SOVIET STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000100030013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/29: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100030013-5
The USSR has been deeply involved with supporting the Marxist/Leninist
regime in Angola since the regime came to power in 1975. Moscow has:
Provided Luanda with more than $4 billion in military aid and
about $6 million in economic aid.
Stationed some 1000 military advisers there to assist in the fight
against UNITA and defend against South African incursions.
Gained a position in southern Africa giving them the opportunity
to influence events in the region and to claim a voice in
decisions regarding political arrangements there.
Gained support from another Third World nation on matters in
international fora.
-TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft periodically
3~;-p(LSk ~`yS~01\y deploy to Angola and fly missions over the South
Atlantic.
10 avi" -The Soviet West Africa patrol--some five to seven
SAS
P warships--uses Luanda for crew rest, logistic support,
L nor,
~~yS~"t v~ss and minor ship repairs.
The USSR's key objectives in Angola are:
Ensure the survival of the MPLA government and continued influence
with Luanda.
Preserve its access to Angolan military facilities.
Prevent a Namibian settlement linked to a Cuban withdrawal from
Angola, particularly one that does not provide for a Namibia
dominated by the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO).
Undermine South African- and US-sponsored regional initiatives
with the aim of isolating the United States and South Africa from
black Africa.
Encourage black African suspicions of South Africa and the US.
The Soviets are also building an enormous mausoleum in memory of late
Angolan President Agostinho Neto.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/29: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100030013-5
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The USSR has provided Angola with more than $4 billion of
military aid including:
-Near-39Q.aircat--MIG-23 and MIG-21 fighters, SU-22
fighter bombers, MI-25 attack helicopters, and numerous
transport aircraft and helicopters.
-Seven different types of SAMs--medium-to-high altitude
SA-2s, low-to-medium altitude SA-3s, and mobile
SA-6,7,8,9 and 13 SAMs.
-About 400 light and medium tanks--T-62, T-55, T-54,
f T-34 and PT-76s.
-About-46-naval vessels--amphibious landing ships,
missile attack patrol boats, and torpedo patrol boats.
About--304-a tii ler pieces and rocket launchers--122
and 152 MM howiters, BM-21 rocket launchers.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/29: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100030013-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/29: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100030013-5
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Government offensive against UNITA appears over.
-- Pretoria has said Angolans have pulled back from
Mavinga; two failed attempts to take the town were blunted by
South African air strikes.
Angola's improved performance reflects more extensive Soviet
involvement in annin and directing combat operations.
-- Setback was first reverse for UNITA since 1982.
-- Better trained and organized Angolan forces made more
effective use of large quantities of Soviet weapons, especially
aircraft, delivered in late 1983 and throughout 1984.
UNITA knocked off stride but far from beaten.
-- Shows UNITA's lightly armed insurgents cannot stand and
fight well-equipped conventional army; must revert to guerrilla
tactics or suffer reverses in next offensive.
-- Activity continues in central and northern Angola; will
step up urban bombings and try to hit Cabinda oil facilities.
Would like to disrupt Luanda's December Party Congress,
despite past failures to take war into capital city.
South Africa intervened during offensive with repeated air
strikes, limited troop reinforcements, substantial materie aid.
-- Pretoria probably will increase materiel and logistic
assistance to Savimbi; also continue covert sabotage operations
in Angola to inflict economic damage and enhance UNITA's
reputation.
Soviets and Luanda likely perceive offensive as a "victory"
despite failure to take Mavinga.
-- At December Party Congress, those favoring military
solution against UNITA should find their hand strengthened.
Doubt Luanda will pursue seriously US-sponsored
regional negotiations (could jeopardize Soviet interests), but
probably will continue contacts of some sort.
Expect another Angolan offensive after rainy season ends
next April.
-- Soviets probably will replace lost equipment and beef
Angola pays for most military aid in hard currency
Uses more than half of annual $2 billion hard currency
earnings (90% from oil production) to pay Soviet Bloc.
-- Moscow and Havana probably would continue assistance
even if Angola could not pay.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/29: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100030013-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/29: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100030013-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/29: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100030013-5