A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
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Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
67
Document Creation Date:
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Document Release Date:
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Sequence Number:
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Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 14, 1950
Content Type:
REPORT
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NSc 68
A REPORT
TO THE
COPY NOL.
NATIONAL SECURTI Y COUNCIL
by
TifE FXECUTriE SECRETARY
on
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PRORAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
April th, 1950
ECT:aSSIFIED
Dater
1. By: .----r,/2,7,?" /V. WASHINGTON
'11!..TIC.N.AL SECURITY COUNCIL
STAT
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.COPY
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
(-1,1 n r2,111z--
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April 12, 1950
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Dear Mr. ay:
After consideration of the Report by the Secretaries
of State and Defense, dated April 7, 1950, re-examining our ob-
jectives in peace and war and the effect of these objectives
on our strategic plans, I have decided to refer that Report to
the National Security Council for consideration, with the re-
quest that the National Security Council provide me with fur-
ther information on the implications of the Conclusions con-
tained therein. I am particularly anxious that the Council
give me a clearer, indication of the programs which are envis-
aged in the Report, including estimates of the probable cost
of such programs.
Because of the effect of these Conclusions upon the
budgetary and.economic situation, it is my desire that the Eco-
nomic Cooperation Administrator, the Di.-ector Of the Bureau of
the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers,
participate in the consideration of this Report by the Council,
in addition to the regular participation of the Secretary of
the Treasury.
Pending the urgent completion of this study, ?I am
.concerned that action en existing programs should not be post-
poned or delayed. In addition, it. is my desire that no pub-
licity be given to.this Report, or its contents without my
approval.
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr,.
? Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington, D. C.
NY.: 68
Sincerely yours,
(SIGNED)
HARRY S. TRUMAN
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11.
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE
OF JANUARY 31,, 1950
Terms of Reference
Analysis
I. Background of the Present World Crisis 4
NSC 68
April 7, 1950
CONTENTS
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3
4
II. The Fundamental Purpose of the United States
5
III. The Fundamental Design of the Kremlin 6-
IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of
Ideas and Values Between the U. S. Pur-
pose and the Kremlin design 7
A. Nature of the Conflict 7
B. Objectives 9
C. Means 10
V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities--
Actual and Potential 13
VI. U. S. Intentions and Capabilities--
Actual and Potential
VII. Present Risks
VIII. Atcmic Armaments
21
34
37
A. Military Evaluation of U. S. and
U.S.S.R. Atomic Capabilities 37
B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic
Weapons 38
C. International Control of Atomic
Energy. 4o
IX. Possible Courses of Action 44
Introduction 44
The Role of Negotiation - 44
A. ? The First Course--Continuation of Cur- ?
rent Policies, with Current and Cur-
rently. Projected Programs for Carry-
ing Out These Projects 48-
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B.
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Conclusions
Recommendations
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CONTENTS
(Cont Id)
The Second Course--Isolation
The Third Course--War ?
The Remaining Course of Action--
a Rapid Build-up of Political,.
Page
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52
Economic, and Military Strength.
In the Free World
54
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TERMS OF REFERENCE
The following report is submitted in response to the
President's directive of January 31 which reads:
? "That the President direct the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense to undertake 'a reexamination-'
of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of
these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the
probable fission bomb capdpility and possible thermonuclear
bomb capability of the Soviet Union."
The document which recommended that such a directive be
issued reads in part:
"It must be considered whether a decision to proceed
with a program directed toward determining feasibility pre-
judges the more fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in
the event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves
successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if
stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used
in war. If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful,
the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be
held for the same purposes for which fission bombs are then
being held will be greatly increased. The question of use
Policy can be adequately assessed only as a part of a general
reexamination of this country's strategic plans and its
objectiCies in peace and war. Such reexamination would need
t?onsider national policy not only with respect to possible
thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission
weapons--viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb
capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability
of the Soviet Union. The moral, psychological, and political
questions involved in this problem would need to be taken
into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this
reexamination would have a crucial bearing on the further
question as to whether there should be a revision in the
nature of the agreements, including the international control
of atomic energy, which we have been seeking to reach with
the U.S.S.R."
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ANALYSIS
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I. BACKGROUNDS- OF TIE PRESENT WORLD CRISIS
Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two
global.wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions
--the Russian and ? the Chinese?Of extrethe scope and intensity. It
has also seen the collapse of five empires.--the Ottoman, the Austro-
Hungarian, German, Italian and Japanese--and the drastic decline of
two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the
span of one generation, the international distribution'of power has
been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved im-
possible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that
a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater
strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods
of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states
was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.
Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this his-
torical distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and
Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have inter-
acted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union
in such away that power has increasingly gravitated to these two
centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to
hegemony, is animated by .a new fanatic faith? antithetical to our
own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the
world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the
part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in ac-
cordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of
increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual
faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the con-
flict enter the phase of total war.
On The one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from
the anxiety arising from the risk, of atomic war. On the other hand,
any substantial further extension of the area under the domination
of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate
to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It
is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascend-
ancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril.
The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment
or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself.
They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With con-
science and resolution this Government and the people it represents
must now take new and fateful decisions.
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II. FUNDANENTAL PURPOSE OF THE UNITED STATES
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The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down
in the Preamble to the Constitution: "...to form amore perfect
Unicn, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liborty.to ourselves and our Posterity." In
essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and
vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity
and worth of the individual.
Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose:
Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual
freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights;
our determination to create conditions under which our free and
democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination
to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as
in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm reliance on the
protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our
lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."
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IIT. FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN OF THE KREMLIN
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The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union
and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify
their.absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in ?
the areas now under their control. '1:11 the' minds of the Soviet
leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic
extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of
any effective opposition to their authority.
The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or
forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure
of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their
rerlacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and con-
trolled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now
directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The
United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet
world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the
principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted
or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve
its fundnmental design.
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IV. THE UNDERLYING CONFLICT IN THE REALM OF IDEAS
AND VALUES BETWEEN THE U. S. PURPOSE AND THE
KREI%1IN DESIGN
A. Nature of conflict:
The Kremlin regards the United States as the only-major
thret to the achievement of its fundamental design. There is
a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government
of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the
Kremlin, which has come to a crisis with the polarization of
power described in Section I, and the-exclusive possession of
atomic weapons by the two protagonists. The idea of freedom,
moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea
of slavery. But the converse is not true. The implacable Purpose
of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed
the two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which
gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis.
The free society values the individual as an end in himself,
requiring of him only that measure of self discipline and self
restraint which make the rights of each individual compatible with
the rights of every other individual. The freedom of the individual
has as its counterpart, therefore, the negative responsibility
of the individual not to exercise his freedom in ways inconsistent
with the.freedom of other individuals and the positive responsi-
bility to make constructive use of his freedom in the building
of a just society.
From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the
marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the
free society. This is the explanation of the strength of free
men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free
and democratic system. The free society attempts to create and
maintain an environment in which every individual has the opportu-
nity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the
free society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom
to destroy it. By the same token, in relations between nations,
the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal
of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring
all societies 140 conformity with it.
For the free society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity.
It derives its strength from its hospitality even to antipathetic
Ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas, secure in its
faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a fuller
and better realization of their powers in exercising their choice.
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The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history,
more contagious than the idea of submission to authority. For
the breath of freedom cannot be tolerated in a society which has
come under the domination of an individual or group of individuals
with a will to absolute power. Where the despot holds absolute
power--the absolute power of the absolutely powerful
other wills must be subjegated in an act of willing submission, a
degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the com-
pulsion of a perverted faith. 'It is the first article of this
faith that he finds and can only find the meaning of his existence
in serving the ends of the system. The system becomes God, and
submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of
the system. It is not enough to yield outwardly to the system--
even Ghandian non-violence is not acceptable--for the spirit of
resistance and the devotion to a higher authority might then remain,
and the individual would not be wholly submissive.
The same compulsion which demands total power over all men
within the Soviet state without a single exception, demands total
power over all Communist Parties and all states under Soviet
domination. Thus Stalin has said that the theory and tactics of
Leninism as expounded by the Bolshevik party are mandatory for the
Proletarian Parties of all countries. A true internationalist is
defined as one who unhesitatingly upholds the position of the
Soviet Union and in the satellite states true patriotism is love
of the Soviet Union. By the same token the "peace policy" of
the Soviet Union, described at a Party Congress as a more advaq-
tar-cous form of fighting capitalism", is a device to divide and
il-,mobilize the non-Communist world, and the peace the Soviet Union
seeks is the peace of total conformity to Soviet policy.
The antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain,
the isolation, the autarchy of the society whose end is absolute
power. The existence and persistence of the idea of freedom is a
permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave
society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued
existence of freedom in the world. What is new, what makes the
continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now ines-
capably confronts the slave society with the free. ?
The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in
the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free
institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. 11112 shock we sus-
tained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the measure
of Czechoslovakiars material Importance to us. In a material sense,
her capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the
integrity of Czechoslovak institutions was destroyed, it was in
the intangible scale of values that we registered a loss more
damaging than the material loss we had already suffered.
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Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally
challenged by the Soviet system.. No other value system is so wholly
irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy
ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerou3
and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully
and Powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature
everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing
center of. military power. . .
B. Objectives:
The objectives of a free society are determined by its
fundamental values and by the necessity for maintaining the material
environment in which they flourish. Logically and in fact, there-
fore, the Kremlin's challenge to the United States is directed not
only to our values but to our physical capacity to protect their
environment. It is a challenge which encompasses both peace and
war and our objectives in peace and war must take account of it.
1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way
In which we affirm our values in the conduct of our national life,
and in the development of our military and economic strength.
2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning
political and economic system in the free world. It is only by
practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our essential
values, that we can preserve our own integrity, in which lies the
real frustration of the Gremlin design.
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3. But beyond thus affirming our-values our policy and
actions must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the
nature of theSoviet system, a change toward which the frustration
of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step.
Clearly it will not only be, less costly but more effective if
, this change occurs to a maximum extent as a result of internal
forces in Soviet society.
In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic
warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check
the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations.is
becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in.
our oun interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It
demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent
In it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with
the principles of freedom and democracy. We should limit our re-
quirement of the Soviet Union to its participation with other
nations on the basis of equality and respect for the rights of
others. Subject to this requirement, we must with our allies and
the former subject peoples seek to create a world society based
On the principle, of consent. Its framework cannot be inflexible.
It will consist of many national communities of great and varying
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abilities and and resources, and hence of war potential. The seeds
of conflicts will inevitably exist or will come into being. To
acknowledge this is only to acknowledge the impossibility, of a
final solution. Not to acknowledge it can be fatally dangerous
in a world in which there are no final solutions.
All these objectives of a free society are equally valid
and necessary, in peace and war. But every consideration of de-
votion to Our fundamental values and to-our national securfty
demands that we seek to achieve them by the strategy of the cold
war. It is only by developing the moral and material strength
of the free world that the Soviet regime will become convinced
of the falsity of its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for
workable agreements can be created. By practically demonstrating
the integrity and vitality of our system the free world widens
the area of possible agreement and thus can hope gradually to
bring about a Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sum
will eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design.
Short of this, however, it might be possible to create a situation
which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with
or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence
on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world. Such a development
would be a triumph for the idea of freedom and democracy. It
must be an immediate objective of United States policy.
There is no reason, in the event of war, for us to alter
our over-all objectives. They do not include unconditional sur-
render, the subjugation of the Russian Peoples or a Russia shorn
of its economic potential. Such a course would irrevocably unite
the Russian people berlind the regime which enslaves them. Rather
these objectives contemplate Soviet acceptance of the specific
and limited conditions requisite to an international environment
in which free institutions can flourish, and in which the Russian
peoples will have a new chance to work out their own destiny.
,If we can make the Russian people our allies in this enterprise we
will obviously have made our task easier and victory more certain.
The objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November 23, 1948) and
ouoted in Chapter X, are fully consistent with the objectives
stated in this paper, and they remain valid. The growing intensity
of the conflict which has been imposed upon us, however, requires
the changes of emphasis and the additions that are apparent.
CoLipled with the probable fission bomb capability and possible
thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying
struggle recuires.us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting
abatement of the crisis unless and until a change occurs in the
nature of the Soviet system.
C. Means:
The free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve
Its ends.
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Compulsion is the negation of freedom, except when it is used to
enforce the rights common to all. The resort to force, internally
or externally, is therefore a last resort for a free society.
The act is permissible only when one individual or groups of
individuals within it threaten the basic rights of other individuals
or when another society seeks to impose its will upon it. The
free society cherishes and protects as fundamental the rights of
the minority against the will of a majority, because these rights
are the inalienable rights of each and every indiVidual.
The resort to force, to compulsion, to the imposition of its
will is therefore a difficult and dangerous act for a free society,
which is warranted only in the face of even greater dangers. The -
necessity of the act must be clear and compelling; the act must
commend itself to the overwhelming majority as an inescapable
exce7-,tion to the basic idea of freedom; or the regenerative capac-
ity of free men after the act has been performed will be endangered.
The Kremlin is able to select whatever means are expedient
In seeking to carry out its fundamental design. Thus it can make
the best of several possible worlds, conducting the struggle on
those levels where it considers it profitable and enjoying the
benefits of a pseudo-peace on those levels where it is not ready
for a contest. At the ideological or psychological level, in the
struggle for men's minds, the conflict is world-wide. At the
political and economic level, within states and in the relations
between states, the struggle for power is being intensified.
And at the military level, the Kremlin has thus far been careful
not to commit a technical breach of the peace, although using
Its vast forces to intimidate its neighbors, and to support an
aggressive foreign Policy, and not hesitating through its agents
to resort to arms in favorable circumstances. The attempt to carry
out its fundamental design is being pressed, therefore, with all
means which are believed expedient in the present situation, and
the Kremlin has inextricably engaged us in the conflict between its
'desii;n and our purpose.
We have no such freedom of choice, and least of all in the
use of force. Resort to war is not only a last resort for a free
society, but it is also an act which cannot definitively end the
fundamental conflict in the realm of ideas. The idea of slavery
can only 'cc overcome by the timely and persistent demonstration
of the superiority of the idea of freedom. Military victory alone
would only partially and perhaps only temporarily affect the funda-
mental conflict, for although the ability oCpthe Kremlin to threaten
our security might be for a time dectroyed;-the resurgence of
totalitarian forces and the re-establishment of the Soviet system
er its equivalent would not be long delayed unless great progress
were made in the fundamental conflict.
