MINUTES OF 11 DECEMBER 1978 MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91G01170R003505680020-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 15, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
15 December 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Public Affairs Advisory Group
FROM, Herbert E. Hetu, Chairman
SUBJECT: Minutes of 11 December 1978 Meeting
1. The Minutes of the December 19788umeetingmofithe Public Affairs
d f
or y
Advisory Group (PAAG) are attache
/7
3 January
2. The PAAG will meet next at 1000 hours on Tuesda l21 ease notify
Room.
in the DCI Conference
,.Fl+he namPenfnvour alternate. pA proposed
7
-
-
agenda for the next meeting will be uis ,bu ---
er er E. Hetu
Attachment
Minutes
Distribution:
OIG
Charles Briggs
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
Minutes of the
Public Affairs Advisory Group
11 December 1978
Attending: OPA - Herbert Hetu, Chairman
OIG - Charles Briggs
OLC
DDS&
DDO
N FAC
Comp
OEEO
DDA I
OPA
Absent: OGC
CTS
RMS
Minutes
1. Introductory Remarks/Announcements/Reports
The Chairman announced the Director's luncheon for five
newspeople that day and his upcoming breakfast with the NBC bureau (12-
18 people) on 14 December. He reviewed the DCI's activities on his 29-
30 November trip to Boston and the schedule for the upcoming Intelligence
Community Public Affairs Officers meetin~ on 13 December.
The Chairman also announced the DCI's proposed meetings with
employees in the auditorium have been tabled until he gets back from his
overseas trip in late January. -The subject probably will not be brought
up again unless the PAAG so recommends. Mr. Hetu's view is that, if the
idea is revived, the meetings should be open Agency-wide on a first
come-first served basis (not by directorate as originally suggested) and
that topical subjects -- such as intelligence on Iran --should be dis-
cussed briefly, followed by a question-and-answer session. The PAAG
expressed no view of the proposed meetings.
In response to subjects discussed at the 9 November PAAG
meeting, an item on the PAAG appeared in the 28 November Notes From
the Director, and the next meeting agenda and list of members were
posted on the Public Affairs bulletin board.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
Also as a follow-on to the 9 November meeting, a proposed DCI
letterhead was shown to the group--a blue banner with ICS seal and
"Director of Central Intelligence" in large letters--for possible use on
Public Affairs handouts. The validity of using the ICS seal was
questioned and it was suggested that "Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence" would b sufficient. In response to the question of why
it was needed at all, explained that some of the handouts we
have will be useful to the RM and CT Staffs and to other IC agencies if
they are not on CIA letterhead. The Chairman said we would try to have
another proposal ready by the next meeting.
A proposed new handout on the Intelligence Cycle was passed to
the group for comment and it was explained that it will be used in
reso-ons~
to an enormous number of requests to define this process.
requested that "analysis" appear more prominently in the
production step of the cycle. expressed his reluctance to
alter an Agency and Community-approved efinition, but agreed with
Mr. Hetu to try to find a suitable solution that would incorporate
this request.
Copies of the DDCI's address to the Commonwealth Club of
San Francisco, California on 15 November and the DCI's remarks to the
JFK School of Government at Harvard on 30 November were distributed
for information. The Question & Answer Book with talking points
prepared by Public Affairs for the DCI and DDCI's review prior to
speaking engagements or public meetings was passed around for in-
formation. The Chairman noted that a similar book was envisioned to
be part of Public Affairs eventual support to members of the Speakers
Bureau which is under construction.
Also passed around the table were the stock still-photo
alb that resulted from a contract with former employee
Photos include a variety of scenes of the Headquarters building
inside and out which may be used internally in publications such as
the DCI's Annual Report and externally in response to requests from
newspeople for pictures to accompany stories.
2. DCI's Article for Foreign Affairs, "Protecting Secrets in
a Free Society"
aid the article was circulated for comment by
Ben Evans'and is currently being redone by as a
result. There was discussion as to whether the article was
appropriate for Foreign Affairs, which has a limited audience that is
already enlightened regarding the theme, and because a similar
article appeared in it less than a year ago. The Chairman agreed
with the suggestion that the PAAG should review the article once it
has been redone.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
STAT
3. CCTV
The Chairman recommended a written recommendation be sent
to DDA regarding the future of CCTV.
A sampling of o inion regarding TV's in the cafeteria has
proven to be negative. suggested that the PAAG attack the
problem from a positive side; that the objective, once defined, would
suggest the placement of the TV sets. The Chairman said the original
reason for the TV's was to accommodate overflow in the auditorium
and to rebroadcast commercial shows of interest to the Agency. He
emphasized his concern that the system be effectively used, either
where they are now or elsewhere, such as in classrooms.
The means for the Agency to communicate internally with
its own employees was discussed as a possible alternative use of
the CCTV.
Members of the PAAG were asked to solicit ideas from their
component organizations.
4. Speakers Bureau
The Chairman noted that the progress of the Bureau has been
delayed for the lack of a full time Director and because of such
problems as the support speakers would need from OPA and a decision
as to who pays for travel. The Chairman also noted that a recent
PMCD survey recommended that OTR's briefing billet be transferred
to OPA and several members expressed agreement with the recommendation.
projects:
5. Goals
Mr. Hetu reported on the status of several goal-related
Multi-media show - Contract has been let and we met
with the designer and writer last Friday. Target
date for completion: 1 May 79
One-day Media Seminar at Headquarters - Cancelled
because of negative reattion to the idea both from
within and from respected members of the media.
