IRANIAN FACTIONALISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000200040002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 14, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Appro
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14,November 1986
600874 R000200040002-5
Iranian Factionalism: Implications\for the United States
Summary
The current infighting in Iran is only the`surface manifestation
of deep-seated theological, institutional, geoo aphical, and
personal divisions. Clerical factionalism, in fa` t is the
regime's chief weakness. These divisions fuel instability that is
likely to work more to the advantage of radical than moderate
forces in Iran. The inability of pragmatic or moderate leaders to
gain a decisive edge probably will give powerful radical factions
a veto over significantly improved relations with the United
States for some time to come.
This paper was prepared by the Persian Gulf
Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
NESA M 86-20167
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Three broad categories of Iranian leaders have become apparent
since the revolution in 1979. Radicals support aggressive export
of the revolution, continuation of the war, and greater government
control of the economy.' They are most vehemently opposed to the
United States. A moderate/conservative coalition generally
opposes violent export of the revolution, favors a negotiated end
to the war, and seeks to limit the government's economic role.
This group is most anti-Soviet but is also suspicious of the
United States. Pragmatists maneuver between the two other
factions, for the most part choosing policies they believe advance
Iran's national interests--and their own political careers
We believe these terms accurately depict the broad divisions in
Iranian politics. They are not, however, meant to imply that
Iranian political factions are well-defined, coherent entities.
Both the moderate and radical camps are comprised of members who
share a core set of assumptions and beliefs but who differ among
themselves on specific issues. The pragmatists are the most
difficult to categorize, since by definition they adhere to some
radical and some moderate policies. Pragmatism and moderation,
however, are not identical. The pragmatists adopt different
positions at different times on the same issue, depending on their
calculation of what serves their near-term political interests.
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Personal relations and familial ties play an important role. Key
leaders move in an out of alliances, blurring ideological or
policy differences. Many of the clerics are related by blood or
marriage, creating loyalties that sometimes transcend other
considerations.
The key factor in a change in Iranian perceptions probably will
not be the rise to power of a particular leader or faction or
Iranian considerations of the practical benefits that might result
from better relations; the key is likely to be the extent to which
a consensus of Iranian leaders becomes convinced that the United
States understands, accepts, and respects the Iranian revolution
and its basic precepts. Iranian leaders will have to present
evidence to the Iranian people that it was the United States, not
Iran, that changed its outlook and made reconciliation possible.
The Roots of Factionalism
The roots of political factionalism are deeply embedded in Iranian religion
and culture. Nearly eight years after the revolution, even the central issue of
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the proper role of clerics in governing remains unresolved. At one extreme are
Khomeini and those clerics who accept his interpretation of Shia doctrine as
calling for direct clerical rule. These activists advocate strict clerical
supervision of society under the the leadership of a supreme religious
jurisprudent (velayat-e faqih). In the middle are clerical moderates who argue
for general clerical supervision, with less direct intervention in the
government. At the other extreme are quietists who oppose any clerical
involvement in politics--and hence, the whole structure of Khomeini's Islamic
Republic
The'activists and moderates presently control the regime. The quietists are
on the sideline. Included in this group are the Shia Grand Ayatollahs--those
senior clerics who theoretically are Khomeini's religious equals. Only four
Grand Ayatollahs other than Khomeini are living. One resides in Iraq. Of the
three in Iran, one has been under house arrest since 1984 because of his
opposition to Khomeini; one engages in moderate criticism of the regime; and one
generally avoids involvement in politics.
The dissent of the Grand Ayatollahs and other influential Shia clerics from
the concept of theocratic government as practiced by Khomeini works against the
institutionalization of his regime. Once Khomeini dies, his religious critics
probably will speak out more forcefully against Khomeini's doctrines. His
heirs, lacking his religious credentials, are likely to be on the defensive on
this issue. This may force them to cling even more strongly to Khomeini's
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legacy on other issues, for fear that an admission of his fallibility on any one
policy would lend credence to the charge that Khomeini's whole concept of
clerical rule was flawed.
