A FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT IRAN

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91G01170R003405790067-7
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• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2010
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Approved For Release 2010/10/15: CIA-RDP91 G01 170R003405790067-7
A FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT IRAN
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, re-
viewing a political crisis from the van-
tage point of hindsight poses certain
temptations and pitfalls. It is a tempta-
tion to chart out what should have been
and lay the blame on those in power
who did not foresee correctly or analyze
astutely. The order of events, the pat-
tern or sequence of critical moves be-
comes clear with time, while often re-
maining cloudy during the actual period
in question.
During a crisis, information is at a
premium. It comes in piecemeal. it has
not been analyzed. Events appear inter-
related which on reflection are coinci-
dental. There are gaps, sometimes criti-
cal gaps, in the flow of information. Im-
perfection hallmarks of human nature often
are un-
der the stress.
What then should we have expected
from our policymakers with regard to
the Iranian revolution? It would be un-
fair to expect a grasp of the subtle or to
prophesy the unusual. It is unrealistic
to demand the anticipation of the un-
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 Feb)- nary 26, 1979
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CONG1u SSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S1779
expected or to manage events normally - There being no objection, the material
beyond control of -a distant nation. was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
more in the nature of a list of negatives.
There should have been no indifference
to the full range of political outcomes;
there should have been at least rudi-
mentary planning for unlikely events;
there should have been a willingness to
step beyond bureaucratic or policy con-
straints to anticipate threats to our Na-
tion's well being; there should have been
a suspicion that concrete answers were
illusory. We should have kept our eyes
open and our ears on alert.
Mr. President, even by this conserva-
tive standard of negatives, there has been
a U.S. policy failure in Iran. There is
proof of what I say.
ADMINISTRATION POLICY TOWARD IRAN
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD
My interest in Iran has been long-
standing. It would be difficult to count
the number of speeches I have given on
the senseless policy of arming Iran with
sophisticated U.S. weaponry beyond its
national security needs. Furthermore, in
the course of the background investiga-
tion for the confirmation of G. William
Miller, I began to consider what would
happen in the absence or death of the
Shah.
During March of 1978, I wrote letters
to Secretary Vance and CIA Director
Turner asking a series of questions about
future events in Iran, should the Shah
die. To the question "Who are the likely
contenders for power if the Shah died
suddenly" came the following answer:
The monarchy has been an enduring insti-
tution in Iran-over 2,500 years-and we be-
lieve the vast majority of Iranians favor con-
tinuation of this form of government. .
We cannot predict whether the currently
small radical terrorist groups will attempt
to exploit the occasion of a changeover to
seize power. Their success in any such effort
would appear very doubtful. Other political
opposition leaders could very well exert their
efforts to reduce the power of the monarchy-
but not to end it.
Hon. CYRUS VANCE,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: My service with this
and other committees has made me increas-
ingly aware of the influence of Iran on the
American economy, and on defense planning
and foreign policy. Recent hearings have now
reminded me sharply that the government of
Iran is a one-man regime, thoroughly con-
trolled and directed by the Shah.
I am therefore in~.erested in what would
happen if the Shah >;llould die or be killed
suddenly. Experts outside the government
have giv8Til me their views on this subject and
I request your assessment of it as well. Please
include in your reply responses to these
questions:
(1) The loyalty of government and military
officials in Iran appears to be directly and
personally to the Shah, rather than to a sys-
tem of government or to each other: How
much of this loyalty might be transferred to
a successor regime, such as the regency by
the Queen provided in the present formal
succession arrangements?
(2) The Shah's present ruling methods
appear to perpetuate and exploit constant
rivalry among his subordinates. Can they be
expected to offer unified support to a suc-
cessor regime or is a long period of squabbling
and disorganization likely?
(3) Who are the likely contenders for power
if the Shah dies suddenly? The military has
been a stabilizing force during transition
periods in some other developing countries.
For reasons of culture and history, the
Iranian military apparently has a relatively
low status and Iranians prefer other national
models of modernization and efficiency. Is it
therefore likely that, in addition to strug-
gles by and among military officers for power
and influence in the course of succession,
there will also be further destabilizing con-
tests between civilian elite groups and mili-
tary officers?
(4) Does the present pervasive control
exercised by the Shah over all aspects of
Iranian public life and expression make it
likely that there will be among politically
active and aware Iranians a powerful urge to
release repressed actions and feelings, and a
strong reaction against continuing his sys-
tem of rule?
As for the question, "Does the present
pervasive control exercised by the Shah
over all aspects of Iranian public life and
expression make it likely that there will
be among politically active and aware
Iranians a powerful urge to release re-
pressed actions and feelings and a strong
reaction against continuing his system of
rule?"
The answer was basically that liberali-
zation was continuing to involve more
and more people in the affairs of the
government, thus facilitating a "larger
consensus."
Perhaps the most disturbing of all,
however, was the information that our
intelligence community was not collect-
ing information on critical internal de-
velopments in Iran. Therefore, I again
wrote Admiral Turner urging that more
attention be paid to making sure infor-
mation on Iran was extensive, current,
and detailed. His reply shed no additional
light on the matter.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that all the correspondence men-
tioned be printed in the RECORD, along
with an article from Fortune magazine.
It should be noted that individual names
have been deleted from these letters.
Approved For
(5) Is our commitment to the Shah so
complete that we would have to start over
again from scratch with any of the most
likely successor regimes? Are such regimes
likely to have strong anti-American feelings?
