STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000500100008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 8, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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I
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
8 April 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH ?
? Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
FROM ?
? Richard Lehman
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT ?
? Strategic Warning Staff
NFAC #2009-81
1. You may remember that when I briefed you on warning arrange-
ments I mentioned that we are undertaking a review of the Strategic
Warning Staff. The results of that review are attached. They include a
recommendation that the Staff be disestablished and a few of the po-
sitions moved to Langley to augment the present NIO/W Staff.
2. You told me at that time that you had some ideas about the
warning business that you would like to discuss with me later. No
further action will be taken on these recommendations without your ap-
proval or your instructions to go off in a different direction.
3. the Assistant NIO for Warning, will be resigning
from the Agency on 1 July to take a much higher paying private job. It
is important that we decide quickly what shape the organization should
take or there will not be time to get a suitable replacement from DoD.
If you wish to place additional emphasis on the warning account, we
probably should think about a full-time NIO at the general officer
level, with a CIA civilian assistant.
CLQ,0 ,
Richard Lehman
Chairman
National Intelligence Council
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SUBJECT: Strategic Warning Staff (NFAC #2009-81)
Distribution:
1 - Addressee
1 - DD/NFA
1 - DD/NFAC
AS/NFAC
(1)- A/NIO/W
1 - C/NIC Cbrono
1 - NFAC Registry
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lUr act,mci firm VIVD0-01
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
7 April 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
- ? Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT Future of the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS)
The Warning Working Group met on 13 March 1981 to discuss the
future of the Strategic Warning Staff (or its successor) with a view
toward improving its contribution to the Intelligence Community and/or
the Policy Community. Attendees at the meeting are listed in Attach-
ment A.
1. The Group considered three papers: a sub-committee report
which they had commissioned (Attachment 8), and independent view by a
consultant (Attachment C), and one reflecting the views of the Director,
SWS (Attachment 0).
2. In the course of the discussion, a three-part consensus
emerged.
-- Emphasis of the Staff or its successor
should be on management, both substantive and non-
substantive. In the former case, the Staff should
ensure that a complete range of the "right
questions" are asked of the line production ele-
ments thus serving a challenge or conscience func-
tion without becoming a separate, competing ana-
lytical entity. On non-substantive issues, atten-
tion needs to be devoted to the areas of warning
resources and planning.
-- The Group leaned toward putting less
weight on the independence now embodied in the
semi-autonomous state of the SWS and more on
serving as a instrument of the NIO/W.
-- Location at either DIA or CIA Hqs. would
be acceptable. Since the Staff is entirely depen-
dent on analytical support from line production
elements
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3. Implementation of the points contained in the consensus would
not be without risk. In a dissenting view, the Director, SWS, made the
following arguments:
-- Reasonable alternative hypotheses explain-
ing events of potentially major warning signifi-
cance, when disseminated beyond the Intelligence
Community, serve a useful purpose.
-- The existing Staff
is fully employed
in following situations likely to involve signifi-
cant security interests of the United States,
especially where US-USSR confrontation might re-
sult. To broaden this mission, while at the same
time reducing the number of people, would be
counter-productive.
-- A semi-autonomous Staff under the general
supervision of the NIO/W could provide the directed
analytic support necessary to insure that all
reasonable interpretations of available evidence
having important warning implications are investi-
gated. At the same time, maintaining the Staff in
a semi-autonomous status would free the NIO/W from
substantive controversy within the Community that
might compromise his efforts in coordination of the
overall community warning effort.
-- The Staff's experience suggests that,
should it no longer be involved in publishing as a
separate entity, it is likely to become simply
another current intelligence organization, but one
that is unheared. Therefore, the SWS recommenda-
tion is to maintain an autonomous entity like the
SWS, or if that is unacceptable, abolish the SWS,
create no follow-on entity, and return the scarce
analyst assets to the parent intelligence organiza-
tion.
4. Notwithstanding the risks expressed in Paragraph 3 above, the
Warning Working Group recommends the following:
a. Abolish the SWS.
Ex and the NIO/W staff at Langley
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or a
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t tal counting the NIO/W and A/NIO/W, of
c. Restructure the NIO/W staff's mission to
emphasize both substantive and non-substantive
management.
d. Rely on occasional issuances by the NIO/W
to supplant those of the SWS, restricting normal
distribution to the Intelligence Community, but
giving the NIO/W discretion to include the Policy
Community when he sees fit.
Attachments
Attachment A
Attachment B
Attachment C
Attachment D
Richard Lehman
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CONFIDENTIAL
NFAC #1958-81
SUBJECT: Future of the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) 7 April 1981
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee (w/atts.)