Practical and ideological considerations therefore both impel
us to the conclusion that we have no choice but to demonstrate the
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superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application,
and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of
war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten
the decay of the Soviet system.
For us the role of military power is to serve the national
purpose by deterring an attack upon us while we seek by other means
to create an environment in which our free society can flourish, .
and by fighting, if necessary, to defend the integrity and vitality
of our free society and to defeat any aggressor. The Kremlin uses
Soviet military power to back up and serve the Kremlin design.
It does not hesitate to use military force aggressively if that
course is expedient in the achievement of its design. The differ-.
ences between our fundamental purpose and the Kremlin design,
therefore, are reflected in our respective attitudes toward and
use of military force.
Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values,
naturally will take such action, including the use of military
force, as may be required to protect those values. The integrity
of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or
overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frus-
trating the Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting
ourselves so as to affirm our values in actions as well as words
for-aid such measures, provided only they are appropriately cal-
culated to that end and are not so excessive or misdirected as
to make us enemies of the people instead of the evil men who have
enslaved them.
But if war comes, what is the role of force? Unless we so
use it that the Russian people can perceive that our effort is
directed against the regime and its power for aggression, and not
against their own interests, we will unite the regime and the
people in the kind of last ditch fight in which no underlying
problems are solved, new ones are created, dnd where our basic
Principles are obscured and compromised. If we do not in the
application of force demonstrate the nature of our objectives we
will, in fact, have compromised from the outset our fundamental
purpose. In the words of the Federalist (No. 28) "The means to
be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief."
The miscief may be a global war or it may be a Soviet campaign
for limited objectives. In either case we should take no avoidable
initiative which would cause it to become a:war of annihilation,
and if we have the forces to defeat a Soviet drive for limited
objectives it may well be to our interest not to let it become a
global war. Our aim in applying force must be to compel the
acceptance of terms consistent with our objectives, and our
capabilities for the application of force should, therefore,
within the limits of what we can sustain over ':.he long pull, be
congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.
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V. -SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES
A. --Political and P.tychological
The Kremlin's design for world domination begins at home. The -
first concern of a despotic oligarchy is that the local base of its _
??power and authority be secure. The massive fact of the iron cur-
tain isolating the Soviet peoples from.the-oUtbide -world, the-re-.
peated political purges within the U.S.S.R. and the institution-
alized crimes of the MVD are evidence that theKremlindoes not feel
secure at home and that "the entire coercive force of the socialist ?
_state" is more than ever one of seeking to .impose its.absolute -
authority over "the economy, manner of:life, and??cOnsciousness of
people", (Vyshinski, "The Law of the Soviet -State", P. 74). Similar
evidence in the satellite states .of Eastern Europe leads to the ? ?
conclusion, that this same policy, in less advanced phases, is
bein applied to the Kremlin's colonial areas.
Being a totalitarian dictatorship, the Kremlin's objectives
in these policies is the total subjective submission of the
peoples now under its control. The concentration camp is the
prototype of the society which these policies are designed to
achieve, a society in which the personality of the individual is
so broken and perverted that he participates affirmatively in his
own degradation.
The Kremlin's policy toward areas not under its control is
the elimination of resistance to its will and the extension of
Its influence and control, It is driven to follow this policy
because.. itcannot, for the reasons set forth in Chapter IV, tolerate
the existence of free societies; to the Kremlin the most mild and
Inoffensive free society is an affront, a challenge and a sub-
versive influence. Given the nature of the. Kremlin, and the
evidence at hand, it seems'clear that the ends toward which this
policy is directed are the same as those where its control has
already been established.
The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of this policy
are limited only by considerations of expediency. Doctrine is
not a limiting factor; rather it dictates the employment of violence,
subversion and deceit, and rejects moral considerations. In any
event, the Kremlin's conviction of its own infallibility has made
its devotion to theory so subjective that past or present pronounce-
ments as to doctrine offer no reliable guide to future actions.
The only apparent restraints on resort to war are, therefore,
calculations of practicality.
With particular reference to the United States, the Kremlin's
strategic and tactical policy is affected by its estimate that
we are not only the greatest immediate obstacle which stands between
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It and world domination, we are also the only power which could
release forces in the free and Soviet worlds which could destroy
It. The Kremlin's policy toward us is consequently animated by
a peculiarly virulent blend of hatred and fear. Its strategy
has been one of attempting to undermine the complex of forces,
In this country and in the rest of the free world, on which our,
power is based. In this it has both adhered to doctrine and fol-
lowed the sound principle of seeking maximum results with minimum
risks and commitments. The present application of this strategy
Is a new form of expression for traditional Russian caution. How-
ever, there is no justification in Soviet theory or practice for .
predicting that, should the Kremlin become convinced that it could
cause our downfall by one conclusive blow, it would not seek that
solution.
In considering the capabilities of the Soviet world, it is of
prime importance to remember that, in contrast to ours, they are
being drawn upon close to the maximum possible extent. Also in
contrast to us, the Soviet world can do more with less, - it has
a lower standard of living, its economy requires less to keep it
functioning and its military machine operates effectively with
less elaborate equipment and organization.
The capabilities of the Soviet world are being exploited to
the full because the Kremlin is inescapably militant. It is
Inescapably militant because it possesses and is possessed by a
world-wide revolutionary movement, because it is the inheritor of
Russian imperialism and because it is a totalitarian dictatorship.
Persistent crisis, conflict and expansion are the essence of the
Kremlin's militancy. This dynamism serves to intensify all Soviet
capabilities.
Two enormous organizations, the Communist Party and the secret
police, are an outstanding source of strength to the Kremlin. In
the Party, it has an apparatus designed to impose at home an
ideological uniformity among its people and to act abroad as an
instrument of propaganda, subversion and espionage. In its police
apparatus, it has a domestic repressive instrument guaranteeing
under present circumstances the continued, security of the Kremlin.
The demonstrated capabilities of these two basic organizations,
operating openly or in disguise, in mass or through single agents,
is unparalleled in history. The party, the police and the con-
spicuous might of the Soviet military machine tosether tend to
createan overall impression of irresistible Soviet power among
many peoples of the free world.
The ideolo,7ical pretensions of the Kremlin are another great
source of strength. Its identification of the Soviet system with
communism, its peace campaigns and its championing of colonial
peoples may be viewed with apathy, if not cynicism, by the oppressed.
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totalitariat of the Soviet world, but in the free world these
ideas find favorable responses in vulnerable segments of society.
They have found a particularly receptive audience in Asia, es-
pecially as the Asiatics have been impressed by what has been
plausibly portrayed to them as the rapid advance of the U.S.S.R.
from a backward society to a position of great world power. Thus,
in its pretensions to being (a) the source of a new universal
faith and (b) the model ?"scientific" society, the Kremlin cynically
identifies itself with the genuine aspirations of large numbers
of people, and places itself at the head of an international cru-
sade with all of the benefits which derive therefrom.
Finally, there is a category of capabilities, strictly
speaking neither institutional nor ideological, which should be
taken into consideration. The extraordinary flexibility of Soviet
tactics is certainly a strength. It derives from the utterly amoral
and opportunistic conduct of Soviet policy. Combining this quality
with the elements of secrecy, the Kremlin possesses a formidable
capacity to act with the widest tactical latitude, with stealth
and with speed.
The greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in the basic
nature. of its relations with the Soviet people.
That relationship is characterized by universal suspicion,
fear and denunciation. It is a relationship in which the Kremlin
relies, not only for its power but its very survival, on intri-
cately devised mechanisms of coercion. The Soviet monolith is
held together bY the iron curtain around it and the iron bars
within it, not by any force of natural cohesion. These artificial
mechanisms of unity have never been intelligently challenged by
a strong outside force. The full measure of their vulnerability is
.4 therefore not yet evident.
The Kremlin's relations with its satellites and their peoples
Is likewise a vulnerability. Nationalism still remains the most
potent emotional-political force. The well-known ills of colonial-
ism are compounded, however, by the excessive demands of the Kremlin
that its satellites accept not only the imperial authority
of Moscow but that they believe in and proclaim the ideological
primacy and infallibility of the Kremlin. These excessive require-
ments can be made good only through extreme coercion. The result
is that if a satellite feels able to effect its independence of
the Kremlin, as Tito was able to do, it is likely to break away.
? In short, Soviet ideas and practices run counter to the'best
and potentially the strongest instincts of men, and deny their most
fundamental aspirations. Against an adversary which effectively
affirmed the constructive and hopeful instincts of men and was
capable of fulfilling their fundamental aspirations, the Soviet
System might prove to be fatally weak.
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The problem of succession to Stalin is also a Kremlin vul-
nerability. In a system where supreme power is acquired and held
through violence and intimidation, the transfer of that power may
well produce a period of instability.
In a very real sense, the Kremlin is a victim of its own
dynamism. This dynamism can become a weakness if it is frustrated,
1ff in its forward thrusts it encounters a superior force which
halts the expansion and exerts a superior counterpressure. Yet
the Kremlin cannot relax the condition of crisis and mobilization,
for to do so would be to lose its dynamism, whereas the seeds of
decay within the Soviet system would begin to flourish and fructify.
The Kremlin is, of course, aware of these weaknesses. It
must know that in the present world situation they are of secondary
signifj.cance. So long as the Kremlin retains the initiative, so
long as it can keep on the offensive unchallenged by clearly
superior counter-force--spiritual as well as material--its vulner-
abilities arc largely inoperative and even concealed by its
successes. The Kremlin has not yet been given real reason to fear
and be diverted by the rot within its system.
B. Economic
The Kremlin has no economic intentions unrelated to its
overall policies. Economics in the Soviet world is not an end in
itself. The Kremlin's policy, in so far as it has to do with
economics, is to utilize economic processes to contribute to the
overall strength, particularly the war-making capacity of the
Soviet system. The material welfare of the totalitariat is
severely subordinated to the interests of the system.
As for capabilities, even granting optimistic Soviet reports
of production, the total ecbnomic strength of the U.S.S.R. compares
with that of the U.S. as roughly one to four. This is reflected
not only in gross national product (1949: U.S.S.R. $65 billion;
U.S. $250 billion), but in production of key commodities in 1949:
Ingot Steel
U.S.
U.S.S.R.
1LS.S.R. and
European Orbit
Combined
(Million Met. tons)
80.4
21.5
28.0
Primary aluminum
(thousands Met. tons)
617.6
130-135
140-145
Electric power
(billion kwh,)
410
72
112
Crude oil
(million. Not, tons)
276.5
33.0
38.9
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Assuming the maintenar,ce of present policies, while a large
U.S. advantage is likely to remein, the Soviet Union will be
steadily reducing the discrepancy between it- overall economic
strength and that of the U S. by continuir; to devote propor-
tionately more to capital investment than the U.S.
But a full-scale effort by the U.S. would be capable of
precipitately altering this trend. The U.S.S.R. today is on a
near maximum production basis. No matter what effortS. Moscow
might make, only a relatively slight change in the rate of increase
in overall production could be brought about. In the U.S., on
the other hand, a very rapid absolute expansion could be realized:
The fact remains, however, that so long as the Soviet Union is
virtually mobilized, and the United States has scarcely begun to
summon up its forces, the greater capabilities of the U.S. are to
that extent inoperative in the struggle for power. Moreover,
as the Soviet attainment of an atomic capability has demonstrated,
the totalitarian state, at least in time of peace, can focus its
efforts on any given project far more readily than the democratic
state.
In other fields--general technological competence, skilled
labor resources, productivity of labor force, etc.-- the gap
between the U.S.S.R. ?aud the U.S. roughly corresponds to the gap
in production. In the field of scientific research, however, the
margin of United States superiority is unclear, especially if the
Kremlin can utilize European talents.
C. Military
The Soviet Union is developing the military capacity to
support its design for world domination. The Soviet Union actually
possesses armed forces far in excess of those necessary to defend
its national territory. Thpse armed forces are probably nbt yet
considered by the Soviet Union to be sufficient to initiate a war
which would involve the United States. This excessive strength,
coupled now with an atomic capability, provides the Soviet Union
with great coercive power for use in time of peace in furtherance
of its objectives and serves as a deterrent to the victims of
Its aggression from taking any action in opposition to its tactics
which would risk war.
. ?
Should a major war occur in 1950 the Soviet Union and its
.satellites are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be in
a sufficiently advanced state of preparation immediately to
undertake and carry out the following campaigns.
a. To overrun Western Europe, with the possible
exception of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas;
to drive toward the oil-bearing areas of the Near and
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Middle East; and to consolidate Communist gainsin
the Far East;
. b. To launch air attacks against the British
Isles and air and sea attacks against the lines of
communications of the Western Powers. in the Atlantic
and the Pacific;
c. To attack selected targets with atomic
weapoES, now including the likelihocd of such attacks
against targets in Alaska, Canada, and the United
States. Alternatively, this capability, coupled with
other actions open to the Soviet Union, might deny,
the United Kingdom as an effective base of operations
for allied forces. It also should be possible for
the Soviet Union to prevent any allied "Normandy"
type amphibious operations intended to force a re-
entry into the continent of Europe.
After the Soviet Union completed its initial campaigns and
Consolidated its positions in the Western European area, it could
simultaneously conduct:
a. Full-scale air and limited sea operations
,against the British Isles;
be Invasions of the Iberian and Scandinavian
Peninulas;
C. Further operations in the Near and Middle
East,?continued air operations against the North
American continent, arid air and sea operations against
4
Atlantic and Pacific lines of communication; and
d. Diversionary attacks in other areas.
During the course of the offensive operations listed in the
second and third paragraphs above, the Soviet Union will have an
air defense capability with respect to the vital areas of its own
and its aatellites' territories which can oppose but cannot pre-
vent allied air operations against these areas.
It is not known whether the Soviet Union possesses war
reserves and arsenal capabilities sufficient to supply its satel-
lite armies or even its own forces throughout a long war. It
might not be in the interest of the Soviet Union to equip fully
its satellite armies, since the possibility of defections would
exist.