Strengthen the Publications Review Board Procedures -
Need an updated Agency regulation on the process, but
it is currently working well. In response to a question,
STAT said that the PRB in recent months has been
Brochure - Considerable text has been written and
Suzanne Black is working with an Agency designer on
composition and layout. We hope to have something to
show the PAAG by January.
able to stay, within the 30 days allowed for review.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
6. Purpose of PAAG
There was a request for clarification of the purpose of
the PAAG and what is expected of its members. It was suggested that
members be given items to consider in advance of meetings so that they
would have full opportunity to play "advisory" roles. The Chairman
said that the point is well taken, that he is not only looking for
advice from the PAAG but for feedback as well, in an effort to try
to overcome misconceptions about what OPA is trying to do.
7. University Student Group Visits to Headquarters
distributed for information a memorandum dated
28 November 78, which he had sent to D/OS recommending reconsideration
of the policy of limiting student groups to rium and
excluding non-US students from the compound. said these
restrictions seriously hamper the mission of is o ice.
Mr. Briggs suggested that public image be focused on the
intelligence world, rather than CIA specifically, and to overcome
problems such as space and security, other buildings such as those
in the_complex be considered for meetings of both external
and internal groups, task forces, etc.
8. I lannounced that the DDCI was to testify before the
House Assassinations Committee that day at 1400.
9. The Chairman closed the meeting by asking for members inputs
to future agendas.
Herbert E. Hetu, Chairman
Respectfully submitted:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
Intelligence is knowledge and fore-
knowledge of.the world around us-
the prelude to Presidential decision
and action.
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone: [phone]
The Intelligence Cycle
is the process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to
policymakers. There are usually five steps which constitute The Intelligence Cycle.
1. Planning and Direction
This involves the management of the entire intelligence effort, from the identification of the need for
data to the final delivery of an intelligence product to a customer.
The whole process is initiated by requests or requirements for intelligence on certain subjects. These
are based on the ultimate needs of the policymakers-the President, the National Security Council, and
other major departments and agencies of government.
2. Collection
This involves the gathering of the raw data from which finished intelligence will be produced. There are
many sources for the collection of information, including foreign radiobroadcasts, newspapers,
periodicals, and official government personnel stationed in American embassies abroad.
There are also secret sources, such as agents and defectors who provide information obtainable in
no other way.
Finally, technical collection-photography and electronics-has come to play an indispensable part
in modern intelligence by extending the Nation's sensory system-its eyes and ears.
3. Processing
This step is concerned with the conversion of the vast amount of information coming into the system
to a form more suitable for the production of finished intelligence, such as in language translations,
decryption, and sorting by subject matter. The information that does not go directly to analysts is
sorted and made available for rapid computer retrieval.
Processing also refers to data reduction-interpretation of the information stored on film and tape
through the use of highly refined photographic and electronic processes.
4. Production and Analysis
This refers to the conversion of basic information into finished intelligence. It includes the integra-
tion, evaluation, and analysis of all available data and the preparation of a variety of intelligence products.
Such products or estimates may be presented as briefings, brief reports or lengthy studies.
The "raw intelligence" collected is frequently fragmentary and at times contradictory. Analysts, who are
subject-matter specialists for a particular country, produce finished intelligence by evaluating and
integrating the various pieces of data and interpreting their meaning and significance.
The subjects involved may concern different regions, problems, or personalities in various
contexts-political, geographic, economic, military, scientific, or biographic. Current events, capabilities,
or probable developments in the future may also be examined.
5. Dissemination
The last step is the distribution and handling of the finished intelligence to the consumers of intelligence,
the same policymakers whose needs triggered the Intelligence Cycle.
Sound policy decisions must be based on sound knowledge. Intelligence aims to provide that knowledge.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone: [phone]
MEMORANDUM FOR: .PAAG Members
For discussion at next PAAG meeting. See
Item 1, para. 4 of Minutes of 11 Dec
Meeting.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
f ::y E s: t 3 ti! Z.i 3 Y: S i i~ 3 u
NFAC #5339/78
28 November 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert W. Gambino, Director of Security
THROUGH . Director, National Foreign Assessment Ce
FROM : Coordinator for Academic Relations, NFAC
SUBJECT New Security Regulations on University Student Group
Visits to Headquarters
1. It has come to the attention of this office that over the past
several weeks there has been a change in security policy on two aspects
of university student group visits to the Headquarters Building. These
changes are:
a. Limiting student and faculty visitors to the
Auditorium.
b. Excluding any foreign national student attending
a US institution of learning from entering the compound.
These restrictions are severely limiting our ability to run a successful
program.
2. Background: When the job of Coordinator for Academic Relations
and Externs na ytical Support (and later that of Associate Coordinator)
was created as a full-time position, its charter included an effort to
change the image of CIA in the academic community. As part of this effort,
a program of Headquarters visits and briefings of university student
groups was undertaken. These visits usually consist of an unclassified
briefing on the CIA, especially on NFAC and its functions of supporting
US policymakers. Sometimes, discussions on functional or regional
problems are added.
3. Our program has centered on graduate and undergraduate schools
with strong programs in area studies and foreign affairs or schools that
run courses on national security problems. In the past two years, NFAC
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTER!!AL USE ONLY
NFAC #5339/78
SUBJECT: New Security Regulations on University Student Group
Visits to Headquarters
has hosted 24 university student and faculty groups from Syracuse
University (the Maxwell School), Columbia University (the International
Fellows Program), West Point, the University of California, Princeton
University, Illinois Wesleyan University, Colgate University, and the
University of Michigan. These groups have ranged in size from ten to
150 people. Often they included a few foreign nationals.