Have we current contingency planning for
the Shah's sudden death and its most likely
political and economic consequences for us.
I realize that an examination of the con-
sequences of the Shah's retirement or linger-
ing death could also be important and inter-
esting. However, I prefer now to concentrate
entirely on the situation which would be
likely to follow his sudden death from acci-
dent, disease, or assassination, since this
would be most likely to produce the most se-
vere crisis and present us with the most
difficult decisions.
Best wishes.
Sincerely,
DEPARTMENT OF' STATE,
Washington, D.C., March 30, 1978.
HOn. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,`
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: Secretary Vance
has requested me to reply to your letter of
March 14 containing a number of questions
about Iran, The issues you have raised are
indeed important and receive careful and
continuing examination in the Department.
The following paragraphs are numbered ac-
cording to the numeration in your letter.
1. The establishment of the Regency
Council and designation of the Empress as
Regent in the event of the Shah's death be-
fore the oldest son reaches maturity has, to
the best of our knowledge, wide support
throughout Iran. The military has strongly
supported the present Shah, as it did the
'Shah's father, and we expect that this sup-
port would be extended to the Empress in
her role of continuing the monarchical order.
Iranian nationalism is a strong motivating
force on the Iranian military and will be
a major factor in the military's backing for
the transition to the legitimate successor.
2. Within the Iranian political structure
there are rivalries for power and influence,
such as exist in any political system. Iranian
political leaders are not now "unified" with
respect to formulation or execution of par-
ticular policies and we would not expect
complete homogeneity at the time of transi-
tion. However, these differences are likely to
be within normal and manageable bounds,
particularly as institutions supporting the
present form of government increase in
strength and acceptance.
3. The monarchy has been an enduring in-
stitution in Iran-Over 2500 years-and we
believe the vast majority of Iranians favor
continuation of this form of government.
There is no generally recognized rival to the
Crown Prince for the succession. However, a
difference of views exists on how much power
the monarch should have. The Iranian mili-
tary has been loyal, as I noted in paragraph
1 above, and we do not foresee at this time
seriously destabilizing contests between
civilian and military elites. They would
share an interest in a smooth transition and
a continuation of economic and military
modernization.
We cannot predict whether the currently
small radical terrorist groups will attempt
to exploit the occasion of a changeover to
seize power. Their success in any such effort
would appear very doubtful. Other political
opposition leaders could very well exert
their efforts to reduce the power of the mon-
archy-but not to end it.
4. Over the last 16 months or so a political
liberalization has been taking place in Iran
and many groups and individuals are speak-
ing out frankly and openly against various
policies and practices of the government.
Complaints range from the extent of the
Shah's power to the functioning of the ju-
diciary and to the prices of goods and hous-
ing. The Shah stated publicly in the after-
math of the Tabriz riot that the liberaliza-
tion will continue. This policy is encourag-
ing, as it involves more and more people in
the affairs of the government and facilitates
a larger consensus. '
5. Although our relations with the Shah
have been very close for three decades, Amer-
ican officials deal with a broad range of of-
ficial and private Iranians, and we foresee
no particular difficulty in working closely
with a successor government. We believe that
the length and strength of the Iran-U.S.
friendship, as well as the factors which un-
derlie it, make it likely that a mutually
beneficial relationship will continue under
any likely future Iranian leadership.
If you believe that it would be useful to
you, I would be pleased to ask one or two
of our Iranian specialists at the Department
to call on you at your convenience to go into
greater depth on these matters.
Sincerely,
DOUGLAS J. BENNET, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations.
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S1780
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE February 26, 1979
MARcH 9, 1978.
Admiral STANSFIELD TURNER,
Director of Central Intelligence, Central In-
telligence Agency, Washington, D.C.
DEAR ADMIRAL TURNER: My service with
this and other committees has made me in-
creasingly aware of the Influence of Iran on
the American economy, and on defense
planning and foreign policy. Our recent dis-
cussion reminded me sharply that the gov
ernment of Iran is a one-man regime,
thoroughly controlled and directed by the
Shah.
I am therefore interested in what would
happen if the Shah should die or be killed
suddenly. Experts outside the government
have given me their views on this subject
and I request your assessment of it as well.
Please include in your reply responses to
these questions:
(1) The loyalty of government and mili-
tary officials in Iran appears to be directly
and personally to the Shah, rather than to
a system of government or to each other:
How much of this loyalty might be trans-
ferred to a successor regime, such as the
regency by the Queen provided in the pres-
ent formal succession arrangements?
(2) The Shah's present ruling methods ap-
pear to perpetuate and exploit constant
rivalry among his subordinates. Can they be
expected to offer unified support to a suc-
cessor regime or is a long period of squabbling
and disorganization likely?
(3) Who are the likely contenders for
power if the Shah dies suddenly? The mili-
tary has been a stabilizing force during
transition periods in some other developing
countries. For reasons of culture and his-
tory, the Iranian military apparently has a
relatively low status and Iranians prefer
other national models of modernization and
efficiency. Is it therefore likely that, in ad-
dition to struggles by and among military
officers for power and influence in the course
of succession, there will also be further
destabilizing contests between civilian elite
groups and military officers?
(4) Does the present pervasive control
exercised by the Shah over all aspects of
Iranian public life and expression make it
likely that there will be among politically
active and aware Iranians a powerful urge
to release repressed actions and feelings,
and a strong reaction against continuing his
system of rule?
