possible costs in terms of developing
country cooperation on North-South issues.
-- Inevitable inconsistencies in our human rights
policy around. the world will expose us to criticism.
Allies such as Korea, Iran and the Philippines, for
instance, cannot be immune from some application of the
policy without endangering the integrity of the policy;
neither can powerful adversaries like the Soviet Union.
But whatever qualifications on the application of our
policy toward these or other nations we deem necessary
will invite charges that our policy lacks credibility.
-- The implementation of our policy is likely
to provoke reciprocal criticism of domestic conditions
in this country, not only from communist nations but
also from friends. Our response should be to welcome
constructive criticism, noting that our system provides
many remedies for social and economic ills.
-- The pursuit of our human rights objectives
will in some cases result in reduction of security
assistance to, and cooperation with, offending
governments. In some instances where our own defense
posture is involved, U.S. security interests may be
adversely affected.
-- The human rights effort could involve
significant dollar costs. While our commitment to
a substantial increase in economic assistance is not
solely a function of our human rights policy, it does
relate to our commitment to the enchancement of economic
and social rights.
F. Strategies for Pursuing our Human Rights Objectives.
Our human rights objectives obviously cannot be pursued
everywhere, at once, and in the same manner. While no two
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countries' situations will ever be identical, there are
certain logical groupings of countries which can be useful
for analysis and discussion.
1. Western Democracies.
We should support and reinforce human rights values
in the Western industrial countries (including Canada, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand) and encourage these countries to
support our human rights initiatives. We are now at a
historic point at which all NATO and Western European coun-
tries are democracies, and a major effort should be made to
reinforce democratic tendencies, particularly in countries
that have only recently established or re-established
democracy, such as Turkey, Greece, Portugal and Spain.
2. Third World Nations.
Efforts should be made to reinforce positive human
rights and democratic tendencies in the Third World, par-
ticularly in states that already have demonstrated good or
improving human rights performance. This support is parti-
cularly important with respect to countries that are
vulnerable to external or internal threat, or which face
severe economic problems. We should provide increased
symbolic support as well as increased economic assistance,
as appropriate, and cultural, educational and scientific
exchanges. We should also seek support for U.S. human
rights initiatives by these countries.
Our efforts with respect to Third World nations
where a human rights tradition has been disrupted should
seek to encourage return to former norms and to discourage
the arbitrary use of power. In such societies, the populace
may be receptive to various forms of assistance geared to
support human rights values. Educational and cultural pro-
grams directed to human rights supporters might be especially
effective.
In Third World nations where human rights values
have never taken firm root, we should discourage the arbi-
trary use of power and promote a more equitable and humane
social and economic order. In some cases, it will be more
realistic to expect concrete achievements with respect to
the first and second groups of rights than with respect to
the third.
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An important aspect of our policy should be to
ensure that our relations with countries that continually
violate human rights are correct, in keeping with our
other interests, but not close. The tone we set in our
relations is important to the credibility and thus to the
success of our overall policy.
3. Communist States.
With respect to the communist countries, our
human rights effort should remain firm and consistent but
non-polemical. We should recognize that major changes in,
communist regimes and their human rights practices will not
take place in the short term; they are only likely to occur,
if at all, gradually as the basic political and social
structures of these countries change. On the other hand,
we believe that U.S. and world opinion and U.S. actions can
positively influence trends in the long term and encourage
improvements in limited but important areas in the short
term. We should make it clear that our commitment to human
rights is basic to our foreign policy. This view should be
communicated to the people of these countries as well as
their governments. We should emphasize implementation of
the Helsinki Final Act.
Because of its pivotal importance, the Soviet Union
is a special case meriting a separate word. Soviet govern-
mental response to our emphasis on human rights has been
negative and increasingly sharp, explicitly suggesting
that detente is threatened by our policy. To what extent
the Soviet leadership truly feels their system and their
hold in Eastern Europe is endangered is unclear; but
their objective appears to be to bring about a significant
decrease in our public advocacy of human rights, thus re-
ducing its most embarrassing aspects for them, on the pretext
that a "one-sided" U.S. advocacy of human rights and respect
for state sovereignty cannot co-exist.
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There is no evidence that the U.S. human rights
policy has affected Soviet bargaining positions in important
negotiations, even if the atmosphere surrounding negotiations
is tense. Our substantive position on arms control has and
likely will continue to determine the Soviet response on
this critical. issue. Similarly, we believe that the Soviet
Union will continue to pursue its perceived interests in
arms control,-trade, scientific and cultural exchanges and
other areas of our bilateral relations, regardless of our
advoca
f
cy o
human rights. The inevitable strain of a
massive arms race, the need to take increasing consumer
demands into account, and the potential for ,,nresa- ,
n
away from MBFR or SALT negotiations, technological transfer
Y
agreements or commercial credit arrangements.