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It is not possible at this time to assess accurately the
finite disadvantages to the Soviet Union which may accrue through
the implementation of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as
amended, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. It should
be expected that, as this implementation progresses, the internal
security situation of the recipient nations should improve con-
currently. In addition, a strong United States military position,
plus increases in the armaments of the nations of Western Europe,
should strengthen the determination of the recipient nations to
counter Soviet moves and in event of war could be considered as
likely to delay operations and increase the time required for the
Soviet Union to overrun Western Europe. In all probability, al-
though United States backing will stiffen their determination,
the armaments increase under the present aid programs will not be
of any major consequence prior to 1952. Unless the military
strength of the Western European nations is increased on a much
larger scale than under current programs and at an accelerated
rate, it is more than likely that those nations will not be able
to oppose even by 1960 the Soviet armed forces in war with any
degree of effectiveness. Considering the Soviet Union military
?capability, the long-range allied military objective in Western
Europe must envisage an increased military strength in that area
sufficient possibly to deter the Soviet Union from a major war or,
in any event, to delay materially the overrunning of Western
Europe and, if feasible, to hold .a bridgehead on the continent
against Soviet Union offensives.
We do not know accurately what the Soviet atomic capability
is but the Central Intelligence Agency intelligence estimates,
concurred in by State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Atomic Energy
Commission, assign to the Soviet Union a production capability
giving it a fission bomb stockpile within the following ranges:
By mid-1950 10- 20
By mid-1951' 25- 45
By mid-1952 45- 90
By mid-4953 70- 135
By mid-1954 200
This estimate is admittedly based on incomplete coverage of Soviet
activities and represents the production capabilities of known or
deducible Soviet plants. If others exist, as is possible, this
estimate could lead us into a feeling of superiority in our atomic
stockpile that might be dangerously misleading, particularly with
regard to the timing of a possible Soviet offensive. On the other
hand, if the Soviet Union experiences operating difficulties, this
estimate would be reduced. There is some evidence that the Soviet
Union is acquiring certain materials essential to research on and
development of thermonuclear weapons.
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The Soviet Union now has aircraft able to deliver the atomic
bomb. Our intelligence estimates assign to the Soviet Union an
atomic bomber capability already in excess of that needed to
deliver available bombs. We have at present no evaluated estimate
regarding the Soviet accuracy of delivery on target. It is believed
that the Soviets cannot deliver their bombs on target with ?a degree
of accuracy comparable to ours., but a planning estimate might well
place it at 40-60 percent of bombs sortied. For planning purposes,
therefore, the date the Soviets possess an atomic stockpile of 200
bombs would be a critical date for the United States for the
delivery of 100 atomic bombs on targets in the United States would
seriously damage this country.
At the time the Soviet Union has a substantial atomic stock-
pile and if it is assumed that it will strike a strong surprise
blow and if it is assumed further that its atomic attacks will be
met with no more effective defense opposition than the United
States and its allies have programmed, results of those attacks
could include:
a. Laying waste to the British Isles and thus
depriving the Western Powers of their use as a base;
b. Destruction of the vital centers and of the
commuiiications of -Western Europe, thus precluding
effective defense by the Western Powers; and
c. Deliverin? g devastating attacks on certain
vital centersof the United States and Canada.
The possession by the Soviet Union of a thermonuclear capability
in addition to this substantial atomic stockpile would result in
4 tremendously increased damage.
? During this decade, the defensive capabilities of the Soviet
Union will probably be strengthened particularly by the develop-
ment and use of modern aircraft, aircraft warning and communica-
tions devices, and defensive guided missiles.
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VI. U.S. INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES--ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL
A. Political and Psychological
Our overall policy at the present time may be described as
one designed to foster a world environment in which the American
system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the .concept
of isolation 'and affirms the necessity of our positive participa-
tion in the world community.
This broad intention embraces two subsidiary policies. One
is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no
Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy
international community. The other is the policy of "containing"
the Soviet system, These two policies are closely interrelated
and interact on one another. Nevertheless, the distinction between
them is basically' valid and contributes to a clearer understanding
of what we are trying to do.
The policy of striving to develop a healthy international
community is the long-term constructive effort which we are en-
gaged in. It was this policy which gave rise to our vigorous
sponsorship of the United Nations. It is of course the principal
reason for our long continuing endeavors to create and now develop
the Inter-American system. It, as much as containment, underlay
our efforts to rehabilitate Western Europe. Most of our inter-
national economic activities can likewise be explained in terms
of this policy.
In a world of polarized power, the policies designed to
develop a healthy international community are more than ever neces-
sary to our own strength. ,
As for the policy of "containment", it is one which seeks by
all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet
power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce
a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence and (4) in
general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet
system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modify-
ing its behavior to conform to generally accepted international
standards.
It was and continues to be cardinal in this policy.that we
possess superior overall power in ourselves or in dependable com-
bination with other like-minded nations. One of the most important
ingredients of power is military strength In the concept of
ncontainment", the maintenance of a strong military posture is
deemed to be essential for two reasons: (1) as an ultimate
guarantee of our national security and (2) as an indispensable
backdrop to the conduct of the policy of "containment". Without
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superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobili-
zable, a policy of "containment"--which is in..cffecta policy of
calculated and gradual coercion--is no more than a.policy of bluff..
At the same time, it is essential to the successful conduct
of a policy of "containment" that we always leave open the possi-
bility of negotiation with the U.S.S.R A diplomatic freeze?and
we are in one now--tends to defeat' the very purposes ? of "containment"
because it raises tensions at the same time. that it makes Soviet
retractions and adjustments in the direction cf moderated behavior
more difficult. ,It also tends, to inhibit our initiative and de-
prives us of opportunties for maintaining a moral ascendency in
our struggle with the Soviet system.
In "containMent". it is desirable to exert pressure in a
fashion which will avoid so far as possible directly challenging
Soviet prestige, to. keep open the possibility for the U.S.S.R. to
retreat before pressure with a minimum loss of face and to secure
political advantage from the failure of the Kremlinto yield Cr
take advantage of the openings we leave it.
We have failed to implement adequately these two fundamental
aspects of "centainnent". In the face of obviously mounting Soviet
military strength ours has .declined relatively. Partly as a by-
product of this, but also for other reasons, we now find ourselves
at a diplomatic impasse with the.Soviet Union, with thi: Kremlin
.growing bolder, With both of us holding on grimly to what we have
and with ourselves facing difficult decisicns.
In examining ourcapabilities it is relevant to ask at the
outset--capabilities for what? The answer cannot be stated solely
in the negative terms of r9sisting the Kremlin design. It includes
. also our capabilities to attain the fundamental purpose of the
United States, and to foster a world environment in which our free
society can survive and flourish.
Potentially we have these capabilities. We know we have them
in the economic and military fields. Potentially we also have them
in the political and psychological fields. The vast majority of
Americans are confident that the system of values which animates
our society--the principles of freedom, tolerance, the importance
of the individual and the supremacy of reason over will--are
valid and more vital than the ideology which is the fuel of Soviet
dynamism. Translated into terms relevant to the lives of other
peoples--our system of values can become perhaps a powerful appeal
to millions who now seek or find in authoritarianism a refuge from
anxieties, bafflement and insecurity.
Essentially, cur democracy also possesses a unique degree of
unity. Our society is fundamentally more cohesive than the Soviet
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system, the solidarity- of which is artificially created through
force, fear and favor. This means that expressions of national
concensus in our society are soundly and solidly. based. It means
that the possibility of revolution in this country is fundamentally
less than that in the Soviet system.
? These capabilities within us constitute a great potential
force in our international relations. The potential within us of
bearing witness to the values by which we live holds promise for a
dynamic manifestation to the rest of the world of the vitality
of our system. The essential tolerance of our world outlook, our.
generous and constructive impulses, and the absence of covetousness
In our international relations are assets of potentially enormoue
influence.
These then are our potential capabilities. Between them and
cur capabilities currently being utilized is a wide gap of un-
actualized power. In sharp contrast is the situation of the Soviet
wcrld. Its capabilities are inferior to those of our Allies and to
our own. But they are mobilized close to the maximum possible
extent.
The full power which resides within the American people will
be evoked only through the traditional democratic process: This
process requires, firstly, that sufficient information regarding
the basic political, economic and military elements of the present
situation be made publicly available so that an intelligent
popular opinion may be formed. Having achieved a comprehension of
the issues now confronting this Republic, it will then be possible
for the American people and the American Government to arrive at a
consensus. Out of this common view will develop a determination of
the national will and ?a solid resolute expression of that will.
The initiative in this process lies with the Government.
The democratic way is harder than the authoritarian way
because, in se4.,kir..7 to protect and fulfill the individual, it
demands of him understanding, judgment and positive participation
in the increasingly complex and exacting problems of the modern
world. It demands that he exercise discrimination: that while
pursuing through free inquiry the search for truth he knows when
he should cOmmit an act of faith; that he distinguish between the
necessity for tolerance and the necessity for just suppression.
A free society is vulnerable in that it is easy for people to
lapse into excezses--the excesses of a permanently open mind wish-
fully waiting for evidence that evil design may become noble
Purpose, the excess of faith becoming prejudice, the excess of
tolerance degenerating into indulgence of conspiracy and the
excess of resorting to suppression when more moderate measures
are not only more appropriate but more effective.
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470:8 1.; s a ? `L'
In coping with dictatorial governments acting in secrecy and
with speed, we are also vulnerable in that the democratic process
necessarily operates in the open and at a deliberate tempc. Weak-
nesses in our situation are readily apparent and subject to immedi-
ate exploitation. This Government therefore cannot afford in the
face of the totalitarian challenge to operate on a narrow margin
of strength. A democracy can compensate for its natural vulner-
ability only if it maintains clearly superior overall power in its
most inclusiVe sense.
The very virtues of our system likewise handicap us in certain
respects in our relations with our allies. While it is a general
source of strength to us that our relations with our allies are
conducted on a basis of persuasion and consent rather than com-
pulsion and capitulation, it is also evident that dissent among us
can become a vulnerability. Sometimes the dissent has its principal
roots abroad in situations about which we can do nothing. Some-
times it arises largely out of certain weaknesses within ourselves,
about which we can do something--our native impetuosity and a
tendency to expect too much from people widely divergent from us.
The full capabilities of the rest of the free world are a
potential increment to our own capabilities. It may even be said
that the capabilities of the Soviet world, specifically the
capabilities of the masses who have nothing to lose but their
Soviet chains, are a potential which can be enlisted on our side.
Like our own capabilities, those of ?the rest of the free
world exceed the capabilities of the Soviet system. Like our own
they are far from being effectively mobilized and employed in
the struggle against the Kremlin design. This is so because the
rest of the free world lacks a sense of unity, confidence and
common purpose. This is true in even the most homogeneous and
advanced segment of the frpe world--Western Europe.
As we ourselves demonstrate power, confidence and a sense of
moral and political direction, so those same qualities will be
evoked in Western Europe. In such a situation, we may also
anticipate a general improvement in the political tone in Latin
America, Asia and Africa and the real beginnings cf awakening
among the Soviet totalitariat.
'In the absence of affirmative decision on our, part, the rest
of the free World is almost certain to become demoralized. Our
friends will become more than a liability to us; they can eventually
become a positive increment to Soviet power.
In sum, the capabilities of our allies are, in an important
sense, a function of our own. An affirmative decision to summon
up the potential within ourselves would evoke the potential
strength within others and add it to our own.
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?
B. Economic
4 rlit.2h9trilragD
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1. Capabilities. In contrast to the war economy of the Soviet
world (cf. Ch. V-B), the American economy (and the economy of the
free world as a-whole) is at present directed to the provision of
rising standards of living. The military budget of the United .
States represents 6 to 7 precent of its gross national .product
(as against 13.8 percent for the Soviet Union). Our North Atlantic
Treaty allies devoted 4.8 percent of their national product .to
military purposes in 1949.
This difference in emphasis between the two economies means
that the readiness of the free world to support a war effort is
tending to decline relative to that of the Soviet Union. There is
little direct investment in production facilities for military
end-products and in dispersal. There are relatively few men
receiving military training and a relatively low rate of pro-
duction of weapons. However, given time to convert to a war effort,
the capabilities of the United States economy and also of the
Western European economy would be tremendous. In the light of
Soviet military capabilities, a question which may be of decisive
importance in the event of war is the question whether there will
be time to mobilize our superior human and material resources for
a war effort (cf. Chs. VIII and IX).
The capability of the American economy to support a build-up
of economic and military strength at home and to assist a build-up
abroad is limited not, as in the case of the Soviet Union, so much
by the ability to prodUce as by the decision on the proper alloca-
tion of resources to this and other purposes. Even Western Europe
could afford to assign a substantially larger proportion of its
resources to defense, if the necessary foundation in public under-
standing and will could be laid, and if the assistance needed to
meet its dollar deficit were provided.
A few statistics will help to clarify this point.
Percentage of Gross. Available Resources
Allocated to Investment, National Defense,
and Consumption in East & West, 1949.
COUNTRY
U.S.S.R.
Soviet Orbit
NSC 68
(in percent of total)
GROSS DEFENSE CONSUMPTION
INVESTMENT
25.4 13.8 60-.8
22.0 a/ JI.O b/ 74..o a/
;
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COUNTRY GROSS
INVESTMENT
U .S . 13.6
European NAP countries 20.4
a/ Crude estimate.
b/ Includes Soviet Zone of Germany; otherwise 5 percent.
The Soviet Union is now allocating nearly 40 percent of its
gross available resources to military purposes and investment,
much of which is in war-supporting industries. It is estimated
that even in an emergency the Soviet Union could not increase this
proportion to much more than 50 percent, or by one-fourth. The
United States, on the other hand, is allocating only about 20
percent of its resources to defense and investment (or 22 percent
including foreign assistance), and little of its investment outlays
are directed to war-supporting industries. In an emergency the
United States could allocate more than 50 percent of its resources
to military purposes and foreign assistance, or five to six times
as much as at present.
11;" CA1
? N Li* 1
DEFENSE CONSUMPTION
6.5 79.9
4.8 74.8
The same point can be brought out by statistics on the use
of important products. The Soviet Union is using 14 percent of
Its ingot steel, 47 percent of its primary aluminum, and 18.5
percent of its crude oil for military purposes, while the corres-
ponding percentages for the United States are 1.7, 8.6, and 5.6.
Despite the tremendously larger production of these goods in the
United States than the Soviet Union, the latter is actually using,
for military purposes, nearly twice as much steel as the United
States and 8 to 26 percent more aluminum.
Perhaps the most impressive indication of the economic
superiority of the free world over the Soviet world which can be
made on the basis of available data is provided in the following
comparisons (based mainly on the Economic Survey of Europe, 1948):
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us
Comparative Statistics on Economic
Capabilities-of East and West
Total
U.S.
