NSPG MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000200060013-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: January 5, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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5 January 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism
and Narcotics
SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting
A National Security Planning Group meeting is scheduled for 1100 Monday, 6
January, to consider options for retaliating against Libya for its involvement
in the 29 December terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports. You
have been asked to start the meeting by addressing three principal points:
-- Libyan involvement with Abu Nidal and culpability in the terrorist
attacks,
-- the internal situation in Libya, and
This briefing book provides a variety of background material to assist you in
preparing for that meeting. It is organized as shown on the index which
appears on the next page.
Charles E. Allen
cc: DDCI
DDI
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Subject
Libyan Involvement with Abu Nidal and Culpability
in Terrorist Attacks
The Internal Situation in Libya: Qadhafi's Domestic
Position
Report on CPPG Meeting, 3 January
Likely Libyan and Other Arab State Reactions to US Strikes F
Likely European Reactions
- Reactions to Military Strikes
- Poll on Public Attitudes Toward Terrorism
- Views on Sanctions
Likely Soviet Reactions
Libyan Foreign Economic Relations
- Basic Data
- Role of U.S. Companies
Libyan Expatriate Population J
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Libyan Support for Abu Nidal
Libyan involvement with the Abu Nidal terrorist group has grown
significantly since early 1985. Libya has provided money, training,
safehaven, political support, and possibly arms and operational assistance as
part of its efforts to promote terrorism against the US and Israeli interests
and the undermine the Arab-Israeli peace progress.
-- The current phase of Libyan support for the Abu Nidal group
apparently began as a response to the 11 February accord between
Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization which called for
joint action on peace negotiations with Israel.
-- By the spring of 1985, Abu Nidal and Qadhafi apparently had reached
general agreement on the need to cooperate in targeting moderate Arab
states, Israel, and the US. This coincided with the Libyan
announcement of a "Pan Arab Command" to unify dissident groups to
conduct attacks against these same targets.
- In October 1985 Abu Nidal's press officer in Damascus was reported as
saying that the organization receives most of its support from Libya.
-- Collaboration between Abu Nidal and Qadhafi in specific terrorist
activity was evident in the Egypt Air 648 hijacking in November.
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Responsibility for El Al Attacks
The weight of evidence implicates the Abu Nidal group in the attacks at
the Vienna and Rome airports.
-- The two surviving terrorists in Vienna have admitted membership in
the Abu Nidal group and have stated that Abu Nidal sponsored the
attack.
The terrorist hospitalized in Rome has identified himself as a member
of Abu Nidal
-- An unexploded grenade found in'Rome had the same markings as the
grenades used in the EgyptAir hijacking, which we judge to have been
an Abu Nidal operation.
-- The modus operandi of the coordinated attacks matches that of
previous attacks by Abu Nidal operatives in Western Europe in recent
years. The attackers used automatic weapons and grenades and were
intent on causing indiscriminate casualties.
-- Abu Nidal is known to retaliate against those governments who
imprison its members,-and in this regard both Italy and Austria were
likely targets. Italy currently is holding three of the group's
members arrested for three separate attacks this year. Austria
jailed three Abu Nidal members responsible for an attack on a Vienna
synagogue during the summer of 1981.
-- Senior officials of the Abu Nidal group held discussions with
Austrian officials regarding the early release of its prisoners. One
of the Abu Nidal officials stated that his assignment was to solve
the problem through negotiations, not to deliver threats or
ultimatums. He stated, however, that if the discussions proved
fruitless, "other comrades will take over the matter."
Direct Evidence of Libyan Involvement
Although we have only a single piece of solid evidence indicating Libyan
involvement in the El Al attacks, this must be viewed in the context of the
substantial ties (money, training, safehaven) that Abu Nidal has developed
with Libya in less than a year as well as Libya's reaction to the terrorist
attacks.
Libya provided the three passports used by the Vienna terrorists. Of
the three Tunisian passports used by the terrorists in Vienna, two
were confiscated by Libyan authorities in mid-1985 from Tunisian
citizens expelled from Libya during the large-scale expulsion of
Tunisian workers there, while a third, also a genuine document, was
reported as a lost passport in 1977 by Tunisian consular authorities
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in Libya. It should be noted that the sole surviving hijacker of
EgyptAir 648 was also operating on a genuine Tunisian passport issued
by the Tunisian Embassy in Tripoli.
-- The wounded terrorist in Rome claimed that Libya provides protection,
weapons, and financing to his group.
-- The Libyan press quickly provided supporting rhetoric, calling the
attacks "heroic operations," although Qadhafi later disassociated
himself from these comments.
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Qadhafi's Domestic Position
Qadhafi is the most unpopular and isolated he has been since
he came to power 16 years ago.
-- He is almost entirely dependent for support on a
diminishing circle of relatives, fellow tribesmen, and
ideological extremists--many little more than young thugs.