I realize that an examination of the con-
sequences of the Shah's retirement or linger-
ing death could also be important and in-
teresting. However, I prefer now to con-
centrate entirely on the situation which
would be likely to follow his sudden death
from accident, disease, or assassination, since
this would be most likely to produce the
most severe crisis and present us with the
most difficult decisions.
Best wishes.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
U.S. Senator.
a debate Is the high cost of the failure In
Iran. In the words of Energy Secretary James
Schlesinger, the curtailment of oil supplies
from Iran looms as "prospectively more seri-
ous" to the U.S. than the Middle East oil
embargo of 1973-74. But as the Secretary
himself earlier noted, the geopolitical con-
sequences of the upheaval in Iran-sharing
a 1,250-mile border with the Soviet Union
and feeling the pressure of Soviet encroach-
ment in other nearby nations-"undoubtedly
exceed in importance" even the impact on
American and Western energy needs. So Na-
tional Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski
cannot be charged with hyperbole in pictur-
ing an "arc of crisis" throughout the stra-
tegic area.
The causes of the Iranian debacle are ob-
viously less simple to state. They cannot be
grasped without appreciating the whole en-
vironment of U.S. policy controlling our re-
lations with the Shah over the last decade.
The quantum leap in the American commit-
ment to the Iranian monarch was triggered
directly by Britain's decision, announced in
1968, to withdraw its forces from "east of
Suez." Before then, Washington's relations
with the Shah had been friendly, but dis-
creetly at arm's length. Though the CIA had
helped to return him to the throne after his
brief flight abroad in 1953 during his con-
frontation with Mohammed Mossadegh, the
U.S. government remained sensitive to the
dangers inherent in the autocratic-style of
the Shah's forced modernization drive, and
used its moderating influence accordingly.
The reserve started to break down toward the
end of the Johnson Administration, largely
as a result of the personal impression the
Shah made on the President. Overriding Pen-
tagon and State Department objections, Lyn-
don Johnson agreed to step up arms
shipments to Iran-as a slow of appreciation
for the Shah's willingness to send a medical
team to Vietnam.
In 1969 Henry Kissinger, soon after moving
into the White House as Richard Nixon's
National Security Adviser, ordered a policy
study of how the vacuum left by the British
withdrawal from the Persian Gulf should be
filled. Rejecting a direct American role, Nixon
opted for "regional cooperation," based on
the twin pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia. At
this stage, the internal stability of the Shah's
regime was taken for granted. 'The whole
assumption was that the Shah was well en-
trenched and that there was no foreseeable
threat to that stability," recalls one of those
actively taking part in the creation of the
policy. "I feel that I was equally as guilty,
and that Mr. Kissinger and the previous Ad-
ministrations were equaly as guilty and obli-
vious as the Carter people." To date, such
candid contrition is not shared by all the
architects of the policy.
The few warnings that were sounded went
ignored. In March, 1969, the National Secu-
rity Council endorsed a "Presidential Review
Memorandum on Arms Sales" to so-called
"forward-defense" countries, including Iran.
Prepared almost a year earlier in the Johnson
Administration by the Pentagon's Office of
International Security Affairs (ISA), the
paper raised caveats about Iran's internal
stability. But its cautions were soon forgot-
ten. So, too, were subsequent ISA objections
that the arms sales to Iran were getting out
of hand. As one senior official who followed
this process remembers, "The revealing thing
was that the warnings did not come from the
Iran experts in the bureaucracy, and were
consistently rejected by them."
Nixon and Kissinger put their new policy
before the Shah during a crucial meeting in
May, 1972. Returning from a Moscow summit
and still aglow from their earlier visit to
Peking, they stopped in Tehran to install the
Shah as their regional proponent of the
"Nixon Doctrine." A shrewd trader, the Shall
laid down his conditions. Along with CIA
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS.
Washington, D.C., March 28, 1978.
Admiral STANSFIELD TURNER,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR ADMIRAL TURNER: This follows up my
letter of March 15 on the questioning of
Iran's future after the Shah's death. Your
analyst (deleted) briefed my staff and an-
swered the questions in my letter-no fur-
ther reply to those is necessary now.
(Deleted) told us that he is preparing an
Intelligence memorandum on precisely this
subject. I was disturbed to hear that there is
no current assessment or contingency plan-
ning on this very important issue and that
the CIA's attention to internal affairs in Iran
is limited. I-believe that the 2-3 year period
following the Shah's death may well be dan-
gerous to our military and intelligence capa-
bilities, and-of particular interest and con-
cern to me-to the international economy
and the stability of the dollar.
I urge you to ensure that the CIA's Infor-
mation on Iran is extensive, current, and de-
tailed. Please make a copy of (deleted) as-
sessment available to me as soon as it is a
completed CIA product ready for circulation
for the comment of other agencies.
Best wishes.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
U.S. Senator.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Was(ington, D.C., Apr. 15, 1978.
Hon. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
Committee on Appropriations, -
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: Thank you for
your letter of March 28 concerning (deleted)
briefing of your staff on Iran's future after
the Shah's death. I believe I can clarify
the matter of your comment about our
limited attention to this problem area.
Let me assure you that analysts like (de-
leted) devote a great deal of time and at-
tention to the internal affairs of Iran. (De-
leted), for example, has worked on this area
for twenty-five years. Our review of this area
is continuous and detailed.