The USSR is continuing efforts to co
t
i
opera
e w
th
the U.S. private sector, despite the Jackson-Vanik amendment.
This indicates that the Kremlin may implicitly recognize
that Soviet economic concerns will make it difficult to
delay forward bilateral movement for long periods of time
because of U.S. human rights advocacy.
With proper management, our security interests
and our human rights concerns both can be accommodated in
our relations with the Soviet Union. In fact, failure to
execute an appropriate human rights strategy with proper
balance will detract from the political value of our human
rights policy elsewhere in the world.
The potential. normalization of relations with China
and Cuba will place some strain on the credibility of our
human rights policy, for in both cases other considerations
are likely to govern in the short term. As relations are
established, we will be expected to take human rights
initiatives. We should now be examining the methods we
will utilize to achieve specific human rights goals. These
would probably fall, at the beginning, in the areas of
family reunification and, with respect to Cuba, the
treatment and disposition of political prisoners. We
should recognize that with respect to human rights we
will have little, if any, leverage or influence with the
PRC at this stage.
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4. Gross Violaters of Human Rights.
Governments that have a consistent record of gross
violations of human rights should be dealt with as special
cases, and our policy should generally be to bring to bear
international opinion and concerted action by the world
community to bring about improvement. Obviously, this should
be done only in flagrant cases after attempts to encourage
evolutionary improvement have been spurned. Even in such
cases, however, there is no necessary reason why formal
diplomatic relations should not be maintained.
II. Identification of "a Consistent Pattern of Gross
Violations of Ii zternaticinaliv Recognized Human
Rights."
The phrase, "a consistent pattern of gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights" derives from
terminology in Resolution 1503 of the UN Economic and
Social Council, dated May 27, 1970, and has been used in
Sections 116 and 502B(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, Section 28(a) of the Inter-American Development
Bank Act, and Section 211(a) of the African Development
Fund Act. The general purport of all these statutory
provisions is that we should not provide assistance to
governments that engage in such conduct.
The legislative history of our statutory provisions
does not indicate the meaning Congress attached to the con-
cept of a "consistent pattern," and there are no judicial
decisions interpreting the phrase. By its terms the
language excludes isolated events and incorporates the
dimensions of time as well as repetition. Thus, frequently
repeated actions over a relatively short period of time
would appear to be covered as would somewhat less frequent
but regular violations over a relatively long period.of
time.
While "internationally recognized human rights" would
include, inter alia, all of the rights in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, it appears from the legislative
history that in using the phrase and combining it with the
concept of "gross violations," Congress intended to cover
mainly the right to be free from governmental violation of
the integrity of the person, i.e., the first group of rights
discussed above.
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Once a determination is made that a country has en-
gaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of inter-
nationally recognized human rights, certain important
questions arise. For example, is the determination binding
as to future decisions with respect to that country? If
that would depend on whether there had been substantial
intervening events, by what standard ought those events
be judged? Further, would a determination as to one
country have precedential effect as to other countries?
These are not easy questions. While answers can no
doubt be devised, the questions point up the limitations
in the human rights context of requiring uniform actions
pursuant to a statutorily-prescribed standard of conduct.
There are vast differences among human rights conditions
in various countries, and what may rise to the level of
offensive conduct in one country may not be properly
so characterized in the setting of another country with
different circumstances, a different history, and a different
trend. To be realistic and effective, our policy must take
account of such differences. That will therefore be diffi-
cult if we are required to take the same action -- e.g., a
"no" vote on an IFI loan -- with respect to different coun-
tries, even though our own best assessment of the circum-
stances in such countries might indicate that the mandated
action would be inappropriate or that other actions should
be taken instead.
III. Evaluate Actions ~^7hich U.S. Could Take to Improve
Human Rights Conditions.
The range of actions we can take to advance our human
rights objectives is examined below. Of primary importance
is the need to evaluate the human rights situation in in-
dividual countries and to consider the various policy
instruments at our disposal in the light of our own foreign
policy objectives in those countries. These evaluations,
which are underway, will apply the factors Secretary Vance
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cited in his April 30, 1977, Law Day speech as important
to the determination of human rights policy in particular
instances.
A. Diplomatic actions, public statements, and
various symbolic acts.
Diplomatic exchanges, ranging from informal talks with
officials or government leaders to formal demarches, are
a valuable tool. Through them we can make our human rights
policy understood by other governments and cation of the sanctions or incentives that mayvflow nfrom1_
our policy. As a general proposition, our actions with
respect to the human rights conditions in any country ought
to begin with. such approaches.
Diplomatic actions, of course, extend beyond demarches.
In flagrant cases we may find it advisable and effective
to reduce the level of our presence in a given country.