-- His continued involvement with ill-conceived foreign
adventures and revolutionary causes--such as the occupation
of Chad or support for Iran against Iraq--is unpopular with
most Libyans.
-- Qadhafi's radical and destabilizing policies have
prompted growing cooperation against him by Algeria, Egypt,
Tunisia, and Iraq, whose national interests are directly
threatened by his actions.
-- Opposition to the regime has become more open, and
occasionally violent. The past year saw antiregime
literature distributed in major cities, student
disturbances, several reported instances of sabotage or
assassination attempts against Qadhafi, and the first
organized coup plot by military officers in over two years..
-- The killing last November of Qadhafi's ambitious cousin
and confidant, Hassan Ashkal--whether by dissidents inside
Libya or by rivals positioning themselves to exploit a
sudden change in regime--is the latest indication of
Qadhafi's deteriorating political position.
Political and economic trends have been running counter. to
Qadhafi for some time;- if, as seems likely, Qadhafi remains
determined to pursue his radical policies, we assess his chances
of surviving another year as little better than even.
-- Qadhafi's nationalization of businesses, seizure of
homes, burning of property records, and other radical
measures aimed at "bourgeois reactionaries" have driven
increasing numbers of Libyans into exile.
-- Libya's neighbors are increasingly willing to provide a
safehaven and base of operations for the National Front for
the Salvation of Libya--the largest and most effective exile
organization.
-- Over four years of economic decline have undermined
Qadhafi's ability to buy domestic support.
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A Constricted Economy
A sharp drop in oil revenues, economic mismanagement, and a
declining standard of ving are major causes of Qadhafi's
political difficulties.
-- In comparison with $24 billion in oil revenues in 1981,
we estimate that Libyan export earnings in 1985 remained at
the previous year's level of about $11 billion. A slight
increase in oil production last year was offset by the
continued erosion of prices offered for Libya's high quality
crude. Production is currently over 1.1 million barrels per
day.
-- Qadhafi held imports to about $7 billion last year
through severe austerity measures, particularly in the
consumer sector; nonetheless, in conjunction with worker's
remittances and other services, Libya still ran a current
account deficit of $1.2 billion last year.
-- Foreign exchange reserves have dwindled from $14 billion
in 1981 to a current level of $4.0 billion.
Qadhafi's imposition of austerity measures as a means of
coping with Libya's economic decline has only increased
discontent and produced a growing consensus that change is
needed.
-- Shortages of food, water, and electricity have become a
way of life for most Libyans; what is available is often
expensive.
-- Long lines at state-run stores are common, generating'
sporadic disturbances that have resulted in several deaths.
-- Austerity also is reported to be affecting the heretofore
privileged armed forces: military units have been forced to
fish or herd livestock to provide fresh meat for their
personnel, and some stores open only to military personnel
have been closed.
Political Effects of Action against the Libyan Economy
Efforts to further weaken the Libyan economy through non-
military action would only be successful if Libya's main economic
partners--Italy, West Germany, and the other West European
states--agreed to cooperate with the US in maintaining sanctions
against Tripoli. Public statements from some governments such as
Bonn and London following the terrorist attacks in Rome and
Vienna suggest a continued reluctance to employ economic
sanctions against Libya.
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-- If, however, economic sanctions were supported by most
West European governments, the effect would be to accelerate
the erosion of Qadhafi's domestic support. Qadhafi might
respond to such pressure with increased threats of action
against European assets and interests in Libya.
-- Partial or unilateral sanctions by Washington alone would
not seriously affect the stability of Qadhafi's regime, and
would provide him with further propaganda opportunities to
denigrate US efforts to punish him.
Military action against Libyan economic targets would weaken
the stability of the regime only if key installations--such as
oil export terminals--are severely damaged or destroyed. Qadhafi
would try to stem the erosion of his domestic support by
appealing to Libyan nationalist sentiments and blaming the US for
the resultant economic hardships.
-- Qadhafi almost certainly would portray such a strike as
aggression against the Libyan people and might at least
temporarily generate a popular backlash of anti-US
sentiment. His ability to maintain anti-US fervor, however,
would be lessened by a well-orchestrated campaign of
propaganda that emphasized that US actions were aimed at
Qadhafi, not the Libyan people.
-- In the immediate aftermath of a strike, potential coup
plotters probably would hesitate to move against the regime.
in order to avoid being perceived as US puppets.
Any political gains for Qadhafi resulting from the US strike
probably would only be temporary.
-- Damaging or destroying an important economic or military
target would almost certainly shake Qadhafi's confidence and
probably undermine the aura of "invincibility" he has
cultivated over the years.
-- A successful strike, coupled with sustained US and Allied
economic and political pressure probably would increase
Qadhafi's sense of encirclement and prompt him to further
repressive measures to maintain power. When under pressure,
he may be more prone to poor judgment and political
miscalculation.
