CPPG AGENDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000200060011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 3, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/06: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000200060011-3
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Talking Points for the DDI
3 January 1986
Libya: Status of the Alert
Tripoli is acutely concerned about the potential for a US or
Israeli strike in retaliation for the recent terrorist incidents
in Rome and Vienna. The Libyan military has been placed on full
alert.
-- Several missile boats at Tripoli and Banghazi have put to
sea and also staged to other small ports to provide a
capability to meet hostile ships anywhere along the Libyan
coast.
-- Libya's only operationally deployed coastal defense
missile facility at Tajura--the SSC-3 Styx system with a 50
nautical mile range--has been set up for the first time.
-- Ground forces are at alert nationwide. Moreover, a
general callup of Army reservists in mid-December--probably
for as annual training purposes--provides Tripoli with
additional manpower in the event of hostilities.
Qadhafi's longstanding suspicion that the US intends to put
military pressure on his regime has increased in the last week.
-- His anxiety over US press allegations that Washington is
sponsoring a Libyan dissident campaign against him
undoubtedly was aggravated by this week's press claims that
the US has developed a list of military targets in Libya.
-- His worst fears are being fanned by reports Libyan
intelligence has sent him that Israeli F-16s have staged to
Italy to strike Libya in cooperation with the Sixth Fleet.
Construction of the SA-5 complex at Sirte is proceeding very
rapidly. The pace of construction implies that Qadhafi himself--
with Moscow's approval--has ordered the SA-5s to be set up as
soon as possible.
-- SA-5 launchers and missile guidance radars have been
moved into position, along with support equipment. Another
launcher has been moved to the launch complex from storage
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 but is not yet in position.
-- We estimate that it will take another two weeks to
calibrate the radar--calibration equipment already has been
moved into place. By mid-January, Libya will have an SA-5
site capable of tracing a target and firing a missile at it
if the present pace on construction continues. The movement
of fueled missiles to the complex from storage--which can
happen in a day--will provide our best tip-off that the
system is ready.
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We believe Qadhafi is weighing the potential for a US strike
before taking action against any of the 1,000-1,500 Americans in
Libya.
-- He probably views the seizure of a large number of these
Americans as his last card in protecting his regime from US
military pressure. We believe he will refrain from such
hostage taking until he is convinced that a US strike is
intended to topple him. A strike against his residence at
Aziziyah Barracks probably would lead him to that
conclusion.
Libyan leader Qadhaf is warning last Wednesday that no US or
Israeli aircraft or ship would be safe if Libya were attacked and
that he would export terrorism to the US are intended to bluff
Washington and Tel Aviv into backing down from any plans to
strike back.
-- At the same time, Qadhafi's remarks position him to take
credit for any lack of retaliation--which he almost
certainly would cite as evidence of US inability to confront
Arab radicals.
-- Qadhafi probably also hopes that official Libyan denials
of involvement in the Vienna and Rome attacks will
discourage Washington's West European allies from supporting
US military retaliation.
Qadhafi fears US strength, but probably believes that his
chances of surviving a US strike and turning it to his political
advantage are sufficiently good to continue support for
terrorism.
-- We believe that a surgical strike probably would
reinforce Qadhafi's predilection for terrorism if it were
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TOP SECRET
not accompanied by a sustained campaign of increased
political, economic, and paramilitary pressures.
-- Qadhafi might even regard a US strike as a political
windfall if it resulted in damage that he could exploit to
publicly denegrate US military capabilities and reinforce
his claims to Third World revolutionary leadership.
Qadhafi would also try to use any US attack to regroup his
declining domestic political fortunes.
-- We believe, however, that a limited US attack that
avoided substantial civilian casualties would weaken
Qadhaf is hold on power.
-- Our assessment is based on evidence following the
Egyptair hijacking that Libyans were not prepared to support
Qadhafi against Egyptian military retaliation.
-- A US strike would encourage Libyan dissidents in exile to
continue and possibly accelerate their plans to remove
Qadhafi.
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Key Factors in the Libyan Petroleum Industry
US Workers in Libya
We estimate there are aroximatel 1,000 - 2,000 US citizens iiving
in Libya
While we do not have a breakdown as to their occupations,
we estimate that approximately 500 - 1,000 of this total are employed in
the oil industry in key technical functions such as drilling
supervisors, petroleum engineers, computer and instrumentation
technicians. and oil pipeline and terminal operators. In addition, US
citizens employed by US service and equipment companies travel to Libya
on a spot basis and could be temporarily in the country
Impact of a Withdrawl of US Personnel
If all US workers were forced out of Libya, the impact on Libyan
petroleum operations would only be temporary. Libyan personnel have the
capability to keep vital facilities operating over the short term until
better qualified foreign workers were recruited. Key countries where
Libya would recruit personnel are Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy,
West Germany and Japan. In addition, oil technicians from the Soviet
Union and Romania could also handle most situations. The only major
impact on Libyan oil operations would be caused by a complete withdrawl
of all Western oil workers from the country. Over the longer run, Libyan
petroleum operations would be badly hurt by this move.
Impact of Loss of Libyan Oil Terminals
Libya has five oil export terminal and the loss of these facilities
would cripple the oil industry. Libya would have no ability to export
its oil.
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SECRET
Destination of Libyan Oil, 1 December 1985
1,000 b/d
Liftings of
Liyban Oil
Communist States (total)
170
Bulgaria
25
Romania
8
Yu
osla
i
g
a
v
a
37
USSR
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