Public statements can also promote our human rights
goals. By conveying publicly what we have previously said
privately, they add the force of world opinion to our
efforts. Statements can be critical of particular violations
or general attitudes, or they can commend positive conduct
or attitudes. Critical statements will be used sparingly
to preserve their effectiveness. A constant stream of
criticism of foreign governments may cause the U.S. ultimately
to be ignored as a tiresome and ineffective international scold.
While public statements are an extremely important tool, they
must be used with skill and discrimination.
Symbolic acts can in certain circumstances be even more
effective than public statements and may not Present the
same risks. They can encourage countries with good human
rights' records to persist. Invitations to make state visits,
Presidential letters, goodwill missions, special visitor
programs and the like are highly valued abroad. Directing
them to countries with good or improving human rights' records
will send a very effective signal.
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There will clearly be circumstances in which we
should use symbolic acts to identify the U.S. with
representatives of human rights organizations, or with
the victims of human rights abuses who seek or would
welcome such identification. We not only demonstrate
thereby our concern and communicate our support, but we
may also add an element of protection to the organizations
and individuals involved. Of course, there will be cir-
cumstances in which such symbolic acts on our part would
actually increase the risks, to such organizations and
individuals.
B. Changes in Levels of _Se_curity and Economic
Assistance and Food Ai.d.-____.__
If we genuinely seek to promote economic and social
rights, we should work to meet the Administration's
objective to increase substantially both bilateral and
multilateral foreign economic assistance by 1982.
Where the promotion of human rights is concerned,
increases or reductions in the security and economic
assistance (including food aid) that we provide to
individual countries are more decisive and visible
measures than diplomatic actions, public statements or
symbolic acts. However, because of the sensitivity of
recipients and the unpredictability of their reactions,
reductions in aid ought not be considered lightly or
until less drastic measures have been taken. Ideally,
we would like to be perceived as working closely with
the developing nations that are pursuing equitable
growth policies which protect and promote human dignity.
To the extent we are so perceived, our human rights
policy will be strengthened.
Obviously we do not write on a clear slate when
we consider reductions in assistance in view of the
various statutory provisions which direct that
assistance be used to promote human rights, and
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except in certain exceptional cases, be withheld when a
consistent pattern of gross violations emerges.
Our military and economic assistance is generally
valued highly by recipient governments. Thus it is
appropriate, circumstances permitting, that we should
seek to obtain improved human rights conduct in return.
It should be noted that in many cases aid is extended
in return for other considerations, e.g., in some cases
it is called for by base rights agreements. In other
cases, our assistance may be small in amount and thus
easily dispensed with or replaced from other sources.
In such cases our aid may afford us only limited leverage
on human rights issues.
Certain general costs and benefits apply to the
use of both military and economic assistance as sanctions
and incentives with respect to human rights. The bene-
fits include underscoring the seriousness and determina-
tion with which we are pursuing our human rights objectives,
avoiding where feasible the inconsistency of providing
substantial material assistance to repressive governments,
and demonstrating tangibly that it can be costly to violate
human rights and. valuable to respect them. The costs in-
clude possible damage to U.S. national security interests,
and to our general political and economic interests; dis-
ruption of established assistance relationships; curtail-
ment of activities directly supporting the second group
of human rights; possibly penalizing groups of individuals
who bear no responsibility for the abuses of their govern-
ments; and the risk that some recipient governments from
whom we withhold assistance may be in a position to
retaliate by withholding resources that we vitally need.
As a very general proposition, reductions in
military assistance ought usually to procede reductions
in economic assistance. Conversely, increases in eco-
nomic assistance ought usually to precede increases in
levels of military assistance.
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1. Security (Military)
Assistance.
Our military assistance is a matter of great
sensitivity both to the governments that receive it and
to those segments of the American public and the Con-
gress who watch it closely as an index of the priority
we place on human rights objectives in relation to our
other foreign policy concerns. Moreover, under Section 502(B)
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, we have
a legal obligation to ensure that our security assistance
programs are formulated and conducted in a manner that will
promote and advance human rights and avoid identification
of the U.S. with governments that violate human rights.
Perhaps more than any other single factor, U.S.
military assistance is seen as implying U.S. support for
the governments that receive it. To be perceived as
supporting a repressive government inevitably exacts
costs in terms of the consistency and the credibility of
our human rights policy. Moreover, some types of arms
we provide, finance or license can he used by a reci-
pient government to carry out or undergird repressive
practices. (Although such use is prohibited by U.S.
law, our ability to prevent it is limited.)
A full discussion of the criteria for providing
military assistance is beyond the scope of this study.