1 - DD/NFA (wo/atts.)
1 - DD/NFAC (wo/atts.)
1 - AS/NFAC (wo/atts.)
1 - SA/CI (wo/atts.)
1 - each WWG Member (wo/atts.)
1 - NIO/W (wo/atts.)
1 - A/NIO/W (w/atts.)
1 - ER (wo/atts.)
1 - NFAC Registry (wo/atts.)
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Attendees
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C4
ATTACHMENT A
Warning Working Group Meeting
13 March 1981
Richard Lehman, NIO/W - Chairman
MGen. James L. Brown, DIA
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Richard J. Kerr, CIA
Robert A. Martin, State/INR
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Peter C. Oleson, DoD
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, RMS
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SWS
A/NIO/W
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I. Background: The Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) was established
in 1974 as a replacement for the National Indications Center. It is
manned jointly by the agencies of the Intelligence Community, located
in the National Military Intelligence Center, Pentagon, and chaired by
a CIA officer. DCID 1/5, National Intelligence Warning, placed the SWS
under the supervision
of the NIO/Warning. The staff personnel
allowance
presently stands at
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In February 1979,
the NIO/W prepared a paper for the DCI
which
explored potential roles for the SWS. These included:
-- Option A: A larger SWS: Under this option the SWS
would be increased
Such
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a staff would maintain a working discipline by issuing a daily
national-level warning report (emphasis added). Its report in
normal periods would be primarily a device for maintaining dialogue
and warning consciousness in and with the Community in
Washington and the field. In major crisis, however, it would
serve as a vehicle for periodic reporting to policy officers
(emphasis added). Manning to this level would permit the
Director/SWS to issue such a report without becoming consumed
by routine. His analysts would have time to think and to
bring their expertise to bear on Community analyses, and the
staff would be strong enough to maintain around-the-clock manning
in crisis without the augmentation that could be had only
with great difficulty in such periods. At the same time, the staff
could make a serious contribution to an inter-Agency research program.
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analysts working full-time on important questions
would provide the core around which a coherent program could
be built.
-- Option B: SWS at Its Present Strength.
SWS could either issue a
daily report as in Option A or do this weekly and supply
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some working manpower for research. Crisis
require augmentation.
-- Option C: Reduce Present Strength b
operations
would
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Under
this option SWS manning would be reduced
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to provide
the
NIO with
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a staff of
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-- Option
D: A Sharply Curtailed SWS.
Option
D would
staff,
raising its
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add professionals to the NIO's
There would be an
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strength including the NIO/W.
SWS of perhaps
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total manpower by percent. At this level the SWS
could synthesize agency contributions and probably encourage
a dialogue between Washington and the field. Any larger
analytic or "conscience" role would have to be assumed by
appropriate NI0s.
-- Option E: No SWS. Further reduction in manning would
make maintenance of a separate SWS inefficient. This option
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would therefore further augment the NIO/W staff
These
positions would provide the nucleus for a strong research
effort and provide some additional backup to the NIOs
responsible for strategic warning.
-- Option F: No Special Attention to Strategic Warning.
This would not only eliminate SWS but somewhat reduce NIO/W's
staff from that in Option E. He would have an A/NIO,
officers responsible for plumbing, systems, budget, and support
to the NI0s, and
the NIO/W himself.
for a total of
The DCI approved option C, however the transfer
from the SWS to the NIO/W office was never accomplished.
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DCID 1/5 delineates responsibilities for the NIO/W, the NI0s, and the
SWS.
Relevent portions follow:
The NIO/W is charged to advise and assist the Director and Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence on all matters relating to warning, to
coordinate national intelligence warning activities, and to serve as a
focal point for warning in the Community. For organizational purposes, he
will be located in the National Foreign Assessment Center. He will to the
maximum extent rely on existing organizations in carrying out his duties.
The responsibilities of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning are:
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i. To oversee analysis of intelligence from all sources
which might provide warning. In particular, he should be alert
to alternate interpretations within the Community and assess
these with a view to the need for issuance of warning. He
should encourage consultation and substantive discussion at
all levels of the Community.
ii. To recommend to the Director or Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence the issuance of warning to the President
and National Security Council, and to ensure the dissemination
of such warning within and by the organizations of the Intel-
ligence Community. When time is of the essence, the National
Intelligence Officer may issue such warning directly to the
President and the National Security Council with concurrent
dissemination to the Director and Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and senior officers of the Intelligence Community.
iii. To advise the Deputy Director for Collection Tasking
and Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment on appropriate
Community response to developing warning situations.
iv. To develop plans and procedures for support of the
Director of Central Intelligence in crisis situations.
v. To support the Deputy Director of Cental Intelligence
and the National Foreign Intelligence Board on warning matters.
vi. To chair the Warning Working Group.
vii. To oversee the warning activities of the National
Intelligence Officers.
viii. To supervise the Strategic Warning Staff.
ix. To arrange for intelligence research and production
with respect to strategic warning.
