DCI/DDCI MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN BEILENSON AND MR. HYDE OF THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (HPSCI) ON 24 MAY 1989

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 24, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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24 May 1989 .
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: DCl/DDCI Meeting with Chairman Beilenson and Mr. Hyde
of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) on 24 May 1989
1. On Wednesday, 24 May 1989, the Monthly Meeting with
Chairman Beilenson and Ranking Minority Member Hyde was held.
In attendance were:
HPSCI: Anthony C. Beilenson,.Chairman
Henry J. Hyde, Ranking Minority Member
Tom K. Latimer, Staff. Director
Thomas R. Smeeton, Associate Counsel
CIA:
William H. Webster, Director
Richard J. Kerr, Deputy Director
Office of Congressional_Affairs
2. The meeting began when Chairman Beilenson indicated
that the Committee had been contacted by a disaffected former
. .
Agency employee
Chairman Beilenson indicated he was bringing this to the
Director's attention for information purposes only, but it is
clear is seeking help. feels as
though the Agency has mistreated him. The Director being
unfamiliar with the matter has promised to give it his
attention.
mni\prorT
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SUBJECT: DCl/DDCI Meeting with Chairman Beilenson and Mr. Hyde
of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) on 12 April 1989
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SUBJECT: DCl/DDCI Meeting with Chairman Beilenson and Mr. Hyde
of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) on 12 April 1989
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6. NRO
a. The Director brought up the next topic which as the
status of the National Reconnaissance Office. The Director -
indicated that the study regarding the NRO's restructuring is
due 30 June. He noted that in fact it had been essentially
completed and drafts are being circulated. He said that
Secretary of Defense Cheney and NRO Director Designee Fega know
that the organization needs to be made stronger. The Director
volunteered certain conclusions concerning the NRO:
(1) That there should be an EXCOM chaired by the
Director of Central Intelligence and including the Director of
the NRO.
(2) There must be a strong internal policy and
analysis group.
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SUBJECT: DCl/DDCI Meeting with Chairman Beilenson and Mr. Hyde
of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) on 12 April 1989
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SUBJECT: DCl/DDCI Meeting with Chairman Beilenson and Mr. Hyde
of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (HPSCI) on 12 April 1989
10. Inspector General Issue
The Director touched upon the IG/McCurdy issue. He stated
that he did not want the review of IG inspections to become a
platform for everything we have done. He told the Chairman
that Mr. McCurdy has been requested to pick one IG report and
that it should be discussed further. Chairman Beilenson
acknowledged the Agency's concern with producing IG inspection
reports. (AIUO)
OCA/LEG
Distribution:
Copy 1 - OCA Record
Copy 2 - DCI
Copy 3 - DDCI
Copy 4 - EXDIR
Copy 5 - ER
Copy 6 - D/OCA
Deputy Director of Legislation
Office of Congressional Affairs
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STAT
STAT
(8 June 1989) 25X1
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
2 3 MAY 1989,
FROM: E. Norbert Garrett
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Your Monthly Meeting with Chairman Beilenson
and Mr. Hyde
1. On Wednesday, 24 May 1989 at 4:30 p.m. you are
scheduled to have your regular "monthly" meeting with
Chairman Beilenson and Ranking Minority Member Hyde. Dick Kerr
and Haill accompany you. Tom Latimer and
Tom Smeeton will be the attendees from the Committee staff.
Your last meeting with the House Intelligence Committee
leadership took place on 12 April 1989. Markup of the 1990
Intelligence Authorization Bill has now slipped until the first
or second week of June so this will be your last scheduled
meeting with the Committee leadership before markup.
2. We have attached talking points to cover the following
subjects should you wish to discuss them:
Status of the National Reconnaissance Office
Reorganization Review: There is a great deal of interest
on the part of HPSCI Members concerning NRO reorganization
and they would welcome your views.
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3. As a result of discussions with the staff, we have
included talking points for the following subjects should they
be raised by either the Chairman or Mr. Hyde:
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25
Requests for the Public Release of 5atellite
Imagery:
Repeated Requests of the Agency to Prepare Classified
Studies For Their Use and Unclassified Material for Public
Release: There have recently been requests from Committee
Members for the preparation of classified and unclassified
studies. We cannot accept tasking from the Hill for
intelligence product and we certainly must avoid requests
to prepare documents for public release for partisan
purposes.
Afghanistan:
For
your DacKgrouna we have included a copy of an oped piece
written by Chairman Beilenson which appeared in the New
York Times on May 22.