However, we should remember that most countries (certainly
including our own) believe strongly in the right to an
adequate defense. A careful evaluation of the interests
at stake, and the potential benefits to be gained, is
needed in each case. Where there are vital national
security interests at stake which require a continuing
military relationship between the U.S. and the recipient,
and where the recipient's human rights record is con-
sidered to be acceptable or improving, we should consider
sympathetically approving arms transfers that are consistent
in other respects with the President's arms transfer guide-
lines. Conversely, where those factors are not present,
we should view such requests unsympathetically.
* Security assistance includes grant material aid, grant
military training, FMS and licensed commercial arms sales
and FMS financing of arms sales through credits and loan
guarantees. (Security supporting assistance is discussed
in the'section on bilateral economic assistance below.)
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Military assistance can be used as a sanction
or incentive to promote human rights by altering the
size or functions of our military advisory contingent;
by altering the level of training grants; by altering
the quantity of arms transfers; and by altering the
types of arms transferred. Reduction or elimination of
military assistance may have little direct impact on a
country's human rights performance; in many instances
the country will be able to turn to an alternate supplier.
However, when a decision is made to reduce military assis-
tance as part of an overall strategy, with advance warning
communicated through diplomatic channels, some improve-
ment of human rights performance may be possible in
specific countries. Governments and military forces in
many regions desire close relations with the U.S., and
a firm human rights policy, which demonstrates that
benefits such as military assistance are placed at risk
in the absence of human rights progress, will be a
continuing element in their decision--making.
Some argue that the strongest signal that could
be sent to offending governments would be to alter
the relationships that have been built up over the
years between our military and the military of other
countries, some of whom are responsible for repressive
practices, by reducing the size of our military con-
tingent and our training (IMET) grants. They do not
believe such action would impair our security interests;
indeed, they argue that we do not have legitimate
security interests in many of the 57 countries that
receive our military assistance. (46 of the 57 countries
receive IMET assistance.) Others believe that reducing
our military presence will reduce our ability to
communicate with and influence segments of the gover-
ments whose policies we are -trying to change. They
believe we should increase the IMET program on a
worldwide basis, particularly in certain selected
countries now prohibited from participating in it,
because they believe IMET has proven successful in
fostering pro-U.S. attitudes in foreign military
students. This complex issue requires further study.
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2. Bilateral Economic Assistance, Trade
and Investment Programs .
U.S. bilateral economic assistance is provided
in several forms. It includes direct humanitarian assistance
(disaster relief and PL 480 Title II), assistance programs
directed primarily to benefit the needy, other economic
development programs which benefit the poor majority less
immediately, food aid given to support development (PL 480
Title I), and security supporting assistance (assistance
extended for primarily political reasons in the form of
grants, budget support, commodity loans and development
projects).
Humanitarian assistance, such as International
Disaster Assistance and PL 480 Title II, is designed to
alleviate human suffering by responding to emergencies
caused by manmade or natural disasters. As such it directly
promotes the most basic human right -- that of survival --
and should not be considered for use as leverage in supporting
broader economic, political or social rights.
The basic objective of our bilateral assistance
program continues to be to meet the needs of the poor, even
in those countries where serious human rights problems
exist. This policy is reflected in law --- the original
Harkin Amendment --- which states that AID programs do not
have to terminate in such countries where AID assistance
"directly benefits needy people".
As a result of the "New Directions" in development
assistance, mandated by Congress, the focus of regular U.S.
bilateral economic assistance has increasingly been directed
to meeting the basic human needs of the poor majority in the
developing countries, such as nutrition, health care, educa-
tion and human resource development, and less on large-scale
capital transfers for major infrastructure development.
Such programs,which assist the poor majority in developing
countries gain access to participation in decisions which
shape their lives, strongly and independently promote
group two economic rights, as well as create a climate
supportive of a broader observance of political and social
rights.
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As a rule then, bilateral development assistance
which directly benefits the needy should not be used as a
policy instrument to sanction a government for its human
rights violations. (Where assistance benefits the needy,
but a country's human rights record is poor, we should
consider the extent to which our aid is or can be provided
through non-governmental institutions thus reducing our
identification with the government.) There may be instances,
however, in which a particular government's human rights
violations are so flagrantly gross and systematic that
the need to disassociate from that government outweighs
the development assistance goals in that country. Such
a balancing of considerations will require case-by-case
analysis.
Reducing economic assistance that does not
directly benefit the needy is a more appropriate means
to disassociate the U.S. from a repressive or corrupt
government, but such bilateral programs are now the
exception.
Security supporting assistance is extended to
a limited number of countries in which the U.S. has
special interests of high political priority. Currently,
80% of our security supporting assistance goes to Israel
and the three confrontation states in the Middle East.
Food assistance under PL 480 Title I can also be used to
leverage human rights improvement. However, the distri-
bution and terms of Title I aid have traditionally been
affected by political. factors. In addition, its use
would entail the'considerable political risk of appearing
to provide or deny food to hungry people in order to
achieve U.S. political objectives.
