RECENT DI BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ ON HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY UNITA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030020-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 31, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

STAT
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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL This Information has been Authorized for
Release to.
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PAGE 9
LEVEL 1 - 6 OF 11 STORIES
Copyright 1989 The New York Times Company;
The New York Times
March 12, 1989, Sunday, Late City Final Edition
SECTION: Section 1; Part 1, Page .9, Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 565 words
HEADLINE: A ONETIME BACKER ACCUSES SAVIMBI
BYLINE: By CRAIG R. WHITNEY, Special to the New York Times
DATELINE: LONDON, March 11
BODY:
Allegations that Jonas Savimbi, head of an American-supported guerrilla
movement in Angola, has murdered and tortured high-ranking political rivals over
the years are _"substantially true," Fred Bridgland, a British authority and
longtime supporter of the movement, asserted tonight.
Mr. Bridgland, a journalist who has spent long periods with Mr. Savimbi in
the field and wrote a book describing him as the best hope for democracy in the
former Portuguese colony, did not explicitly renounce him.
But he said at the end of a documentary broadcast on Britain's Independent
Television Network, "I think one can only draw one's own conclusions."
In the program, two guerrillas formerly loyal to Mr. Savimbi who have sought
asylum in London said that relatives who had high positions in the movement had
been accused of witchcraft, sentenced to death, and beaten lifeless or shot on
his orders. Mr. Savimbi leads the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola, or Unita.
One of those interviewed also described the burning of an entire family as
witches at a public bonfire in the Unita headquarters at Jamba in September
1983. The New York Times on Friday reported many of the same charges, made by
other defectors from the rebel movement interviewed in Portugal and Sweden.
Mr. Bridgland's support for them is important, since his book, "Jonas
Savimbi: A Key to Africa," published in 1986, is highly supportive of Mr.
Savimbi.
Help From Friends
The rebels, who are battling the forces of the Soviet-supported Marxist
Government of Angola as Cuban troops supporting the Government are being
withdrawn, have been receiving military aid from the Central Intelligence
Agency
Mr. Bridgland described his attempt to determine whether the former
Washington representative of Unita, Tito Chingunji, was being held against his
will in Jamba. The program said Mr. Bridgland visited Mr. Chingunji there just
before Christmas and found him "looking extremely nervous."
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PAGE 10
1 1989 The New York Times, March 12, 1989
"From sources I do trust very much," he said, "I've heard that there was a
kind of trial, and that four very senior members of the Unita Politburo
demanded of Tito that he confess to crimes of witchcraft and plotting to
overthrow Savimbi. People who were there have told me privately that they heard
screams. And I think one can only draw one's own conclusions from that kind of
description."
Dinho Chingunji, Tito Chingunji's nephew and a student who sought political
asylum in Britain three weeks ago, described how the head of the clan and a
founder of the rebels, Jonatao ChinThey were beaten to death, he said, after the
older man accused Mr. Savimbi of organizing the killings of two of his other
sons who had also been Unita heroes, David and Samuel Chingunji.
After the confrontation, he said, Mr. Savimbi "went berserk, started
screaming for help, saying that the Chingunjis were again using witchcraft on
him, they were trying to kill him, so the following day they were caught and
beaten up." He said this happened in 1979.
Sousa Jamba, described as the brother of Mr. Savimbi's current minister of
education, described the public burning of witches in Jamba in 1983 and said
his sisters and nieces had seen it. "Savimbi too, he saw everything, and one of
the women tried to escape and Savimbi pulled that famous ivory pistol of his,"
he said, forcing her back into the flames.
SUBJECT: CIVIL WAR AND GUERRILLA WARFARE; BRUTALITY CHARGES
NAME: WHITNEY, CRAIG R; SAVIMBI, JONAS; BRIDGLAND, FRED
GEOGRAPHIC: ANGOLA
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NOUTINO AND TRANbm I I ma. _
M
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,
building, Agency/Post
Director of rican and
.1 is.