4. At the 26 October 1978 meeting of university presidents with
Admiral Turner, the visitors pointed out that student visits to the
Agency are a major way of improving the Agency's image with the student
body. The university presidents suggested that this program be expanded.
The program also has had positive aspects besides the obvious public
relations effects. For example, the program has aided in establishing
good personal relationships with faculty members on many campuses. These
contacts are useful in recruiting employees and consultants. In addition,
many of the students and some faculty members who visit become interested
in employment by the Agency. Further, some students who visit us will
find employment at the State Department, the Department of Defense or the
Treasury, where they will begin with an awareness of the resources
available from the Agency and will be more inclined to coordinate their
work efforts with Agency analysts.
5. The Problem: The restriction that limits all student groups to
the Auditorium during working hours severely limits our ability to run a
successful briefing program. First, there are the physical problems.
The Auditorium is often booked when student groups would like to visit
the Agency. Many of these groups are from out of town and are planning
a Washington visit for only a day or two. Their flexibility in time and
date of visit is limited and with only the Auditorium, so is ours. For
example, recently a small group of honors students from the University
of Michigan were planning to visit Washington for one day only, 27 November.
They requested a series of area briefings similar to those received by the
same group last year. We had to turn them down because the Auditorium
had been booked all day for a series of security briefings.
6. On occasion we have had several groups requesting visits on the
same day and even at the same time of day. If we are limited to the use
of the Auditorium, we can only accommodate one group at a time. As a
-2-
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
AOMmISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE IJ LY
NFAC #5339/78
SUBJECT: New Security Regulations on University Student Group
Visits to Headquarters
case in point, we are scheduled again this year to host the language clubs
from the US Military Academy at West Point in April, 1979. These clubs,
of which there are usually at least three, have about 40 members each.
In the past they have been given individual area briefings; for example,
a Soviet area briefing for the Russian language club and a Middle East
situation briefing for the Arabic club. Obviously it will not be
feasible to do this, unless we have three or four separate rooms to
meet in.
7. There are also certain valuable intangibles such as the atmosphere
of intimacy a briefing creates. This is hardly achievable, however, if we
are forced to brief 20 students in an auditorium that holds 500. A small
conference room would serve much better. In addition, we are told that
the trip to the Agency is often the highlight of a student group's trip
to Washington. Many of our visitors are greatly impressed with our
facilities and go away with the feeling that they have seen something
few others have seen.
8. The second change in security procedure, that of excluding foreign
students from participating in Agency visits, will probably have an even
more damaging impact upon our program. We naturally seek to attract
graduate students involved in area study programs or foreign affairs
curriculum at major universities. These types of programs from major
universities usually attract a number of foreign students for obvious
reasons. At present, there are over 235,000 foreign students registered
in colleges and universities throughout the US. It is very difficult to
tell a program administrator or faculty member that he can bring forty
of his students into the compound but must not bring his two non-US
students. In discussions with university officials on this matter, I
have encountered resentment and a general lack of understanding. The
reaction usually is to question what a few well-mannered non-US students
could possibly do to the Agency, which has a security force capable of
coping with TV and movie cameras shooting in the building.
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERTA1 !J1E D 11
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTER>AL USE ONLY
NFAC #5339/78
SUBJECT: New Security Regulations on University Student Group
Visits to Headquarters
9. Recommendation: That the policy of (a) limiting student groups
to the Auditorium and (b) excluding non-US students from the compound
be reconsidered.
-.4-
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
i S" V..:~ ...wi
NFAC #5339/78
SUBJECT: New Security Regulations on University Student Group
Visits to Headquarters
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - D/NFAC
1 - DDA
1 - A/DCI/PA
1 - NFAC Security Officer
2 - NFAC/CAR
1 - NFAC Registry
NFAC/ACAJ
is (28 November 1978)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
Deputy Director Frank D. Carlucci
Address The Commonwealth Club
San Francisco, California
Wednesday, November 15, 1978
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
AMBASSADOR SHIRLEY TEMPLE BLACK: ...the Congo, Tan-
zania and Brazil, where he was Counselor for Political Affairs.
Returning to Washington in 1969, he served two years with the
Office of Economic Opportunity, one year with the Office of
Management and Budget as Deputy Director, and two years with
Health, Education and Welfare as Undersecretary. In 1974, he
returned to overseas service as U. S. Ambassador to Portugal
during the turbulent times when socialism and communism were
locked in their own wrestling match over Portugal.
Our guest has received Distinguished Service awards
from three departments -- State, HEW and Defense; an honorary
doctorate from two universities. Not only is he is a distin-
guished public servant and wrestler, he also served briefly as
an officer in the U. S. Navy, which would provide a bond of
professional interest with both the Director of the CIA and
and the President.
We are delighted to welcome a gentleman that's got
very serious and profoundly important responsibilities. Ladies
and gentlemen, may I present to you the Deputy Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, Mr. Frank C. Carlucci.
[Applause.]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Thank you very much,
Ambassador Black, President Javits. After that introduction,
I'm not sure whether I should give you a speech or wrestle.
I will try the former.