An increase in aid that directly benefits the
needy can be an effective way to encourage
positive human rights conduct. Such increases directly
promote our overall human rights objectives by contri-
buting to the fulfillment of vital human needs. In
addition, assistance programs designed to encourage
wider participation in the economic life of a nation
can encourage creation of an underlying climate suppor-
tive of a broader observance of human rights. Increasing
assistance within existing budget levels to support
countries with improving human rights records is possible,
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but difficult to accomplish. We would expect such
increases to be made very selectively. Increases in
bilateral economic assistance on human rights grounds
should normally be considered on an annual basis to
support long-term improvement in human rights conditions
and to meet legitimate development needs. In shaping
the overall bilateral aid budget, the pattern of alloca-
tion should reflect our human rights policy as well as
more traditional economic development criteria.
3. Trade and Investment Programs
The U.S. is a strong proponent of liberalized
trade, most importantly because discriminatory arrange-
ments established by other major trading countries
generally damage U.S. trade. The power of the President
to use trade measures to favor or discriminate against
a country on human rights grounds is limited by inter-
national and domestic legal obligations to grant non-
distriminatory treatment to most nations. P?Moreover,
singling out particular countries for punitive action
is very difficult to accomplish "cleanly". Other
countries' trade and economic interests almost inevitably
become involved, riskinc, a chain reaction which may
adversely affect our economy. Only where there has been
a broad international consensus that a country is guilty
of particularly egregious conduct have a sufficient number
of countries coordinated their trade sanctions so as to
have a significant economic impact on the offending
regime.
Most Favored Nation Treatment. Under current U.S.
domestic law (19 U.S.C. 1202), all non-communist coun-
tries, as well as Poland and Yugoslavia, are accorded
most-favored nation (MFN) tariff treatment. There is
no existing domestic legal authority to withdraw MFN
tariff treatment from any of these countries, although
section 301 of the Trade Act authorizes applying discri-
minatory duties to an individual country in response to
a proven unfair trade practice.
Furthermore, such a sanction, even if authorized
by U.S. law, would violate our international obligations
if applied to any of the forty-three countries with which
we have treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
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or any of the one hundred six countries which are parties
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or
to which that agreement is applied do facto.
Beyond these legal limitations, we believe that our
trade policy interests, as well as practical considera-
tions, militate strongly against using withdrawal of MFN
treatment as a sanction against human rights violations.
Withdrawing MFN would set a damaging precedent. It is
conceivable that some countries, faced with domestic
pressures for increased protectionism, might cite foreign
policy objectives as a convenient justification for dis-
criminatory restrictions.
Generalized System of Preferences. The United States
accords preerentZl treatment (i.e., duty-free entry) for
certain products of about 100 developing countries under
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) authorized by
Title V of the Trade Act of 1974. Under the Trade Act, by
the President has the authority to designate any develop-
ing country meeting certain requirements as a beneficiary
of GSP. He also has the authority to terminate GSP bene-
fits for any country upon sixty-days notice. The benefits
of GSP are a unilateral grant authorized by a GATT waiver
and are not subject to the same rights of compensation or
retaliation provided in the GATT with respect to MFN
treatment. Consequently, the President could use the
GSP as a human rights sanction without obtaining new
legislation and without violating our international
obligations.
Denial of GSP benefits as a sanction would not
entail nearly the same adverse trade policy consequences
as in the case of the long-enshrined MFN principle. The
denial of GSP to Uganda, in part because of human rights
concerns, generated no adverse reaction. However, since
GSP benefits are limited, it remains to be seen whether
the threat of termination or denial of benefits would
induce greater respect for human rights. Widespread
denial (or withdrawal) of GSP benefits might call into
question our trade commitment to a generalized system.
Export-Import Bank and OPIC. Government programs
supporting U.S. exports are administered by the Export--
Import Bank (Ex-Im), while the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) encourages U:S. private investors to
invest in developing countries through its political risk
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insurance and finance programs. Ex-Im and OPIC can be
distinguished from bilateral assistance programs in that
they facilitate U.S. business activities in foreign coun-
tries. In some cases Ex-Im does deal directly with foreign
governments. OPIC does not provide financial subsidies to
LDC governments, but does enter into umbrella agreements
with them. OPIC insures U.S. private investment in LDCs,
particularly the lowest income LDCs, thereby complementing
the development assistance objectives of the U.S.
Ex-Im and OPIC programs normally will not be appro-
priate vehicles for influencing changes in the human rights
practices of governments. In cases of gross violations,
where we do not wish to be associated with the government
in question, it may be desirable to curtail them. In the
rare cases where we might resort to curtailment, our action
could have a significant impact on the government in question.
C. Initiatives in International Financial
1 nstituti.ons.