From time to time, as circumstances war-
rant, we prepare an assessment of the situa-
tion. That is what (deleted) is currently
preparing and will be pleased to make it
available to you when it is fully coordi-
nated and completed.
Your concern about contingency plan-
ning is a policy matter and I suggest you
might want to take it up with the State
Department.
I appreciate your interest in this vital area
of the world.
Yours sincerely,
STANSFIELD TURNER,
Director.
IRAN
Even the elaborate spectacle of Chinese Vice
Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing's recent tour of
the U.S. could provide only a fleeting di-
version from the gravest foreign-policy set-
back the U.S. has suffered since the Carter
Administration took office. Indeed, no sooner
had the honored guest returned to Asia
than he himself was publicly criticizing his
Washington hosts for their lack of resolu-
tion in handling the crisis in Iran. However
indelicate this may have seemed, Teng had
a point. For the fall of a pro-Western regime,
and the seizure of power by an Islamic gov-
ernment of uncertain orientation-and even
more uncertain stability-have placed in
peril U.S. interests that are intrinsically
more vital than those that sent Americans
to fight and die in Indochina.
There are, in fact, some critical connect-
ing threads-not instantly obvious, but pol-
itically serious-between these seemingly re-
mote historical happenings. In the first place,
a measure of the hesitation and anxiety of
American policymakers, as they confronted
the crisis in Iran, can be ascribed to the
haunting memory of the presumptions and
misjudgments underlying the Vietnam
tragedy. In the second place, the opening of
diplomatic relations with Communist China
could hardly fail to bring back another bleak
memory-the bitter and futile debate over
"Who lost China?" that raged through U.S.
politics two and three decades ago. The re-
membrance should temper the polemics-
and elevate the purposes-of all debate to-
day over the latest great misadventure of
U.S. diplomacy.
Perhaps the only incontestable fact in such
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February 26, 1979 W,NLj - " 31U1NAL nlGwnL - ~Ll~~~ iL a 1781
support to help the Kurds fight their rebel- were being reported back to the Shah gence, A, iral Stansfield Turner, Carter
lion in neighboring Iraq, he most of all through the ubiquitous secret police, SAVAK. complained that something was obviously
wanted a U.S. promise to sell him whatever Rather than risk imperial displeasure. one wrong about "the quality of our political in-
military hardware he asked for, and to sup- ambassador warned an enterprising political telligence." By the date of this lament, un-
ply as many as 50.000 technicians, military or officer to be "more discreet." On other oc- fortunately, the time had already passed
civilian, to take care of training and main- casion, the same ambassador felt that he when the U.S. could have exerted its influ-
tenance. Nixon agreed. had to mask his own worries by inviting a ence to persuade the Shah to turn himself
In July, 1972, a Kissinger memorandum visitor to ask the Shah whether Iran's arms into a truly constitutional monarch and to
instructed the bureaucracy accordingly. Re- purchases were not perhaps more than the co-opt important elements of the opposition.
moving the last restraints, this open-ended system could bear. And yet-would better intelligence have
commitment to the Shah was preceded by no The American Embassy was not alone in its changed U.S. policy? It seems doubtful. As a
serious effort to examine the sociopolitical record of unrealisni. The U.S. press generally classified staff report of the House Intelli-
underpinnings on which any "structure of conveyed no audible alarms over dangers gence Committee commented in August,
peace" must stand or fall. Swiftly thereafter, ahead. The community of American busi- 1978, "History provides ample illustration to
U.S. military sales to Iran soared. From a rel- nessmen and their dependents in Iran suggest the futility of warning if decision-
atively modest level of $113 million in fiscal swelled to more than 40,000. But their home makers are unwilling to accept a warning or
year 1970, they had climbed to $2.1 billion offices were apparently no better informed, are unprepared to deal with the terns in
by 1973. How his military ambitions affected and no more prescient, than the State which the warning comes."
the Shah's demand for higher oil prices is a Department. Such a lesson was confirmed by the ex-
matter for conjecture. What is clear is that The best communications evidently be- perience of Professor James Bill of the Uni-
me ns to pursu t oil revenues gave him the longed to the Shah himself. He could always versity of Texas, one of a handful of aca-
ea ra pursue these ambitions p tinments hilt. outflank both the U.S. Embassy in Tehran demic experts who had correctly analyzed
sophisticated ct deweaponry-some for these vast shipments and the State Department through his the explosive pressures rising underneath
semi-
orders stwere ithe pipeline when $12 bthe illion i Shah trusted and adroit ambassador in Washing- the Shah's regime. Invited to attend a semi-
was othin the overthrown-was the hollow argument ton, his onetime son-in-law, Ardeshir Zahedi. nar of State Department Iranian experts in
was oveer r
that they would contribute to regional eta- Zahedi, whose departure now threatens social March, 1978, he presented a paper entitled
bility. When the crisis in Iran came, the Washington with its worst caviar crisis in re- "Monarchy in Collapse." As Bill recalled
Shah's regime had an overabundance of su- cent memory, was a master at using his direct later, "The State Department people were
personic fighters, including seventy-eight of line to his friend Henry Kissinger. Till the very receptive, but I did not see my views
the advanced F-14's-but ran short of tear bitter end, he was equally adept at getting reflected in any changes in policy." Warn-
gas. Far from stabilizing the situation, the his message directly to Brzezinski. tags like these did not move the policy-
arms became a major source of popular un- The use of the American "back channel" makers. Even the assistant secretary for Near
rest, arousing bitter resentment against the of the CIA to keep informed on what was Eastern Affairs had relatively little time to
wasteful diversion of the country's economic happening in the opposition was sparse and spend on Iran, being engrossed in the diplo-
resources, the corruption rampant through- ineffective. This pattern did not change even macy leading to Camp David. Weeks after the
out the Iranian procurement program, and when former CIA Director Richard Helms seminar, a presumably "receptive" official
the culturally jarring invasion of thousands served in Tehran as ambassador from 1973 still objected vehemently when a colleague
of foreign personnel and their dependents. It to 1976. Helms concentrated on cultivating was bold enough to qualify a description of
is a historical irony that by enabling the the Shah, and left the station to its own the Shah's regime as "one of the most stable"
Shah to pursue his grandiose ambition of devices. Indeed, Iranian internal develop- with the weasel word "perhaps." (It re-
surpassing West Germany by the year 2000, ments were never seen as the Tehran sta- minded me of One Flew Over the Cuckoo's
the oil bonanza sowed the seeds of his own b Nest," recalls a witness to the exchange.