1948-9
'
European
NAT
Countries
l9489
Total
USSR
(1950
Plan)
?
Satel-
lites
1948-9
Population
(millions)
149
173
322
198 a/
75
273
Employment in
non -Agricultural
Establishments
(Millions)
45
Im? ?????
31a/
--
Gross National
250
84
334
65a/
21
86
Production
(billion dollars)
National Income
per capita
-(current
1700
480
104o
330
280
315
dollars)
Production Data?
Coal (million
tons)
582
306
888
250
88
338
Electric Power
(billion KWH)
356
124
480
82
15
97
Crude Petroleum
(million tons)
277
1
278
35
5
40
Pig Iron
(million tons)
55
24
79
19.5
3.2
22.7
Steel
(million tons)
80
32
112
25
6
31
Cement
(million tons)
?35
21
56
10.5
2.1
12.6
Motor Vehicles
(thousands)
5273
580
5853
500
25
525
a/ 1949 data.
I)/ For the European
the data include
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NAT countries and for the satellites,
only output by major producers.
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'April 14, 1950
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
References: A. NSC 20/4
B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
same subject, dated April 14,-?1950
The enclosed letter by the President and the Report by the
Secretaries of State and Defense referred to therein are trans-
mitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Coun-
cil, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Economic Cooperation Ad-
ministrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, at the next regularly
scheduled meeting of the Council on Thursday, April 20, 1950.
A proposed. procedure for carrying out the President's. di-
rective as .a matter of urgency is being Circulated for concur-
rent consideration in the reference memorandum of April 14.
It is requested that this report -)e, handled with special
security precautions in accordance with the President's decdre
that ne Publicity be Riven this report or its contents without
his approval.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Economic Cooperation Administrator
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
DECLASS 'IED
Auth:. //
Bate
By
2UTI01.[AI., SECURITY COUNCIL
4:a3
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A
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It should be noted that these comparisons understate the
relative position of the NAT countries for several reasons: (i)
Canada is excluded because comparable date were not available;
(2) the data for the U.S.S.R. are the 1950 targets (as stated in
tie fourth five-year plan) rather than actual rates of production
ami are believed to exceed in many cases the production actually
achieved; (3) the data for the European NAT countries are actual
data for 1948, and production has generally increased since that
time.
Furthermore, the United States could achieve a substantial
absolute increase in output and could thereby increase the alloca-
tion of resources to a build-up of the economic and military
strength of itself and its allies without suffering a decline in
its real standard of living. Industrial production declined by 10
percent between the first quarter of 1948 and the last quarter of
1949, and by approximately one-fourth between 1944 and 1949. In
March 1950 there were approximately 4,750,000 unemployed, as
compared to 1,070,000 in 1943 and 670,000 in 1944. The gross
national product declined slowly in 1949 from the peak reached
in 1948 ($e,-162 billion in 1948 to an annual rate of $256 billion
in the last six months of 1949), and in terms of constant prices
declined by about 20 percent between 1944 and 1948.
With a high level of economic activity, the United States
could soon attain a gross national product of $300 billion per
year, as was pointed out in the President's Economic Report
(January 1950). Progress in this direction would permit, and
might itself be aided by, a build-up of the economic and military
strength of the United States and the free world; furthermore, if a
dynamic expansion of the economy were achieved, the necessary
build-up could be accomplished without a decrease in the national
standard of living because the required resources could be obtained
4 by siphoning off a part of the annual increment in the gross
national prcduct. These are facts of fundamental importance-in.
considering the courses of action open to the United States (cf. CH
IX).
2. Intentions. Foreign economic policy is a major instrument
in the conduct of United States foreign relations. It is an
instrument which can powerfully influence the world environment
in ways favorable to the security and welfare of this country. It
is also an instrument which, if unwisely formulated and employed,
can dc actual harm to cur national interests. It is an instrument
uniquely suited to our capabilities, provided we have the tenacity
of purpose and the understanding requisite to a realization of its
potentials. Finally, it is an instrument peculiarly appropriate
to the cold war.
The preceding analysis has indicated that an essential
element in a program to frustrate the Kremlin design is the develop-
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nt
C
g
ment of a. successfully functioning system among the freenations.
It is clear that economic conditions are among the fundamental
determinants of the will and the strength to resist subversion
and aggression.
United States foreign economic policy has been,designed to
assist in the building of such a system and such conditions in
the free world. The principal features of this policy can-be.
sunlarized as follows:
(1) assistance to Western Europe in recovery and the
creation of a viable economy (the European Recovery Program);
(2) assistance to other countries because of their
special needs arising out of the war or the cold war and our
special interests in or responsibility for meeting them (grant
assistance to Japan, the Philippines, and Korea, loans and credits
by the Export-Import Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
the International Bank to Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Iran, etc.);
(3) assistance in the development of under-developed
areas (the Point IV program and loans and credits to various
countries, overlapping to some extent with those mentioned under
2);
(4) military assistance to the North Atlantic Treaty
countries, Greece, Turkey, etc.;
(5) restriction of. East-West trade in items of military
importance to the East;
(6) purchase and stockpiling of strategic materials; and
(7) efforts to re-establish an international economy
based-on multilateral trade, declining trade barriers, and con-
vertible cUrrencies (the.GATT-ITO program, the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements program, the IMF-IBRD program, and the program now
being developed to solve the problem of the United States balance
of. payments).
In both their short and long term aspects, these policiesand
programs are directed to the strengthening of the free world.and. -
therefore to the Trustation of the Kremlin design. Despite
certain inadequacies and inconpistencies, which are now being
studied in connection with the problem of the. United States balance
of payments, the United States has generally pursued a foreign
economic policy which has powerfully supported its overall ob-
jectives. The question must nevertheless be asked ?whether current
and currently projected programs will adequately support this
Policy in the future, in terms both cf need and urgency.
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,
II
The last year has been indecisive in the economic field. The
Soviet Union has made considerable progress in integrating the
satellite economies of Eastern Europe into the Soviet economy,
but still faces very large problems, especially with China. The?
free nations have important accomplishments to record, but also have
tremendous problems still ahead. On balance, neither side can
claim, any great advantage in this field over its relative position
a year ago. The important question therefore becomes: what are
the trends?
Several conclusions seem to emerge First, the Soviet Union
is widening the gap between its preparedness for war and the un-
preparedness of the free world for War. It is devoting a far
greater proportion of its resources to military purposes than are
the free nations and, in significant components of military power,
a greater absolute quantity of resources. Second, the Communist
success in China, taken with the politico-economic situation in
the rest of South and South-East Asia, provides a springboard for
a further incursicn in this troubled area. 'Although Communist
China faces serious economic problems which may impose some strains
on the Soviet economy, it is probable that the social and economic
problems faced by the free nations in this area present more than
offsetting. opportunities for Communist expansion. Third, the
Soviet Union holds positions in Europe which, if it maneuvers
skillfully, could'be used to do great damage to the Western Euro-
pean economy and to the maintenance of the Western orientation Of
certain Countries, particularly Germany and Austria. Fourth,
despite (and-in part because of) the Titoist-defection, the Soviet
Union has accelerated its efforts to integrate satellite economy
with its own and to increase the degree of autarchy within the
areas- under its control.
Fifth, meanwhile Western Europe, with American (and Canadian)
assistance, has achieved a record level of production. However,
it faces the prospect of a rapid tapering off of American assistance
without the possibility of achieving, by its own efforts, a
satisfactory equilibrium with the dollar area. It has also made
very little progress toward "economic integration", which would
In the long run tend to improve its productivity and to provide
an economic environment conducive to political stability. In
pa:]icular, the movement towards economic integration does not
appear to be rapid enough to provide Western Germany with adequate
economic opportunities in the West. The United Kingdom still faces
economic problems which may require a moderate but politically
difficult decline in the British standard of living or more
American assistance than is contemplated. At the same time, a
? strengthening of the British position is needed if the stability
of the Commonwealth is not to be impaired and if it is to be a
focus of resistance to Communist expansion in South and South-East
Asia. Improvement of the British position is also vital in building
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'up the defensive capabilities of Western Europe.
' Sixth, throughout Asia the stability of the present moderate
governments, which are more in sympathy with our purposes than any
probable successor regimes would be, is doubtful. The problem
is only in part .an economic one. Assistance in economic develop-
ment is important as a means of holding out to the peoples of
Asia some prospect of improvement in standards of living under
their present governments. But probably more important are a
strengthening of central institutions, an improvement in administra-
tion, and generally a development of an economic and social struc-
ture within which the peoples of Asia can make more effective use
of their great human and material resources.
Seventh, and perhaps most important, there are indications
of a let-down of United States efforts under the pressure of the
domestic budgetary situation, disillusion resulting from excessively
optimistic expectations about the duration and results of our
assistance programs, and doubts about the wisdom of continuing to
strengthen the free nations as against preparedness measures in
light of the itatensity of the cold war.
Eighth, there are grounds for predicting that the United
States and other free nations will within a period of a few years
at most experience a decline in economic activity of serious
proportions unless more positive governmental programs are developed
than are now available.
In short, as we lopic into the future, the programs now
planned will not meet the requirements of the free nations. The
difficulty does not lie so,r;uch in the inadequacy or misdirection
, of policy as in the inadequacy of Planned programs, in terms of
timing or impact, to achieve our objectives. The risks inherent
in this situation are set forth in the following chapter and a
course of action designed to reinvigorate our efforts in order to
reverse the present trends and to achieve our fundamental purpose
is outlined in Chapter IX.
C. Military
The United States now possesses the greatest military potential
of any single nation in the world. The military weaknesses of
the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, however, include its
numerical inferiority in fcrces in being and in total manpower.
Coupled with the inferiority of forces in being, the United States
also lacks tenable positions from which to employ its forces in
event of war and munitions power in being and readily available.
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r? 3 E
It is true that the United States armed forces are now
stronger than ever before in other times of apparent peace; it is
also true that there exists a sharp disparity between our actual
military strength and our commitments. The relationship of our
strength to our present comTitments, however, is not alone the
governing factor. The world situation, as well as commitments,
should govern; hence, cur military strength more properly should
be related to the world situation confronting us. When our military
strength is related to the world situation and balanced against
the likely exigencies of such a situation, it is clear that our
military strength is becoming dangerously inadequate. ?
If war should begin in 1950, the United States and its allies
will have the military capability of conducting defensive opera-
tions to provide a reasonable measure of protection to the Western
Hemisphere, bases in the Western Pacific, and essential military
lines of communication; and an inadequate measure of protection to
vital military bases in the United Kingdom and in the Near and
Middle East. We will have the capability of conducting powerful
offensive air operations against vital elements of the Soviet war-
making capacity.
The scale of the operations listed in the preceding paragraph
is limited by the effective forces and raterial in being of the
United States and its allies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Consistent
with the aggressive threat facing us and in consonance with overall
strategic plans, the United States must provide to its allies on a
continuing basis as large amounts of military assistance as pos-
sible without serious detriment to United States operational
requirements.
If the potential miliAary capabilities of the United States
and its allies were rapidly and effectively developed, sufficient
forces could be produced probably to deter war, or if the Soviet
Union chooses war, to withstand the initial Soviet attacks, to
stabilize supporting attacks, and to retaliate in turn with even
greater impact on the Soviet capabilities. From the military point
of view alone, however, this would require not only the generation
of the necessary military forces but alao the development and
stockpiling of improved weapons of all types.
Under existing peacetime conditions, a period of from two
tc three years is required to produce a material increase in
military power. Such increased power could be provided in a some-
what shorter period in a declared period of emergency or in
wartime through a full-out national effort. Any increase in
military power in peacetime, however, should be related both to
its probable military role in war, to the implementation of im-
mediate and long-term United States foreign policy vis-a-vis the
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lear-
z
Soviet Union and to the realities of the existing situation. If
such a course of increasing cur military power is adopted now,
the United States would have the capability of eliminating the
disparity between its military strength and the exigencies of the
'situation we face; eventually of gaining the initiative in.the'
"cold" war and of materially delaying if not stopping the Soviet
offensives in war itself.
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VII. PRESENT RISKS
A. ?G6.nera1
: - 7.1 al Ircr tsycp.rs .... 1
It is apparent from the preceding sections that the integrity
and vitality of our system is in greater jeopardy than ever before
In our history. Even if there were no Soviet Union we would face
the great problem of the free society, accentuated many fold in
this industrial age, of reconciling crder, security, the need for
participation, with the requirements of freedom. We would face
the fact that in a shrinking world the absence of order among
nations is becoming less and less tolerable. The Kremlin design
seeks to impose order among nations by means which would destroy
our free and democratic system. The Kremlin's possession of atomic
weapons puts new power behind its design, and increases the jeopardy
to our system. It adds new strains to the uneasy equilibrium-
without-order which exists in the world and raises new doubts in
men's minds whether the world will long tolerate this tension
without moving toward scme kind of order, on somebody's terms.
The risks we face are of a new order of magnitude, commen-
surate with the total struggle in which we are engaged. For a
free society there is never total victory, since freedom and
democracy are never wholly attained, are always in the process of
being attained. But defeat at the hands of the totalitarian is
total defeat. These risks crowd in on us, in a shrinking world
of polarized power, so as to give us no chcice, ultimately,
between meeting them effectively or being overcome by them.
B. Specific
It is quite clear fro4Soviet theory and practice that the
, Kremlin seeks to bring the free world under its dominion by the
methods of the cold war. The preferred technique is to subvert
by infiltration and intimidation. Every institution of our society
is an instrument which it is scught to stultify and turn against
our purposes. Those that touch most closely our material and moral
strength are obviously the prime targets, labor unions, civic
enterprises, schools, churches, and all media for influencing
opinion. The effort is not se much to make them serve obvious
Soviet ends as to prevent them from serving cur ends, and thus to
make them sources of confusion in our economy, our culture and our
body politic. The doubts and diversities that in terms of our
values are part of the merit of a free system, the weaknesses
and the problems that are peculiar to it, the rights and privileges
that free men enjoy, and the disorganization and destruction left
in the wake of the last attack on our freedoms, all are but op-
portunities for the Kremlin to do its evil wcrk. Every advantage
Is taken of the fact that our moans of prevention and retaliation
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???2
are limited by those principles and scruples which are precisely
the ones that give our freedom and democracy its meaning for us.
None of our scruples deter those whose only code is, "morality is
that which serves the revclution'!.