U.S. concern with promoting human rights through the
international financial institutions (IFI's) became explicit
last spring with the passage of the Harkin Amendment to the
authorizing legislation for the Inter--American Development
Bank (IDS) and the African Development Fund (ADF). That
amendment requires that the U.S. vote "no" on loans or
assistance to a country that "engages in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights . . . unless such assistance will directly
benefit the needy people in such country."
The Harkin Amendment will in all likelihood soon be
replaced by language on this year's IFI authorizing
legislation. As it emerged from conference, the legis-
lation instructs the USG through its Executive Directors
to seek to channel assistance away from countries whose
governments engage in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of human rights or provide refuge to airplane
hijackers; to use our "voice and vote" in seeking to
channel assistance towards projects which address basic
human needs; and to consider a number of factors related
to human rights concerns e.g. specific actions taken on
bilateral assistance on human rights grounds, extent to
.which the assistance benefits needy people, status of a
country regarding nuclear proliferation, and responsive-
ness of governments in providing better accounting of
MIAs.
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Where other means have proven ineffective, the legislation
requires us to oppose loans (i.e., vote "present," abstain, or
vote "no") to countries which engage in a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights
unless such assistance is directed specifically to programs
which serve the basic human needs of the citizens of such
countries or unless the President certifies that the cause of
international. human rights would be more effectively served by
actions other than voting against such assistance.
This legislation is fully compatible with our policy to use
our membership in the IFIs to promote human rights.
The new IFI legislation also specifies "the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall initiate a wide
consultation designed to develop a viable standard for the
meeting of basic human needs and the protection of human rights
and a mechanism for acting together to insure that the rewards
of international economic cooperation are especially available
to those who subscribe to such standards and are seen to be
moving toward making them effective in their own systems of
governance." We will need to develop a strategy for implementing
this requirement.
While most of the discussion to date concerning human rights
and the IFI's has focused on particular loans and votes, it is
also important to develop a long-term approach whereby we seek an
overall reduction in IFI lending to countries that consistently
violate human rights, excepting loans for the needy. Our policy
in this regard should parallel our bilateral aid policy (see
pg. 20, para. I).
Support from the other industrialized democracies for our
efforts to use our voice and vote in the IFI's to promote human
rights has been minimal to date: only Canada and Sweden have
indicated some support. A number of leading LDCs -- including
Egypt and India -- have questioned the legality of U.S. actions
on human rights in the IFI's.
The articles of all the IFI's contain a provision not
different in substance from the following language in the World
Bank's acticles: "The Bank, its officers and employees should
not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall
they be influenced in their decisions by the political character
of . . . (the recipient government). Only economic considerations
shall be relevant to their decisions . . . ." (Art. 10, Sec. 10).
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The Legal Adviser of the State Department believes that
the prohibition against interference in the "political"
affairs of members may be interpreted validly as not
applicable to the consideration of human rights factors,
particularly group one rights, which are more fundamen-
tal than "political" matters and therefore not within
the scope of that term. The injunction to weigh only
economic considerations in making deci.sions can in many,
if not most, cases be satisfied by relating the human
rights situation in a country to economic issues. For
example, welfare and other social concerns are, broadly
speaking, economic as well as human rights considerations.
It is only fair to state, however, that other IFI
members may very well resist this line of reasoning.
Some may argue that our negative vote or abstension on
human rights grounds raises serious questions of compati-
bility with an IFI charter. Others may b.e encouraged to
condition their participation on what we would consider
to he "political" grounds, citing our action as a prece-
dent. For example, the Arab countries might raise matters
concerning the Palestinians or the allegations they have
made elsewhere concerning Israel's human rights practices
in the occupied territories. We should consider whether
or not it would be possible and in our interest to seek
amendments to the charters to include human rights
considerations.
Our interest in promoting human rights will be best
served by adherence to the following guidelines:
-- There is a presumption that our votes in the
executive boards of the IFI's in support of our human
rights policy should be used sparingly and designed to
advance the overall strategies we will work our for indi-
vidual countries.
-- When we plan to cast a non-affirmative vote or make
a statement of concern for or condemnation of human rights
practices in the IFI's, we should apprise other nations of
the rationale for our proposed action an seek their under-
standing and cooperation.
-- The information on human rights which the U.S. uses
to arrive at its judgments should be available to other
IFI members to the extent possible.
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-- In the longer run we should develop a consensus
among IFI member governments in support of our human rights
policy and seek to persuade these governments that IFI
managements and members should give great weight to human
rights factors when assessing the suitability of proposed
loan programs.
D. Use of Overseas Broadcast Facilities and
Cultural n Educaci_ona~ll- ograms.