-- As political and economic conditions worsened, potential
assassins and coup plotters might be emboldened to move
against Qadhafi.
-- If, however, Libyans perceived a military strike as an
isolated event and not a sustained policy in which further
action might be taken, Qadhafi's prospects for survival
would be somewhat better.
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5 January 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
FROM: Charles E. Allen
NIO/CT-NARC
SUBJECT: CPPG Meeting on Libya, 3 January 1985
1. The Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG), chaired by Don Fortier, met in
the Situation Room on 3 January to discuss possible US responses towards Libya
in view of Tripoli's involvement with the terrorist group that staged the
attacks at the Vienna and Rome airports. Principals at the meeting included
Bob Gates, Clair George, Mike Armacost, Don Gregg, Bob Kimmitt, Fred Ikle, and
Lt. Gen. John Moellering. Six NSC staff members also attended.
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The DoD cable which lists
Libyan target nominations
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30 December 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Douglas J. MacEachin
Director of Soviet Analysis
SUBJECT: Soviet/Libyan Contingencies
1. This memorandum summarizes SOVA's thinking about
possible Soviet military responses and political
calculations in the event of a US military operation against
Libya. Annex 1, written last July with a somewhat different
set of scenarios, provides an elaboration of the military
dimension. Annex 2 sets out the reasoning behind our
political judgments.
2. The character of the Soviet response would depend
upon whether Moscow perceived the uS operation to be a
limited "Rambo"-type reaction to terrorism, or the first
step in a new and determined effort to attack the USSR's
client base in the region (Syria and the PLO as well as
Libya).
3. Moscow's military options in advance of a strike of
any size remain seriously constrained by inability to deploy
credible military forces to Libya from the USSR rapidly
enough to make a difference.
-- A quick limited attack without prior warning
w.ould give Moscow little opportunity to react
militarily; Soviet response would be limited to
participation by Soviet advisers assigned to
Libyan air defense units.
-- If Moscow received several days or more warning
due to a buildup of US forces near Libya, the
Soviets could interpose small "trip wire" forces
(Soviet air defense units or even a small ground
force contingent) that they might calculate
could force a US reassessment. We doubt they
would do this, but cannot rule it out.
4. Our assessment of how Moscow would respond after a
US attack is qualified by substantial uncertainty about
Gorbachev's stature in the leadership and what his personal
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response would be to his first foreign policy crisis.
Nevertheless, we believe Gorbachev is strong enough
politically not to need for personal power reasons to
display his manhood through provocative military responses
to a US operation. In our view, Gorbachev's reaction would
be conditioned first of all by a desire to stick to the
strategy of domestic economic modernization, to continue to
seek to influence the US administration's security policies
(especially SDI), and to avoid military confrontation with
the US in the Third World while nevertheless standing behind
commitments to client regimes. In the Middle East, Moscow
currently sees a number of trends going its way and would
not want to undercut them through overreaction.
5. Moscow's sense of commitment to Qadhafi is highly
qualified; it has no ideological kinship with the Libyan
regime, views Qadhafi as an adventurist, and has refused to
provide security quarantees to him. But, Gorbachev's room
for maneuver might be narrowed if a US operation killed
substantial numbers of Soviet personnel.
6. Moscow would probably not perceive a limited US
anti-terrorist strike as a fundamental challenge to Soviet
interests, but as an opportunity to gain propaganda
advantage and enhance Soviet leverage against Qadhafi.
7. Moscow could interpret a large-scale US attack on
Libyan military facilities as an attempt to alter the
balance of power in the Middle East to Moscow's
disadvantage, but it would wait to make such a judgment. If
Moscow did reach this judgment, it could make it more
difficult for Gorbachev to maintain his preferred resource
allocation priorities and tactical flexibility in dealing
with arms control and other bilateral US/USSR issues.
8. In the event of a major US strike on Libya, Moscow
would probably resupply Qadhafi and unleash a global
propaganda campaign against US "state terrorism."? It would
probably cut back bilateral relations with Washington for a
period of six months or so, possibly postpone the next
summit, inject larger naval forces and increase air
activities in the Mediterranean theater, and expand the
Soviet military presence on the ground in Libya. We
doubt,however, that Moscow would pay the price of major
security commitments to Oadhafi to acquire expanded access
to Libyan naval and air facilities.
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Libya's Forei np Trade
Three-quarters of Libya's trade o is with countries; East Bloc and
Soviet states account for much
The US is the third largest non-communist exporter to Libya,
accounting for 8%of the western total. Heavy lionrinl
machinery xports.
marepresents the majority of our $304 mil
Italy, with $1.3 billion in exports -- largely, electric
and heavy equipment -- is first, accounting for 34% of the
western total.
West Germany, $583 million, is the second largest
exporter, 15% of the western total.