Institutional Division
The clerics are divided by institutional rivalries. The regime contains a
variety of competing power centers, only some of which are part of the
government structure. The most important institutions--in and out of the
government--each have leaders who are key players in the succession struggle.
Over 10 quasi-official revolutionary organizations that sprang up during the
revolution remain largely autonomous, despite some government success in recent
years in bringing them more under central control. These include the
Revolutionary Guard, the komitehs--revolutionary cells that carry out many of
the functions of local governments--and the Foundation for the Oppressed, which
took over much of the Shah's assets. Included as well is the Qom theological
circle--influential clerics in Iran's theological capital who have their own
network of followers, many of whom are armed.
The most significant rivalry between traditional government institutions and
revolutionary organizations is between the Revolutionary Guard and regular armed
forces. The Guard is the clear winner and is well along toward supplanting the
regular army as Iran's premier military force. The Guard has steadily expanded
its manpower and equipment, and it has been shaped more along conventional
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military lines. Last year Khomeini decreed that it develop its own air and
naval forces. The Guard is solidly in the radical camp. Revolutionary Guard
Minister Rafiq-Dust; Rezai, the commander of the Guard's combat forces; and the
bulk of the Guard's rank-and-file support the radicals' policies on the war and
export of the revolution.
Within the government, the overlapping and interlocking authority of the
executive branch, the Majles (Assembly), the judiciary, and the Council of
Guardians reinforces institutional and personal rivalries. The Cabinet, headed
by Prime Minister Musavi, has become a bastion of radical influence, with
notable exceptions like conservative Foreign Minister Velayati. President
Khamenei and his staff are pragmatists, but more likely to support moderate than
radical policies. The 272-member Majles, Rafsanjani's main institutional base,
is roughly evenly balanced between radicals and moderates/conservatives. A
hardcore conservative bloc of about 90 members has frequently joined with
moderates to prevent the passage of radical legislation. The Council of
Guardians, whose job is to ensure that legislation is in conformity with the
constitution and the laws of Islam, has emerged as the most conservative
official body. It has vetoed as "un-Islamic" bills providing for extensive land
reform and nationalization of foreign trade.
The regular armed forces do not now and are unlikely in the future to play a
significant role in the political process. They have been extensively purged of
elements suspected of harboring anti-regime sentiment, and clerical control has
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been tightened through the installation of loyal officers and an extensive
system of informers. The regular forces are likely to become more politically
important only if the Revolutionary Guard and other armed revolutionary
organizations exhaust themselves in internecine conflict. Even then the regular
forces probably will be unable to act independently and will have to seek
alliances with more moderate and conservative clerical elements.
Khomeini's Role
The regime has never developed a mechanism to manage policy disputes among
these many power centers without resort to Khomeini. His major aim has been to
prevent any one from becoming too powerful, rather than resolve disputes in a
decisive way that might alienate the losers. He has, in fact, perpetuated the
rivalries by playing power centers and leaders off against each other. With
Khomeini's control faltering, the barely suppressed rivalries are beginning to
surface. His heirs will enter the post-Khoemini era with no precedent of
resolving their disputes peacefully among themselves through compromise
.The result of Khomeini's aloofness to date has been relative political
stability at the price of near paralysis in policy making. Seven years into the
revolution, the regime has not yet resolved such key issues as the
nationalization of foreign trade; land reform; private vs. public control of the
economy; and rural migration. In foreign policy, all Iranian leaders espouse
"export of the revolution," but differ sharply over methods and targets.
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Conservatives support peaceful efforts, such as expanded contacts with Muslim
communities, international seminars, and increased religious proselytizing.