As I thought about the topic of the real issues facing
the CIA, a plethora of subjects lept to mind. And I tried to
distill them down to essentially four. Well, let me give them
to you directly and then go over them.
Number one, the nature of the external threat. Number
two, the challenge of the changing nature of the intelligence
business. Number three, the imperative to define the role of a
secret organization in a free society. And number four, our
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
ability or inability, as it may be, to protect our vital informa-
tion; in particular, our sources and methods. Let me look at
these one at a time.
In terms of the nature of the external threat, I sup-
pose there were some of us in the early 1970s who were thinking
in terms of the changing adversary, a new kind of world order,
a different kind of relationship between the big powers. And
indeed, it is fair to say that all of us hoped that this will
come about. But there have been two events, at least, that have
occurred in the mid and late 1970s which have certainly at least
raised warning signs. First are the rather extensive and blatantly
imperialistic activities of the Soviet Union and its Cuban proxy
in Africa. This has reminded us all too clearly that communist
doctrine is a revolutionary doctrine and that it is directed at
the kind of free society that we represent. I had an opportunity
to observe this at firsthand in 1975 in Portugal.
Secondly, we have all watched the increasing resources
being devoted by the Soviet Union to its defense establishment, or,
better stated, its offensive establishment. The United States de-
votes somewhere between five and a half to six percent of its GNP
to defense expenditures. The Soviet Union devotes more than double
that. In the past ten years, U. S. defense expenditure has actu-
ally declined in real terms. The Soviets' defense expenditure has
increased at a rate of about four or five percent per annum.
If we try to measure what they are doing in terms of
dollar value, that is how many dollars does it take to purchase
what they are doing in defense areas, we find that their effort
exceeds ours by some thirty-five to forty percent, certainly far
more than they need for their legitimate defense requirements.
WeII, what does this mean in the intelligence area?
It means, first of all, that we have reached an era of strategic
parity. The United States no longer has a vast lead. Simply
stated, that means we can't afford to make any mistakes. A
couple of years back, missing out on some information on some
new alliance might not have made a difference. But today it could
make a difference both in political and military terms.
That is why we find our military commanders increasingly
placing more emphasis on intelligence, on what they call strategic
w a r n i n g . Those few hours , those few days cou I d make the c r i t i c a l
difference. An obscure troop movement somewhere, the movement of
some atomic weapons, the deployment of submarines, maybe a report
picked up by a strategically placed agent could reveal some intent
or some kind of new alliance.
Indeed, intelligence today could provide the critical
difference. And that, I suggest, is very real. We learned the
lesson awfully painfully in 1941 at the time of Pearl Harbor. And
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
it was for that reason that the CIA was created.
Now since then, the nature of the intelligence business
has changed rather dramatically. And this brings me to my second
issue: the challenge that that change represents. Certainly we
still have to keep an eye on the strategic balance, and we have
to watch what the Warsaw Pact is doing. But that's not enough
in a complex, intriguing world. We also have to keep our eye
on regional and issue-oriented problems. A couple of years back,
it was enough just to take a look at one country and analyze that
country and say "Where is it heading?" That kind of analysis no
longer serves us very well.
Just take a look, for example, at the Horn of Africa,
Ethiopia and what's happening in the Ogaden and in Eritrea. But
you can't look at that in isolation. You have to look at what's
happening in Somalia, how does it affect the Sudan; what about
Egypt, what about the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen right
across the Gulf; how does the Cuban presence in Ethiopia relate
to the Cuban presence in Mozambique; what does this all mean for
Angola. Indeed, you could make an analysis that would stretch
all the way from Zimbabwe up to Afghanistan.
So it's become much more complicated to look at nations
today. And it no longer serves just to have one country as your
specialty.
Secondly, we have to deal with a lot of issues today
that we didn't have to, things that were never dreamed of at the
time CIA was founded. Let's take the intention of some countries
to build nulcear weapons, a matter of intense concern to the ad-
ministration. And there are countries in the world that are doing
that, and they're doing it without trying to let anybody know about
it. And in many Instances, it is only through intelligence that
we can find out.
Of course, nobody in his right mind would think of hav-
ing a SALT treaty if we didn't have the means to implement it.
And that means will have to fall principally to our intelligence
agencies. Even such issues as the North-South dialogues have
have national security implications these days. And then we
have a couple of others that sometimes touch us in very personal
ways. The question of narcotics. The best way to stop the nar-
cotics trade is to stop it abroad. A lot of that information comes
clandestinely through intelligence.
Or terrorism. Practically the only way to stop terrorism
is to find out about it in advance, to have a penetration. For-
tunately, we've been spared a lot of that in this country. But
there is still a danger to our people abroad. And we in the in-
telligence business do try to penetrate terrorist groups, sometimes
successfully, sometimes not so successfully.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
And finally, there are the resource issues. Whoever
thought at the time that Central Intelligence was being set up
that we would be worried so much about the world's oil reserves
and what's going to happen. And whether or not you agree with
the study that's been put out on this subject, I think you have to
agree that we made these studies in the interests of our national
security. And this requires very careful intelligence collection.
Finally, there are the new techniques. And a lot has
been made about the technical systems, and indeed these systems
will be extremely helpful; indeed essential to verifying SALT.
Some people have said to me, "Well, you have the technical systems.
Why do you need the human element?" A very simple answer. The
technical system will tell you what happened yesterday and what
may even be happening today. But it can't tell you what's going
to happen tomorrow. It can't tell you what people's intent is.
And as long as we need to know the intentions, there will continue
to be a human element in the collection business.