Since everything that gives us or others respect for cur
institutions is a suitable object for attack, it also fits the
Kremlin's design that where, with impunity, we can be insulted
and made to suffer indignity the opportunity shall not be missed,
particularly in any context which can be used to cast dishoncr
on our country, our system, our motives, or our methods. Thus ?
the means by which we seught to restore our own economic health in
the '30's, and now seek to restore that of the free world, come
equally under attack. The military aid by which we sought to help
the free world was frantically denounced by the Communists in the
early days of the last war, and of course our present efforts to
develop adequate military strength for ourselves and our allies
are equally denounced. ?
At the same time the Soviet Union is seeking to create over-
whelming military force, in order to back up infiltration with
intimidation. In the cnly terms in which it understands strength,
it is seeking to demonstrate to the free world that force and the
will to use it are on the side of the Kremlin, that those who lack
it are decadent and docmed. In local incidents it threatens and
encroaches both for the sake of local gains and to increase anxiety
and defeatism in all the free world.
The possession of atomic weapons at each of the opposite poles
of power, and the inability (for different reasons) of either side
to place any trust in the,other, puts a premium on a surprise
attack against us. It equally puts a premium on a more violent
and ruthless prceecution of its design by cold war, especially if
the Kremlin is sufficiently objective to realize the improbability
of our prosecuting a preventive war. It also puts a premium on
piecemeal aggression against others, counting on our unwillingness
to engage in atomic war unless we are directly attacked. We run
all these risks and the added risk of being confused and immobilized
by our inability to weigh and choose, and pursue a firm course
based on a rational assessment of each.
The risk that we may thereby be prevented or too long delayed
in taking all needful measures to maintain the integrity and
vitality of our system is great. The risk that our allies will
lose their determination is greater. And the risk that in this
manner a descending spiral of too little and too late, of doubt
and recrimination, may present us with ever narrower and more
desperate alternatives, is the gratest risk of all. For example,
it is clear that cur present weakness would prevent us from
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offering effective resistance at any of several vital pressure .
points. The only deterrent we can present. to the Kremlin ? is the
evidence we ?give that we may make any of the critical points, which
we cannot hold the occasion for a global war of annihilation.
The 'risk of having. no better?choice than:to capitulate .or
precipitate a global war at any of a number of pressure points is
bad enough in itself, but it is multiplied by the weakness it
imparts to our position in the cold war. .Instead of appearing
strong and resolute we are continually at the verge of appearing
and being alternately irresolute and desperate; yet it is the
cold war which we must win, because both the Kremlin design, and Our
fundamental purpose give it the first priority.. ?
The frustration of the Kremlin design, however, Cannot be
accomplished by us alone, as will appear from the analysis in
Chapter IX, B. Strength at the center, in the United States, is
only the first of two essential elements. The second is that our.
allies and potential allies do not as a result of a sense of
frustration or of Soviet intimidation drift into a course of
neutrality eventually leading to Soviet domination. If this were
?to happen .in Germany the effect upon Western Europe and eventually
upon us might be catastrophic.
But there are risks in making ourselves strong. A large
measure of sacrifice and discipline will be demanded of the
American people.. .They will be asked to give up some of the
benefits which they have come to associate with their freedoms.
Nothing could be more important than that they fully understand
the reasons for this. The risks of a superficial understanding. .
or c: an inadequate appreciation of the issues are obvious and
might lead to the adoption of measures which in themselves would
jeopardize the integrity of cur system. At any point in the
?process of demonstrating our will to make good our fundamental
purpose, the Kremlin may decide to precipitate .a general war, or
in testing us, may go too far.. These are risks we will invite
by makinz ourselves strong, but they are lesser risks than those
we seek to avoid Our fundamental purpose is more likely to be
defeated from lack of the will to maintain it, than from any
mistakes we may make or assault we may undergo because of asserting
that will.. No people in history. have preserved their freedom ?
who thought that by. not being strong enough to protect themselves
they might prove inoffensive to their enemies.
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VIII. ATOMIC ARMAMENTS
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A. Military Evaluation of U. S. and U.S.S.R. Atomic Capabilities.
1. The United States now has an atomic capability, Including
both numbers and deliverability, estimated to be adequate,.if ef-
fectively utilized, to deliver a serious blow against the war-making
capacity of the U.S.S.R.. It is doubted whether such a blow, even
If it resulted in the complete destruction of the contemplated tar-
get systems, would cause the U.S.S.R. to sue for terms or present
Soviet forces from occupying Western Europe against such ground re-
sistance as could presently be mobilized. A very serious initial
blow could, however, so reduce the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. to
?supply and equip its military organization and its civilian Popula-
tion as to give the United States the prospect of developing a gen-
eral military superiority in a war of long duration.
2. As the atomic capability of the U.S.S.R. increases, it will
have an increased ability to hit at our atomic bases and installa-
tions and thus seriously hamper the ability of the United States to
carry out an attack such as that outlined above. It is quite pos-
sible that in the near future the U.S.S.R. will have a sufficient
number of atomic bombs and a sufficient deliverability to raise a
question whether Britain with its present inadequate air defense
could be relied upon as an advance base from which a major portion
of the Ti. S. attack could be launched.
It is estimated that, within the next four years, the U.S.S.R.
vill atain the capability of seriously damaging vital centers of the
United States, provided it strikes a surprise blow and provided fur-
ther that the blow is opposed by no more effective opposition than
we now have programmed. Such a blow could so seriously damage the
United States as to greatly reduce its superiority in economic po-
tential.
Effective opposition to this Soviet capability will recuire
among other measures greatly increased air warning systems, air de-
fenses, and vigorous development and implementation of a civilian
defense program which has been thoroughly integrated with the mili-
tary defense systems:
In time the atomic capability of the U.S.S.R. can be expected
to grow to a point where, given surprise and no more effective oppo-
sition than we now have programmed, the possibility of a decisive
initial attack cannot be excluded.
3. In the initial phases of an atomic war, ?the advantages of
initiative and surprise would be very great. A police state living
behind an iron curtain has an enormous advantage in maintaining the
necessary security and centralization of decision required to cap-
italize on this advantage.
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k. For the moment our atomic retaliatory capability is probably
rdecuate to deter the Kremlin from a deliberate direct military at-
against ourselves .or other free peoples. However, when it cal-
culates that it has a sufficient atomic capability to make a surprise
Etr_P_C on us, nullifying our atomic superiority and creating a mili-
tary sj.tuation decisively in its favor, the Kremlin might be temptedto strke swiftly and with Stealth The existence .of two large
atc:7:1_c capabilities in such a relationship might well act, there-
fore, not as a deterrent, but as an incitement to war..
5. A further ?increase in the number and power of our?atomic
;recns is -necessary in order to assure the .effectiveness of any
U. S. retaliatory blow,- but would not of itself seem to change the
icic of the above points. ? Greatly increased general air,
gro:_lnd and sea strength, and increased air defense and?ciVilian.de-
feTise Programs would also be necessary to provide reasonable assur-
ance that the free world could survive an initial surprise atomic
attack of the weight which it is estimated the U.S.S.R. will be
cl,:pable of delivering by 1954 and still permit the free world to
?go 071 to the eventual attainment of its objectives. Furthermore,
.such a build-up of strengthcould safeguard and increase .our retal-
1. -cower, and thus mis-qt put off for some time the date when the
Soviet Union could calculate ? that a surprise blow would be advan-
tao,as. This would provide additional time for the effects of our
policies to produce a.modification of the Soviet system.
6. If the U.S.S.R.- develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the
U. S., the risks of greatly increased Soviet pressure against all
the free world, or an attack against the U. S., will be greatly in-
creased
7. If the U. S. develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the
U.S.S.R., the U. S. should for the time being be able to bring in-
creased pressure on the U.S.S.R..
B. Stockpilinc: and Use of Atomic Weapons.
1. From the .foregoing analysis it appears that it would be to
the long-term advantage of the ?United States if atomic weapons were
to te effectively eliminated from national peacetime armaments; the
additional 'objectives which must be secured if there is to be a rea-
sonable prospect of such effective elimination of atomic weapons. are
discussed InChapter IX.- In the absence of such elimination and the
securing of these objectives, it would appear that we have no. alter-
nat',.ve but to increase our atomic capability as rapidly as other
considerations make .appropriate. In either case; it appears to be.
1r;p:7-rativo to increase as rapidly as possible our general air, ground
.and sea strength and .that of our allies to a point where we are mili-
tarily not so heavily dependent on atomic weapons.
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2, As is indicated in Chapter IV, it is important that the
-United States employ military force only if the necessity for its
use is clear and compelling and commends itself to the overwhelming
majority of our people. The United States cannot therefore engage
in war except as a reaction to aggression of so clear and compelling
a nature as to bring .the overwhelming majority of our people to ac-
cept the use of military force.. ? In the event war comes, our use. of
force must be to 'compel the acceptance of our objectives and must be
congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.
. In the event of a general war with the. U.S.S.R., it Must be
?anticipated that atomic weapons will be used by each side in the man-
ner it deems best suited to accomplish its objectives. ? In view of
our vulnerability to Soviet atomic attack, it has been argued. that
we might wish to hold our atomic weapons only for retaliation against
prior use by the U.S.S.R.. To 'be ableto do so and still have hone
of achieving .our Objectives, the non-atomic military capabilities of
ourselves and our allies would have to be fully developed and the 'po-
litical weaknesses of the Soviet Union fully exploited. In the event
of war, however, we could not be sure that we could move toward the
attainment of these objectives without the U.S.S.R.'s resorting
sooner or later to the use of its atomic weapons. Only if we had
overwhelming atomic superiority and obtained command of the air might
the U.S.S.R. be deterred from employing its atomic weapons as we pro-
grassed toward the attainment of our objectives.
In the event the U.S.S.R. develops by 1954 the atomic capa-
bility which,we now anticipate, it is hardly conceivable that, if
war comes, the Soviet leaders would refrain from the use of atemic
weapons _unless they felt .fully confident of attaining their object-
Ives by other means.
In the event we use atomic weapons either in retaliation for
their prior use by the U.S.S.R. or because there is no alternative
*:metl7locl by which we can attain our objectives, it is imperative that
the strategic and tactical targets against which they are used be
appropriate and the manner in which they are used be consistent with
those objectives.
It appears to follow from the above that we should Produce
and stockpile thermonuclear weapons in the event they Prove feasible
and would add significantly to our net capability. Not enough is yet
known of their potentialities to warrant a judgment at this time re-
garding their use in war to attain our objectives. .
3. It has been suggested that we announce?that we will not use
atomic weapons except in retaliation against the prior use of such ?
weapons by an. aggressor. It has been argued that such a declaration
would decrease the danger of an atomic attack against the United
States and its allies.
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In our present situation of relative unpreparedness in con-
ventional weapons, such a declaration would be interpreted by the
U.S.S.R. as an admission of great weakness and by our allies as a
clear indication that we intended to abandon them. Furthermore, it
is doubtful whether such a declaration would be taken sufficiently
seriously by the Kremlin to constitute an important factor in deter-
mining whether or not to attack the United States. It is to be an-
ticipated that the Kremlin would weigh the facts of our capability
far more heavily than 'a declaration of what we proposed to do with
that capability.
Unless we are prepared to abandon our objectives, we cannot
make such a declaration in good faith until we are confident that we
will be in a position to attain our objectives without war, or, in
the event of war, without recourse to the use of atomic weapons for
strategic or tactical purposes.
C. International Control of Atomic Energy.
1. A discussion of certain of the basic considerations involved
in securing effective international control is necessary to make
clear why the additional objectives discussed in Chapter IX Must be
secured.
2. No 'system of international control could prevent. the produc-
tion and use of atomic weapons in the event of a prolonged war. Even
the most effective system of international control could, of itself,
only proVide (a) assurance that atomic weapons had been eliminated
from national peacetime armaments and (b) immediate notice of a vio-
lation. In essence, an effective international control system would
be expected to assure a certain amount of time after notice of vio-
lation before atomic weapons could be used in war.
3.. The time period between notice of violation and possible use
At of atomic weapons in war which a control system could be expected to
assure depends upon a number of factors.
The dismantling of existing stockpiles of bombs and the de-
struction of casings and firing mechanisms could by themselves give .
little assurance of securing time. Casings and firing mechanisms
are presumably easy to produce, even surreptitiously, and the as-
sembly of weapons does not take much time.
If existing stocks of fissionable materials were in some way
eliminated and the future production of fissionable materials effect-
ively controlled war could not Start with a surprise atomic attack.
? In order to assure an appreciable time lag between notice of
violation and the time when atomic weapons might be available in
quantity, it would be necessary to destroy all plants capable of
making large amounts of fissionable material. Such action would,
however, require a moratorium on those possible peacetime uses which
call for .large quantities of fissionable materials.
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Effective control over the production and stockpiling of raw
materials might further extend the time period which effective inter-
national control would assure. Now that the Russians have learned
the technique of producing atomic weapons, the time between viola-
tion of an international control agreement and produbtion of atomic
weapons will be shorter than was estimated in 1946, except possibly
in. the field of thermonuclear or other new types of. weapons.
4. The certainty of notice of violation also depends upon a
number of factors. In the absence of good faith, it is to be doubted
whether any system can be designed which will give certainty of not-
ice of violation. International ownership of raw materials and fis-
sionable materials and international ownership and operation of dan-
gerous facilities, coupled with inspection based on continuous un.-
limited freedom of access to all parts of the Soviet Union (as well
as to all parts of the territory of other signatories to the control
agreement) appear.to be necessary to give the requisite degree of
assurance against secret violations. As the Soviet stockpile of
fissionable materials grows, the amount which the U.S.S.R. might
secretly withhold and not declare to the inspection agency grows.
In this sense, the earlier an agreement is consummated the greater
the security it would offer. The possibility of successful secret
production operations also increases with developments which may re-
duce the size and power consumption of individual reactors. The de-
velopment of a thermonuclear bomb would increase many fold the dam-
age a given amount of fissionable material could do and would, there-
fore, vaatly increase the danger that a decisive advantage cou1,2. be
gained through secret operations.
5. The relative sacrifices which would be involved in interna-
tional control need also to be considered. If it were possible to
negotiate an effective system of international control the United
States would presumably sacvifice a much larger stockpile of atomic
=1-weapons and a much larger production capacity than would the U.S.S.R.
The opening up of national territory to international inspection in-
volved in an adequate control and inspection system would have a far
greater impact on the U.S.S.R. than on the United States. If the
control system involves the destruction of all large reactors and
thus a moratorium on certain possible peacetime uses, the U.S.S.R.
can be expected to argue that it, because of greater need for new
sources of energy, would be making a greater sacrifice in this re-
gard than the United States.