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x. To develop a warning consciousness and discipline
throughout the Community.
xi. To seek improvements in methodologies and procedures
for warning, including communications and dissemination of
information.
xii. To arrange with appropriate organizations of the
government for provision to the National Intelligence Officer
for Warning and the Strategic Warning Staff of the information
they need to carry out their mission.
xiii. To promote improved analyst training in indications and
warning techniques and in other analytic techniques that might
contribute to improved warning.
xiv. To advise the Deputy for Collection Tasking and the
Deputy for Research Management, as appropriate, on warning
activities that relate to their responsibilities.
The National Intelligence Officers are specifically charged with
substantive responsibility for warning in their respective fields. They
will conduct Communitywide reviews at least monthly of situations potentially
requiring issuance of warning, and will keep the Director of Central
Intelligence advised of the results, in consultation with the National
Intelligence Officer for Warning. They will be continually alert to the
need for immediate issuance of warning.
The Strategic Warning Staff will be under the supervision of the
National Intelligence Officer for Warning. Its principal functions are to
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assist him in his responsibilities with respect to strategic warning and
to conduct research with respect thereto. It may also engage in other
warning related activities within the Intelligence Community with the
concurrence of the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.
II. The Evolution: The NIO/Warning position was established in October,
1978 to provide a single point Of accountability for warning at the National
level. Prior to that time, emphasis had been on "strategic warning",* and
that flavor carried over to the new organization. Most assumed the NIO/W
would continue to observe procedence and devote most of his attention to the
threat of hostilities involving US military forces (by implication--USSR,
North Korea, or China). A trend had already started, however, which was to
broaden the scope of warning attention considerably.** Over time, there
had been a gradual realization that most "intelligence warning failures"
had had nothing to do with the use of military force against US troops, ships,
or aircraft, nor had they involved the use of force by the USSR, North Korea,
or China. In fact, those analysts who devoted most of their efforts to
"strategic warning" were seen by some to be outside the mainstream--sitting
around waiting for World War III was a phrase heard not infrequently. The
Community was already moving from an emphasis on the more restrictive
strategic warning to the broader context of avoiding surprise.
*DCID 1/5 defines strategic warning as "intelligence information or
intelligence regarding the threat of the initiation of hostilities against
the US or in which US forces may become involved; it may be received at
any time prior to the initiation of hostilities. It does not include
tactical warning."
**DCID 1/5 defines warning as "those measures taken, and the intelligence
information produced, by the intelligence Community to avoid surprise to
the President, the NSC, and the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign
events of major importance to the security of the United States. It
includes strategic, but not tactical warning.
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Concurrently, the FIOs were assuming their revitalized warning roles.
The Alert memorandum was revivified as the principal national level warning
vehicle. Potential crises in Iran, Pakistan, Egypt/Libya, Nicaragua,
El Salvador, etc. became the subjects of Alert Memoranda whose production
was chaired by the responsible area NIO in concert with the NIO/W.
Potential crises, and their warning implications, were judged important
as a result of their impact on US policy interests. The old strategic
warning-imminent hostilities concept was not abandoned, nor was it
deemphasized. Rather, it was subsumed by a broader warning context.
Meanwhile, our concept of the Strategic Warning Staff's mission lagged
the realities envolving in the Community. The SWS mission had been extrapolated
from its previous role--Big W, or strategic warning concerning the USSR,
North Korea, and China. Provisions had been made to broaden their area
of interest at the discretion of the NIO/W, but this was envisioned as an
infrequent, ad hoc occurance. The Director of the SWS was charged to
concentrate on the larger problems threatening general war.
The Chinese-Vietnamese imbroglio, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
and the Polish crisis with its potential for Soviet intervention served
to keep the Staff occupied through 1979 and 1980. At the same time,
however, the NIO for Warning staff of two was hard pressed to keep up
with the rest of the world. As the NIO for Warning assumed his role as
warning conscience to the regional NIOs and the DCI, it became apparent
that he needed more help in areas other than strategic warning.
III. The Problem: No one disagrees that the Community needs a
warning conscience, and DCID 1/5 charges the NIO/W with that task. While
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the SWS has supported him admireably with respect to the Soviet
Union
and China, they have done little or nothing in other areas. Yet
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of the
Alert Memoranda issued since the establishment
of
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the
NIO for
Warning have
been concerned with other areas. The present
NIO/W
is just not enough.
