QUESTIONS ON NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000100190007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 18, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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QUESTIONS ON NICARAGUA
NIO/LA
18 June 1986
The following questions on Nicaragua have been addressed to the
Administration by the Congressional Leadership, and our assistance has
been requested in answering them.
QUESTION: Why are East European deliveries to Nicaragua down compared
to previous years?
ANSWER: East European military deliveries to Nicaragua have been
significantly reduced in 1986 compared to previous years,
apparently because these countries are no longer willing to
provide military assistance on easy credit terms. They have
been disillusioned by the Sandinistas' inability to pay past
debts even on the easy terms provided. The Soviet Union, on
the other hand, appears to be willing to provide even greater
military assistance to Nicaragua despite Moscow's realization
that the Sandinistas are unlikely to fully repay their
debts. Thus Moscow has more than made up for the slack in
East European deliveries.
QUESTION: What changes in Nicaragua have occurred over the last year
which indicate continued desire by the Sandinistas to
consolidate the Marxist-Leninist regime.
ANSWER: Over the past year, the following Sandinista actions indicate
that they are unwilling to compromise with the opposition and
are determined to consolidate a Marxist-Leninist regime in
Nicaragua.
-- Managua declared a state of emergency in October 1985
which a
activity or other signs of dissent.
-- The regime has suspended its dialogue with the Church,
openly accused Caf` ina Obando y Bravo of being a tr-a
to Nicaragua, closed the Church radio station, and
confiscated its newspaper.
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-- The regime has broken off reconciliation talks with the
Miskito Indians in eastern Nicaragua and has launched a
new military offensive which has driven over 10,000 of
them back into Honduras.
-- The regime has arrested over 1,500 political opponent ,
swelling the a re arge prison population to perhaps
10,000 inmates.
-- The regime has pushed ahead with its ratification of a
constitution despite a boycott of the deliberations by
several opposition parties in the National Assembly. The
constitution bans all political parties that do not
support the revolution, grants extraordinary powers to the
President, fails to provide guarantees for private
property, and maintains the armed forces as a military arm
of the Sandinista party.
-- The Sandinistas have stepped up confiscation of private
proper~t , and Commandan a ee aspu is y s a e
th-a'C-the concept of private property is no longer valid in
Nicaragua.
-- The Sandinista regime has refused to even acknowledge a
declaration by six moderate opposition parties that calls
for the lifting of the state-of-emergency, a general
amnesty, a dialogue with all elements of the opposition,
including the insurgents, and new legislative elections.
-- The Sandinistas have continued to reject the signing of a
Contadora Treaty which would force them to limit their
military buildup, would provide guarantees of democratic
pluralism, and would provide comprehensive international
verification of its political and security provisions.
QUESTION: How do we know aircraft revetments at Punta Huete are for
fighter aircraft?
ANSWER: The aircraft revetments at Punta Huete are similar to
reve men aircraft.
TFiese revetments are large enough to accommodate three MIGs
at one time, if necessary, and they also can protect larger
aircraft such as bombers and transports.
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QUESTION: What is the likely Soviet response to increased aid for the
Contras?
ANSWER: The Soviets will probably continue to provide increased
military aid to the Sandinsta regime to assist its
counterinsurgency effort, such as helicopters, trucks,
artillery weapons and small arms. They will probably refrain
from supplying US-proscribed arms, such as MIG-21 fighters,
but may test the limits of US tolerance in grey areas such as
L-39s or surface-to-air missiles.
QUESTION: What proof do we have that the recent Soviet delivery from
Nikolayev contained arms?
ANSWER: While we have no positive proof that the recent Soviet
delivery from Nikolayev contained arms, the following factors
persuade us that such is the case.
-- The ship misrepresented its destination when it left the
Black Sea, by declaring for Havana,
-- The fact that the ship took a long journey around South
America to avoid passing through the Panama Canal
indicates it was carrying a sensitive cargo.
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-- The ship which made the deliveries is known to have made a
short stop in Peru where arms were off loaded.
QUESTION: How much Soviet and East European economic aid is being
provided to Nicaragua?