6. The United States and the peoples of the world as a whole
desire a respite from the dangers of atomic warfare. The chief dif-
ficulty lies in the danger that the respite' would be short and that
we might not have adequate notice of its pending termination. For
such an arrangement to be in the interest of the United States, it
is. essential that the-agreement be entered into in good faith by
both sides and the probability against its violation high.
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7. The most substantial contribution to security of an effect-
ive international control system would, of course, be the opening up
of the Soviet Union, as required under the U. N. plan. Such opening
up is not, however, compatible with the maintenance of the Soviet
system in its present rigor. This is a major reason for the Soviet
refusal to accept the U. N. plan.
The studies which began with the Acheson-Lilienthal commit':
tee and culminated in the present U. N. plan made it clear that in-
spection of atomic facilities would not alone give the assurance of
control; but that ownership and operation by an international author-
ity of the world's atomic energy activities from the mine to the last
use of fissionable materials was also essential. The delegation of
sovereignty which this implies is necessary for effective control
and, therefore, is as necessary for the United States and the rest
of the free world as it is presently unacceptable to the Soviet Unial.
It is als6 clear that a control authority not susceptible di-
rectly or indirectly to Soviet domination is equally essential. As
the Soviet Union would regard any country not under its domination
as under the potential if not the actual domination of the United
States, it is clear that what the United States and the non-Soviet
world must insist on, the Soviet Union must at present reject.
The principal immediate benefit of international control
vould be to make a surprise atomic attack impossible, assuming t]hcf
elimination of large reactors and the effective disposal of stock-
piles of fissionable materials. But it is almost certain that tho
Soviet Union .would not agree to the elimination of large reactors,
unless the impracticability of producing atomic power for peaceful
purposes had been demonstrated beyond a doubt. By the same token,
it would not now agree to elimination of its stockpile of fission-
? able materials.
Finally, the absence of good faith on the part of the U.S.S.R
must be assumed until there is concrete evidence that there has been
a decisive change in Soviet policies. .It is to be doubted whether
such a change can take place without 'a change in the nature of the
'Soviet system itself.
The above considerations make it clear that at least a major
change in the relativo. power positions of the United States and the
Soviet Union would have to take place before an effective system of
international control could be negotiated. The Soviet Union would
have had to have moved a substantial distance down-the path of ac-
commodation and compromise before such an arrangement would be con-
ceivable. This conclusion is supported by the Third Report of the
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council,
May 17, 1948, in which it is stated that "...the majority of the
Commission has been unable to secure...their acceptance of the
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IX. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION
Introduction. Four possible courses of action by the United
States in the present situation can be distinguished. They are:
a. Continuation of current policies, with current and
, currently projected programs for carrying out these policies;
b. Isolation;
C. War; and
d. A more rapid building up of the political, economic, and
military strength of the free world than provided under a, with
the purpose of reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order
among nations without war and of Preparing to defend ourselves
in the event that the free world is attacked.
The role of negotiation. Negotiation must be considered in re-
lation to these courses of action. A negotiator always attempts to
achieve an agreement which is somewhat better than the realities of
his fundamental position would justify and which is, in any case,
not worse than his fundamental position requires. This is as true
in relations among sovereign states as in relations between individ-
uals. The Sov'at Union possesses several advantages over, the free
-world in negotiations on any issue:
-a. It can and does enforce secrecy on all significant facts
about conditions within the Soviet Union, so that it can be ex-
pected to know more about the realities of the free world's po-
sition than the free world knows about its position;
b. It does not have to be responsive in any important sense
to public opinion;
c. It does not have to consult and agree with any other
countries on the terms it will offer and accept; and
d. It can influence public opinion in other countries
while- insulating the peoples under its control.
These are important advantages. Together with the unfavorable
trend of our power position, they militate, as is.shown in Section
A below, against successful negotiation of a general settlement at
this time. For although the United States probably now possesses,
Principally in atomic weapons, a force adequate to deliver a power-
ful blow upon the Soviet Union and to open the road to. victory in a
long war, it is not sufficient by itself to advance the position of
the United States in the cold war.
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The problem is to create such political and economic conditions in
the free world, backed by force sufficient to inhibit Soviet attack,
that the Kremlin will accommodate itself to these conditions, gradual-
ly withdraw, and eventually change its policies drastically. It has
been shown in Chapter VIII that truly effective control of atomic en-
ergy would require such an opening up of the Soviet Union and such ev-
idence in other ways of its good faith and its intent to co-exist in
peace as to reflect or at least initiate a change in the Soviet system.
) Cleerly under present circumstances we will not be able to negoti-
ate a settlement which calls for a change in the Soviet system. What,
then, is the role of negotiation?
In the first place, the public in the United States and in other
free countries will require, as a condition to firm policies and ade-
quate programs directed to the frustration of the Kremlin design, that
the free world be continuously prepared to negotiate agreements with
the Soviet Union on equitable terms. It is still argued by many peo-
ple here and abroad that equitable agreements with the Soviet Union are
possible, and this view will gain force if the Soviet Union begins to
show signs of accommodation, even on unimportant issues.
The free countries must always, therefore, be prepared to negotiate
and must be ready to take the initiative at times in seeking negotia-
tion. They must develop a negotiating position which defines the is-
sues and the terms on which they would be prepared--and at 'what stages
--to accent agreements with the Soviet Union. The terms must be fair
in the view of popular opinion in the free world. This means that thezr.
. must be .consistent with a positive program for peace--in harmony with
?the United Nations' Charter and providing, ?at a minimum; for the ef-
fective control of all armaments by the United Nations or a successor
organization. The terms must not require more of the Soviet Union
? than such behavior and such participation in a world organization. The
fact that such conduct by the Soviet Union is impossible without such
a radical change in Soviet policies as to constitute a change in the
,Soviet system would then emei.ge as a result of the Kremlin's unwill-
ingness to accept such terms or of its bad faith in observing them.
A sound negotiating position is, therefore, an essential element
in the ideological conflict. For some time after a decision to build
up strength, any offer of, or attempt at, negotiation of a general
settlement along the lines of the erkeley speech by the .Secretary
of State could be only a tactic.I Nevertheless, concurrently with
The Secretary of State listed seven areas in which the Soviet thicn
could modify its behavior in such a way as to permit co-existence in
reasonable security. These were:
1.
2.
3.
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Treaties of peace with Austria, Germany, Japan and relaxation
of pressures in the Far East;
Withdrawal ofSoviet forces and influence from satellite area;
Cooperation in the United Nations;
- (Continued on following page)
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a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free ?
world, it may be desirable to pursue this tactic both to gain public
support for the program and to minimize the immediate risks of war.
It.is urgently necessary for the United States to determine its ne-
gotiating position and to obtain agreement with its major allies on
the purposes and terms of negotiation.
In the second place, assuming that the United States in coopera-
tion with other free countries decides and acts to increase the
strength of the free world and assuming that the Kremlin chooses
the path of accommodation, it will from time to time be necessary
and desirable to negotiate on various specific issues with the Krem-
lin as the area of possible agreement widens.
The Kremlin will have three major objectives in negotiations
with the United States. The first is to eliminate the atomic capa-
bilities of the United States; the second is to prevent the effect-
ive mobilization of the superior potential of the free world in
human and material resources; and the third is to secure a with-
drawal of United States forces from, and commitments to, Europe and
Japan. Depending on its evaluation of its own strengths and weak-
nesses as against the West's (particularly the ability and will of
the West to sustain its efforts), it will or will not be prepared
to make important concessions to achieve these major objectives.
It is unlikely that the Kremlin's evaluation is such that it would
now be prepared to make significant concessions.
The objectives of the United States and other free countries in
negotiations with the Soviet Union (apart from the ideological ob-
jectives discussed above) are to .record, in a formal fashion which
will facilitate the consolidation and further advance of our posi-
tion, the process of Soviet accommodation to the new political,
Psychological, and economiC conditions in the world which will re-
sult from adoption of the fourth course of action and which will be
supported by the increasing military strength developed as an in-
tegral part of that course of action. In short, our objectives are
to record, where desirable, the gradual withdrawal of the Soviet
Union and to facilitate that process by making negotiation, if pos-
sible, always more expedient than resort to force.
It must be presumed that for some time the Kremlin will accept
agreements only if it is convinced that by acting in bad faith when-
ever and wherever there Is an opportunity to do so with Impunity, it
.1)( (Continued)
' 4. Control of atomic energy and of conventional armaments;
5. Abandonment of indirect aggression;
6. Proper treatment Of official representatives of the U. S..;
7 Increased access to the Soviet Union of persons and ideas
' from other countries.
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can derive greater advantage from the agreements than the free world.
For this reason, we must take care that any agreements are enforce-
able or that they are not susceptible of violation without detection
and the possibility of effective counter-measures.
This further suggests .that we will have to consider carefully the
order in which agreements can be concluded. Agreement on the cOntrol
of .atomic energy would result in a relatively greater disarmament of
the United States than of the Soviet Union, even assuming consider-
able progress in building up the strength of the free world in con-
ventional forces and weapons. It might be accepted by the Soviet
Union as part of a deliberate design to move against Western Europe
and other areas of strategic importance with conventional forces and
weapons. In this event, the United States would find itself at 'war,
having previously disarmed itself in its most important weapon, and
would be engaged in a race to redevelop atomic weapons.
This seems to indicate that for the time being the United States
and other free countries would have to insist on concurrent agreement
on the control of non-atomic forces and weapons and perhaps on the
other elements of a general settlement, notably peace treaties with
Germany; Austria, and Japan and the withdrawal of Soviet influence
from the satellites. If, contrary to cur expectations, the Soviet
Union should accept agreements promising effective control of atomic
energy and conventional armaments, without any other changes in So-
viet policies, we would have to consider very carefully whether we
, could accept such agreements. It is unlikely that this problem will
arise.
To the extent that the United States and the rest of the free
world succeed in so building up their strength in conventional forces
and weapons that a Soviet attack with similar forces could be thwarted
tr held, we will gain increased flexibility and can seek agreements on
the various issues in any order, as they become negotiable.
In the third place, negotiation will play a pert in the building
up of the strength of the free world, apart from the ideological
strength discussed above. This is most evident in the problems of
Germany, Austria and Japan. In the process of building up strength,
It may be desirable for the free nations, without the Soviet Union,
to conclude separate arrangements with Japan, Western Germany, and
Austria which would enlist the energies and resources of these coun-
tries in support of the free world. This will be difficult unless
It has been demonstrated by attempted negotiation with the Soviet
Union that the Soviet Union is not prepared to accept treaties of
peace which would leave these countries free, under adequate safe-
guards, to Participate in the United Nations and in regional or
broader associations of states consistent with the United Nations'
Charter and providing security and adequate opportunities for the
peaceful development of their political and economic life.
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lrarant-mti.
Te.1.,6.) ?
This demonstrates the importance, from the point of view of ne-
gotiation as well as for its relationship to the building up of the
strength of the free world (see Section D below), of the problem of
closer association--on a regional or a broader basis--among the free
countries.
In conclusion, negotiation is not .a possible separate course of
action but rather a means of gaining support for a program of build-
ing strength, of recording, where necessary and desirable, progress
In the cold war, and of facilitating further progress while helping
to minimize the risks of war. Ultimately, it is our objective to ne-
gotiate a settlement with the Soviet Union (or a successor state or
states) on which the world can place reliance as an enforceable in-
strument of peace. But it is important to emphasize that such a
settlement can only record the progress which the free world will
have made in creating a political and economic system in the world
so successful that the frustration of the Kremlin's design for world
domination will be complete. The analysis in the following sections
indicates that the building of such a system requires expanded and
accelerated progrPris for the carrying out of current policies.
A. The Pirst Course--Continuation of Current Policies, with. Current
and Currently Projected Programs for Carrying out These Policies.
1. Military aspects. On the basis of current programs, the
United States has a large potential military capability but an ac-
tual capability which, though improving, is declining relativelto
the U.S.S.R., particularly in light of its probable fission bomb
capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability. The same
holds true for the free world as a whole relative to the Soviet
world as a whole. If war bteaks out in 1950 or in the next few
years, the United States and its allies, apart from a powerful
atomic blow, will be compelled to conduct delaying actions, while
building up their strength for a general offensive. A frank evalua-
tion of the requirements, to defend the United States and its vital
Interests And to support a vigorous initiative in the cold war, on
the one hand, and of present capabilities, on the other, indicates
that there is a sharp and growing disparity between them.
A review of Soviet policy shows that the military capabili-
ties, actual and potential, of the United States and the rest of the
free world, together with the apparent determination of the free
world to resist further Soviet expansion, have not induced the Krem-
lin to relax its pressures generally or to give up the initiative in
the cold war. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has consistently
pursued a bold foreign policy, modified only when it probing re-
vealed a determination and an ability of the free world to resist
?ancroa.chment upon it. The relative military capabilities of the
free world are declining, with the result that its determination to
resist may also decline and that the security of the United States
and the free world as a whole will be jeopardized.
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41
From the military point of view, the actual and potential capa-
bilities of the United States, given a continuation of current and
projected programs, will become less and less effective as a war de-
terrent. Improvement of the state of readiness will become more and
more important not only to inhibit the launching of war by the Soviet
Union but also to support a national policy designed to reverse the
present ominous trends in international relations. A building up of
the military capabilities of the United States and the free world is
a precondition to the achievement.of the objectives outlined in this
report p.nd to the protection of the United States against disaster.
Fortunately, the United States military establishment has been
developed into a unified and effective force as a result of the pol-
icies laid down by the Congress and the vigorous carrying out of
these policies by the Administration in the fields of both organiza-
tion and economy. It is, therefore, a base upon which increased .
strength can be rapidly built with maximum efficiency and economy.
2. Political Aspects. The Soviet Union is pursuing the initia-
tive in the conflict with the free world. Its atomic capabilities,
together with its successes in the Far East, have led to an increas-
ing confidence on its part and to an increasing nervousness in West-
ern Europe and the rest of the free world. We cannot be sure, of
course, how vigorously the Soviet Union will pursue its initiative,
nor can we be sure of the strength or weakness of the other free
countries in reacting to it. There are, however, ominous signs of
further deterioration in the Far East. There are also some indica-
tions that a decline in morale and confidence in Western Europe may
be expected. In particular, the situation in Germany is unsettled.