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In early 1979 the DCI decided to leave the SWS in the Pentagon for
various reasons not the least of which were historical. As the warning
responsibility has shifted to the NIOs at Langley, it has become
increasingly difficult to do business via elephone and the
Blue bird shuttle bus. As a result, the ability of the Staff to effectively
support the NIO for Warning (and the other NI0s) has suffered.
IV. The Solution: There are five major elements to be considered
in establishing a revitalized, pertainant SWS.
-- Director Control by the NIO for Warning
We recommend eleminating the SWS as a separate, semi-autonomous
body, and replacing it with an enlarged NIO/W staff consisting
of
CIA
DIA, and
NSA and State. One existing SWS slot should be converted to a
permanent State billet against which an officer could be charged.
Consideration should be given to retaining an additional CIA
slot as a liaison to the DIA warning office.
-- Expansion of Mission: The NIO/W's area of interest and
responsibility is worldwide. If his staff is augmented as we
recommend, emphasis should be on selecting officers with broad,
general experience who are well schooled in the warning discipline.
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The NIO/W staff should review community iltelligence production to
ensure it adequately treats the warning aspects, provide aggressive
skepticism in the face of two comfortable an acceptance of the con-
ventional wisdom, and research longer term matters of warning
significance worldwide.
-- Access to Community Resources: Implicit in the arrangement
we recommend is broad access to community analytical resources.
This should be facilitated by the manning recommended above, with
representation by CIA, DIA, NSA, and State. The NIO/W should, like
the other NI0s, tap Community resources for assistance when it is
needed.
-- Access to the NIO/W and NI0s: The need for effective
communication between the NIO/W, NIO/W staff, and the geographic
NIOs dictates location of the staff at Langley.
-- Access to Customers: The NIO/W should publish, either
routinely or aperiodically, for the consumption of the intelligence
community. Subjects should include alternative hypothesis and
research in depth on warning matters. In times of impending
crisis, the NIO/W should have the option of expanding distribution
to include the policy community.
V. Conclusion: In summary then, we recommend replacing the SWS with
an NIO/W
professionals drawn from the Community and located 25X1
at Langley whose function would be to support the NIO/W in publishing
alternative hypotheses on budding crises and in-depth research papers
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on warning issues. Consideration should also be given tp providing an
NIO/W liaison officer to the DIA warning office.
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer
for Warning
SUBJECT : Review of the Strategic Warning Staff
NFAC #501/81
30 January 1981
1. The following is based on several days of interviewing former
directors of the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS), looking at a few of the
staff's products and reading background memoranda on alternatives to
the SWS that have been considered in the last few years. This brief
review has not led me to any earth-shaking insights or novel recommen-
dations, or to extremely high confidence in my conclusions. My basic
impression is that preservation of SWS as a separate entity is not
vital as long as its demise is coupled with a beefing up of your Warning
Staff at CIA. By the same token, however, it is not obvious that aboli-
tion of SWS under that condition would serve much purpose beyond marginal
administrative consolidation and budgetary savings. How those savings
balance out against the slight political advantages (in terms of bureau-
cratic credibility and congressional oversight) of retaining a separate
unit, I can't judge. But it is not clear that the SWS' operational
problems (such as recruitin better personnel) would be solved by
moving it to Langley.
2. A third alternative of abolishing SWS without compensating
expansion of staff under the National Intelligence Officer for Warning
(NIO/W)--as a gesture toward the new austerity in government--would be
a mistake. While it might not dramatically raise the odds of a (non-)
warning disaster, the incremental increase in the odds of unpleasant
surprises, or reduction in the means for prodding analysts into more
"warning consciousness," probably outw ? h the savings from paring a
few analysts off the employment roles.
3. Finally,a fourth alternative of compromise, reducing the size
of SWS but transferring people to your staff at CIA,
probably makes little sense. One stall with a critical mass seems
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better than two mini-staffs. If SWS as it stands is inadequate or
superfluous, what is to be gained by keeping it at a level that would
further reduce its competence? Fish or cut bait.
4. In short, the scale and function of SWS shou e preserved,
but its form or location need not be. The attached report, "Assessment
of the Strategic Warning Staff," offers the reasoning behind these views.
Consultant to the
National Intelligence Council
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ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF
I. Reasons for Preserving the SWS Function
1. The original grounds for establishing SWS have not changed. As
Dianne LaVoy's HPSCI staff report on warning noted, the Watch Committee
and National Indications Center "had not adequately performed the long-
term trend analysis essential to warning. Rather it had become little
more than the synthesizer of current intelligence production." The five
other major watch centers in Washington are really geared more to tactical
warning than strategic. The SWS directors I interviewed, including ones
who would not mind seeing the present SWS abolished, agreed on three
things:
(1) There should be some unit, somewhere, worrying about
strategic warning "in a Community way."
