INTELLIGENCE CHARTER LEGISLATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91M00696R000100010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 3, 1977
• Content Type: MF

The Director of Central Intelli Bence
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1 'Uuve nt.ni,.,r,,
3 September 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT:
Intelligence Charter Legislation
1. This responds to your memorandum of 20 August 1977
requesting my views on intelligence charter legislation.
2. Contact with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI) on c ar er legislation has been maintained. since the beginning of the
year and is expected to continue on a discussion level with both the SSCI
and the new House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, although no
formal positions will be taken without appropriate coordination with the
Executive Branch. It has been and continues to be my view that development
of appropriate and acceptable intelligence charter legislation can best be
accomplished by maintaining a close working relationship with key committees
in the Congress to minimize areas of disagreement and to progress on issues
of mutual agreement. At the same time, however, I recommend that a
reorganization plan, incorporating the decisions contained in Presidential
Directive/NSC-17, be submitted to the Congress pursuant to the Reorganization
Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-17). This procedure would retain the full opportunity
for joint Executive-Congressional effort on charter legislation while
expanding Presidential decisions in cooperation with the Congress.
3. 0 The concepts I view as being embodied in charter legislation
should include: (a) clear, succinct duties; (b) authority commensurate with
those duties, including in the case of CIA infrastructure needs
and (c) a delineation of acceptable restrictions on
intelligence activities. Within these three broad areas, I have the following
specific recommendations to make.
4. Recommendations for Intelligence Charter Legislation
a. II Role of the DCI: Responsibility would be more clearly
assigned if the basic authorities and duties now spelled out in the
National Security Act were vested directly with the DCI. The Director
of Central Intelligence should remain as head of the CIA, and should
retain the powers and duties specified in the National Security Act of
1947, as amended, including the responsibility to protect intelligence
sources and methods and his termination authority. The authorities and
duties granted the CIA in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,
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should be granted to the DCI in a new intelligence charter. Under this
scheme the DCI could assign whatever duties he deems appropriate to the
Agency., whether identical with those now exercised by it or otherwise.
The DCI would be able to delegate his authorities and duties on a
Community basis, within limitations of appropriate laws, Executive
Orders, etc. The DCI's Intelligence Community management mechanism
should be administratively provided for as a separate statutory authority
for the?DCI (e.g., an "Office of the Director of Central Intelligence")
as a part of the IC and with a budget
r..... 1-Y
a single DDCI or a predetermined number of Deputy Directors. Rather,
the legislation should allow for the appointment, by the President and
with'the advice and consent of the Senate, of such deputies (at least at
the under secretary level) as the DCI may require in the discharge of his
duties. The statute also should provide that the DCI shall direct, as
the need arises and commensurate with his Community responsibilities,
which deputy shall act in his name in his absence. Finally, the charter
should contain necessary restrictions on the incumbency of military
officers in the positions of DCI and his deputies.
c. Intelligence Collection: The DCI should be given the
duty to direct and supervise the collection of foreign intelligence.
The Director should have full authority to task all national resources
for the collection of intelligence by the Intelligence Community in
accordance with directives and requirements of the NSC. The DCI should
be authorized by statute to.establish such mechanisms as necessary to
carry out his tasking responsibilities; this authority should include
the power to detail personnel assigned to these entities. The CIA should
be charged, by statute, with the responsibility for collection of foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence and the conduct of foreign counter-
intelligence activities under the direction of the NSC and the DCI..
The charter should specify that the CIA shall engage in such special
activities in support of national foreign policy objectives as directed
by the President and the NSC,. again under the direction and supervision
of the NSC and the DCI.
d. I Intelligence Production: The DCI should be authorized
to produce finished national foreign intelligence. He should have full
responsibility for the production and dissemination of national foreign
intelligence and authority to levy analytic tasks on departmental
intelligence organizations.
e. Q Budget and Fiscal Responsibilities: In accordance with
the decisions embodied in Presidential Directive/NSC-17, the new charter
should specifically grant to the DCI full and exclusive authority for
approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, and it should
be stipulated that the DCI should provide guidance for program and budget
development to program managers and heads of component activities involved
STAT
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involved in the National Foreign Intelligence Program. In addition, the
DCI should have full and exclusive authority within Congressional
guidelines for reprogramming National Foreign Intelligence Program funds,
and for the utilization under appropriate Congressional and Executive
guide lines of the CIA Contingency Reserve.
f. I I The CIA: The CIA should have its own statutory charter
in view of its unique m ssion. The administrative and support authorities
now given the CIA under the Central Intelligence Agenc Act of 1949 should
remain generally changes STAT
Moreover, to clarify
provisions, and to implement Presidential Directive/
NSC-17, the CIA should be tasked in the charter with collecting foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence and the conduct of foreign
counterintelligence activities.
g? Q Reporting to the Congress: The charter should specify
that the DCI shall be the primary adviser to the Congress on national
foreign intelligence matters, including the provision of substantive
intelligence product. Consideration also should be given to providing,
by statute, for a single, exclusive joint intelligence oversight committee
as the sole committee to which the Executive would be required to report
pursuant to statute. I do not subscribe to the views, as expressed by
the SSCI in commenting on the 15 August 1977 draft revision of Executive
Order 11905 (section 8), regarding reporting to the Congress on aspects
of intelligence activities and information. That section raises serious
constitutional issues relating to the separation of powers and impinges
on the authority of the President. A further issue which should be
considered is a statutory requirement that the DCI shall provide intelligence
to the Congress only under appropriate guidelines to insure protection of
sources and methods.
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