bon's principal concern. Even the new sta- ?Unless you've been in an insane asylum
destruction. tier chief assigned this year was not picked
But at the time, the Shah's spending was because of his Iranian expertise; like most yourself, you just don't know what it's really
even seen to be one more reason for Wash- like.") One top-level Administration official
ington to support him. For every $1 the U.S. of his staff, he does not speak n's main n mis- Besides put his finger on the crux of the problem:
spent on Iranian oil, the Shah was spending the Kurdish problem, Soviet vactivities, .,Our so-called intelligence failure was of
$2 in the U.S. The procurement side of the sion was to monitor ctivit, both in the worst kind you can get: the reporting
Defense Department, as well as the arms Iran and in the Soviet Union. The invaluable was imbibing the presuppositions of the
electronic surveillance installations along olic
makers, was delighted that stretch tch sales ro the Soviet border increased inhibitions about p y'
Iran on rAt the means stretch out proe offending the host country. Consequently, There is no evidence that the Carter Ad. a balance balance runs. u was ns. dipping time when deeper into to the red, trade the the CIA obtained most of its material on the ministration made any serious effort to take
opposition from SAVAK. Reflecting the a fresh look at these presuppositions. Like of god- send. Me trade with Iran seemed like a ring Kissinger before him, Brzezinski saw the
Shah's own preoccupation with leftwingers,
send. f to Washi goo Shah kept endearing SAVAK concentrated on student activists- Shah as what he termed the Admiriistra-
himsel to Washington little ways-such bon's regional influential." In the course of
as by letting Iran participate in the Inter- even extending its activities to the U.S., with Jimmy Carter's two personal meetings with
national Control Commission in Vietnam in Washington's tacit permission-but it the Shah during his first year in office-first
1974. ignored the more important alliance between in Washington in November, 1977, and six
Other warnings came-and went unheeded. the disgruntled bazaar merchants and the weeks later in Tehran-the President re-
The original Nixon-Kissinger decision to take mullahs. According to the staff report of the stated this reliance in the most effusive
the lid off arms sales to Iran took cheer from House Intellience Committee of January 24, terms. "Iran? because of the great leadership
the presumed influence this would give to "No CIA intelligence reporting based on of the Shah, is an island of stability in one
the U.S. But a Senate Foreign Relations Com- sources within the religious opposition oc- of the more troubled areas of the world,"
mittee staff report noted correctly in July, curred during a two-year period ending in the President intoned in his New Year's Eve
1976, that the policy was in fact giving the November, 1977." toast to his hosts. "This is a great tribute to
Shah "a curious kind of 'reverse influence' Although more aggressive embassy and you, Your Majesty, and to the respect and
on the U.S." The U.S. commitment to him CIA reporting resumed in the second half of the admiration and the love which your peo-
had acquired a momentum that made it ever 1977, it was not until last September that ple give you." A week later, a wave of angry
more difficult to control, much less reverse. significant insights on the political opposi- Islamic demonstrators, shouting their hatred
In this atmosphere, the message filtered tion first reached the desks of key policy- of the Shah, started to sweep over the "island
quickly through the bureaucracy that devil's makers in the State Department's "Morning of stability." But another nine months pas-
advocates were not wanted. "Until recently, Summary." With respect to the CIA, the in- sed before the President first took public no-
you couldn't give away intelligence on Iran," vestigators of the House Intelligence Com- tice that the Shah was in trouble.
a CIA analyst testified last January. The Ad- nmittee found that "there was absolutely no While the basic policy toward Iran re-
ministration worried that critical reporting reporting on the internal situation based oil mained unchanged, however, its execution
might jeopardize congressional support for sources within the opposition party during became complicated by two other lofty
the military-sales program. Despite evidence the first quarter of '1978." Despite the pro- policy goals of the Carter Administration.