International awareness of the effort to preserve and
extend human rights will, in itself, contribute to the
success of our policy. That awareness can be increased
by appropriate use of the facilities and programs of the
United States Information Agency (USIA), Radio Free Europe,
Radio Liberty and the State Department's cultural and edu-
cational programs. Domestic awareness and understanding
of our policy can be promoted by the State Department's
Bureau of Public Affairs.
USIS posts abroad offer important opportunities
available to the U.S. for the creation of intellectual,
philosophical and (to at least a limited dec;rr e) politi-
cal "infrastructure" in support of human rights. USIS
posts are engaged in dialogue with influential elites
and "establishments" -- as well as the next generation
of leadership. Seminars, symposiums, relations with
editorial writers, bar associations and the like offer
important opportunities to kindle and sustain the spark
of concern for group three rights, in particular.
The USIA, through its radio broadcast facilities,
in print and via television, can present and elaborate our
human rights concerns directly to audiences abroad. Al-
though all communications media can and should be used,
radio is our primary direct channel to mass audiences.
where other media are controlled, radio is particularly
important. Coordinated, balanced and consistent future
programming should develop the theme that human rights is
a universal human aspiration, not an American idiosync.racy,
and should cover positive human rights developments, par-
ticularly outside the U.S., as well as the record of
continuing violations of human rights.
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2. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RFE and RL have played a key role in the rising
awareness that has accomoani.ed the expanding human rights
movement in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Human
rights activists in Moscow, Warsaw and other cities fre-
quently cite RFE/RL's extensive coverage as a vital source
of information. In the future, the Radios will utilize
the expansion of their technical facilities which has been
proposed by the President to extend their human rights
coverage to larger audiences. Another priority is to
augment news-gathering and research capabilities, especially
in Western Europe, for more detailed reporting of CSCE
developments. The Radios also seek to give increased
attention to human rights developments affecting the non--
Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union.
3. Cultural and Educational Exchange.
The international exchange of persons program
administered by the State Department's Bureau of Educa-
tional and Cultural Affairs (CU) conveys a human rights
message to all foreign leaders who participate in it.
perience indicates that the overwhelming impression left with most visitors to this country is that the American
people do care about human rights and that the United
States does seek to protect and foster them. CU intends 'Co
give additional, more specific attention to human rights
concerns. Objectives could include encouraging increased
international activity among American non-governmental groups
which have an interest in human rights, especially groups
from the academic and journalistic communities, and
strengthening CU relations with activities of the legal pro---
fession in international human rights endeavors.
E. Improved access to the U.S. for refugees and
dissidents.
In keeping with our overall objectives, we should dcomon--
strate a generous, humanitarian policy of providing refuge
to victims of repression. We should continue to support r)ro
visions in H.R. 7175 that would increase the authorized
global number of conditional cntr,ies under the
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Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) from 17,400 to
20,000 and admit additional refugees in emergent situations
as conditional entrants, permitting them to adjust their
status to that of permanent residence after two years.
We should oppose provisions in II. R. 7175 that would
impose numerical limitations on the numbers of such
refugees who may he admitted by the President in emergent
situations under certain circumstances and the reauiremer_t
that other countries must accept resettlement of their fair
share of the refugees involved before the admission of
such refugees into the United States.
We recommend a more liberal use of the Attorney General's
authority to admit individual refugees and groups of refugees
who do not qualify under the INA. Specifically, we believe
that the Attorney General and the INS in considering
applicants for parole into the United. States should be more
forthcoming with respect to innocent victims of authoritarian
regimes. Such a change in policy would be a concrete demon-
stration of the sincerity of our commitment to human rights.
While the process of consulting with Congressional leaders
before using the parole authority is not required by law,
we would want to notify them before 'Liberalizing our policy.
There is likely to be some negative Congressional reaction
to a liberalized parole policy.
Dissidents in repressive countries, to the extent
they may be able to proceed to free countries, should
generally be considered as refugees. Most such dissidents
would qualify as refugees under the new definition of
refugees contained in the pending legislation that we support.
Substantive and Procedural Initiatives the
U. S. Could Take .in Various I~t:erna-i~donal-~
Forums S.
There are important advantages to pursuing our human
rights objectives through multilateral institutions. Be-
cause of the clearly defined human rights responsibilities
of multilateral organizations, examination of the human
rights practices of all countries can be properly pursued
and, since the responsibility for initiatives in multilateral
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bodies is shared, individual country situations can be con-
sidered in a manner less likely to bring the U.S. into
direct confrontation with the country concerned.
Increased use of multilateral institutions will im-
prove their capacity to deal effectively with human rights
problems and enhance public support for them.
The United Nations.
The United Nations can be a, valuable forum for
developing multilateral cooperation on behalf of human
rights. It has broad representation and mechanisms for
protection of human rights. Specific documents such as
the Charter, the Universal Declaration, and the UN human
rights conventions express concerns and commitments in this
field. Accordingly, we should expand and intensify our ef-
forts at the UN and support and carry through on them in
our bilateral relations and by ratifying promptly those
conventions we support.