Should the belief or suspicion spread that the free nation are not
now able to prevent the Soviet Union from taking, if it chooses, the
military actions outlined in Chapter V, the determination of the
free countries to resist probably would lessen P.nd there would be
an increasing temptation for them to seek a position of neutrality.
?
Politically, recognition of the military implications of a
continuation of present trends will mean that the United States and
especially other free countries will tend to shift to the defensive,
or to follow a dangerous policy of bluff, because the maintenance of
a firm initiative in the cold war is closely related to aggregate
strength in being and readily available.
This is largely a problem of the incongruity Of the current ac-
tual capabilities of the free world and the threat to it, for the
free world has an economic and military potential far superior to
the potential of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The shadow of
Soviet force falls darkly on Western Europe and Asia and supports a
policy of encroachment. The free world lacks adequate means--in the
form of forces in being--to thwart such expansion locally. The United
States will therefore be confronted more frequently with the dilemma
of reacting totally to.a limited extension of Soviet control Or of
not reacting at all (except with ineffectual protests and half meas-
ures). Continuation of present trends is likely to lead, therefore,
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to a gradual withdrawal under the direct or indirect pressure of the
Soviet Union, until we discover one day that we have sacrificed posi-
tions of vital interest. In other words, the United States would
have chosen, by lack of the necessary decisions and actions, to fall
back to isolation in the Western Hemisphere. This course would at
best result in only a relatively brief truce and would be ended
either by our capitulation or by a defensive war--on unfavorable
terms from unfavorable positions--against a Soviet Empire comprising
all or most of-Eurasia. - (See Section B.)
3. Economic and social aspects. As was pointed out in Chapter
VI, the present foreign economic policies and programs of the United
States will not produce a solution to the problem of international
economic ecuilibrium, notably the problem of the dollar gap, and will
not create an economic base conducive to political stability in any
important free countries.
The European Recovery Program has been successful in assisting
the restoration and expansion of production in Western Europe and has
been a major factor in checking the dry rot of Communism in Western
Europe. However, little progress has been made toward the resumption
by Western Europe of a position of influence in world affairs commen-
surate with its potential strength. Progress in this direction will
require integrated political, economic and military policies and pro-
grams, which are supported by the United States and the Western Euro-
pean countries and which will probably require a deeper participation
by the United States than has been contemplated.
?!The Point TV Program and other assistance programs will not
adequately supplement, as now projected, the efforts of other import-
ant countries to develop effective institutions, to improve the ad-
ministration of their affairs, and to achieve a sufficient measure
of economic development. The moderate regimes now in power in many
countries, like India, Indontsia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, will
Srobably be unable to restore or retain their popular support and au-
thority unless they are assisted in bringing about a more rapid im-
provement of the economic and social structure than present programs
will make possible.
The Executive Branch is now undertaking a study of the prob-
leth of the United States balance of payments and of the measures which
might be taken by the United States to assist in establishing interna-
tional economic eauilibrium. This is a very important project and
work on it should have a high priority. However, unless such an eco-
nomic Program is matched and supplemented by an equally far-sighted
and vigorous political and military program, we will not be success-
ful in checking and rolling back the Kremlin's drive.
4. Neotiation. In short, by continuing along its present course
the free world will not-succeed in making effective use of its vastly
superior political, -economic, and military potential to build a
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tolerable state of order among nations. On the contrary, the polit-
ical, economic, and military situation of the free world is already
' unsatisfactory and will become less favorable unless we act to re-
verse present trends.
This situation is one which militates against successful ne-
gotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms of agreements on important
pending -issues would reflect present realities and .would therefore be
unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of
the free world. Unless a decision had been made and action undertaken.
to build up the strength, in the broadest sense, of the United States
and the free world, an attempt to negotiate a general settlement on
terms acceptable to us would be ineffective and probably long drawn
out, and might thereby seriously delay the necessary measures to
build up our strength.
This is true despite the fact that the United States now has
the capability of delivering a powerful blow against the Soviet Union
in the event of war, for one of the present realities is that the
United States is not prepared to threaten the use of our present
atomic superiority to coerce the Soviet Union into acceptable agree-
ments. In light of present trends, the Soviet Union will not with-
draw and the only conceivable basis for a general settlement would
be spheres of influence and of no influence--a "settlement" which the
Kremlin could readily exploit to its greet advantage. The idea that
Germany or Japan or other important areas can exist as islands of
neutrality in a divided world is unreal, given the Kremlin design
for world domination,
B. The Second Course--Isolation.
Continuation of present trends, it has been shown above, Will lead
Progressively to the withdrawal of the United States from most of its
present commitments in Europe and Asia and. to our isolation in the
Western Hemisphere and its approaches. This would result not from a
conscious decision but from a failure to take the actions necessary
to bring our capabilities into line with our commitments and thus to
a withdrawal under pressure. This pressure might come from our pres-
ent Allies, who will tend to seek other "solutions" unless they have
confidence in our determinaticin to accelerate.our,efforts to build a
successfully functioning political and economic system in the free'
world.
There are some who advocate a deliberate decision to isolate our-
selves. Superficially, this has some attractiveness as a -course of
action, for it appears to bring our commitments and capabilities into
harmony by reducing the former and by concentrating our .present, or
perhaps even reduced, military expenditures on the defense of the
United States.
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4,
This argument overlooks the relativity of capabilities. With the
United States in an isolated position, we would have to face the prob-
ability that the Soviet Union would quickly dominate most of Eurasia,
probably without meeting armed resistance. It would thus acquire a
potential far superior to our own, and would promptly proceed to de-
velop this potential with the purpose of eliminating our power, which
wo:Ild,even in isolation, remain as a challenge to it and as an 'ob:
stacle to the imposition of its kind of order in the world. There is
no way to make ourselves inoffensive to the Kremlin except by complete
submission to its will. Therefore isolation would in the end condemn
us to capitulate or to fight alone and on the defensive, with drastic-
ally limited offensive and retaliatory capabilities in comparison with
the Soviet Union. (These are the only possibilities, unless we are
prepared to risk the future on the hazard that the Soviet Empire, be-
cause of over-extension or other reasons, will spontaneously destroy
itself from within.)
The argument also overlooks the imponderable, but nevertheless
drastic, effects on our belief in ourselves and in our way of life of
a deliberate decision to isolate ourselves. As the Soviet Union came
to dominate free countries, it is clear that many Americans would
feel a deep sense of responsibility and guilt for having abandoned
their former friends and allies. As the Soviet Union mobilized the
resources of Eurasia, increased its relative military capabilities,
and hei-htened its threat to our security, some would be tempted to
accept 1)eace on its terms, while many would seek to defend the?
, United States by creating a regimented systet which would permit
- the assignment of a tremendous part of our resources to defense.
Under such a state of affairs our national morale would be corrupted
and the integrity and vitality of our system subverted.
Under this course.of action, there would be no negotiation, unless
Ipla the Kremlin's terms, for we would have given up everything of im-
portance.
It is possible that at some point in the course of isolation,
many Americans would come to favor a surprise attack on the .Soviet
Union and the area under its control, in a desperate attempt to alter
decisively the balance of power by an overwhlming blow with modern
weapons of mass destruction. It appears unlikely that the Soviet
Union would wait for slich an attack before launching. one of its own.
But even if it did and even if our attack were successful, it is
clear that the United States, would face appalling tasks in establish-
ng a tolerable state of order among nations after such a war and
after Soviet occupation of all or most of Eurasia for some years.
Th-ese tasks appear so enormous and success so unlikely that .mason
dictates an attempt to achieve our objectives by other means.
C. The Third Course--War.
Some Americans favor a deliberate decision to go to war against
the Soviet Union in the near future.. It goes without saying that the.
idea of "preventive" war--in the sense of a military attack not
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provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies--is generally un-
acceptable to Americans. Its supporters argue that since the Soviet
Union is in fact at war with the free world now and that since the
failure of the Soviet Union to use all-out military force is explain-
able on grounds of expediency, we are at war and should conduct our-
selves accordingly. Some further argue that the free world is prob-
ably unable, except under the crisis of war, to mobilize and direct
its resources to the checking and rolling back of the Kremlin's drive.
for world dominion. This is a powerful argument in the light of his-
tory, but the considerations against war are so compelling that the
free world must demonstrate that this argument is wrong. The case for
war is premised on the assumption that the United States could launch
and sustain an attack of sufficient impact to gain a decisive advan-
tage for the free world in a long war and perhaps to win an early
decision.
? The ability of the United States to launch effective offensive op-
erations is now limited to attack with atomic weapons. A powerful
blow could be delivered upon the Soviet Union, but it is estimated
that these operations alone would not force or induce the Kremlin to
capitulate and that the Kremlin wotild still be able to use the forces
under its control to dominate most or all of Eurasia. This would
probably mean a long and difficult strugg'.0 during which the free
institutions of Western Europe and many freedom-loving people would
be destroyed and the regenerative capacity of Western Europe dealt a
crippling blow.
Apart from this, however, a surprise attack upon the Soviet Union,
despite the provocativeness of recent Soviet behavior, would be re-
pugnant to many Americans. Although the American people would prob-
ably rally in support of the war effort, the shock of responsibility
for a surprise attack would be morally, corrosive. Many would doubt
that it was a "just war" anc that all reasbnable possibilities for a
peaceful settlement had been explored in good faith. Many more, pro-
portionately, would hold such views in other countries, particularly
in Western Europe and particularly after Soviet occupation, if only
because the Soviet Union would liquidate articulate opponents. It
would, therefore, be difficult after such a war to create a satisfac-
tory international order among nations. Victory in such a .war would
have brought us little If at all closer to victory in the fundamental
Ideological conflict.
These considerations are no less weighty because they are impond-
erable, and they rule out anattack unless it is demonsti'ably in the
nature of a counter-attack to a blow which is on its way or about to
be delivered. (The military advantages of landing the first blow be-
come increasingly important with modern weapons, and this is a fact
which requires us to be on the alert in order to strike with our full
weight as soon as we are attacked, and, if possible, before the So-
viet blow is actually delivered.) If the argument of Chapter -IV is
accepted, it follows that there is no "easy" solution and that the
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only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by
the steady development of the moral and material strength of the -
free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such away
as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system.
D. The Remaining Course of Action--a Rapid Build-up of _political,
Economdc, and Military Strength in the Free World
A more rapid build-up of political, economic, and military
strength and thereby of confidence in the free world than is now
contemplated is the only course which is consistent with progress
toward achieving our fundamental purpose. The frustration of the
Kremlin design requires the free world to develop a successfully
functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political
offensive against the Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an ad-
equate military shield under which they can develop. It is neces-
sary to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet ex-
pansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-
directed actions of a limited or total character. The potential
strength of the free world is great; its ability to develop these
military capabilities and its will to resist Soviet e'gaansion will
be determined by the wisdom and will with which it undertakes to
meet its political and economic problems.
1. Military aspects. It has been indicated in Chapter VI that
U. S. military capabilities are strategically more defensive in na-
ture than offensive and are more potential than actual. It is evi-
dent, from an analysis of the past and of the trend of weapon devel-
opment, that there is now and will be in the future no absolute de-
fense. The history of war also indicates that a favorable decision
can only be achieved through offensive action. Even a defensive
strategy, if it is to be successful, calls not only. for defensive
forces to hold vital positions while mobilizing and preparing for
the offensive, 'Out also for offensive forces to attack the enemy
and keep him off balance.
The two fundamental requirements which must be met by forces
in being or readily. available .are support of foreign policy and pro-
tection against disaster.' To meet the second requirement, the forces
in being, or readily available must.be able, at a minimum, to perform
certain basic tasks:
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a. To defend the WesternHemisphere and essential allied
areas in order that their war-making capabilities can be de-
veloped;
b. To provide end protect a mobilization base while the
offensive forces required for victory are being built up;
c. To conduct offensive operations to destroy vital el-
ements Of the Soviet war-making capacity, and to keep the
enemy off balance until the full offensive strength of the
United States and its allies can be'brought to bear;
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d. To defend and maintain the lines of communication. -
and base areas necessary to the execution of the above
tasks; and
. e. To provide such aid to allies as.is essential to
the execution of their role in the above tasks.
In the broadest terms, the ability to perform thee tasks
requires a built-up of military strength by the United States and
its allies to a point at which the combined strength will be super-
ior for at least these tasks, both initially And throughout a -
war, to the forces that can be brought to bear by the Soviet Union
and its satellites. In specific terms, it is not essential to match
item for item with the Soviet Union, but to provide an adequate de-
fense against air attack on the United States and C-nada and an ad-
equate defense against air and surface attack, on the United Kingdom
and Western Europe, Alaska, the Western Pacific, Africa, and the
Near and Middle East, and on the long lines of communication to
these areas. Furthermore, it is mandatory that in building up our
strength, we enlarge upon our-technical superiority by an acceler-
ated exploitation of the scientific potential of the United States
and our allies.
?
Forces of this size and character are necessary not only for
protection against disaster but also to support our foreign policy.
In fact, it can be argued that larger forces in being and readily
available are necessary to inhibit a would-be aggressor than to pro-
vide the nucleus of strength and the mobilization base on which the
tremendous forces required for victory can be built. For example,
in both World Wars I and II the ultimate victors had the strength,
in the end, to win though they had not had the strength in being or
readily available to prevent. the outbreak of war. In part, at least,
dthis was because they had not had the military strength on which to
base a strong foreign policy. At any rate, it is clear that a sub-
stantial and rapid building up of strength in the free world is 11,-..-c-
essary to support a firm policy intended to check and to roll back
the Kremlin's drive for world domination.
Moreover, the United States and the other free countries do
not now have the forces in being and readily available to defeat lo-
cal Soviet moves with local-action; but must accept reverses or make
these local moves the occasion for war--for which we are not prepared..
This situation makes for great uneasiness among our allies, particu-
larly in Western Europe, for whom total war means, initially, Soviet
occupation. Thus, unless our combined strength is rapidly increased,
our allies will tend to become increasingly reluctant to support a
firm foreign policy on our part and increasingly anxious toseek
other solutions, even though they are aware that appeasement means
defeat. An Important advantage in adopting the fourth course of ac-
tion lies in its psychological impact--the revival of confidence and
hope in. the future. It is recognized, of course, that any announce-
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ment of the recommended course of action could be exploited by the
Soviet Union in its peace campaign and would have adverse psycho-
logical effects in certain parts of the free world until the neces-
sary increase in strength had been achieved. Therefore, in any an-
nouncement of policy and in the character of the measures adopted,
emphasis should be given to the essentially defensive character and
care should be taken to minimize, so far as possible, unfavorable
domestic and foreign reactions.