Closely trailing the US are Japan and the UK, 7.5% each.
The US still accords Libya Most Favored Nation status..
Libya, in 1985, exported $7.8 billion in oil to the west. It imported
$3.8 billion -- largely heavy industrial ofdbetter thanr2a1net
positive balance with western Only the US and Japan, among the top non-communist exporters,
run a trade surplus, importing virtually nothing from Libya.
Libya's Dependence on Trade
Typical of a developing nation, Libya exports its natural wealth and
imports its food and industrial
Tripoli depended, in 1985, on western countries for almost 70%
of its food supply.
Hard currency earnings from the west go for Soviet arms --
three-quarters of Libya's 's military materiel -- and to underwrite
terror and insurrection Hard currency also pays for the guest-worker population.
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Foreigners in Libya
As world oil prices have declined, the population of guest workers in
Libya has been reduced, but is still substantial. Overall, as many as
375,000 foreigners are estimated to remain in Libya.
64,000 western workers -- including as many as 1,000 US citizens
-- continue to work in Libya.
East Bloc and Soviet personnel may number 65,000.
US Citizens in Libya
Tripoli has claimed that as many as 2,695 Americans resided in the country
at the start of 1984.
This probably represents a flow over time, rather than a
snapshot of the population.
Our best estimate is that there are 800 to 1,000 US citizens -- including
dependents -- in Libya at this time.
A core group of US citizens and dependents, about 450, call
Libya home and did not depart in 1982.
This core is made up of teachers and other professionals,
including a few oil workers, who have established roots in
Libya.
The remaining 350-550 include opportunists drawn by lucrative
employment contracts, and businessmen who rotate in/out of the
country as necessary.
Tripoli has been reneging on contract terms and demeaning
workers by subordinating them to incompetent Libyans,
somewhat reducing the opportunist population.
The location of US citizens in Libya is not well known.
The core group is primarily in Tripoli, Banghazi and, possibly,
Tobruk.
Non-oil businessmen would similarly reside in these urban
centers.
Petroleum workers are scattered throughout the petroleum
industry and, therefore, throughout the country.
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US Leverage on Libya)
Several thousand Libyan students continue to reside in the US.
Libya still enjoys Most Favored Nation status.
US exports to Libya of $300 million last year are up almost 50%.
US exports include badly needed -- but not unique -- heavy
industrial goods, and food.
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Trade with Libya by Selected Non-Communist Countries
1985 estimated (million US$)
Imports from Libya
(mainly oil)
exports to Libya
2,755.
ITALY
1,293.
electric and heavy
industrial equipment
2,012.
WEST GERMANY
583.
arms, electric and
heavy industrial goods
UNITED STATES
304.
heavy industrial
machinery
JAPAN
287.
transport equipment
281.
machinery
220.
manufactured goods,
some arms
SPAIN
151.
machinery
NETHERLANDS
143.
food
SOUTH KOREA
115.
construction goods
TURKEY
105.
construction goods
SWITZERLAND
73.
machinery
AUSTRIA
68.
machinery
BENELUX
68.
food and manufactured
goods
CANADA
56.
food
IRELAND
GREECE
33.
beef
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US Companies Operating in Libya
Amerada Hess
Marathon
Conoco
Occidental
Brown and Root
Price Brothers
Bechtel
National Southwire Aluminum a major contractor for the "Great Man-made
River Project" (GMRP).
Superior
Haliburton
Pool-Interdrill
Reda
C. E. Vetco
Boeing
W. R. Grace
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US Companies Operating in Libya cont'd
Christian
IDC
US Food Development Corp.
Charter Oil
Coastal Corporation
Kaiser Engineers
and Constructors
McGaughy, Marshall, McMil
and Holmes & Narver
Stone and Webster
US El-Paso Company
Scientific Design
Foster Wheeler Ital'iana
M. W. Kellog Company
Woodward-Clyde Consultants
Banker's Trust
a number of US Banks
First National Bank of Chicago, and
Continental Illinois,
General Electric
Sofec, Inc.
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Other Firms Which Have Requested Export Licenses
or May Be Involved in Libya to Some Extent
Taylor Instruments
A. 0. Smith
Rosemont
Gould Modicon
CATCO
Bristol
Leeds and Northrup
Hewlett Packard
ISSC
Research, Ltd.
Robershaw Controls
Systronics
Forney Engineering
Honeywell
Fisher Controls
Foxboro
Bailey's Controls
UOP Process Division
Beekman Instruments
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Expatriates in Libya, 1984
Egyptians 180,000
Tunisians 70,000
Soviets and East Europeans 70,000
Turks 35,000
South Koreans 18,000
Sudanese 18,000
Italians 15,000
Moroccans 10,000
British 4-5,000
West Germans 4,000
French 3,000
Greeks 2,000
Americans 1,000
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