Now, CIA for a number of years has been on the front
pages of your newspapers. There's been a lot more written than
we would like to see. It's not been the best climate in which
to conduct an intelligence operation. Some of the charges have
been sensationalist; others have been factual. But they have led
to what I believe is, by and large, a constructive debate. And
that is a debate on what the role of a secret agency in a free
society ought to be.
But let's try and put, first of all, some of the charges
into perspective without making any effort to defend against all
of the charges that have been made. But there is an impression
among some that the CIA intelligence community is some kind of a
rogue elephant on the loose. And let me just quote a few things.
The Church Committee itself, which conducted a far-reaching and, I
think it's far to say, not terribly friendly investigation of the
CIA, said [words unintelligible]. The Pike Committee, on the
House side, said, and I quote: "All evidence suggests that the
CIA, far from being out of control, has been utterly responsive
to Instructions of the President and the assistants for national
security."
Senator Inouye, the highly respected chairman of the
first Senate oversight committee, put it even more strongly. He
said, and I quote: "There's no question that a number of abuses
of power, mistakes in judgment and failures by the intelligence
agency have harmed the United States. In almost every instance,
the abuses that have been reviewed were the results of directions
from above, including Presidents and secretaries of State. Further,
in almost every instance, some members of both houses of Congress
assigned to give oversight were knowledgeable about the activity."
And to blame the CIA for implementing some of these poli-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
Gies is somewhat akin to blaming the Army for the landing in the
Dominican Republic, blaming Marines for the landing in Lebanon
in the mid 1950s. It was an organization that was carrying out
orders.
But be that as it may, I ' m prepared to concede the
point that we have a credibility problem, or a political problem,
or both. And the best way to correct that problem is to reassure
the American people that a proper set of checks and balances have
been instituted, that the abuses that occurred in the past will
not re-occur.
And I think I can tell you in all candor that these
checks and balances do exist. And the Director and I practice
very much an open door policy. If people have dissents or grie-
vances, we're readily available. And the internal insepection
system has been strengthened, and it has a full mandate to look
into any charges.
Over and above that, the President has established by
Executive Order something called the Intelligence Oversight Board,
consisting of three distinguished Americans -- Tom Farmer, former
Governor Scranton, former Senator Gore -- which is entirely in-
dependent of the CIA. It reports directly to the President, and
it is empowered to hear any complaint of wrongdoing from any citi-
zen, anywhere, including CIA employees, without any reference to
to the Director of Central Intelligence.
And finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is
congressional oversight. The congressional oversight system has
been greatly strengthened in the past two years, both on the Senate
and the House side. I think we have constructive relationships
with our parent committees. But that doesn't mean that they don't
hesitate to criticize us, or to cut off our funds when they think
we're doing something they don't approve of. But this kind of
constructive oversight is welcomed.
Finally, we are in favor of seeking charter legislation
for the intelligence community. We think this kind of endorsement
by the people's representatives in Congress will be helpful. But
we also think that charter legislation ought to be just that: broad
legislation that gives us certain authorities and sets up procedures
to make sure there are no abuses of these authorities. It should
not be a form of micro management. And there are difficult issues
here. Some people say we ought to write into the charter that we
shouldn't overthrow democratic governments, and there shouldn't be
any relationship with the press, all of which sounds fine until
you get down to the question of trying to define what a democratic
government is. Or when you think about the press, does that mean
that the CIA shouldn't have a relationship with a TASS correspon-
dent? Oh, of course not. He's a communist. How about some other
countries that we may not like, but aren't communist? The question
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
gets quite complex. When you start trying to legislative morality,
it becomes very difficult.
Let's take a look at terrorism. I mentioned earlier
that the best way to stop terrorism is to penetrate it. And
in several instances we've received information that has saved
lives, including lives of U. S. Ambassadors. But what do we do
when our agent in a terrorist group is ordered to go on a hit,
or maybe a bank robbery? Well, obviously, you don't authorize
him to go out and kill. But if we tell him not to, his life is
then in danger. A difficult judgment to make; and even more
difficult to make in legislation.
I would suggest that the best way is through the nor-
mal procedures, and that is to have Congress confirm in office
executives in whom they will have the confidence to make the
difficult kind of judgment calls, and then to exercise the proper
oversight.
Now in coming to this, we have gotten ourselves into
situations where the micro management doesn't seem to make much
sense. You have a requirement, for example, that every time
that the CIA engages in anything other than pure intelligence
collection, something euphemistically called special activity
-- it used to be called a covert action -- there has to be a
presidential finding and we have to brief seven committees of
Congress, up to 140 people. It sounds fine, until the other day,
during the Moro kidnaping, we received a request for assistance
from the Italian government. They said "Could you send us a
psychiatrist who knows something about terrorism?" I said sure.
The lawyer came in and said "Huh-huh, that's not intelligence
collection. That's a specialized case. And to do that, you'll
have to get a presidential finding." The President happened to
have been visiting Brazil at that point. "And then you'll have
to brief these committees of Congress, 104 congressmen." I said
"What? To put a psychiatrist on an airplane?" The answer was
yes.
I called up the State Department and said "Do you have
a psychiatrist?" He said yes. I said "Will you please put him
on an airplane and send him to Rome?" That was that. But it
just doesn't make much sense.
