CPPG MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000200070006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 12, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
12 January 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism
and Narcotics
The Crisis Pre-Planning Group will meet in the White House Situation Room
at 2:00 PM Monday, January 13, to consider the Libyan situation. An agenda
and list of participants is attached at TAB A.
This briefing book presents supporting materials for each of the major
JAI. intelligence points listed in the agenda. An index appears on the next page.
Attachement
As stated
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SUBJECT TAB
Agenda and List of Participants .................. A
Qadhafi's Next Steps ............................. B
Western Europe and Canada: Update on Reactions
to Sanctions Against Libya ..................... C
Capability to Monitor Departure of Americans .... D
Declassified Study Linking Terrorism ............ E
-- Evidence of Libyan Involvement in
International Terrorism
Intelligence Support for Whitehead Mission ...... F
-- Libyan Support for International Terrorism
-- Libyan Terrorist Financing: The US Bank
Connection
-- Western Europe and Canada: Economic Links
with Libya
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Talking Points for Deputy Director for Intelligence
13 January 1986
Qadhafi's Next Steps
Qadhafi's responses to US economic sanctions probably will
continue to mix diplomacy and threats and prep)lanninq for
terrorist operations against US and Israeli interests.
-- Dividing the US from its allies on policy toward Libya
and promoting a united anti-US stand ampnn the Arabs are
two of Qadhafi's longstanding foreign policy objectives.
-- To this end, Qadhafi will continue pressing the Arabs for
actions that would undermine their relations h i with
Washington and demonstrate that US e ortsto Isola e him
are failing. Qadhafi in the past has made highly
publicized impromptu visits to a number of Arab, capitals
to give the appearance of Arab receptivity to his
proposals and could do so again.
He also will continue using the current crisis to play on
concerns among West E.urro2ean governments that their'-'
suport_ for US initiatives to iso ate Libya would prompt
increased Libyan terrorist activities in Western Europe
closer ties to the Soviet Uni
Oadhafi's tactics might include offering economic
incentives to West European firms who help it mit he
impact of US sanctions and threats of reprisals against
West European economic interests in Libya if Westt" ""~
European governments appear willing to cooperate with
Washington.
Qadhafj already
nas warne Paris_ that he would not abide by his tacit
agreement to desist from terrorist operations in N'rance
if-Paris supports US sanctions.
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,Qadhafi might Qrder several hits on Libyan dissidents in
the hone that selected acts of terrorism against non-
Europeans would induce the west Europeans to cooperate
while minimizing the risk of a backlash against Libya.
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TOP SECRETI
-- He also will seek opportunities to publicize Libya's
appreciation for Soviet political and military support as
a means of exploiting West European, concerns over
Tripoli's expanding ties to Moscow.
Qadhafi's conviction that radical Palestinians are justified
in carrying out terrorist attacks and that such attacks are
necessary to put pressure on the US and Israel will drive
continuing Libyan support for Palestinian operations.
-- Such support probably will be conditioned in the near
is rm by Qadhafi's concern that Tripoli's involvement in
another bloody incident would prompt the ~t Europeans
to be more forthcoming in imposing diplomatic and
economic santions on Libya.
Oadhafi probably will promote operations that minimize
he risk to citizens of West European countries an
redouble his efforts to con
Qadhafi, for example, could use additional cut s or
place some of his People's Bureaus in Western Europe off
limits to radical Palestinians in an attempt to confuse
the issue of Libyan complicity.
Pale
tinian c rou Qs backed b Libya ma? be 1
12
5 5
another terrorist attack in Western Europe, ut we have
no eviaeenncee so far of Libyan invo vement in these
operations.
-- Oadhafi also may look fQr o~ ortunities to,karget~his
moderate Arab enemies, especially if he sees an.
opportunity to portray them as insufficiently Arab
nationalist and lackeys of the US. We believe that
Tunisia--because of its increasing political vulner-
abilities--and Egvpt--because of its support for the
Camp David accords--woula he Qadhafi's principal
targets.
Intelligence gathering by Libyan agents on US Government
instal~at~c asa e a decision by Uadha i o arget US
personnel directly in terroris opera ions.
-- We believe that Qadhafi would be only temporarily
deterred by the threat of US military action from
supporting such operations, although he almost certainly
would use surrogates to retain a degree of plausible
denial.
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Qadhafi
The recent remark by Lib
robably is an
that US
statement of Oadhafi's intention. We have no information with
regard to how-many-OS citizens have left Libya since sanctions
were imposed.
Qadhafi almost certainly anticipates that Washington
would view harassment of US citizens as justification for
military action. At the same time, he. will take hostages
only if he is convince that a ,massive Usm li.ta.,y strike
i imminent.
