CPPG MEETING ON IRAG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000200050003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 22, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
CPPG Meeting on Iraq
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
NIC 03455-86
A/NIO/NESA
DATE
22 Jul 1986
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
buildings
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
DDI
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b.
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FORM L 7 O USE PREVIOUS
1-79 v 1 EDITIONS
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
NIC 03455-86
22 July 1986
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: CPPG Meeting on Iraq
1. After supplying a paper (Attachment A) and a briefing on the
Iran/Iraq war last week, the Director requested further information and
expanded recommendations in preparation for his weekly meeting with
Admiral Poindexter. I am forwarding the paper written in response to
that request (Attachment B) to provide our view of the situation before
the upcoming CPPG.
2. If we can be of any further assistance, please ask. I would also
like to take the opportunity to compliment the analysts in NESA covering
the war. They have always been cooperative and supportive of our efforts
but, more importantly, their analysis have been well ahead of
developments in the war and certainly ahead of the rest of the
community. I have found them anxious to "push the evidence" and
thoroughly professional.
3. I look forward to hearing the results of the CPPG.
Attachments:
As stated
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
N
National Intelligence Council 1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for
Near East and South Asia
SUBJECT: Developments in the Iran-Iraq War
1. A crisis in Iraq could be imminent. In our recent SNIE
(Attachment A) we judged that Baghdad would probably lose the war over
the longer term if it did not exploit its military advantages. Saddam
has not substantially altered his war policies and the possibility of a
collapse of Iraqi will is rapidly becoming more plausible. Several
current developments are particularly disturbing:
-- Iraq is faring badly in what has become a major Iranian effort
(at least six Revolutionary Guard and two regular Army
divisions) to take a strategic ridgeline overlooking key Iraqi
communications and logistics lines. (Attachment B)
-- There is a confluence of factors leading Iran to conclude that
it must act now if it hopes to achieve a decisive victory. For
example, the Iraqi Air Force has recently demonstrated
dramatically the vulnerability of Iranian oil and communications
facilities to its precision weapons, but they have not sustained
the attacks in a way that seriously impairs Iran's ability to
make war.
2. is especially noteworthy, particu
their t oug gical dimensions of the war.
not an Iranian drive to Baghdad but a series of dramatic victories that
destroys Iraqi military and political cohesion.
The war has lingered on for so long that there is a dangerous,
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widely held, assumption that the situatio
n will not change rapidly
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3. Recommend the following:
-- That we advise NSC and other senior policymakers of 25X1
the remainder of 1986.
current situation and the prospects for 25X1
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SECREIi
The Director of Central Intelligence
WasAington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
NIC 03384-86
16 July 1986
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA
1. Saddam Husayn's grip may be slipping and his political fortunes
are closely linked to reversing recent trends in the war. On the Iranian
side, there is significant evidence that Iran has embarked on a major
effort to win the war in the near term.
2. Iraq has suffered two serious military setbacks in 1986--A1 Faw
and now Mehran. Al Faw was a strategic loss and Mehran was (so far) only
a tactical reversal, but both were major blows to Iraqi morale. By using
surprise, better planning, and improved coordination Iranian forces have
achieved success in limited attacks that have kept Iraq guessing and
preserved the initiative for Iran. Even with these improvements, Iran
could only impose a decisive strategic defeat on Iraq in conjunction with
there are indications that Iranian efforts to erode/mora a are eginning
to bear fruit:
Iraqi casualties for this year (at least 30,000) are as high as
all of last year. Civilian morale is described as the "lowest
ever", with the first indications of widespread, open complaining
about Saddam s mismanagement of the war.
Similar criticism has been noted in the military--from generals
to enlisted men at the front.
The Iraqi economy has continued to deteriorate with little hope
of improvement.
3. In spite of these problems, there is little threat from the
organized resistance elements such as the Iranian sponsored Da'wa or
Kurdish groups. The more likely threat to Saddam comes from the senior
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ranks of the military or from within the Bath party itself.
4. On the Iranian side, our information shows that the calls for a
one million man mobilization are not merely another recruitment campaign
but an unprecedented effort to increase available military manpower
(although we don't know if it will actually result in a one million man
increase). The new recruits are now undergoing training and not yet
being rushed to the front. We have no indications that a major offensive
is imminent. If, however, the object of Iranian efforts is to destroy
Iraqi morale, we may not see a massive offensive but a series of
operations aimed at tactically attainable objectives that further
embarrass Saddam, inflict casualties, and divert Iraqi resources.
5. In short, the key element in preserving Iraqi stability will be
the performance of the military. A major defeat--especially in a large
campaign that inflicts significant casualties--would have a significant
impact. Short of a complete debacle, another tactical defeat in the near
term would not result in an unravelling of the military or a collapse of
the front, but would further undermine Saddam's position. Over the
longer term, a failure to develop and execute an effective strategy could
well result in an outright Iranian victory.
-- Advise NSC and other senior policymakers of
the current situation and the prospects for the
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-- Seriously study the costs and benefits of further discussions/
initiatives with the Soviets (See NIO/US'SR's
comments.)
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SUBJECT: CPPG Meeting on Iraq
NIC/A/NIO/NESA~
Distribution:
Orig - DUI
1 - AC/NIC
1 - UC/NIC
1 - A/NIU/MESA
1 - NIO/NESA (Chrono
(22 July 1986)
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