Or let me give you a hypothetical example. Let's say
we have a democratic election in country "X." And a group of
generals begin to wonder about that election. They don't like
the candidates for election. And we have an agent in that country
who happens to be a general. And he comes to us and says "What
should I do? Should I side with the generals, or should I say
'Go pull off a coup?'" Well, if I understand the law, before we
give him advice, we would have to have a presidential finding and
brief nearly a dozen committees of Congress. And how long do you
think the name of that general will remain a secret? Obviously
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
we're not going to give him advice.
And I simply put these kinds of issues out as the
type of thing that can be addressed and, I hope, simplified
in charter legislation.
My last issue, our ability to protect our sources and
methods, is probably the most fundamental of all. No matter how
sincere people are, it is simply axiomatic that the more people
know about something, the greater is the likelihood that it will
become public. And frankly, too many people know about what is
going on in our intelligence community today. And in fact, there
are those who make a career out of trying to expose the names of
CIA employees. There's a former CIA employee named Philip Agee
who prints in DuPont Circle, in Washington, D. C., a monthly pub-
lication called "Covert Action," which is designed, purely and
simply to expose the names of CIA people overseas and does so in
such a way that it clearly incites people to violence. And we
have some unhappy memories of that kind of thing.
Yet when we look at ways to deal with this, we find
that we antequated espionage laws. We have laws in this country
that make it a crime just to give out information from the Depart-
ment of Agriculture on crop futures, or to give out information
from the Department of Commerce, or information from the IRS.
But there is no such law with regard to national security. It
is only a crime if you can prove intent to harm the United States,
which is very difficult to do.
So it's no wonder that we have people who come into
the CIA, spend some time, go out and write a book, make some
money. And we find that our only legal remedy right now is a
civil suit; hardly adequate if we're going to maintain the in-
tegrity of our intelligence secrets.
And in fact, some of our laws wouldn't seem to help.
I mentioned Philip Agee before. Under the Privacy Act and the
Freedom of Information Act, we have three people in the CIA,
at least at the last count I made, who are spending ful Itime
supplying information to Mr. Agee.
Now in terms of making information available to the
public, we favor it. And I think Admiral Turner spoke to this
group about it last year. Our agency puts out some hundred and
fifty finished reports on serious topics, such as economic develop-
ments in the Soviet Union, the steel industry in China, world oil
reserves. I think that serves a useful purpose, and we intend to
continue that. But at the same time, we find that we have diverted
109 man years to answering 85 Freedom of Information Act requests
a week; people writing in saying "Tell me all about the Berlin
Tunnel," one of whom was a 13 year old. It's not that I see any-
thing wrong with the Freedom of Information Act. But when it comes
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
to an intelligence agency, it is virtually self-deafeating. We
spend 2.6 million dollars supplying this information, at approxi-
mately $540.00 per request, most of which goes to taking out
the national security information. So when the product emerges,
it amounts to very little, except that it's been helpful to one
or two authors.
Also as I understand the act, if the head of the KGB
were to write and say "Tell us about the KGB, what you have in
your files on the KGB," we would legally have to respond in ten
days. And if we turned down his request on security grounds, he
would have twenty days in which we have to respond -- we would
have twenty days to respond to his appeal.
Now, I suggest that we don't want to turn an agency
designed to provide our policy-makers with the best possible in-
formation to the purveyor of information to the world.
I can say that this is a matter of very serious concern
for us. The issue is very simple. Do we need an intelligence
organization? The answer is, yes. Then you have to accept the
fact that with that organization comes some secrecy. And secrecy
is not a new concept in our society. When we talk about the doctor-
patient relationship, the lawyer-client relationship, the secrecy
of grand juries, credit information, why should someone who pro-
vides information to the U. S. government be entitled to less
than that? Indeed, I find myself in agreement with our friends
in the press when they say they've got to protect their sources,
because if they can't protect their sources, they're going to lose
information. That's exactly our point.
A couple of differences. Their stand is based on a
constitutional interpretation which is still open to dispute.
Our responsibility to protect our sources is very specific in
the 1947 National Security Act. And in most cases, if they lose
their sources, they lose information. Quite frankly, in some
cases if we lose our sources, lives are at stake. So I think
it is a very serious issue.
I'm frequently asked, well, how do we stand? How do
we do vis-a-vis the adversary? And let me close on this note.
The KGB has more resources than we have. They have fewer re-
straints than we have. They operate with a pretty few hand.
They also have disadvantages. Technically, we're ahead. And
they carry around an awful lot of ideological baggage. And the
worst way to deal with intelligence is from an ideological per-
spective. In many cases, intelligence is bad news. And I would
not like to be the bearer of bad news to the Kremlin.
The fact is that our analytical capability is, in my
judgment, far superior to theirs. Yes, I still think we're num-
ber one, and we need to be number one. But we're going to have
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
to run to stay ahead. We're going to have to work hard. We're
going to make progress, and to make that progress we're going to
need the support of groups such as this.
And I thank you very much for the opportunity to let
me make my speech here tonight.
Thank you.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
JFK School of Government
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Thursday, 30 November 1978
IS THE CIA ACCOUNTABLE?
I am very pleased to be back at Harvard and to share with you some of
the significant new trends that I see in the intelligence process of
our country today. There are few public institutions in history that
have undergone such thorough public scrutiny as has the American
intelligence community in the last four years, particularly, the
Central Intelligence Agency.
The CIA is and should be our most secretive government agency.
The fact that it has undergone this public scrutiny is really extraordinary.