(2) There is a need for a "middle ground" warning product
between current intelligence and estimates. The assumption that
Current Intelligence producers' inattention to trend analysis
could be compensated for by in-depth analysis by estimators
was no longer valid by the time ONE was disestablished.
(3) Regular analysts or managers responsible for partic-
ular areas cannot, alone, satisfactorily perform these functions.
noted in an earlier memorandum to you, there is
a "constant... struggle between the warners, who wish to act
earlier, and the analysts, who like to wait for more evidence."
Non-expert kibitzers are needed as an antidote to the natural
tendency of a specialist to see more continuity and predictability
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in a troubled area than a "professional warner" (without
the working assumptions of the expert) might see. As one
interviewer said, "It's like watching a beard grow. If
you look at it everyday you don't realize how much change
there's actually been."
2. The two obvious questions are whether SWS met the needs mentioned,
and why SWS' role was not logically superseded when your position, NIO/W,
was established. (The answers of course are related.) LaVoy cited
problems in effectiveness that flowed from SWS' principal virtue:
independent-minded detachment. The Staff could not ensure that the
Community would respond to what it produced. Most interviewees felt
that establishment of NIO/W alleviated some of the problem, and also
helped circumvent current intelligence analysts' resistance to SWS. Also,
one of the principal advantages of SWS is the speed with which it can
disseminate products, compared with other units, because there is no
bureaucratic hierarchy above it other than NIO/W.
II. Organizational Questions
3. Why not just make SWS the NIO/W's personal staff, rather than
keeping the current separation? The only reasons I have heard are,
first, that this would reduce the credibility of the staff in the eyes
of other elements of the Community, especially in DoD, by making it appear
to be a CIA organ; and second, there are operational advantages to having
the staff located in the Pentagon, near the NMIC. These considerations,
on balance, seem marginal.
4. The apparent bureaucratic political advantage suggested in the
first point has already been mitigated by placing the Staff under the
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authority of NIO/W. Earlier, when the Director of SWS reported to the
DCI through the Deputy Director of DIA, the arrangement may have gained
it a few psychological brownie points with units in DoD, but no one
I talked to thought the advantage of a more symbolically visible inter-
agency character for the Staff was a vital one.
5. Location in the Pentagon also did not impress most Directors as
important. One did recall that by being there he "could push a button
and get an answer, from NSA or DoD, as I couldn't do in CIA," and that
he got to see imagery and some other data six to eight hours before
superiors at Langley. Another, however, said "There should be an
advantage in having it in the Pentagon, but there wasn't." And the others
were indifferent or favored locating the Staff at CIA. Proximity to the
principal substantive area analysts was generally considered to offset
whatever advantage there was to staying in the Pentagon. One Director
thought the Staff could even be moved to the Community Headquarters
and still not lose anything. As to the option of
leaving one person in the Pentagon as a liaison, no practical benefit
was cited that could not be obtained through a phone connection to the
DIA warning shop.
6. Change in location, however, could have a slight negative impact
on personnel incentives, and the personnel problem has been the big head-
ache of SWS. As it is, service on the Staff is not a career-enhancing
assignment, and for those detailed from DoD or State, movement to Langley
might even worsen the situation. There is also the minor factor of
personal convenience; people at other agencies did not choose where they
would live according to commuting distance from CIA. (But then that is a
problem for any detailee or government job-changer.)
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7. You are well aware of the chronic personnel problem at SWS. I
was interested, though, that the current Director of the Staff (unlike
all the others) was very upbeat, saying "the bums have all been replaced."
He was not sure the current good quality was due to more than luck.
Other agencies still do not let him in on the selection process for
assignees, but OPA and OSR did. It is not clear to me that reconstituting
the Staff under NIO/W would have any favorable impact on quality, at least
for the non-CIA representatives. Trimming a couple of the non-CIA billets
might be the only way to deal with Navy and State Department unwillingness
to fill their slots, but visible shrinkage of the Community character of
the Staff, while not critical, would be unfortunate.
III. Operational Problems
8. If organizational changes are going to be made, you might want to
consider whether there is anything that can or should be done at the same
time to deal with procedural impediments to the Staff's work. One example,
though it was not a major pressing concern to anyone I interviewed, is
the apparent persistence of occasional difficulties in access to information.