Radicals advocate violent methods, including terrorist attacks, training
dissidents, and vitriolic
ganda attacks on various Muslim countries
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Policy Disputes
Khomeini's major public statements in recent years have leaned more toward
the moderate/conservative position on foreign and domestic policies than toward
the radicals, except on the war and relations with the United States. Early
this year, Khomeini implicitly supported the rights of private property and a
large role for free enterprise-in the economy. In October 1984 he endorsed the
pragmatists' call for new departures in foreign relations designed to end Iran's
severe international isolation and expand its diplomatic and economic ties to
both East and West. He urged relations with all governments--except the United
States, South Africa, and Israel
We believe a trend has developed over the past four years toward a more
pragmatic foreign policy. Countervailing pressures continue, however, and no
issues appear to have been finally resolved. Pragmatism and moderation are not
identical. We believe the conservatives oppose terrorism in principle, for
example, whereas the pragmatists' opposition is only tactical. They are quite
ready to resort to it if they believe it will advance their goals. As the
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pragmatists exerted more control over foreign policy, the use of terrorism
became more carefully directed at specific objectives and became more lethal.
Attacks on US installations in Lebanon are a case in point. Pragmatists also
have led Iran into closer relations with Syria and a shared effort to expel US
forces from the region.
The Balance of Power
In our view, Khomeini's pronouncements have not significantly altered the
domestic balance of power between the factions. The radicals are still firmly
ensconced at all levels of Iranian politics. More importantly, they are better
armed than their rivals. Radicals dominate the Revolutionary Guard, and the
Guard is likely to be the key in determining the outcome of the leadership
struggle.
The pivotal role of the Guard also will influence significantly the future
of Iran's relations with the United States. The Guard is troubled by
factionalism, Different units are
more loyal to local clerics, commanders, or political leaders than to the Guard
hierarchy. The key political contenders are likely to compete for the loyalty
of Guard factions to support their bid for power. The need of political leaders
to maintain Guard support works strongly against moderating trends in Iran. The
pragmatists, even if they gain the upper hand in the power struggle, are likely
to owe their success more to their radical constituency in the Guard than to any
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other single element. This will be a major impediment to their chances of
adopting more moderate policies or seeking an opening to the United States as a
means of solving Iran's growing military and economic problems.
Montazeri's Role
The power of the radicals made Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's designated
successor, an important ally of those favoring more moderate policies.
Montazeri in the early years of the revolution espoused radical causes,
especially on aggressive export of the revolution. He had close ties to the
Revolutionary Guard and supervised its ideological training. Over about the
past three years, Montazeri has tried to moderate his image. He has called for
curbs on revolutionary organizations and reduced government involvement in the
economy. he has recently severely criticized
radical Prime Minister Musavi. He also reportedly distrusts the Revolutionary
Guard and has removed them from his personal bodyguard and replaced them with
men from his hometown.
Montazeri was probably too weak politically even before the recent arrest of
his associates to initiate dramatic policy changes on his own in a post-Khomeini
Iran. As Khomeini's handpicked successor, however, he could have bolstered the
legitimacy of moderate policies advocated by.other Iranian leaders and help tilt
the balance more in their favor. The undermining of his prestige has reduced
his usefulness to the moderates. We believe the setback to the moderates on
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this score outweighs the gains of eliminating a small group of radicals in
Montazeri's entourage.
Rafsanjani's Role
The increasing influence of Rafsanjani seems to have mixed results for the
moderates. As someone who approaches policy largely bereft of ideological
blinders, we expect Rafsanjani must have begun to have doubts about continuing
the war at the price of practically destroying the Iranian economy and risking
Iran's long-term ability to be the dominant power in the Gulf--and to play a
large role in the Middle East--simply to eliminate the Ba'thist regime in Iraq.
Of all the contenders for power, Rafsanjani seems best poised after Khomeini
dies to move Iran gradually and incrementally toward a moderation of its
revolutionary excesses.
At the same time, Rafsanjani's success in becoming the regime's second most
powerful political figure reflects his skill in maintaining support among both
radicals and moderates and avoiding a firm commitment to either camp's agenda.
His power rests not on his leadership of a coherent coalition committed to a
particular set of policies--much less moderate ones--but on his ability to stay
on top of the shifting political infighting among groups pursuing diverse
objectives.