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Pollard Case:
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Although this
is
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primarily a Justice Department and Naval Investigative
Service matter, we have included some talking points which
might be useful to you since they expect you, as the DCI,
to be generally informed on such matters.
4. Committee Access to IG Reports: You may wish
to take
this
opportunity to brief the Chairman and Mr. Hyde
on the
latest developments in Mr. McCurdy's
attempts to get regular
access, including staff, to IG
reports.
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Attachments
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SUBJECT: Status of NRO Reorganization
-- I have talked with Secretary Cheney and the
Director-Designate for the NRO, Marty Faga, and we agree that
the management and organization of the NRO needs to be
strengthened.
-- We agree on the following proposals:
- need for a strengthened executive committee
chaired by the DCI to make program and policy decisions;
Secretary of Defense would be represented and D/NRO would
serve on the Committee;
- a strong internal planning and analysis
organization to provide
assessment of collection requirements and means for meeting
these requirements; and
-- A planning team will present the Secretary of Defense
and me a detailed set of proposals in about a month. That
report will have in it some things that Aldridge's original
plan did not include, such as:
- details needed to implement organizational and
staffing changes;
- input from the user community, including the
military; and
- a more precise description of the missions and
functions of a Planning Analysis Group.
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SUBJECT: Release of Satellite Imagery
-- I have been successful in strongly resistina release
of overhead imaaerv to support a-political issup
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Classification Issues
Background: Recently on several occasions, HPSCI Members
and staff took issue with the classification of certain
intelligence analytical reports (most notably the National
Intelligence Daily (NID)), asserting that some items appeared
no different from publicly-available information. This, in
turn, has lead to charges of overclassification and to requests
to declassify items for public use by Members.
The former is of concern and we have raised it with the
Directorate of Intelligence. The latter could present real
problems, due to the inherently burdensome nature of a
declassification request.
We think the issue may stem from a misunderstanding on the
part of some newer HPSCI Members as to why analytical items are
classified.
In dealing with this issue, we suggest you make the
following points.
?In light of concerns expressed by Members and staff,
efforts have been made to verify the classification of NID
items and to avoid overclassification.
?In looking at the classification of analytical items,
however, some generic points must be noted:
?While intelligence analysis may appear similar to
publicly-available information, the latter is
speculative while the former has been confirmed
through intelligence sources and methods. The
intelligence information is protected to avoid
jeopardizing the source or method involved.
?Certain time-sensitive analytical items, such as the
NID, are written in advance using intelligence sources
and methods to predict the outcome of events. This
must be kept in mind when such items are read
after-the-fact and the outcome matches the
prediction. Again, confirmation/revelation that the
prediction came from intelligence sources and methods
could jeopardize those sources and methods.
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?Intelligence analysis is properly classified even though
it may not, on its face, reveal intelligence sources and
methods.
?On some topics, sources are so limited that any
public linking of the topic with intelligence could
jeopardize the source.
?The state of our knowledge on a topic obviously must
be protected to avoid stimulating countermeasures.
?Certain topics are such that admission/confirmation
of an intelligence interest could present foreign
relations problems for the United States.
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Requests To Produce Unclassified Reports
Background: Recently, HPSCI staff asked us to produce
short, unclassified reports on various foreign political and
military topics, most notably on the question of whether the
Soviet Union is abiding by its pledge to reduce aid to the
Sandinistas.
We were told the reports were for public use, on a
non-attributable basis, by HPSCI Members
In some instances, the report's
suggested in advance.
conclusion was
We believe this practice is an especially pernicious one
that must be checked immediately. Our reason for being is, of
course, to collect and analyze intelligence for the President
and senior Executive Branch policy-makers. ?Moreover, writing
to a predetermined conclusion smacks of "cooking the books", a
charge we have long labored to avoid.
Obviously, these concerns are difficult to express directly
under the circumstances Moreover, the fact the reports may
have been destined for the subject even more
delicate.
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In dealing with it, we suggest you make the following
points. You may also wish to engage in a 25X1
more forceful one-on-one discussion should that opportunity
arise.
?We are pleased to provide our finished intelligence
products and intelligence briefings to Members and staff as
requested.
?I would like your assistance, though, in avoiding
Committee staff requests for "tasking."
?Congressional "tasking" presents difficult issues:
?"Tasking" could "politicize" the Agency and the
analytical process as partisan concerns are injected.