. De
ut
Director for Intelligence
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Executive Registry
Director of Central Intelligence
Action 11113111
Approval II For Clearance II
As Requested II For Correction III
ISEMEM For Your Information III
Comment II investigate III
111=11111
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Note
REMARKS
DO
and Return
Per Conversation
Prepare Reply
See Me
Signature
NO use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions
Room No.?Bldg.
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eputy Chief, Africa Division, ALA
OPTIONAL FOR-41111001.
prescribed by GSA
FPIAR (41 CFR) 101-11.20e
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* Government Printing Office: 1987-181-246/60000
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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(Security Classification)
ITROL NO
OF
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(Security Classification)
STAT
STAT
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Wishington. D. C. 20505
The Honorable Stephen Solarz
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. Solarz:
ER 89-1129
March 14, 1989
Thanks for joining us for breakfast. I'm sorry I had to
leave early to go to the White House, but I hope you understand.
I was told that you raised a question about our approach
to responding to questions during briefing or testimony. I
want you to know that I take such matters very seriously and
that one of the first things I did upon coming to this agency
was to establish clear guidelines for providing information to
the oversight committees and to the Congress. I am enclosing a
copy of our guidelines and hope that you will take a few
minutes to look them over. You will see that the key is
absolute fidelity to truth and an earnest attempt to answer the
question no matter how inartfully it is posed. If questions
are raised on subjects which we do not believe should be
answered in a particular forum, our employees are directed to
explain that they are not authorized to answer such questions,
but that they will report the question to Headquarters and an
appropropriate response will be forthcoming. In this way, we
work the problem between the Agency, the committee and its
staff until we can reach a satisfactory accommodation.
Sometimes it ends up as a matter between the DCI and the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, but always the goal is to
satisfy your needs and protect my responsibilities for sources
and methods. We will not try to duck the question by
construing it narrowly or implying that we do not know the
answer. I believe this approach has worked well and I hope you
will let me know if you ever have any reason to believe it is
not being followed.
With best wishes,
Enclosure
Distribution:
0-H/C by DCI
1-DCI
1-DDCI
1-0CA
Sincerely,
1,3
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
-2 og Pr
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GUIDELINES FOR CONTACTS WITH CONGRESS
As a CIA official in contact with the Congress, you will
be called upon to ensure that our obligation is met to present
information which is both candid and complete. In meeting this
obligation, you are fulfilling our compact with the Congress to
provide needed information, while ensuring that the responsibility
of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence
sources and methods is met and that Agency guidelines are
respected. The Agency by law is obliged to keep the intelligence
oversight committees fully and currently informed of all
intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated
intelligence activities.
Speaking before the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference in
Colorado Springs on 18 July 1987, the Director of Central
Intelligence commented on relations with Congress as follows:
In our relationship with the Congress,
I believe it is important for us to recognize
that it must be one of truth and not of
deception. There is so much confusion about
deniability and deception coming over the
television tubes that I think that it's
important to make one legitimate distinction.
In covert activity there is often deception to
conceal the source of the activity in order to
influence through means that we believe to be
appropriate but which must necessarily be
covert. But in dealing with the Congress
there is absolutely no excuse for deception.
There will be occasions, / believe--and I told
the Congress this in my testimony--when I did
not believe that I was in a position to
respond to a particular question, particularly
if it were one in open session. But I believe
it is possible to tell the Members of
Congress--and I have done so on occasion--that
I am not at liberty to answer the question,
that I have an answer but I cannot give it.
That is a lot different than trying to answer
the question narrowly when I know what the
Congress wants to hear from me, and pretending
that they have failed to ask the question
accurately enough.
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The gist of the Agency's approach to Congressional
testimony and briefings can be summed up in the four C's:
Candor, Correction, Completeness and.Consistency. Each of them
is important and should be kept in mind when appearing before
Congress.
--Candor. Both during and after formal
testimony, briefings, or other contacts with
Congress, it remains the responsibility of the
Agency official to ensure that the information
presented to Congress is to the best of our
knowledge true and accurate. If there is
uncertainty as to the correct facts in a
particular case, the official should so state
candidly with a pledge to report the full and
correct facts as soon as possible.