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If moderation is indeed Rafsanjani's ultimate goal, he must first
consolidate his power, and to do that, he needs radical support. Probably more
to the point, he must avoid taking any steps that would cause the radicals to
coalesce into an anti-Rafsanjani bloc. In particular, he--like any other
contender--will need the support of significant Revolutionary Guard factions to
gain political dominance. In order to mollify his radical constituency, we
believe Rafsanjani must continue to tread carefully on the two issues that the
radicals view as the litmus test of commitment to the revolution and to
Khomeini's legacy: continuation of the fight against Iraq and opposition to the
United States.
Besides having to appease the radicals, Rafsanjani's hardline stance on the
war also offends the moderates. He has assumed a more prominent role this year
in directing the war and is heavily involved in preparations for the offensive.
His influence will be enhanced if an offensive succeeds, but damaged if it is
postponed indefinitely or is launched but fails. Rafsanjani's political
survival would not guarantee that Iran will someday turn toward moderation, but
his demise would be a severe setback for such prospects.
Implications for the United States
We do not believe that any Iranian leader other than Khomeini has the power
to initiate a rapprochement with the United States or even to offer such a
suggestion for debate. Relations with the United States remain in a unique
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category. Khomeini has exempted the United States from the countries with which
Iran should seek good relations. This fact together with the Islamic
revolution's inherent animosity toward the United States makes it virtually
imposssible to judge Iran's readiness to improve relations with Washington by
assessing general trends toward moderation. The Iranians are capable of seeking
closer ties to Western Europe, for example, while still treating the United
States.as a pariah.
Iran's anti-US stance was not adopted as a pragmatic move that can be
abandoned overnight just as pragmatically, nor was it a knee-jerk reaction
easily discarded after more sober afterthought or considerations of the
practical benefits of reconciliation. It is a basic element in the ideological
precepts of Khomeini's Islamic revolution. It is rooted in the fundamentalists'
view of the United States not only as the chief threat to the survival of their
Iranian revolution but as the main obstacle to their divinely-inspired
obligation to spread that revolution throughout the world.
Both superpowers are seen by Khomeini as forming an antagonistic front
against Islam, but he holds the United States in special contempt because of its
former relationship with the hated Shah and because it is perceived as more
powerful worldwide and therefore more threatening. In the Iranian
fundamentalists' view, the threat is more than raw power. It is the cultural
seduction of the West's materialism, secularism, and sexual liberalism that
leads Muslims away from traditional Islamic values.
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Rapprochement with the United States after years of preaching this view
would thus call into question the regime's claim of religious invincibility.
The death of Khomeini and the resolution of the power struggle in favor of the
moderates/conservatives--which we belive is the less likely outcome--would
enhance the prospects for improved relations. Even then, Khomeini's legacy will
not be easily abandoned. The key factor in a change in Iranian perceptions
probably will not be the rise to power of a particular leader or faction or
Iranian considerations of the practical benefits that might result from better
relations; the key is likely to be the extent to which a consensus of Iranian
leaders becomes convinced that the United States understands, accepts, and
respects the Iranian revolution and its basic precepts. Iranian leaders will
have to present evidence to the Iranian people that it was the United States,
not Iran, that changed its outlook and made reconciliation possible.
We do not believe Iran's economic downturn will have much near-term
influence on its leaders' receptivity to improved relations with the United
States. A government dominated by pragmatists and moderates probably would
devote more resources to economic rebuilding, but while the power struggle
continues, these groups are more likely to expend their political capital on
winding down or ending the war than on the more risky effort to improve
relations with Washington. They probably would not anticipate significant US
economic aid under the best of circumstances, and we do not believe that even
those leaders willing to draw closer to the United States politically would be
willing or able to increase Iran's economic dependency on the United States.
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We have no evidence that the leadership currently is considering specific
options for making overtures to the United States, and therefore can only
conjecture what issues the Iranians will want to discuss. We expect they will
--The war, and related issues of US support for Iraq and for Iran.
--Iran's involvement in terrorism.
--Iran's support for radical Shias in Lebanon, and the Shias
military actions against Israel and Israeli surrogate forces.
--Tehran's militant opposition to Israel's existence
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