9. It is axiomatic that compartmentation hinders warning analysts.
Perhaps there is no problem, since DCID 1/5 stipulates that SWS receive
"all information from every source pertinent to the strategic warning
mission," unless the DDCI agrees it is too sensitive, in which case only
you get it. But NSAM 226 of 1963 made similar provisions, yet just before
the October 1973 Middle East War the Watch Committee was denied some very
relevant clandestine reports because of their sensitivity. The first
director of SWS told me that he had trouble gettingjDDO information.
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Another complained that he always had difficulty getting "blue-side"
data from the military. The current director said he had less trouble
in general than DIA did in getting access to information but he noted
that SWS is the only Community unit in which personnel are not cleared
by a single security organization. This means that he cannot plug into
CIA data systems because the rest of the SWS would then have access,
and they are not all CIA-cleared
10. The current director also mentioned an instance in which
accurate interpretation of an important recent warning event was damaged
by lack of relevant information about US activities.
Without this knowledge how could a warner assess
intentions or perceptions? And this was exactly the sort of event where
the role of the SWS is most important.
11. There may be no consistent way around this sort of problem,
but the specification of what constitutes all "pertinent" data (in the
language of DCID 1/5) might be explored a little further if SWS or its
successor is to have better odds of warning wisely
IV. Scope of Activities
12. If SWS is abolished or whittled down in size, or a smaller
staff is moved over to NIO/W, this may affect the range of concerns the
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staff can deal with. Apparently directors of the Staff have had a fair
amount of discretion about how wide a net to cast. One made the case
for defining the Staff mission as narrowly as possible: to focus on
Soviet troop movements. Another was slightly more ambitious, saying
"It's not my job to say a couple of Arab countries are going to have at
it," but reserving the need to warn about non-Soviet threats if they
seem to impinge significantly on US interests. Still another, working
under DCI Turner's broadened definition of warning that involves anything
that would produce surprise, interpreted his mandate freely to cover a
wide range of dangerous activities throughout the world.
13. Any more explicit definition of mission that might coincide
with review of the SWS should be flexible, allowing expansion or con-
traction according to changes in either personnel or general international
conditions. If improvement in personnel assigned is not permanent, the
Staff will be hard-pressed to cover a broad range of politico-military
concerns. The director who interpreted SWS responsibilities most broadly
admitted that personnel problems made much activity "a one-man show"
(himself). The one who preceded him, though, said his biggest problem
had been "trying to keep everybody usefully employed." The autonomous
status of the Staff created temptations "to generate crises, to show
we're doing the job." (He recommended shrinking the staff to a couple
of people from CIA and from DIA, and one each from State and NSA.)
14. What intervened between those two views, however, was an
acceleration of crises in various parts of the world, which created more
for warning analysts to do. This trend has only gotten worse in the
past year. It seems sensible to encourage the Staff to venture beyond
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narrow "Big W" sorts of work if times are calm or if personnel improve,
and to expect a more limited focus when either or both conditions are
reversed.
15. As you noted in your memorandum to the DDCI of 22 February 1979,
there is a trade off between a charter for SWS that is too narrow (pro-
ducing stagnation) or too broad (producing overlap with current
intelligence and diffusion of effort). I would err in the direction
of breadth, softening the problem of overlap and diffusion by stipulating
that SWS be selective in choosing which problems beyond "Big W" to
meddle in. The Staff or its successor should have a license to hunt
but not a quota to fulfill.
16. The issue which hinges on these considerations is the research
function of SWS. One director considered that task "impossible" because
the agencies would not assign people capable of serious research. Another,
however, believed research on warning methodology (working, for example,
with EUCOM) should be the primary function of the Staff because it could
not really live up to its other responsibility: warning itself. He felt
the Staff could not compete effectively with other agencies in warning
("If NSA gets a good scoop, they put it all over town themselves"), and
was less important since the establishment of NIO/W.
17. Primary emphasis on methodological research, however, does not
seem practical. It would transform the Staff, since different types of
people would be needed. And aftera while the product would deteriorate
as topics were researched to death and analysts reached the point of
diminishing returns in ideas. If effort on methodology is left as one
of several tasks it's more likely to yield better ideas (though fewer),
and less likely to lead to spinning wheels in the sand.
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18. Some substantive research mission is necessary, at the least
to keep the Staff from twiddling its thumbs in slack periods, but it
should not be defined too specifically. Given personnel problems that
are likely to persist, the director should have the flexibility to
match his analysts, or himself as time permits, against targets of
opportunity, without having a carefully prefabricated set of topics on
which he has to produce. Similarly, regularly scheduled publications
may not be as useful as ones produced ad hoc. One director who grappled
with the Weekly left over from the Watch Committee felt pressure to dig
up anomalies, to find things to put in it. The current director feels
his practice of putting out special reports irregularly, as events
indicate, works better, and he sounded convincing to me.