Perhaps it is the first time the world has had opened up to it a major
intelligence organization in almost all of its aspects. It has been a
traumatic experience for those of us in the intelligence community. It
has damaged morale. The typical intelligence officer, for instance,
feels that he is performing a difficult, patriotic task which requires
great sacrifice on his part. When he finds his activities exposed in
the public media and severely criticized, he cannot help but feel
that the country neither understands nor appreciates that sacrifice.
That is a shame because we are very dedicated to you and to the entire
country.
The trauma also extends to the fact that it is more difficult to
do our job under these conditions. It has damaged our capability to
perform the intelligence functions authorized by law. When we cannot
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 . Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 GO117OR003505680020-9
ensure adequate secrecy, foreigners who are willing to work on our
behalf and support our country; foreign governments whose intelligence
services complement ours are certainly much less willing to do so.
It has been a traumatic period for the American public also.
Americans like to view the world in idealized terms and yet the world
is not ideal. It is not open and free. The world is a highly competitive
place and more societies than not are closed and totalitarian. Not all
countries are willing to tell us what they are going to do in advance,
even if their actions may be inimical to our interests. Let me
remind you only of the great Soviet wheat steal of 1972 where we simply
lacked the statistical data base to drive the proper bargain for our
national interests.
Today, if we are to protect those interests and our pocketbooks,
we must have good information about what is going on in the rest of the
world. It is, in fact, much more important today than ever before.
Thirty years ago, when the Central Intelligence Agency was founded,
we were the preeminent military power in the world; we were a totally
independent economic power and many if not most of the world's free
nations took their political cues from us. How different is today's
world. We are one of several interdependent economic powers. We do
not dominate the world's political scene. Small nations and large
are activist and independent. We are much closer to military parity.
In these circumstances, the leverage of good information is much
greater than it was in the days of economic, political, and military
superiority.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
Yet, if we are going to have better intelligence, we also must
have at least as much secrecy as we have had in the past and the
ability to keep national secrets. There is of course a contradiction
between the importance of continued secrecy and the danger of secrecy,
as shown by the exposures of the last four years. Secrecy can lead to
unidentified power. Power in any form can be abused, but unidentified
power has a particular potential for abuse. How then can we provide
for good intelligence for our country and yet insure against abuse?
On the one hand we can underreact and simply assume that the
relatively limited number of abuses of the past will not be repeated
because we are more conscious of the problem today. On the other hand
we can overreact and so attempt to control potential abuses that we
handcuff and handicap our intelligence effort out of business. Either
course would be shortsighted. We need to achieve some balance here.
The best way to achieve that balance is to have a system of accountability;
accountability to the Legislative Branch of our government, accountability
to the Executive Branch, and in addition, accountability to the public.
And, we must do this in a way that does not handcuff intelligence
capability at the same time.
I would like, briefly, to look with you at how this accountability
is being structured in all three of these segments of American society
and to try to determine whether there is an adequate basis for the
kind of accountability the country needs to be assured the intelligence
function is being carried out properly.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
First, the public sector. In the past, public oversight, public
accountability was impossible. Not enough information was shared with
the public. Today that is no longer true. The recent revelations, the
public inquiries and investigations, the Freedom of Information Act,
have all made the American intelligence community much more accessible
to the public than before. In addition, over the past several years we
have made a very definite and deliberate effort to be more open. My
presence here with you tonight, something that probably would not have
taken place as recently as four or five years ago, is an earnest of
that effort to keep the public as well informed as we can. Also,
we respond to the press more forthrightly than ever before. Clearly,
we cannot answer every question, but I assure you that the needle is
not stuck in the groove that says, "no comment."
Beyond that, we are publishing more; making more intelligence
analyses and estimates available to the public. Obviously we are doing
that in those areas where information can be downgraded to unclassified.
In that process I hope that we are also helping to protect
classified information better. The big problem we have is that there
is too much classified information and, because of its quantity, it does
not engender the respect that is due. So if we can declassify as much
as possible and move it into the public sector, I hope we can garner
greater respect for that which remains.
Finally, in the public sector, the free press is a major assist to
the public in its effort to hold the American intelligence community
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 GO117OR003505680020-9
accountable. People like Woodward and Bernstein and others have
performed yeoman service in helping the public keep track of governmental
activities. There are, however, potential problems here.
When something is made known to the press and consequently to
the public, it is automatically revealed to a potential enemies.
And, unlike a court of law, the press can find you or me guilty through
accusation alone. The power to accuse in the public press or on the
airwaves of our country is a profound power and one that is susceptible
to as much abuse as any other form of power. This can also give rise
to another kind of problem. The press, I hope, never has the full set
of facts on any given intelligence subject. That means that any member
of the media writing about intelligence activities must always work
from an incomplete evidentiary base. It is a very difficult position
because they must always draw their conclusions from incomplete information.
The danger of misinterpretation or distortion is great.
However, we do have some things in common. One of them is the absolute
necessity to protect sources. I know how ardently the press holds to that
principle in their case; sometimes I am dismayed when they don't recognize
it in ours. Let me cite an example.
A few weeks ago in column three on the front page of a national
newspaper there was a story about an impending trial with two officials
of the ITT Corporation for perjury before the Congress testifying about
ITT activities in-Chile. The thrust of the story was how bad it was
that the Central Intelligence Agency might frustrate that prosecution
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
because of their unwillingness to release certain information. Over in
the next column was another story about a trial underway in New Jersey
in which a man accused of murder claimed that to defend himself
properly he needed the notes of a New York Times reporter. That
reporter refused to produce those notes. The trial was completed,
the reporter went to jail for awhile, but the notes were never
provided.