--Corrections. If the official has
supplied incorrect information or omitted
needed information, he or she is obligated to
correct the record. There are a number of
methods available for correcting the record
including submission of supplementary
information either orally or in writing, or in
cases where official testimony has been given,
correction of the official transcript or
requests to testify again on the same
subject.
--Completeness. It is not enough that
testimony be accurate; it must also be
complete. Agency officials should not respond
to a question with the narrowest possible
answer. Instead, keeping in mind the
protection of sources and methods and other
issues identified in these guidelines, Agency
officials should be forthcoming in responding
to a question and should attempt to answer it
with an informative, complete answer. The
Agency's collective credibility suffers if the
Congress believes that it "will not get the
right answer if it does not ask the right
question."
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--Consistency. Established principles
or guidelines, not ad hoc arrangements, should
-govern the Agency's response to Congress.
When questions from Members or staff raise
potential issues under these established
guidelines, the Agency official should
identify rather than obscure the points in
dispute. The Director expects that all Agency
officials will respond to questions from
Congress in a manner consistent with the
guidelines given below.
A final note on the four C's. They apply to all
communications with the Congress. Whether the setting is a
formal hearing or an informal briefing with the staff, the four
C's should guide your responses. They cover opening statements
and written correspondence. And, finally, they apply whether or
not the official is placed under oath. They are an important
part of maintaining the Agency's primary asset with the
Congress--its credibility.
The following set of guidelines has been prepared to
assist Agency officials in contacts with the Congress. Like the
four C's, the guidelines apply to formal testimony before a
specific committee, briefings for individual Members or staff,
requests for written responses and more casual contact. This
guidance is not intended to anticipate every possible situation
that might arise. Officers from the Office of Congressional
Affairs, who accompany Agency officials during most contacts with
Congress, will provide additional guidance as needed. The terms
"intelligence oversight committees" and "oversight committees"
used in these guidelines refer to the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations
Defense Subcommittees.
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. I
OBLIGATIONS OF SUPPORTING BRIEFERS
Each Agency official has the primary responsibility for
ensuring that his or her testimony or briefing is truthful and
accurate. Although not actually speaking, supporting officials
should assist the principal spokesman in avoiding misstatements,
mistakes and gaps. Such assistance may be provided by passing
messages in an unobtrusive fashion to the principal spokesman or
privately conferring during breaks in the proceedings or after
the proceedings. Supporting officials should respond to
questions that are either posed directly to them or referred by
the principal spokesman in accordance with these guidelines.
ANALYTICAL VERSUS OPERATIONAL INFORMATION
There is a clear distinction between analytical
information provided by analysts and operational information
provided by operations officers. While analytical information is
generally provided to any committee or Member of the Congress
with a legitimate reason for requesting information, operational
information such as electronic surveillance, counterintelligence,
collection and undisclosed participation is provided only to
oversight committees.
If analysts are pressed for operational information during
a briefing before non-oversight committees, they should point out
that such discussions are handled under guidelines established
for dealings with the oversight committees. If necessary, an
Office of Congressional Affairs representative will intervene to
ensure that these ground rules are observed.
For
portraying
their
their
part,
views
operations officers should avoid
as representing the Agency's analytical
judgments.
When
asked
for such assessments, operations officers
should indicate that the Office of Congressional Affairs will be
happy to set up an appropriate briefing on the analytical
questions being asked.
POLICY ANALYSIS VERSUS POLICY PRESCRIPTION
Agency officials should not comment directly on the merits
of U.S. foreign policy and should attempt to avoid, where
possible, offering personal opinions on whether such policy will
work. They may discuss variables to consider in maximizing
4
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policy outcomes. They may outline possible policy alternatives
and assess factors affecting the likelihood of achieving policy
goals. They may also discuss how foreign governments might react
to various U.S. actions.