19. Routinization of publication schedules would also seem to
take the edge off of warnings; by making warning data something to be
expected in the mail every, say, Thursday, it reduces the odds that
users will see such warnings as real reason to worry. Leaving the
anticipated form and schedule of publication flexible should also
make it easier for the Staff to switch back and forth between activities
as events require. As the current director suggests, "Do research when
you don't have to do warning, and drop the research if things get hot.'
V. Criteria for Success
20. Allow me an excursion on how a warning track record ought to
be evaluated in case this figures in decisions on reorganization.
17 November 1980 memorandum to you suggests to me that
the track record of Alert Memoranda since your position was established
is pretty good, and if SWS' contribution to the Memoranda were significant
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and figured evenly in successes and "failures," maybe it hasn't been
doing so badly. The reason the record looks good to me, despite
tabulation which shows about as many false alarms as "on the mark"
Memoranda, is that a 50-50 record for a professional warner is probably
better than 100%. If the warner never issues a false alarm, he's
probably being too cautious, failing to flag potential dangers that it's
his business to make users worry about. As lona as the false alarms
don't comprise well over half of the Alert Memoranda, they won't feed
the cry-wolf syndrome.
out to be right, users
on the side of warning
warning staff.
If every second or third Alert Memorandum turns
should take all of them seriously. Thus erring
within those bounds seems the proper norm for a
21. Also,
in that memorandum that there "has been a
definite trend to include more analysis of the policy implications
attendant to the papers" sounds encouraging. This is a hobby horse of
mine, and perhaps it's not as controversial as it used to be, but intel-
ligence without implications for policy is not much good for anything.
If users are more inclined to accept such policy-tinged analysis from a
warning staff than from other producers, that may be a minor "plus" of
sorts to consider when totting up the advantages and inadequacies of a
large warning staff, whether it remains as SWS in the Pentagon or is
reconstituted under you at CIA.
VI. Alternatives to Current SWS
22. As I suggested at the beginning, it seems to me that it
doesn't matter whether SWS remains, provided that moving the staff
responsibility over to you doesn't cut the total manpower involved by
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more than a few slots. There are two reasons why, despite the government-
wide push to trim bureaucratic "fat," there is a good case for retaining
a warning staff of
people:
(1) If the earlier public rhetoric of many of President
Reagan's intelligence advisors is indicative of thinking at
higher levels today, the administration places a high priority
on warning, including some form of "challenge" function, com-
petitive analysis, devil's advocacy, etc. A staff of
"professional warners," designed to prod substantive expert
analysts--to make them see that the "beard" has "grown"--
may be best suited to this function. It should have some of
the advantages of an official devil's advocate without many
of the disadvantages (since it would not be intended to subvert
conventional wisdom just for the sake of challenge, or to
fabricate a case for warning when reasonable grounds did not
exist).
(2) As long as the NIO/W has more than one hat, and is
distracted from warning issues much of the time, he has a special
need for augmented staff. Getting rid of the NIO/W's other
responsibilities is not a good alternative. Although one
interviewee said "there really isn't an NIO for Warning, given
Lehman's absorption in other jobs," it seems likely that the
double-hat arrangement enhances the warning function: you have
more authority to move things. If NIO/W is not higher in the
pecking order than the other NI0s, whatever the disposition
of SWS, the situation may revert de facto to what was criticized
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as the inadequacy of the Strategic Warning Staff before NIO/W was
created: detached reflection or challenge without clout, inability to
force serious attention to warning staff concerns.
23. Another solution proposed by several interviewees was to take
the NIO/W position out of the NIC structure and make him a Special
Assistant to the DCI, with no intervening filter. One former SWS
director argued, "An NIO responsible to the Director of NFAC doesn't
hack it, in the competition with NSA or other organizations, compared
to an NIO responsible to the DCI." Whether or not this alternative
makes any better sense is something you, DD/NFA, and the DCI can judge
much better than I.
VII. Audience and Dissemination
24. A final consideration for either a continued SWS or new NIO/W
Staff is the proper form, style, and distribution of warning products.
The status of the Staff has not been precisely defined. Two former
SWS directors gave me starkly different views:
(1) One argued that he wanted to change the normal
operating style of his predecessor, which was based on
memoranda directly to NIO/W, because it was harder to
reach people outside the Community--the users who should
get the warnings--that way. "The memoranda to Lehman were
pooh-poohed when they were circulated; the warnings get dropped
when they reach the substantive analysts, out of deference
to expertise." In this respect warnings on the Afghanistan
invasion failed the test. He wanted to circulate reports
widely and directly from SWS, and felt that the results of
doing so--substantial feedback from users--validated the
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change. He did not see the controversy and complaints
this sometimes generated among other analysts as grounds for
questioning the practice: "If you're going to warn you're
going to have to get people upset."