These cases may seem different but they are analogous in that they
both stand on the principle of protecting sources of information. And
yet, the media does not often recognize the similarity here. I believe
it is symptomatic of the fact that throughout our country there is not
really an adequate recognition of the legitimacy of some degree of
secrecy.
Let me move on to survey the second means by which we are held
accountable by the Executive Branch of the government. There are a
number of processes ensuring accountability in the Executive Branch,
but let me focus just on those revolving around the Presidency.
Today, no President can rely on the doctrine of plausible deniability
as we have seen in the past. The President is required personally to
sign the authorization for any covert political action. The President
is kept informed of all sensitive intelligence activities. And this
President has very strongly supported the concept that Congress must be
given adequate information to perform its oversight responsibilities,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
which I will talk about more in a minute. This attitude is vital
to the whole process of accountability.
The President also has the Intelligence Oversight Board composed
of three members from outside the government, at the moment former
Senator Gore, former Governor Scranton and Mr. Thomas Farmer of
Washington, D. C. These three men, appointed by and reporting only to
the President, have the sole charge to look into the legality and the
propriety of intelligence community activities. Any of our employees,
any of you, anyone who believes there is an abuse of the intelligence
privilege may report it to them. This Board will look into it and
report only to the President as to the validity of the allegation and
what should be done about it.
Let me move to the accountability process with the Congress. Some
people are skeptical here, feeling that the record of the Congress
is no better than that of the President in exercising accountability
over intelligence. Yet, let me point out that the Congress is a body
elected separately from the President and operating totally separate from
the Executive Branch of our government. Being accountable to both of
these branches is, I think, a reinforcing assurance. There are two
committees in the Congress, one in each chamber dedicated exclusively to
the task of overseeing the intelligence process.
In the past, intelligence key members of the Congress and effective
oversight was really impossible. Vice President Mondale summed up this
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
situation in his book on accountability by quoting your eminent Massachu-
setts senator of the past, Leveret Saltonstall. At one time when he was
chairman of the subcommittee to oversee the Central Intelligence Agency,
the senator said:
"It is not a question of reluctance on the part
of CIA officials to speak to us, instead it is our
reluctance to seek information and knowledge on
subjects which I personally, as a member of Congress
and as a citizen, would rather not have."
I can assure you that attitude does not prevail in the Congress
today.
On top of that, the two committees I have mentioned conform very
closely to requirements laid out in a recent book by your own dean,
Graham Allison, in stating what he felt were the prerequisites for
good Congressional oversight of the intelligence community. Let me tick
off a few of the standards that Graham set forth:
That the committee should stand permanently. It does.
That they should be specifically concerned with intelligence.
They are.
That they should receive all relevant information. They do.
That they should be subject to rotating membership. While this
is not yet an established rule, the Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, last January, stood down
from his position to establish this principle and concept
and I think it will take hold.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
That they should review and approve the intelligence budget.
They do. They are now responsible for the authorization process
in the Congress for intelligence.
And finally, they should propose statutory charters to
prescribe our authorities and limitations. This is underway
at the moment and hopefully legislation will be enacted by
the forthcoming Congress.
Let me just go back to what I said in the beginning about the need
for balance. Balance between accountability and an ability to conduct
effective intelligence. Have we achieved that balance today? I don't
know. I think it is too early to tell. I think it will be several
years before we know where we are on that tightrope and, in particular,
we must wait until the charters are enacted. But, if we do find the
right balance, we will have achieved a revolution in intelligence, for
never before in history will any major intelligence activity have been
subject to a greater degree of accountability. I believe we are on the
right track and that this can work. I would remind you that it will
require some understanding and some forbearance. Forbearance, for
instance, for having such detailed laws and regulation that we will find
ourselves in a straightjacket unable to conduct intelligence activities
adequately. And here let me just pause to give you an example of how
this can go astray.
When I came to the Central Intelligence Agency there was a regulation
prohibiting the establishment of any paid, contractual relationship
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9
with any accredited member of the United States news media. I was
only there a few weeks when I received a letter from the American
Translators Association. They objected to the firing of a large
number of stringers to the news media who were also part-time translators for
the open and unclassified Foreign Broadcast Information Service. That
really didn't make any sense, so we rewrote the regulation putting in a
loophole clause which it said we would not establish any paid contractual
relationship with any accredited member of the American news media
unless the Director of Central Intelligence personally makes an
exception. That may seem to be no regulation whatsoever; that I can
make an infinite number of exceptions. I don't think that is the case.
I remind you that I am accountable to the oversight process I have just
described; I am subject to interrogation by the Intelligence Oversight
Board, the President, and by two committees of Congress as to what use I
make of this loophole. Unjustified use of it would not be tolerated.
In sum, it is not a perfect world. It is not an open world. It
is a world in which we must balance idealism and realism in international
affairs. We must be sure that the check of accountability encourages
our idealism. We must ensure that the check of accountability is made
sufficiently flexible so that idealism can be tempered with realism.
We are not there yet, but we are moving strongly in the right direction.
It is an exciting period, an important period in American intelligence.
A period when we are, in effect, evolving a new, uniquely American
model of intelligence, one tailored to the values and standards of our
society, and yet, one which is also designed to ensure that we remain
what we are today, the number one intelligence service in the world.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/26: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003505680020-9