MULTIPLE AGENCY APPEARANCES
Policy agencies enunciate policy; intelligence agencies
provide analysis. We make every effort to avoid scheduling
intelligence briefings jointly with policy briefings. Normally
an Agency--or Intelligence Community--briefing will precede
committee discussions with State or Defense policy officials and.
the intelligence briefers will depart, if possible, before the
policy briefing begins. The Office of Congressional Affairs has
the responsibility for ensuring that, where possible, Agency
briefers are not pitted against policy briefers. Differences of
views among intelligence briefers, however, should be clearly
explained. Note: Covert action briefings before oversight
committees are an exception. In this case, officials from policy
agencies are normally present to discuss the reasons for the
covert action while the Agency briefers discuss implementation of
the policy.
THIRD AGENCY RULE
Agency officials should not provide documents from other
agencies or discuss the analytical products of other agencies
unless: (a) such documents and products are already published
and available to the Congress; or (b) the originating agency has
given prior approval.
BRIEFINGS ON PARTISAN OR CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
Officials should exercise caution in giving classified
briefings on subjects that are a current matter of partisan
dispute, especially when a vote is about to take place in the
Congress or the Member being briefed has scheduled a press
appearance on the issue. It remains the responsibility of the
Office of Congressional Affairs to apprise briefers when such
factors exist.
5
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STAT
COMMITTEE ACCESS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTS
As a general matter, the Agency does not provide to
Congress copies of reports prepared by the Office of Inspector
General on the grounds that these are internal management
documents generated solely for the Director of Central
Intelligence. Confidentiality is an essential aspect of the
Inspector General's function and must be maintained. Employees
and others are encouraged to consult with the Inspector General,
especially on suspected illegal or unethical activities, and
their identities must be protected to the extent possible.
The Director of Central Intelligence may grant limited
exceptions to this rule on occasions when the Inspector General
has conducted a special investigation into allegations of
possible illegal or improper conduct by Agency personnel in areas
of particular Congressional interest. On such occasions, access
is limited to Members or selected staff of the intelligence
oversight committees, or special investigative committees.
Requests for Inspector General reports must be made in writing by
the Chairman of an oversight or special investigative committee.
No Agency witness should promise access to an Inspector General
report unless he or she has been authorized to do so by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
REVIEW OF AGENCY PERSONNEL, SECURITY AND MEDICAL RECORDS
The Agency generally will make available personnel and
security records of current and former Agency employees only when
there is a credible allegation of improper or illegal
intelligence activities or when the records are being sought
pursuant to a Congressional investigation. In those instances,
the records will be made available only, to the oversight
committees or special investigative committees. Requests for
6
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4.
such records must be made in a letter from the oversight Member
requesting a record review. The Agency will consider the release
of medical records on a case-by-case basis, but only to a
physician designated and authorized by the employee. A physician
from the Office of Medical Services will, however, brief the
medical history of an employee to an appropriate representative
of an oversight or special investigative committee.
All such requests must be approved by the Director of
Congressional Affairs or higher authority. Since dissemination
to oversight committees of information concerning employees or
former employees in connection with an illegal or improper
intelligence activity on behalf of the Agency is consistent with
the Privacy Act and Executive 12333, it. will not be necessary to
obtain permission of employees for the staff of these committees
to review relevant records.
In situations where there is no allegation of improper or
illegal intelligence activities, the Agency will make available
personnel records to the oversight committees only where there is
a serious and credible allegation of personnel mismanagement.
Requests for personnel records must be made in a letter from an
.oversight committee Member requesting a record review.. The
letter must be accompanied by a properly executed Privacy Act
waiver from the employee.
All such requests must be approved by the Director of
Congressional Affairs or highet authority. An authorized staff
member may review the records for the committee Member, provided
he or she is identified by name in the requesting letter. The
Agency will not permit the examination of either security or
medical files where there is no allegation of improper or illegal
intelligence activities. Where circumstances warrant, the Agency
is willing to brief on the contents of the security file.
SOURCES AND METHODS
Sources are readily described to oversight committees in
general terms--human sources, signals intelligence, imagery,
liaison, .to name the most common ones. Methods are also
described to oversight committees in general terms--surveillance,
technical collection, photography, to name a few general methods
that may be mentioned. Agency officials should not.discuss the
specific sources of intelligence and the specific methods used in
collecting intelligence, except in unusual circumstances and with
advance approval. Such exceptions generally involve cases where
there is credible evidence of illegal or improper activities.