that the program was "out of control," Sen- phetic-sounding title of "Iran After the The lesser of them was Carter's commitment,
ate Foreign Relations Committee investiga- Shah," a twenty-three-page Intelligence As- strongly backed by Cyrus Vance, to put a
tors charged in July, 1976, that "senior State sessment published in August, 1978, flatly ceiling on American arms sales abroad. The
Department officials appear not to have been stated In its preface that "Iran is not in a difficulty was "solved" by a mix of artful
prepared to tolerate open debate on ... un- revolutionary, or even in a'pre -revolutionary' figure-juggling and the exercise of the presi-
restricted arms sales to Iran." situation." dential prerogative to invoke "special cir-
The problem of political reporting were One can therefore sympathize with the cumstances." When it appeared that the
compounded in Tehran. The U.S. Embassy frustration that drove the President to dash planned sale of frigates to Iran would crack
there was handicapped by a chronic shortage off his now famous "Cy, Zbig, and Stan" note tthhest eiilling, for to buipl e, the was hullsleft for the
of officers who spoke Farsi. At the same time, on November 11. Addressing himself to his
U.S. diplomats became increasingly worried Secretary of State, his National Security came to the $1.2-billion sale of seven Boeing
that any contacts with opposition sources Adviser and his director of Central Intelli- 707 "Airborne Warning and Control Sys-
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51782
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February .2G, 1979
tern Aircraft"-each loaded with over $100
million worth of the most exotic electronic
gear-the President simply made an excep-
tion.
Iviore consequential were the problems
caused by the Administration's human-
rights policy. Its defenders dismiss the no-
tion that pronouncements from Washington
were needed to open the Iranians' eyes to
the repressiveness of the Shah's regime. The
human-rights policy certainly did not cause
the pressures that eventually overpowered
the Shah, and the efforts to magnify its im-
portance amount to exercises in self-justi-
fication by those who had ignored these
pressures in earlier years. Nevertheless, the
human-rights policy did have a confusing
effect in both Washington and Tehran.
On the Washington end, according to one
State Department insider, "The human-
rights people muddied the policy debate by
giving a gopdy-goody quality to the argu-
ment that the U.S. should actively push the
Shah toward constitutional reforms in order
to pacify at least some of his opposition.
This made it that much easier for the 'real-
ists' to dismiss the argument when such an
approach, just conceivably, might still have
worked." At the same time, the State De-
partment did not feel that it could, in good
conscience, exempt the Shah from the hu-
man-rights policy altogether. "We had a lot
of discussions with the Shah about liberal-
ization," insists a top-level State Depart-
ment official. "Whether on his own initiative
or under our influence, the Shah did say
in the summer that he was prepared to take
risks." According to the same source, he was
also made aware that any bloody put-down
of popular revolt "would not have been well
received in the U.S."
A revealing insight into how the Khomeini
camp perceived the' human-rights policy
comes from Princeton University Professor
Richard Falk, a human-rights activist who,
with former Attorney General Ramsey Clark,
traveled to Iran and Paris in January at the
invitation of Islamic opposition groups. Cit-
ing remarks by Mehdi Bazargan-Khomeini's
senior political adviser and later his choice
for the premiership-Falk reports that the
proclamation of Carter's human-rights pol-
icy did embolden the religious opposition.
"It was quite a surprise to me," admits Falk.
"I had thought that this was right-wing
propaganda, used for domestic politics in this
country. But Bazargan confirmed it. They
took appearance for reality."
The impact on the Shah's actions reflected
the worst of both possible worlds. Appar-
ently persuaded that this was necessary to
keep Washington's support, the Shah made
concessions-like some easing of press cen-
sorship and the release of prisoners-which
were just enough to convince his enemies
that he was losing his grip, but never enough
to satisfy them. When he got advice from
some of his hard-line advisers to crack down
hard, he was inhibited by the fear that the
U.S. would not stand for a bloodbath. Pre-
cisely this, in fact, was the message that
came across on September 10, two days after
"bloody Friday," when President Carter in-
terrupted his Camp David peacemaking ef=
forts to telephone the Shah to express his
regret over the loss of life and his hope that
th' movement toward political liberalization
would continue.
Even this telephone call, however, did not
yet signify that the Administration had fully
awakened to the magnitude of the crisis. ("I
dot they ever really did," laments one
member of the Carter team.) With Carter
basking in the glories of Camp David, Brze-
zinski pressing toward full normalization
of relations with Peking, and Vance laboring
on S.1LT and the Middle East, the job of
keeping on top of the rapidly deteriorating
;it;.ration in Iran fell to fourth-level people.
P.11 dedicated and able, but badly in need of
the active support of their principals to give
their views clout and coherence. Country di-
rector Henry Precht at the State Department,
his Pentagon counterpart Robert Murray,
and U.S. Navy Captain Gary Sick at the Na-
tional Security Council were four bosses re-
moved from the President.
Yet it was during these crucial weeks of
September and early October that time ran
out for the Shah. Had he departed in Sep-
tember-so U.S. Ambassador William Sulli-
van has suggested to recent visitors-he still
might have been able to leave behind the
framework of a constitutional monarchy.
But sources in Washington contend that this
judgment was not reflected in the embassy's
reporting at the time. And the fact that
Sullivan fe]t it safe to be away on vacation
for much o1 August hardly suggests that he
sensed the urgency of the crisis.
Thus, it appears that by the time the first
top-level machinery was set up to deal with
the crisis, the hour for decision had already
passed. Not till November 2 did the first
meeting of the Special Coordinating Com-
mittee take place, chaired by Brzezinski and
composed of Vance, Defense Secretary Harold
Brown, and CIA Director Stansfield Turner.