ANSWER: The Soviet Bloc and radical Arab states have provided
aragua w- h about 1. bi ion in economic aid since 1979,
along with over $500 million in military aid. The bulk of
n ex en a pas wo ye , and we expect
another $500 million to be delivered in 1986. Such aid
includes all of Nicaragua's oil needs, as well as basic
necessities such as food, agricultural equipment,
construction materials, and industrial goods. The Soviet
Bloc is also engaged in a number of large-scale economic
development projects, including textile mills, hydroelectric
plants, port development and a large agricultural project.
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QUESTION: What evidence is there that the insurgency will bring the
Sandinistas to the negotiating table?
ANSWER: The anti-Sandinista insurgency undoubtedly was a major factor
in bringing the Sandinistas to the negotiating table. The
Sandinistas only agreed to serious Contadora talks in
mid-1983, after the insurgency became a major threat to the
economy. Without a viable insurgency, Sandinista incentives
to make negotiating concessions would be reduced and the
democratic opposition would be weakened. A stronger and more
viable insurgency would tempt Managua to accept a less
advantageous Contadora Treaty and undertake at least minimal
talks with the internal opposition on national
reconciliation. Nevertheless, there is some possibility that
no amount of incentives or other pressure would induce
Managua to make fundamental concessions.
QUESTION: Which of the Sandinista Commandantes are more willing to
compromise and reach a settlement with the external
opposition?
ANSWER: Although the Sandinista Commandantes disagree over whether to
make tactical concessions to the opposition, there is no
disagreement over the basic objective of consolidating a
Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua. It would be an
illusion to believe that any of the Commandantes are willing
to make any basic compromises on democratic pluralism or
security that would threaten the survival of the Sandinista
regime.
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19 June 66, iUIS
Pres/House Mbrs
- Three things I'd like to tell you about the situation in Nicaragua.
First the positive side.
- Strength of resistance is high--close to 10,000 combat troops inside
Nicaragua and another 5,000 being reprovisioned and refitted in Honduras--1,000
Indian troops under arms in the eastern part of the country--flight of Indian
refugees over the border has created more potential recruits than can be armed.
- In the south, six field commanders previously loyal to Pastora will
create a stronger front--with 1,500 men inside Nicaragua now, they recently
received supplies and are now more active than at any time in the past two
years. Resistance avoiding combat and concentrating on maintaining itself
in Nicaragua for the long haul.
- Negative side without early renewal of support the resistance forces
can collapse. They are at the end of a tenuous and increasingly unreliable
supply line. Shortages of food and ammunition have reduced the effectiveness
of combat units fighting inside Nicaragua.
- Units which have been exfiltrated for renewed provision cannot be
brought sufficiently up to strength to send them back inside. Absence of a
reliable supply network and transport prevents them from getting enough food
and supplies. A renewed availability of supplies and improved logistics and
communications are urgently needed if the opposition is to remain strong and
intact.
- The Soviets and the Cubans are significantly stepping up their support
for the Sandinistas.
- Military deliveries to Nicaragua in the first five months of this year
already exceed total tonnage over all of 1985.
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- About a month ago, a Soviet ship brought 100 shipping containers
directly from
Another ship brought five helicopters to Nicaragua recently.
- More are on the way.
- We have seen the deployment of three Soviet-style field hospitals in areas
of heavy insurgency activity since early March. These are located near air strips
to assist the rapid evacuation of Sandinista casualties. There are also two
major Soviet-built and Cuban-run hospitals in rear areas.
- The conflict is becoming increasingly brutal. Over 850 clashes have
taken place from January to May this year. The Sandinistas are increasingly
cracking down on the opposition, confiscating the property of opposition leaders,
O
harassing the Church, even taking away Cardinal,Abando y Bravo's electricity.
- What's the net of all this? Clearly the Soviets and the Sandinistas are
driving hard to extinguish the resistance. They are for advanced in establishing
the machinery of permanent control with political commissars in the military,
with units to enforce population control, to monitor the activities of the
Church and the media, to perform telephone, mail and personal surveillance
on the internal opposition, goon squads stage demonstrations and mass rallies,
block committees control and report on the people and their activities on a
street by street basis in all the cities.