We should give careful consideration to taking the
following human rights initiatives in the UN:
-- UNESCO Executive Board Session (September-
October 1977).
Develop broader support for human rights issues
by establishing an independent Expert Review Committee.
32nd Session of the UN General Assembly
(1977).
Conduct a major effort, in close consultation with
other interested governments, to secure approval for the
establishment of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Propose the establishment of a special ad hoc Expert Committee
on Torture to identify serious instances of torture worldwide.
- Next Session of the UN Commission on Human
R1ts (Spring 1978).
Propose measures to strengthen procedures for
instituting studies of situations involving consistent
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patterns of gross violations of internationally-recognized
human rights. Press for an additional annual session of
the Commission, to be held at UN headquarters in New York.
--- Decade for Act i_on to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination. _
Continue to consult with key African delegations
to help break the pattern whereby they link. Zionism and
racism. Our objective is to reach understanding on that
issue before the World Conference to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination so that the U.S. can attend that
meeting, scheduled for August 1978.
2. Organization of American States.
The Inter-American Human Rights Commission, an
independent agency of the OAS, is playing an increasingly
central role in the struggle to defend human rights in
the Western Hemisphere. We are working to increase the
staff and budget of the IAHRC to cope with mounting human
rights complaints. We shall submit the American Convention
on Human Rights, w'iich President Carter signed, to the
Senate for approval.
IV. National Security Aspects of U.S. Policies on Human
Rights, Including Consic).cration of Their Impact on
Friendly States and Allies; and Other Areas of Major
Strategic_ Concern Such as the PRC and the Koreas.
Section I(F) includes a brief discussion of the
direction our policy should take with various groups of
countries, including allied nations and Third World
countries. The thesis underlying much of the discussion
there and elsewhere in this study is that the shape that
our policy ultimately takes with respect to individual
countries will depend on our evaluation of (1) the human
rights situation, (2) the full range of our interests,
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and (3) the leverage we have to encourage change where
change is desired.
Invariably, working out our human rights approach
in individual countries will require a careful balancing
of considerations. The summary analysis of the impact of
our human rights policy on our relations with the Soviet
Union contained in Section I above concludes that we can
pursue our human rights concerns and our security interests,
which include maintaining a credible deterrant while
pursuing arms control and arms reduction, in our long-
term relationship with the Soviets. Full country eval-
uations are in preparation for the Soviet Union, the PRC,
and South Korea, as well as other countries.
V. Action to Promote Integration of Hiuua~, Rights
Conside~ratio? s_ into U. U.S. F or _
eir,n Polir_v .
The Executive Branch has already taken important steps
to help assure implementation of the Administration's focus
on human rights, but needs to do more. Steps taken so far
include:
Interagency: Establishment of the Interagency Group
on Human !'lights and Foreign Assistance, pursuant to an
NSC memorandum dated April 1, 1977. Chaired by the State
Department, this group includes representatives from the
NSC, State, Treasury, DOD and AID. Its mandate is to
coordinate the development and implementation of U.S.
human rights policy as it relates to bilateral and multi-
lateral economic and security assistance programs. With
respect to security assistance, the recently-created
interagency Arms Export Control Board will take human
rights factors into consideration in its deliberations.
State Department: The Office of the Coordinator for
Human Righ-s and Humanitarian Affairs has been expanded.
A Human Rights Coordinating Group, chaired by the Deputy
Secretary of State, functions to provide balance and
consistency for all aspects of U.S. policy on human rights.
All U.S. mission chiefs have been instructed to give their
personal attention to furthering observance of human rights
in their host countries, to provide frequent reporting on
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human rights, and to assure full mission involvement in the
implementation of our human rights policy. Priority atten-
tion, here and at posts abroad, is being given to the
collection and analysis of comprehensive data concerning
human rights conditions in all countries, as well as the
development of country strategies. Fulltime human rights
officers in each of the Department's regional bureaus and
full. or near fulltime human rights officers in each of the
Department's functional bureaus have been designated.
They are responsible for monitoring human rights concerns
within their bureaus, coordinating with the Department's
Office of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and
relating bureau actions on human rights to actions taken
elsewhere in the foreign affairs agencies.
Next steps could include expansion of the mandate of
the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance
to include all aspects of our human rights policy, not
simply foreign assistance. That expanded purview would
promote greater coordination of our human rights policy
within the Executive Branch.
VI . A Strategy to Improve the Admini.strat i_on' s Relations
with Conc;r_ess i.n the Human ~=:i.ghts Area.
A separate analysis of this important issue is being
prepared by the Congressional Liaison Offices of the
agencies involved with the Congress on human rights
questions.
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