He will continue to play up any statements by US workers
irdicatina either unhappiness with U asinaton's_latest
restrictions or a desire to stay in Libya. Qaahafi will
almost certainly offer financial and other incentives to
retain at least a few hundrPd nS nPrsonnel.
Qadhafi will continue to look for ways to minimize the
economic impact of US sanctions.
He will try to lureEropean and o
replace US companies by offering--as he already has--
lucrative potential contracts.
-- He will proha_hly pressure various Arab banks--as a
concrete sign of support--to assist in moving Libyan
funds through US banks
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ZoA]
Qadhafi probab.y will not nationalize US investments to
avoid providing a pretext for even tighter restrictions.
Washington's decision to pursue "secondary sanctions,"
however, may prompt him to confiscate US assets in
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Qadhafi almost certainly will devise fairly soon a revised
policy for marketing Libyan crude oil produced by US companies.
Tripoli already is
preventincq tive companies trom i ing ny cruae.' The
a.n affects aroun'- l`5?`0-,UD1Y'b rre s per day of produc ion.
The move probably is an attempt to minimize potential
loss of oil revenue, as payment for any oil teeing ~ifted
is due after 1 February. Tripoli may anticipate that the
companies will use sanctions to avoid payment or, at a
minimum, to put money in blocked Libyan accounts.
Tripoli probably will ask one or more of the European
companies currently operating i_Lia to market US-
pro ucd~-ed oil. Another option is to use the Libyan
NS-bona i Company, although such a move could affect
oil liftings temporarily while new contracts are
negotiated and marketing offices and shipping schedules
Oadhafi's !military Reactions
Oadhafi will weigh carefully his military options against
the US. He probably will be attracted by the possibility of
destroying a US ship or aircraft to demonstrate his defiance of
'~lashington and to enhance his influence among Third herla
radicals. At the same time, he almost cer zinl? wants to avoid
r,iy~i n~ rr~___~a tiF a r YPtPXt fnr broad military action against
Libya. We believe that Qadhafi e-Tl mill ari y strike US assets
in the Mediterranean under any of the.following circumstances:
If he belieye~ force in the central Mediterranean
poses an immed.i_a_tethr_e_at to Liman security. We
ant cipate that US ships or aircraft approaching the
coast at high speed will be treated as hostile and the
Libyans will make every effort to engage them before. they
are within striking range of the coast.
If he believes that the Libyan participation in the
strike will not be exposed. We believehe will not feel
very bo in is connection until the current
confrontational climate dissipates. He will be-wary lest
Washington links him to any attack on US assets in the
next month or two.
If he believes he is assured of a quick and complete
Victorin an engagement that will not.prompt a~massive
.reta ation. The most likely possibility is the shoot-
down of an unarmed US reconnaissance aircraft. He
probably would retrain from seeking larger targets,
however, hecause he would be aware of the high risk of
failure in the attack as well as the increased risk of a
larger retaliation.
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TOP SECRET
If the US moves naval units into Libyan-qja_j waters as a
show of force, 77e e ieve that Qadhati's.inclina.tion would be
towa'e"straint, to allow time to confirmUS intent. He and his
forces ear the worst, however, and the risk of an
accidental engagement would be high.
Qadhafi would send Libyan ships and aircraft to meet the
US force and monitor its movements.
The likelihood of an engagement increases, however, the
longer the US ships remain in the Gulf, the nearer they
are to the Libyan coast, and the nature or any approach
to Libyan civilian or military targets. A high-speed run
toward Suirt--Qadhafi's tribal heartland--exemplifies an
action likely to prompt a Libyan order to fire.
Qadhafi's reaction to US aircraft operating in or near the
Gulf of Sidra is less predictable.
Jet aircraft can move from international airspace to
Libyan cities in minutes, and Libyan interceptors have
always tried to meet them well away from the Libyan
coast.
The potential for the Libyans to misread US intentions is
much higher with aircraft that with ships and we would
have little warning of Libyan hostile intent. Libyan
interceptors probably will fire on those that appear to
be intent on reachinu the Libyan coast.
9F,)(1
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2bAl
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EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Evidence of Libya involvement in terrorism is sweeping and conclusive.
Libyan assassins have been arrested at the scene of attacks, captured agents
in foiled plots have confessed to links with Libya, and sting operations have
provided incriminating video and audio tapes--even a Libyan claim of
responsibility in one case. The US government has also compiled evidence of
Libyan involvement in terrorism in the United States: in may 1985, after a
grand jury heard evidence of Libyan plotting, a Libyan diplomat at the United
Nations was declared persona non grata and deported from the country.
Libyan Assassins
The arrest of Libyan gunmen immediately after several attacks against
Libyan exiles provides the most direct evidence of Libyan involvement. Libyan
assassins have been notoriously poor operatives who often failed to escape
after attacks--indeed they sometimes were arrested at the scene of the crime.