SECRET
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- If the regime succeeds in consolidating itself, this kind of control
will be irreversible. The Sandinistas have comparable mechanisms for spreading
the revolution which means continuing support for the insurgency in El Salvador,
support for the insurgency in Guatemala, fomenting revolution in Honduras,
undermining the government of Costa Rica, support of the M-19 insurgents in
Colombia, and providing assistance for terrorists elsewhere in South America,
and close relations with exiled Chilean communists. This all spells greater
trouble for the future, including Mexico on our southern border.
- The opposition in Nicaragua is at a critical point. The contras have
established themselves well inside Nicaragua. With a reasonable flow of
support they can prevent the consolidation of the communist regime in Nicaragua
and force the Sandinistas to either risk the collapse of their government or
honor their 1979 commitment to establish democracy.
- History shows that progressive withdrawal of domestic support and
gradual erosion of international support is what brings down or alters oppressive
governments. This process is under way in Nicaragua. The insurgents have
made gains among rural peasants who resent agricultural collectivization and
resettlement programs as well as the government's mandatory military draft
and anti-church policies. The heavy financial burden of the counterinsurgency
effort--about half of the Nicaraguan budget last year--combined with poor
economic management has created mounting discontent with the Sandinista
regime.
- Castro was able to eliminate virtually all internal opposition in Cuba
within the first two years. But after almost seven years in power, the
Sandinistas, faced with a continuing insurgency that enjoys only very modest
US support, have not been able to consolidate and eliminate their opposition.
SECRET
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- We've seen this contrast in Africa where the communist regime
consolidated itself in Ethiopia in two years, while Angola has been kept
open by what started out as a small insurgency. Despite the regimes they
installed in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua, the
Soviets now find themselves supporting a Marxist-Leninist government that is
combatting an insurgency. The cost of this to Moscow and its allies is
considerably greater than the cost of aiding the insurgents. In El Salvador,
for example, a low-level US commitment in support of the government has been
a major factor in reversing the fortunes of Nicaraguan and Cuban-backed
insurgents.
- With modest assistance, the Nicaraguan resistance can demonstrate that
the Sandinistas are incapable of providing for the basic needs of the population.
This can create political circumstances and pressure to require the Sandinistas
to reach a political accommodation with the resistance and restoring basic
democratic freedoms.
- There is a proven formula for insurgent and political action against
repressive and vulnerable governments. It can be applied successfully in
Nicaragua if resolve and renewed support can be mustered before the resistance
is allowed to wither away and before the Marxist regime is allowed to
irreversibly entrench itself in Managua.
- None of us want that on our historical record.
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Status of the Insurgency
The Insurgents
In absolute terms, and relative to the Sandinistas, the democratic
resistance is at one of its strongest points ever.
-- The FDN, the largest of the insurgent organizations, has
nearly 10,000 combat troops inside Nicaragua, with another
5,000 reprovisioning and refitting in Honduras. The FDN
appears to have shifted to a strategy of avoiding combat
except on its own terms in an effort to remain inside
Nicaragua, rather than make a few attention-grabing
raids and then withdrawing.
-- The Indian organization, KISAN, has been receiving
some supplies from NHAO and the FDN and probably now has
some 1,000 troops under arms. The recent mass exodus
of refugees in the east coast border area has
given KISAN access to more potential recruits than it
can arm.
-- The affiliation with UNO of six field
commanders previously loyal to Eden Pastors raises the
real possibility of a more viable southern front. We
believe the southern front -- including Pastora's former
commandantes -- has about 1,500 men inside Nicaragua.
They have received some supplies and are now more active
than they have been at any time during the past two years.
Despite these positive signs, the situation for the resistance
nevertheless remains precarious.
-- Resistance forces operate inside Nicaragua at the end
of a tenuous and unreliable resupply apparatus. Lack
of adequate and reliable resupply already has caused the
effective strength of combat units fighting deep inside
Nicaragua to shrink from a high earlier this year of
nearly 5,500 to a current figure of some 2,900.
