TALKING POINTS FOR TEH ADDI SOUTH AFRICA-UNITA-ANGOLA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91B00874R000100250006-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 8, 2011
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 8, 1986
Content Type:
MISC
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8 September 1986
TALKING POINTS FOR THE ADDI
South Africa-UNITA-Angola
A Marriage of Convenience
The South Africa-UNITA relationship is a marriage of convenience with each
side sharing at present common regional goals. We do not believe that
Savimbi would maintain the same cozy relationship with South Africa should
his quest for power in Angola be successful.
&A ~.
-- Pretoria is UNITA's single most important backer and
full range of military and lngi-,tir ruipport-
provides a
Moreover, the protection offered round and air a U ~~6~fi
--
strength in Nami is apparently has made Angola hesitant a ou
crunching ground or air strikes deep in UNITA's tIiieastern
stronghold.
-- Pretoria for its part publicly admited its materiel support to
d has praised Savimbi as a ea er
In lic remarks, UNITA leader Savimbi has tried to balance the
important uth Africa's military support against the political
disadvantage of ties to a regional pariah. Savimbi argues that he hay n Il~{I~`~~'
other alternative but to accept Pretoria's support while professing his
opposition to apartheid as a system. He is publicly on record as 1A`A'0
supporting Pretoria's own internal reform program. p , 9125X1
Working Relationship
In their working relationship, South Africa and UNITA coordinate closely
on plans and objectives. Savimbi has traveled on several
occasions for high-level rte ions with State President P.W.
Bo-_a there is a regular series o annual 25X1
conferences around the end of the year involving senior South African
UATT -military officials to lay out objectives, support requirements, and
joint plans for the coming year.
-- For day-to-day operations, Pretoria reportedly maintains liaison
officers at UNITA's headquarters in am a in southeastern n-g a. too
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Materiel Support and Training
UNITA receives most of its materiel support either from or through South
A.rjcan controlled Namibia. South African assistance reaches the
insurgents in a variety ways: the bulk probably is trucked to the
bord and turned over to the insurgents. Pretoria also air its vital
supplies to UNITA bases and on occasion has flown its aircra ep into
Angolan territory to_paradrop supplies to UNITA forces fighting in
northern Angola.
-- The main insurgent y i extends from the border to Jamba,
through avinga and on to _Munnhaann~g_.o. The materiel is transported
through ut TA-controlled territory by UNITA trucks on
rudimentary roads and bridges built and maintained by UNITA
engineers. Outside this territory, UNITA relies on columns of
bearers.
South African airdrops in northern
through because of Savimbi's strong objections.
Angolan have become i FisAY e to expansion of the
e ense system. After a near intercept of a South
African aircraft earlier this year, Savimbi was told that these
flights would be stopped, but Pretoria reportedly did not carry
South Africa Provides both specialist and basic training for
rov
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troops ranging from basic infantry tics to specialized
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Z6'i unications, intelligence nd. pmnlitions training.
-- UNITA has two major training centers: one at its headquarters at v
jam Da and
-- The Babwata base lies on the Angolan-Namibian border and the
bor e~ r bT cts the camp. On one side is a South African camp and do ither a complex of'UNIIA r inino a -
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Direct Military Support
than wou intervene again is year it UNITA were har
Intervention. Pretoria periodical) intervenes in the fighting in
support of UNITA. From roperations of its small special forces units S6.
ir-e opera ons by South African re ulars, Pretoria's involvement
~vpI VU"
ap to nave grown in the last few years. %
-- Last yeaarr, in the first confirmed major intervention on UNITA's
Behalf, South African air attacks were instrumental in stopping
the major Angolan offensive territory short of its
object!
at Mavinaa___
.,25X1
AhS
-- Pretoria promised UNITA 25X1
pressed by anotner government offensive. We be ieve
re-fooria's commitment to UNITA is sufficiently strong that it is
prepared to risk entanglement with the growing strength of the
Soviet- and Cuban-supported Angolan airforce.
orces. South Africa maintains about(20.000 troops i
northern Namibi, including territorial forces, op licand a sm
reservists-. Most f these troops are commited to internal security
operations in Namibia or anti-SWAPO raids into southwestern Angola.- For
operations in s don
-- For the last few years,
Udff MY eu tiwo Gov s--v L must. are con %_ 0~5
co r ina in southeastern Angola. For C6h~
larger, but less frequent operations, Pretoria ca son the 32nd CDC \Avk~oe~
Battalion.
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Pretoria has had small 10-20 man commando teams "
operating in Angola continually against ngo an mi
facilities, transporation, or economic facilities. Some of the
operations are conducted unilaterally--such as the cPahnrnP ra;rl
on Namibe harbor earlier this year that sunk a Cuban ship and
hours. Last year, South African aircraft flew rom the smaller,
ut deployment of its aircraft from
South Africa to the main fighter base at 0ndan wa take only a fe~
UNITA and,
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ermanentl y maintain a significant portion of
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Operations t Cuito Cuanavale
/I 1A
The most recent j -South African operation of significance took
place last month at Cuito Cuanaval In the belief that the Angolan 11
government was in the final stages of preparation for its major seasonal
offensive in the southeast, UNITA planned
lion attack
e
intended to disrupt govern e me ap rations and postpone the offensive..
o
NITA effort and rtiller unction and t
avinga in earl The operation was approved by State
resident Botha and Pretoria's particip ion was o e
erected by a senior South African general.
Battalion participated in the attack-.
The attack was launched on the evening o 9 Au us
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elements of the 32nd ?l"25X1
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UNITA reportedly overran the airfield briefly but was driven back by
counterattacking government defenders
ort the SQ, '/ 5X1
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