Energy Secretary Schlesinger was brought in-
to the group in December. Operating imme-
diately under it and meeting more frequent-
ly-but starting only November 21-was a
working group of deputies. chaired by Brze-
zinski's No. 2, David Aaron. Late in Decem-
ber, a third interagency group was set up
under the chairmanship of David Newsom,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
to deal with such everyday operational prob-
lems as the safety of Americans, the security
of sensitive military equipment, the closing
of the banks, and the collapse of oil produc-
tion.
? t ? ? f
In the last analysis, what most matters is
the vision of American leadership that the
President brought to this, his first great cri-
sis. His notion turned out to be a very lim-
ited one. Reduced to its essentials, it was
to leave the crisis to the Shah to handle.
With military Intervention rejected as point-
less from the outset by everyone, the only
real options were whether to lay down to the
Shah the conditions for American support,
or whether to promise him American support
for whatever he himself deemed necessary.
From the start, the President chose the
second option. The shadow of Vietnam
showed through the explanation of one
White House source: "We thought the Shah
had been around for a long time and knew
the country better than we did. We'd just
been through the lessons of Vietnam, not
just the fall of Thieu but the overthrow of
Diem. People have long memories in this
Administration, and there was a certain
genuine modesty about our capacity to know
what was the right political move to make
in a situation like Iran."
The immediate difficulty in all this was
that the Shah, whom the President and other
American officials had known as a self-con-
fident, imperious man of decision, had re-
treated into a state of ever-deepening de-
pression that left him broding and indeci-
sive. Having progressively cut himself off
from reality by his own autocratic style, his
world of gaudy visions quickly collapsed.
From September onward, and with increas-
ing frequency, the same Shah who would
have bristled at foreigners trying to tell him
how to run his country was fretfully calling
in U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan and
his British colleague, Sir Anthony Parsons,
to solicit their advice. But Sullivan's instruc-
tions were to refrain carefully from prescrib-
ing courses of action and to venture only
occasional caveats if one of the Shah's ideas
sounded too far off the mark. "We didn't
want him to cross that line," stressed one
White House official.
The issue of whether the U.S. should lead
or follow the Shah was once again put t,,
the President in early December. This time
the question was posed by New York invest-
ment banker and former Under Secretary o!
State George Ball. The initial suggestion to
call in Ball had come from his erstwhile
protege, Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael
Blumenthal. The only Cabinet member to
visit Iran during the crisis, Blumenthal had
been struck by the transformation of the
Shah when he saw him on his swing of od-
producing states in November. Both Brzezhi-
ski and Vance agreed that it was a good idea
to bring in an experienced man who knew
the area for a fresh review of the facts. "We
felt very uneasy about our data base," ex-
plained one White House official-a Washing-
tonian way of admitting that the Administra-
tion felt at sea.
Though he warned that it was already very
late in the day, Ball acepted the week-ion::
assignment. According to sources familiar
with his secret recommendations, he con-
cluded that the only way in which the Shah
might still salvage something was to turn
himself into a constitutional monarch and
to leave the appointment of a civilian gov-
ernment to a representative "Council of
Notables." Ball personally presented his con-
clusions to the President in the afternoon.
of December 13. In an hour-long discussion,
with only Brzezinski attending, the President
stuck to his policy of detachment, i.e., it wa-
simply not right to tell the Shah how to deal
with a crisis in his own country.
Although there is very little likelihood that
at so late a stage Ball's recommendation,
would have changed history, what is signifi-
cant are the grounds on which the proposal'.
were rejected. In effect, the President'-
rationale left the vital interests of the U.S.
and its allies in the hands of a politically
bankrupt ruler who had lost his grip and
seemed desperate for the U.S. to exercise
leadership. To the Shah's plaintive plea, "Mr
President, it's your world!", Carter's answer
seemed to be, "Shahanshah, but it's your
country!"
As the crisis fast evolved from a problem of
disaster prevention to one of disaster con-
tainment, however, this pristine posture
proved ever more difficult to hold. In the
conduct of a great power, the old lesson wit;
once again driven home-that not to decide
is to decide. During a breakfast with White
House correspondents on December 7, the
President answered a question about the
Shah's chances of survival with the candid
sigh, "I don't know, I hope so. This is some-
thing in the hands of the people of Iran."
This confession only precipitated a frantic
White House effort to deny any intent to
insinuate that the U.S. was putting distance
between itself and the Shah. Not long there-
after, Carter infuriated the Khomeini move-
ment by an implicit slap at the Ayatullah'i.
incendiary statements from Paris, and the
President lavished blessings on the short-
lived regime of Bakhtiar as soon as he war
appointed. In the face of the Iranian wave
of xenophobia and anti-Americanism, more-
over, the well-publicized supply of 200,000
barrels of fuel for the military inevitably
was seen as another partisan American ges-
ture. So also was the dispatch of U.S.A.F.
General Robert Huyser, the deputy conn-
mander of American forces in Europe. But a'
least Huyser did succeed in dissuading the
military from reacting to the Shah's depar-
ture with an ill-considered coup, which
would almost certainly have resulted in the
breakup of the forces and the eruption of
civil war.
All this while, the Administration's signals
to the region and to the U.S.S.R. continued
to be confused and plagued by clumsiness
and bad luck. The order to the aircraft car-
rier Constellation to sail from Subic Bay in
the Philippines on December 30 quickly
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February 26, 1979 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 17FS
turned into a public-relations nightmare.