?"Tasking" could put us at odds with the
Administration should we be asked to produce reports
at odds with the Administration policy.
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?At some point, there would necessarily be a conflict
between "taskings" from the two branches.
?On subjects where information is dependent
and overhead reconnaissance
it is difficult to say
anything unclassified. Anything said risks
intelligence sources and methods involved.
intelligence
on signals
mucn ot
the
?Suggesting a conclusion in advance only compounds the
above problems and opens our analytical objectivity to
suspicion. Having labored to retain that objectivity
vis a vis efforts to have intelligence analysis
support Executive Branch policies, we would not want
to risk it otherwise.
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End Aid
To the
Afghan
Rebels
By Anthony C. &Henson
? WASHINGTON
_
T.
. he Bush Administration
missed an important
opportunity to bring an
end to U.S. involve-
ment in Afghanistan
when Secretary of
State James Baker failed to pursue
the subject during his visit to Moscow
last week.
Supplying military aid to the Af-
ghan rebels is no longer in our inter-
est now that the Soviets have with-
drawn. If the Bush Administration
won't cut off this aid, then Congress
must do it for the Administration.
The United States original goal in
arming the mujahedeen was crystal-
clear: The Soviet Union had invaded
this nonaligned, fiercely independent
country, and we wanted to help the in-
digenous resistance forces oust the
occupying army.
It was an instance-where American
intervention in the affairs of another
nation was clearly the right thing to
do.
To the surprise of many in- the in-
ternational community, our interven-
tion worked. Ten years after the
Soviet Army occupied Kabul, its
troops have retreated across the
northern border ? a significant vic-
tory for the Afghan people and the
United States.
But now that we have achieved our
goal, we ought to get out of Afghani-
stan before our foreign policy success
turns into a disaster.
By continuing to send weapons to
the rebels, we are risking all the bene-
fits we have gained, since the Af-
ghans are beginning to turn their an-
ger ? once directed at the Soviets ?
toward the U.S. for helping to prolong
the war and the killing in this war-
weary nation.
Our continued intervention raises
questions about who we are support-
ing, and why. The resistance has
never been a unified political move-
ment but rather a loose coalition of at
least seven separate factions that
often are paralyzed by infighting and
squabbling.
By providing aid selectively to the,
bickering factions, the U.S. is under-
mining the rebels' struggling efforts
to forge a consensus in military or
political strategy ? and stirring up a
lot of anti-American sentiment in the
process.
Moreover, some of the largest and
best equipped factions are made up of
Islamic fundamentalists whose goals
for a new Afghanistan are. in start
contrast with our min.
We may have been Willing to ignOre
the igy of the rebels while they
were fighting the Soviets, but notv
that they are fighting only their own
countrymen and are trying to form a
new post-occupation government as
well, we face an entirely different
situation that demands a cutoff of our
military aid.
Even if we were supporting fac-
tions that were clearly aligned with
the U.S., it was never our goal to in-
stall a pro-American client govern-
ment. Ultimately, of course, the U.S.
would like to see a broad-based popu-
lar government in Kabul, with pros-
pects for long-term stability and a
friendly view toward American inter-
ests in southwest Asia. But we have
no business telling the Afghans what
kind of government they should es-
tablish.
Of course, U.S. aid to the mujahe-
deen is not the only issue. Soviet mili-
tary support for President Najibul-
lah's regime is also a serious obstacle
to Afghan self-determination. Yet the
Bush Administration remains unwill-
ing to negotiate with the Soviets for a
mutual cutoff of all military aid to Af-
ghanistan.
So far, U.S. support for the resist-
ance has been especially popular in
Congress. But as the American peo-
ple begin to realize that we are now
mired in another cOuntry's messy,
protracted civil war and are sending
weapons to Islamic fundamentalists,
Congressional support will certainly
erode.
Before that happens, the Adminis-
tration would be wise to seize the mo-
ment and announce a new U.S. pro-
posal for an American-Soviet hands-
off policy in Afghanistan.
Pegs
The Washington Peel
The New Tort Throe
The Waatingtan Times
The WM Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily Nevis
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
Military aid to the rebels was mor-
ally defensible and wisely supported
by the international community.
It has been a success. Now let's
take satisfaction in our achievement
and grecefully retire, leaving the task
of building a new government to the
Afghan people.
Anthony C. Beflenson, Democrat of
California, is diairman of the House's
Permanent Select Committee on In
ttillgenCe.
MON 0309-89
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