An attack in April 1985 on a Libyan exile in Bonn--which resulted in
his murder and the wounding of two German bystanders--ended in the
arrest and subsequent conviction of the Libyan assassin.
The Libyan assailant of a Moroccan citizen in April 1985 in West
Germany was captured at the scene of the attack.
In June 1984, a Libyan Arab Airlines employee was arrested while
trying to escape after shooting a Libyan-born businessman in Greece
in June 1984.
Confessions of Libyan Surrogates
In some cases in which Libyan nationals or Libyan-hired mercenaries were
involved, Libya's hand has been revealed. In an attempt to ensure plausible
denial, however, Libya often tries to remain one step removed from terrorist
operations. Tripoli commonly uses members of dissident groups it supports to
do its dirty work.
Zairian authorities claim to have thwarted to plot to kill President
Mobutu in September 1985. The plotters reportedly admitted that they
received Libyan backing, including arms, training and funding.
About 50 suspected Libyan-backed saboteurs were arrested in Tunisia
in the fall of 1985. The terrorists were infiltrated into Tunisia
when Libya expelled over 30,000 Tunisan workers. Libyans carrying
false documentation were among those arrested.
In March 1984, a Chadian national admitted after his arrest to having
acting under Libyan direction, according to the local press. He
reportedly was paid $500,000 to conduct sabotage operations in Chad.
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Equipment and Personnel Traceable to Libya
In several instances, Libyan diplomats have been caught red-handed with
weapons and explosives in their possession. Tripoli extensively abuses the
diplomatic pouch by using it to transport weapons. Equipment actually used in
a terrorist plot has been tied to Libya in at least one instance.
Tunisian officials reported that Libya provided the three passports
used by the Abu Nidal terrorists in the December attack on the El AL
counter in Vienna. Two passports had been seized from Tunisians
expelled from Libya last fall, and the third had been lost by a
Tunisian in Libya in 1977.
In Feburary 1985, Chad presented evidence to the UN Security Council
of a September 1984 plot to assassinate President Habre. An attache
case bomb was to be placed in the meeting room of the Council of
Ministers and detonated from a remote location. The detonating
device was traced to stock purchased by Libya.
Tunisian authorities in September 1985 announced the expulsion of a
Libyan diplomat who had smuggled letter bombs through the diplomatic
pouch.
cr_pr'aln to the Egyptian Tess, Lihyctn.'--; ^Laiming diplomatic
immunity--but lacking proper accreditation--were discovered in August
1984 to be carrying boxloads of weapons. The Libyans were reportedly
trying to smuggle the weapons into an unidentified Arab country on a
Libyan Arab Airlines flight.
The Libyan ship Ghat almost certainly was responsible for the July
1984 mining of the Suez Canal and Red Sea, which resulted in damage
to more than 18 ships. The Ghat transited the Canal during that time
frame. Although it usually carried a multinational crew,.the ship
had only Libyan personnel on this crossing. The crew commander was
assisted by an individual known to command a Libyan unit that
specializes in planting mines.
British police found weapons, ammunition, and body armor in the
Libyan People's Bureau after the UK severed relations with Libya in
1984. British security officials judged that these weapons had been
smuggled into the country in the diplomatic pouch.
Uncovering of Libyan Plots
The Egyptians have been successful in uncovering Libyan operations,
obtaining proof of intended attacks, and rounding up the terrorists involved.
Egypt's infiltration of the plotters has allowed them not only to stymie
attacks on high-level Libyan dissidents, but also to catch terrorists
red-handed. Cairo has widely publicized the Libyan-planned operations--using
audio and video tapes of the terrorists planning attacks.
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Egypt's most successful operation was carried out in November 1984
when the Egyptians encouraged Qadhafi to believe that his hired
agents had assassinated former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush. The
Libyan press claimed credit for.the killing of Bakoush, after which
Egypt revealed the sting: the four assassins were in custody and
pictures of the alleged victim were fakes.
Egypt successfully infiltrated another plot against high-level exiles
in November 1985. Libyan nationals were among those arrested. After
the attack was aborted and arrests made, audio and video tapes
incriminating Libya were relased.
Libyan Funding of Terrorism
Recently available intelligence provides incontrovertible evidence that
the Libyan government is using its official bank accounts to provide funds to
terrorists on a global basis. The Central Bank of Libya, among other Libyan
government controlled financial institutions, transferred many millions of
dollars in 1985 throught bank accounts abroad to terrorist groups and
individuals in the Middle East, Western Europe, and elsewhere. Several
millions of dollars of this money was paid from Libyan bank accounts held in
both domestic and foreign U.S. bank branches. There is no evidence, however,
that any banks handling Libya's accounts were aware of their use for terrorist
Sunnort.
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