During budget hearings or budget briefings, it will be necessary
to provide the details on the capabilities of some technical
collection systems. In these cases the disclosure of such
information will be reviewed before testimony takes place, if
time allows.
Sources and methods ordinarily are not discussed with
committees or Members that do nop have oversight responsibilities.
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,
FOREIGN LIAISON ACTIVITIES
Agency officials should provide generic descriptions of
liaison relationships with foreign intelligence services to
oversight committees so long as identities and details are
protected. Officials should not disclose the identity of or
details about specific liaison relationships unless required by
law or unless special circumstances exist, such as credible
evidence that a liaison service is involved in illegal or
improper intelligence activity as part of its cooperation with
the Agency. Since a foreign liaison service is considered a
source, the guideline on sources and methods applies to such
contacts.
In such special circumstances, the oversight committees
will be made privy to specific information. Prior approval of
the Deputy Director for Operations and the Director of
Congressional Affairs is required. Foreign liaison activities
ordinarily are not discussed with Members or committees that do
not have oversight responsibilities.
STAT
UNEVALUATED VERSUS FINISHED INTELLIGENCE
The Agency readily provides finished intelligence to
Congress under appropriate controls. The Agency does not provide
unevaluated intelligence to the Congress except in instances
where there are credible allegations of wrongdoing or where the
Congress has initiated investigations of Agency performance.
Only the Director of Congressional Affairs or higher authority
can approve provision of unevaluated intelligence to Congress.
Requests for unevaluated intelligence should be deferred to him.
Unevaluated intelligence reports are sometimes also Called field
information reports or raw reports.
8
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STAT
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INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES
The Agency has a statutory obligation to keep the
oversight committees fully and currently informed of all
intelligence activities. In addition, the Agency has
specifically agreed with respect to collection activities
conducted under the authority of Executive Order 12333 to provide
information related to specific collection techniques. Agency
officials should work closely with the Office of Congressional
Affairs in providing such information.
IDENTITIES OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES UNDER COVER
No Agency employee serving under cover should misrepresent
the true nature of his or her employment status or the employment
status of other persons affiliated with the Agency either when
appearing before a committee or in any direct, non-social
contacts with a Member of Congress. Any employee who believes he
or she may be put in such a situation should contact the Office
of Congressional Affairs as soon as possible.
Generally speaking, however, Agency officials should not
provide the names of Agency employees serving under cover,
especially to a non-oversight committee. An exception to this
practice concerns allegations of illegal or improper intelligence
activities. Such questions should be referred to the Office of
Congressional Affairs. In the case of the oversight committees,
those serving at the level of Directorate of Operations Division
Chief and above are routinely acknowledged. Below that level,
they are handled on a case-by-case basis in consultation with the
Office of Congressional Affairs.
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STAT
REQUESTS FOR HEARINGS AND BRIEFINGS
Requests for appearances at hearings should be submitted
in writing. Requests for briefings may be submitted orally only
when circumstances demonstrate that a written request may not be
feasible or desirable. All such requests must be directed to the
Office of Congressional Affairs and may not be handled directly
by any other Agency officer, except on resource matters which are
the responsibility of the Comptroller's office.
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REQUESTS FOR A CONGRESSIONAL DEBRIEFING
There are instances in which Agency analysts may wish to
obtain from Members or staffers who have recently traveled abroad
informa-tion about conditions in foreign countries and impressions
about the political leadership. Where appropriate, the Office of
Congressional Affairs will approach the Member or staffer and ask
that they meet with country analysts to review their trip. If
such information is eventually used in Agency analysis, the
source of the information will not be identified.
TRANSCRIPTS
With some exceptions, Agency officials should not agree to
the taking of transcripts unless Members of the Congress are
present at a committee briefing or hearing. Briefers should not
consent to the taking of transcripts during staff briefings
without the prior approval of the Office of Congressional Affairs.