2. Political and economic aspects. The immediate objectives--
to the achievement of which such a build-up of strength is a neces-
sary though not a sufficient condition--are a renewed initiative in
the cold war and a situation to which the Kremlin would find it ex-
pedient to accommodate itself, first by relaxing tensions and pres-
sures and then by gradual withdrawal. The United States cannot alone
provide the resources required for such a build-up of strength. The
other free countries must carry their part of the burden, but their
ability and determination to do it will depend on the action the
United States takes to develop its own strength and on the adequacy
of its foreign political and economic policies. Improvement in po-
litical and economic conditions in the free world, as has been em-
phasized above, is necessary as a basis for building up the will
and the means to resist and for dynamically affirming the integrity
and vitality of our free and democratic way of life on which our
ultimate victory depends.
At the same time, we should take dynamic steps to reduce the
power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other
areas under its control. The objective would be the establishment
of friendly regimes not under Kremlin domination. Such action is
essential to engage the Kremlin's attention, keen it off balance
and force an increased expenditure of Soviet resources in counter-
action: In other words, it would be the current Soviet cold war
technique used against.the Soviet Union.
A program for rapidly building up strength and improving po-
litical and economic conditions will place heavy demands on our
courage and intelligence; it will be costly; it will be dangerous.
But half-measures will be more costly and more dangerous, for they
will be inadequate to prevent and may actually invite war. . Budget-
ary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact
that our very independence as a nation may be at stake.
A comprehensive and decisive program to win the peace and
frustrate the Kremlin design should be so designed that it can be
sustained for as long as necessary to achieve our national object-
ives. It would probably involve:
? (1) The development of an adequate political and eco-
nomic framework for the achievement of our long-range ob-
? jectives.
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? (2) A substantial increase in expenditures for military -
purposes adequate to meet the requirements for the tasks.
listed in Section D-1..
(3) A substantial increase in military assistance pro-
grams, designed to foster cooperative efforts, which will
adequately and efficiently meet the requirements of our al-
lips for the tasks referred to in Section D-1-e.
(4) Some increase in economic assistance programs and
recognition of the need to continue these programs until
their purposes have been accomplished.
(5) A concerted attack on the problem of the United
States balance of payments, along the lines already approved
by the President.
(6) Development of programs designed to build and main-
tain confidence among other peoples in our strength and res-
olution, and to wage overt psychological warfare calculated
to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to
frustrate the Krt.mlin design in other ways.
(7) Intensification of affirmative and timely measures
and operations by covert means in the fields of economic war-
fare and political and psychological warfare with a view to
fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected stra-
tegic satellite countries.
(8) Development of internal security and civilian de-
fense programs.
(9) Improvement and intensification of intelligence
activities. '
(10) Reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other
than defense and foreign assistance) if necessary by the de-
ferment of certain desirable programs.
(11) Increased taxes.
Essential as prerequisites to the success of this program
*would be (a) consultations with Congressional leaders designed to
make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support,-
and (b) a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the
facts and implications of present international trends.
The program will be costly, but it is relevant to recall the
disproportion between the, potential capabilities of the Soviet and
non-Soviet worlds (cf. Chapters V and VI). The Soviet Union is cur-
rently devoting about 40 percent of available resources (gross
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national product plus reparations, equal in 1949 to about $65 billion) ?
to military expenditures (14 percent) and to investment (26 percent),
much of which is in war-supporting industries. In an emergency the
Soviet Union could increase the allocation of resources to these pur-
poses to about 50 percent, or by one-fourth.
The United States is currently devoting about 22 percent of
its .gross national product ($255 billion in 1949) to military expend-
itures (6 percent), foreign assistance (2 percent), and investment.
(14 Percent), little of which is in war-supporting industries. (As
was Pointed out in Chapter V, the "fighting value" obtained per dol-
lar of expenditure by the Soviet Union considerably exceeds that ob-
tained by the United States, primarily because of the extremely low
military and civilian living standards in the soviet Union.) In an
emergency the United States could devote upward of 50 percent of its
gross national product to these purposes (as it did during the last
war), an increase of several times present expenditures for direct
and indirect military purposes and foreign assistance.
From the point of view of the economy as a whole, the program
might not result in a real decrease in the standard of living, for
? the economic effects of the program might be to increase the gross
national product by more than the amount being absorbed for additional
military and foreign assistance purposes. One of the most significant
lessons of our World War II experience was that the American economy,
when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide
2normous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while
, simultaneously providing a high standard of living. After allowing
for price changes, personal consumption expenditures rose by about
- one-fifth between 1939 and 1944, even though the economy had in the
meantime increased the amount of resources going into Government use
by $60-$65 billion (in 1939 prices).
This comparison between the potentials of the Soviet Union
land the United States also holds true for the Soviet world and the
free world and is of fundamental importance in considering the courses
of action open to the United States.
The comparison gives renewed emphasis to the fact that the
z,roblems faced by the free countries in their efforts to build a suc-
cessfully functioning system lie not so much in the field of econom-
ics as in the field of politics. The building of such a system may -
require more rapid progress toward the closer association of the free
countries in harmony with the concept of the United Nations. It is
clear that our long-range objectives require a strengthened United
Nations, or a succesSor organization, to which the world can look for
the maintenance of peace and order in a system based on freedom and
justice. It also seems clear that a unifying ideal of this kind
might awaken and arouse the latent spiritual energies of free men
everywhere and obtain their enthusiastic support for a positive pro-
gram for peace going far beyond the frustration of the Kremlin design
r.
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t:
and opening vistas to the future that would outweigh short-run
sacrifices.
The threat to the free world involved in the development
of the Soviet Union's atomic and other capabilities will rise
steadily and rather rapidly. For the time being, the United States
possesses a marked atomic superiority over, the Soviet Union which,
together with the potential capabilities of the United States and
other free countries in other forces and weapons, inhibits aggress-
ive Soviet action. This provides an opportunity for the United
States, in cooperation with other free countries, to launch' a
build-up of strength which sill support a firm policy directed to
the frustration of the Kremlin design. The immediate goal of our
efforts to build a successfully functioning political and economic
system in the free world backed by adequate military strength is
to postpone and avert the disastrous situation which, in light of
the Soviet Union's probable fission bomb capability and possible
thermonuclear bomb capebility, might arise in 1954 on a continua-
tion of our present programs. By acting promptly end vigorously
in such a way that this date is, so to speak, pushed into the
future, we would permit time for the process of accommodation,
withdrawal and frustration to produce the necessary changes in
the Soviet system. Time is short, however, and the risks of war
attendant upon a decision to build up strength will steadily in-
crease the longer we defer it.
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CONCLUSIONS ANP RECORMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing anSlysis iftdicates that the probable fission bomb
capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet
Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of
the United States. This threat is of the same character as that de-
scribed in NSC 20/4 (approved by the President on November 24, 1948)
but is more immediate than had previously been estimated. In par-
ticular, the United States now faces the contingency that within the
next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military
capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight
that the United States must have substantially increased general
air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and ci-
vilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance,
In the event of war, that it could survive ?the initial blow and go
on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. In turn, this con-
tingency requires the intensification of our efforts in the fields
of intelligence and research and development.
Allowing for the immediacy of the danger, the following state-
ment of Soviet threats, contained in NSC 20/4, remains valid:
"14. The gravest threat to the security of the United
States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile
designs and formidable power of the U.S.S.R., and from the
nature of the Soviet system.
???
"15. The political, economic, and psychological warfare
which the U.S.S.R. is now waging has dangerous potentialities
for weakening the relative world position of the United States
and disrupting its traditional institutions by means short of
-war, unless sufficient resistance is encountered in the poli-
cies of this and other non-communist countries.
"16. The risk of war with the U.S.S.R. is sufficient to
warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation
by the United States.
a. Even though present estimates indicate that the
Soviet leaders probably do not intend deliberate armed ac-
tion involving the United States at this time, the possi-
bility of such deliberate resort to war cannot be ruled
out.
itb. Now and for
continuing danger that
viet miscalculation Of
rrsc 69
the
war
the
- 6o -
foreseeable future there is a
will arise either through So-
determination of the United
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States to use all the means at its command to safeguard
its security, through Soviet misinterpretation of our in-
tentions, or through U. S. miscalculation of Soviet reac-
tions to measures which we might take.
17. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia,
whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and sub-
versive means, 'would be strategically and politically unaccept-
able to the United States.
"18. The capability of the United States either in peace
or in the event of war to cope with threats to its security or
to gain its objectives would be severely weakened by internal
developments, important among which are:
"a. Serious espionage, subversion and sabotage, par-
ticularly by concerted and well-directed communist activity.
"b. Prolonged or exaggerated economic instability.
c. Internal political and social disunity.
? "d. Inadequate or excessive armament or foreign aid
expenditures.
I I
e. An excessive or wasteful usage of our resources
in time of peace.
"f. Lessening of U. S. prestige and influence
through vacillation or appeasement or lack of skill and
imagination in the conduct of its foreign policy or by
shirking world responsibilities.
4 HE. Development of a false sense of security through
a deceptive change in Soviet tactics."
Although such developments as those indicated in paragraph 18
above would severely weaken the capability of the United Sta.:es and
Its allies to cope with the Soviet threat to their security, consid-
erable progress has been made since 1948 in laying the foundation
which adequate strength can now be rapidly built.
The Analysis also confirms that our objectives with respect to
the Soviet Union, in time of peace as well as in time of war, as
stated in NSC 20/4 (para. 19), are still valid, as are the aims and
measures stated therein (paras. 20 and 21). Our current security
programs and strategic plans are based upon these objectives, aims,
and measures:
H19.
IIa. To reduce the power and influence of the
U.S.S.R..to limits which no longer constitute 'a threat
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to the peace, national independence and stability of the
world family of nations.
"b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of
international relations by the government in power in Rus-
sia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth
in the U. N. Charter.
"In pursuing these objectives, due care must be taken to
avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental
values and institutions inherent in our way of life.
20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives
by methods short of war through the pursuit of the following
aims:
tta. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction
of undue- Russian power and influence from the present pe-
rimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and
the emergence of the satellite countries as entities in-
dependent of the U.S.S.R.
"b. To encourage the development among the Russian
peoples of attitudes which may help to modify current So-
viet behavior and permit a revival of the national life of
groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve
and maintain national independence.
41.?
"c. To eradicate the myth by which people remote
from Soviet military influence are held in a position of
subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to
see and understand the true nature of the U.S.S.R. and the
Soviet-directed world communist party, and to adopt a log-
ical and realistic attitude toward them. ?
"d. To create situations which will compel the So-
viet Government to recognize the practical undesirability
of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the
necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of in-
ternational conduct, as set forth in the purposes and
principles of the U. N. Charter.
"21. Attainment of these aims requires that the United
States:
NSC 68
IIa. Develop a level of Military readiness which can
be maintained as long as necessary.as a deterrent to Soviet
aggression, as indispensable support to our political atti-
tude toward the U.S.S.R., as a source of encouragement to
nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an
adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for
rapid mobilization Should war prove unavoidable.
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"b. Assure the internal security of the. United States
against dangersof sabotage, subversion, and espionage.
c. Maximize our economic potential, including the
strengthening of our peacetime economy and the establish-
ment of essential reserves readily available in the event
of war.
"d. Strengthen the orientation toward the United
States of the non-Soviet nations; and help such of those
nations as are able and willing to make an important con-
tribution to U. S. security, to increase their economic
and political stability and their military capability.
e. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure
of power and particularly on the relationships between Mos-
cow and the satellite countries.
f. Keep the U. S. public fully informed and cogniz-
ant of the threats to our national security so that it will
be prepared to support the measures which we must accord-
ingly adopt.".
In the light of present and prospective Soviet atomic capabili-
ties, the action which can be taken under present programs and plans,
however, becomes dangerously inadequate, in both timing and scope, to
accomplish the rapid progress toward the attainment of the United
: States political, economic, and military objectives which is now im-
perative...
A continuation of present trends would result in a serious de-
cline in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union
jand its satellites. This unfavorable trend arises from the inade-
auacy of current programs and plans rather than from any error in our
objectives and aims. These trends lead in the direction of isolation,
not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a
vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.
Our position as the center of power in the free world places a
heavy responsibility' upon the United States for leadership. We must
organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a
positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design -
for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to
-
which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a coop-
erative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make grad-
ual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we
have sacrificed positions of vital interest.
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c.
It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more
rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the
United States and the other nations of the free world. The anal-
ysis shows that this will be costly and will involve significant
domestic financial and economic adjustments.
The execution of such a build-up, however, requires that the
United States have an affirmative program beyond the solely defens-
ive one of countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This
Program must light the path to peace and order among nations in a
system based on freedom and justice, as contemplated in the Charter
of the United Nations. Further, it must envisage the political and
economic measures with which and the military shield behind which
the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the strat-
egy of the cold war; for every consideration of devotion to our fun-
damental values and to our national security demands that we achieve
our objectives by the strategy of the cold war, building up our mil-
itary strength in order that it may not have to be used. The only
sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the
steady development of the moral and material strength of the free
world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to
bring about an internal change in the Soviet system. Such a posi-
tive program--harmonious with our fundamental nn.tional purpose and
our objectives--is necessary if we are to regain and retain the
initiative and to win and hold the necessary popular support and
cooperation in the United States and the rest of the free world.
This program should include a plan for negotiation with the So-
viet Union, developed and agreed with our allies and which is conso-
nant.with our objectives. The United States and its allies, partic-
ularly the United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to ne-
gotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our object-
ives. The present world situation, however, is one which militates
.'against successful negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms of
agreements on important pending issues would reflect present reali-
ties and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the
United States and the re.t of the free world. After a decision and
a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made,
it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initia-
tive in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate
the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation.
Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable
terms or its bad faith in observing them would assist in-consolidat-
ing popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures
necessary to sustain the build-up.
- In summary, we must,Apy means of a rapid and sustained build-up
of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world,
and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initia-
tive from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of
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the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the
Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is
the only means short of war which eventudly may force the Kremlin
to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable
agreements on issues of Major impertance.
The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on
recognition by this Government,, the American people, and all free
peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the sur-
vival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to
success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to
make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support,
and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts
and imolications of the present international situation. The pros-
ecution of the program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacri-
fice, and unity demanded by the vital imporcance of the issue and
the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been
attained.
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