TALKING POINTS - AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000100200011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 10, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100200011-8
TALKING POINTS - AFGHANISTAN
10 JULY 1986
Afghanistan
Military Events
Combat activity in Afghanistan has intensified-since late spring.
Soviet and Afghan regime forces are seeking to consolidate control of key
urban-areas, curtail guerrilla resupply and infiltration activity, and
respond to insurgent activities. The overall level of Soviet ground
activity is well below that of the comparable period last year, however.
--Fighting has accelerated around the western city of Herat in
recent weeks.
--The Soviets and Afghans are conducting a major operation in
northern Afghanistan against guerrilla forces led by Panjsher Valley
commander Masood. Initiated in mid-June, the offensive initially relied
heavily on Soviet artillery and aircraft for the attacks on insurgent base
camps. During the second phase of the offensive, Afghan infantry units
have taken a afore active role in the sweeps.
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--The Soviets have significantly increased pressure on insurgents
in the southeastern province of Qandahar. Around Qandahar city itself, the
Soviets and Afghan regime forces have established three rings of security
outposts to tighten their control of access to the city.
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The Soviets and Afghans have also increased efforts to weaken Pakistani
support for the insurgency.
increased substantially this year.
--Cross-border violations by Soviet and Afghan aircraft have
country.
still able to deny the Soviets and Afghan regime control of most of the
Despite the intensified military pressure on them, the guerrillas are
of 29 provinces.
--The insurgents repeatedly ambush convoys and mine roads, forcing
the commitment of extensive military resources by the Soviets and Afghans
to protect those lines of communication. The insurgents are active in 27
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--The insurgent's antiair efforts are also continuing. According
to our estimates, Soviet aircraft losses are running at about the same
level as last year, and regime losses have gone up considerably.
The Afghan Army has attempted to take a more aggressive and leading
role against the insurgents this year, but the Soviet military is still the
lynchpin of combat operations.
--The Afghan Army scored one of its few victories in overrunning
the insurgent base camp at Zhawar Killi in April; however, it suffered
heavy casualties. It also depended heavily on Soviet air and artillery
support.
--Continuing high casualties and desertion rates continue to
fundercut the development of the Afghan Armed Forces which remains at less
than 50 percent strength. Shortages of manpower apparently are forcing the
army to shorten or postpone some planned operations.
Political Situation
The replacement of Babrak Karmal as General Secretary of the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan on 14 May is continuing to provoke
dissension in the party and the army.
--Serious opposition to new leader Najibullah is evident in the
ruling Parchami faction, and several hundred Babrak supporters have been
arrested since the leadership changeover. Widespread opposition to
Babrak's removal probably forced Najibullah to keep him on as Politburo
member and President of the Revolutionary Council.
--Many party members are concerned about losing their posts or
being arrested, as purges associated with Najibullah's advancement trickle
down party ranks.
--Problems in the party probably precipitated the visit in late
June of Soviet Central Ccr:mittee Secretariat member Korniyenko, who
probably urged restraint on Najibullah.
The army leadership is also concerned about the Najibullah advancement
and the possibility of further purges.
--Some units were put under Soviet control during the transition.
Intelligence officers loyal to Babrak have been dismissed or arrested.
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Najibullah's efforts to boost army strength by ending student draft
deferments and forcibly conscripting youth are also likely to backfire.
--Public protests have already occurred in Kabul and antipathy to
the government's conscription campaign may lead to increased refugee flight
to Pakistan or new defections to the resistance.
--Even if the numbers increase, the absence of adequate training
wil~the performance and reliability of new units will remain poor.
PAKISTAN
Junejo's Views toward Afghanistan
We believe that both Prime Minister Junejo and President Zia will
continue to provide support to the resistance as long as US aid is not cut
off or the Soviets do not put forward a withdrawal timetable offer
Islamabad considers sufficiently close to its six-month stand. We also
think it is possible that Pakistan will try to postpone the next round of
Geneva talks scheduled for 30 July.
Prime Minister Junejo has always supported the current policy-- but he
has also been concerned about the impact of the continued presence of the
Afghan refugees.
--We believe Junejo currently is worried about Soviet-Afghan
destabilization efforts in the North-West Frontier Province--part of an
intensified effort to pressure Pakistan into an unfavorable agreement with
Kabul to end the Afghan insurgency.
--Sabotage bombings have claimed some 500 casualties in more than
40 incidents between January and June.
--In our view, Junejo's fears have been compounded by the return
of_Benazir Bhutto and her campaign to unseat his government through her
Decisionmaking on Afghanistan
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We do not believe Junejo sees an alternative to encouraging the Soviets
to leave Afghanistan by keeping up military pressure via the resistance.
In our view, he is primarily concerned that Afghan policy not be
politicized by actions that would stir up resentment toward the United
States, which reporting by our missions in Pakistan
indicates is running high.
--Our Embassy in Islamabad reported that Junejo believes his
government will fall if it is seen to be bowing to US pressure.
Relations with the Alliance and Views about a Settlement
Junejo almost certainly is anxious for an early settlement and shares
Zia's frustration with the alliance's disunity, but we have no reason to
suspect that his fundamental requirements for an agreement differ from
Zia's--the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the return of the Afghan
refugees.
--Junejo apparently does not play a guiding role in the
negotiations and is not intimately involved in them.
--We have no reports of Juneio briefing the r
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In our view, both Zia and Junejo would reconsider policy toward
Afghanistan if US assistance were cut off because of Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program.
--Domestic pressure to end support for the resistance would rise
sharply; critics would charge that the United States lured Pakistan into a
threatening position only to prove once again that it was an unreliable
ally. Belt-tightening as a result of the aid cutoff would be readily
supported by the Pakistani public.
--A quick peace agreement that gets the Soviets out of Afghanistan
but does not address US concerns regarding a broadly-based government
becomes much more likely; Islamabad probably would encourage the refugees
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100200011-8