Intended as a gesture of warning to the
Russians and of reassurance to the Saudis,
the action came to look like one more sign
of American faintheartedness when it be-
came known that instead of proceeding into
the Indian Ocean, the carrier had dropped
anchor off Singapore. Later, Administration
sources rather limply explained that the
carrier was never intended to proceed beyond
Singapore, only to get closer to the crisis area
in case of need. Another flagshowing exer-
cise-the dispatch of a dozen U.S.A.F. F-15
fighters to Saudi Arabia in January, first re-
quested by the Saudis in December-turned
out no less dismally when it became known
that Spain had refused permission for a re-
fueling stop and that the planes had been
sent unarmed.
Both of these not very grand, all too halt-
ting gestures might be seen as all to fitting
symbols of a policy of almost chronic irreso-
lution. The overall orchestration of policy
from Washington was bound to revive doubts
about the President's talents for decisive
leadership. And yet the roots of the American
failure run deeper than tactical lapses,
deeper into the past.
Only a fair-minded and patient tracing of
these roots can produce an inquiry of any
serious use to the future. It cannot be said
too often that such an exercise in self-exam-
ination by the U.S. must not traffic in the
emotional and divisive recrimination over
"Who lost China?" so poisonous to the pol-
itics of the 1940's and 1950's. The recent
history of U.S. policies toward Iran is not
a tale conspicuous for wise prophets, long
Ignored, now entitled to raise their voices
and point their fingers. Rather, the responsi-
bility for failure seems widely enough shared
to encourage some general sense of humility.
The grave exaggeration of the personal
power of the Shah to govern Iran was a
misjudment embraced with equal confidence
by both Republican and Democratic Admin-
istrations. And the voices of doubt or dis-
sent were no more audible in the halls of
Congress than In the councils of the White
House.
A debate weighing constructive political
questions, rather than brandishing ad
hominem accusations, probably must start
with renewed awareness that other nations
are not, after all, ours to "lose." If there is
one lesson Americans should have learned
from the Vietnam tragedy, it is that we do
not possess the ability to decree the course
of events in ancient countries deeply af-
fected by their own histories, cultures, and
religions. If the role of Buddhism in South-
east Asia often seemed politically confound-
ing, the role of Islam in Iran has proved
even more remarkable and baffling to U.S.
policymakers.
There are other tough and challenging
questions that the failure in Iran poses for
architects of future diplomacy. There is
the difficulty of accurately gauging the
political and social impact of swift techno-
logical change upon such a society. There is
the problem of "intelligence" in the broadest
sense-the observant measuring of the play
of political forces within a nation that is
not a completely conventional totalitarian
state, but rather a toughly, often brutally
policed society that yet hesitantly tolerates
some sporadic shows of political dissent and
press freedom. On such a scene, the emis-
saries of both the Department of State and
the CIA can maintain continuous and in-
formative contact with the political opposi-
tion only at a certain risk-the risk of any
contact being construed as active sympathy
or encouragement. Yet there would appear
to be even greater risk in relying on the as-
surances based on an autocratic regime's own
self-assurance. And even in Iran it is not
impossible that a more independent U.S. per-
ception of the country's political instability
. -lit have helped the Shah himself to be
spared the full cost of his own self-delusion.
There finally arises the question critical
to the global balance of power: if the U.S.
cannot simply proclaim its pure political
abstinence from the turmoil of such an
arena, how should it make its concerned
presence effectively known and felt? In 1968,
the Soviet Union dealt with a popular threat
to its stake in Czechoslovakia in Its own
way. But this is a way wholly incompatible
with the U.S.'s declared values and principles.
What are the legitimate and effective ways
for the U.S. to safeguard vital interests in
countries threatened by such social pres-
sures and political disorders? Can these ways
be reconciled with any understood code of
conduct restraining any major power from
merely exploiting and manipulating coun-
tries in ferment? And without some such
agreed constraint, can detente prove work-
able?
These are some lasting questions posed by
the unhappy events in Iran. They thrust
far beyond the dilemmas of the immediate
present or the frontiers of that country. And
if we can grasp some realistic answers to
them, we may somewhere else save what we
could not guard there.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, is it
too soon to draw conclusions from
events in Iran? Perhaps not. A few ob-
servations are relevant and not subject
to post-crisis overreaction. First, arms
did not buy us political or economic se-
curity. In fact, they may have placed
this country in a position where they
compromised billions of advanced de-
velopments of vital importance to our
own defenses. Second, while full knowl-
edge of facts during a crisis does not
automatically make for sound decisions,
the absence of them makes any reaction
essentially a random choice. The vacil-
lating on what regime to support in
Iran is a classic case of policy by guess-
work. Third, policy should not blind'
commonsense. Collecting intelligence
information on internal events in Iran
should not have been held hostage to
the fears that any intrusion would be
diplomatically unacceptable.
It is too late to apply these solutions
to Iran. But it is not too late to be
considering what could happen in
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Morroco, In-
donesia, or Pakistan. To what degree
are we denying ourselves the capability
to make correct decisions during a crisis
in any one of these countries? Will en-
hanced arms sales to Saudi Arabia in-
sure U.S. national interests there any-
more than they did in Iran? What sub-
stitutes are there for arms sales as a
dominant instrument of U.S. foreign
policy?
It is more important to avoid a fu-
ture miscalculation tha to argue over
past mistakes. But it is 'difficult to feel
confident that we will.
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