PROVISION OF DOCUMENTS
Agency officials should recognize that any documents they
mention will probably be the subject of a request, particularly
those they take to the Hill to use in making their
presentations. When Congressional Members or staff make such
requests, the Office of Congressional Affairs should be
consulted. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees
routinely receive all finished hard-cover intelligence; the
Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs Committees
receive a weekly index of finished intelligence publications from
which they order. Only the Intelligence and Appropriations
Committees are automatically cleared for CIA ORCON material.
TASKING BY CONGRESS
The Agency will readily answer appropriate written or oral
questions submitted by the Congress. Briefers should avoid,
however, unilaterally accepting tasking that entails additional
areas of research and subsequent publication of results. This
caveat applies with equal vigor to operational taskings:
briefers should avoid unilaterally accepting tasking that entails
collection by field stations. Any such tasking should be
referred to the Office of Congressional Affairs.
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PERSONAL STAFF VERSUS COMMITTEE STAFF
The Agency does not ordinarily provide briefings or
publications of a classification higher than Top Secret to
personal staff. Such material may be provided only to
Congressmen or committee staff members who possess appropriate
clearances.
DIRECT CONTACTS WITH CONGRESS
Per Agency regulation, all Agency contacts with the
Congress are handled in coordination with the Office of
Congressional Affairs. Requests for further contact or servicing
of specific requirements arising from sanctioned meetings, except
those on resource-related matters, should be directed to the
Office of Congressional Affairs. The Office of the Comptroller
is responsible for Congressional requirements on Agency resource
matters. Any attempts by Congressional staffers to contact
Agency officers directly on official business should be politely
referred to the Office of Congressional Affairs. The reason for
this regulation is to ensure that Congressional contacts are
coordinated. Also, it ensures that staffers have appropriate
clearances and that information is provided under appropriate
security conditions.
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ROOM H-400, Ll.b. LAPIT01.
? (202) 226-4 121
ItNTHONY CAEILENSON, CALIFORNIA. CHAIRMAN
4DAVE MCCURDY, OKLAHOMA
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER WISCONSIN
ROBERT A. ROE, NEW JERSEY
MATTHEW F. McHUGH, NEW YORK
BERNARD J. DWYER, NEW JERSEY
CHARLES WILSON. TEXAS
BARBARA B. KENNELLY, CONNECTICUT
DAN GLICKMAN. KANSAS
NICHOLAS MAVROULES. MASSACHUSETTS
BILL RICHARDSON. NEW MEXICO
STEPHEN J. SOLAR2. NEW YORK
HENRY J. HYDE. ILLINOIS
DICK CHENEY. WYOMING
BOB LPANGSTON, LOUISIANA
BUD SHUSTER, PENNSYLVANIA
LARRY COMBEST. TEXAS
DOUG BEREUTER. NEBRASKA
JOHN G. ROWLAND, CONNECTICUT
THOMAS S. FOLEY. WASHINGTON, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT M. MICHEL ILLINOIS. EX OFFICIO
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6415
Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
March 6, 1989
THOMAS K. LATIMER. STAFF DIRECTOR
MICHAEL J. O'NEIL CHIEF COUNSEL
THOMAS R. SMEETON. ASSOCIATE COUNSEL
R89-419
ER 89-0979
Dear Judge Webster:
I would like to request partial declassification of the summary of an .
Inspector General which was sent
to the Congress pursuant to requirements under the FY 98 n elligence
Authorization Act. As a result of last week's hearing by the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Evaluation on Inspector General functions, I had occasion to
review the report. I am requesting this declassification action out of a
conviction that the subject information no longer is sensitive and that its
public release would help restore CIA's unfairly tarnished reputation.
The specific passage I am requesting to be declassified reads as follows:
I would greatly appreciate your prompt attention and response in this
matter.
Sincerely yours,
I.A.GsVZ1
Doug Bereut r
Member
Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation
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ORIG: OCA/H
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - DDCI-D
MVO
1 - DDO
1 - D/OCA
1 - OCA Record
1 - JCW Chrono
:10 Mar 89) 25X1
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