-- Units which have exfiltrated Nicaragua and currently
are reprovisioning prior to reinfiltration do not have
sufficient supporting weaponry (RPGs, machine guns,
mortars) to get up to full strength. This is reportedly
having a negative impact on unit morale.
-- The absence of a reliable resupply network and the
lack of sufficient logistical transport has prevented
KISAN and southern forces from being adequately
provisioned.
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The Sandinistas
Sandinista counterinsurgency operations have improved, but the
Nicaraguan military continues to encounter significant difficulties.
-- Command-and-control has been streamlined and the war effort
now is being directed by one commander, who controls the
action regardless of what branch of service is involved or
where the fighting is taking place.
-- The 14 counterinsurgency battalions and several lighter
Cazador (hunter) units continue to bear the brunt of the
fighting, and continue to make effective use of Sandinista
communications intercept and direction finding capabilities
as well as poor FDN communications security.
-- The Air Force provides the regime major advantages in
firepower and mobility as well as in logistic support, but
it continues to be hamstrung by command-and-control
problems. Senior FDN field commanders have attested to
the effectiveness of the Sandinistas' helicopter gunships.
Unlike the democratic resistance, the Sandinistas are well supplied
via a continuous flow of arms and equipment from the Soviet Union and
Cuba.
-- The Nicaraguans have received some 10 badly needed Soviet
MI-8/17 transport helicopters during the past few months.
-- The Soviets recently began flying tactical support missions
over northwestern Nicaragua. We believe they have been
conducting aerial reconnaissance flights in search of
insurgent infiltration routes and troop concentrations.
Some information gained from these flights, we believe,
already has been passed to the Sandinistas.
-- This unprecedented Soviet participation in the war effort
could presage even greater support to Sandinista
counterinsurgency operations. We believe it likely
that additional helicopters, and especially helicopter
gunships, will be provided, and the Soviets at some point
may furnish surface-to-air missile systems of the SA-2
or SA-3 type.
The Current Tactical Situation
The pace of the fighting has picked up over the past two months,
and the focus of the action has been in the northwest. The Sandinistas,
however, continue to probe the Honduran border and pursue resistance
elements operating deep inside Nicaragua.
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-- Casualties on both sides remain high, but we have
no firm or reliable figures. Continuing high
casualty rates favor the Sandinistas, as resistance
forces have inadequate in-country facilities for
treating wounded.
The tactical initiative is in flux as each side seeks to establish
its objectives.
-- The resistance apparently wants to continue its strategy
of stretching Sandinista capabilities by tying up
Nicaraguan forces in the northwest (and simultaneously
relieving pressure on those units operating deep inside
the country) while trying to revive efforts in the south
and in the northeast.
-- The Sandinistas appear to be concentrating forces in the
northwest in an effort to prevent resistance elements in
Honduras from returning to combat inside Nicaragua, while
at the same time seeking to prevent the exfiltration of
those FDN units operating farther to the southeast.
Outlook
The military stalemate will continue over the next six months or
-- The insurgents probably will attempt to tie up Sandinista
units in the northwest while they try to expand activities
in central Nicaragua as well as in the northeast and
southeast.
-- With their current force structure, the Sandinistas can
contain the insurgency as it currently operates in the
countryside, but cannot defeat it.
The regime is likely to expand its advantage, however, if the
rebels do not receive US aid.
-- The FDN has sufficient stocks of most types of small arms
ammunition to sustain operations at current levels for
about 60 days. It is likely, however, that stores of food
and other non-lethal items like medicines and boots will
be depleted before the ammunition runs out.
-- A delay in aid will probably force the insurgents to
continue fighting in small units and will leave them
vulnerable to the Sandinistas' increasingly effective
helicopter force.
If no definite date is set for a vote on aid, the NHAO funding runs
out, and prospects for eventual approval become problematical, a more
serious drop in rebel fortunes is likely.
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-- The loss of morale among the troops will cause many to
give up, and insurgent strength is likely to decline by up
to 20 percent in a matter of months.
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