(2) Another argued for the other mode of operation--
preparing reports informally and giving them to the NIO/W
for decisions on further dissemination. "If you publish
under hard covers it gets to the policy level immediately,
where they don't realize it's not coordinated. This
creates potential for serious misunderstanding." The SWS
should serve a staff function,and should not be an auton-
omous Warning body.
25. From outside, both views seem to have merit. If the warning
staff function is moved over from SWS to NIO/W, this would seem more
consistent with the second view. In a way the idea of an SWS Director
and an NIO/W both taking responsibility for product dissemination seems
strange. At the same time, however, I would hate to see the advantages
of feedback and controversy (cited in the first view) lost. To the
extent there is some necessary choice between freewheeling behavior
and caution, a warning group should tilt toward the former. Could
the danger of misunderstanding at the policy level be mitigated by
making the disclaimers about coordination obtrusive, e.g. splashing
"UNCOORDINATED/NO-CONSENSUS" across the cover in big block letters?
My own bias about what consumers should get is that coordination should
not be enshrined as a vital process, especially where warning is concerned.
If the issue is clear enough and unpressing so that an unwatered consensus
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can be obtained in time, the issue is probably not a serious warning
problem anyway.
26. Lacking some familiarity with all the ins-and-outs of
bureaucratic protocol, I'm not sure whether this issue impinges
directly on the choice of maintaining a separate SWS or increasing
the NIO/W staff. If one or the other structure would be more likely
to minimize impediments to circulating unorthodox views, that element
of the issue should have some weight in the final decision.
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Strategic Warning Staff
Washington. D.C. 20301
S-0007/SWS 6 February 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WARNING
SUBJECT : Review of the Role of the Strategic Warning Staff
Reference: NFAC Memo #353/81, Strategic Warning Staff, 29 Jan 81.
1. The following sets forth the view of the Strategic Warning Staff
of the mission, composition, subordination, location, and publication
policy of the Strategic Warning Staff, including improvements thereto,
especially as related to the referenced study.
2. The mission of the Strategic Warning Staff, however its role is
defined, is properly accomplished only if it ultimately improves the
quality_smclAdinelinelsof_waining_latelligence to consumers in the
national security olisy community. The strategic warning with which
the Staff, and indeed the NIO/W, should be most concerned is that
of events likely to have great significance to the security of the
United States either because they involve vital national interests
such as availability of Persian Gulf oil, or because they carry strong
possibilities of bringing the forces of the United States into con-
frontation with the forces of the Soviet Union, North Korea, or China.
There are indeed other changes in the world environment for which the
policymakers would like warning but which are of less significance to
United States security policy. The reporting and analysis of these
changes seems more properly the domain of the large and well organized
.current intelligence establishments of the members of the intelligence
community. Neither the Strategic Warning Staff nor any other part of
the national intelligence warning system should become involved in the
establishment of another current intelligence organization. There are
clearly enough in the community.
3. As set forth in the DCID 1/5, the mission and role of the Strategic
Warning Staff are tightly entwined with those of the NIO/W. The NIO/W's
Letter of Instruction (LOI) for the Director, SWS of 2 October 1979, and
subsequent advance work plans, reflect the close relationship of the
Staff and the NIO/W's duties. The NIO/W outlined in the LOI the three
main functions of the Staff as: serving as the conscience of the
Intelligence Community with regard to strategic warning; providing
synthesis of military, political, and economic intelligence related to
strategic warning; and conducting research on strategic warning matters
and promoting Community intelligence production in this field. The
subsequent advance work plans broadened the specific areas of interest
to include those that were, at the time, likely to involve significant
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security interests of the United States, such as Soviet penetration of
specific nations along the sea lanes for shipment of oil from the Persian
Gulf to Europe, especially where Soviet involvement might bring the US
and USSR into confrontation. Based on the experience of the last year
in a survey of some of the principal consumers of warning intelligence
outside the intelligence community, the NIO/W directives as outlined
above seem appropriate.
4. Consumers of intelligence and especially of warning intelligence have
for some time--about ten years--pleaded for full expression of intelligence
conclusions describing or predicting events, even including what has come
to be known as alternative hypotheses. The Strategic Warning Staff was
directed to provide "reasonable hypotheses not covered in other community
pytlicatiora?providia?ilternate explanations aria-short-term forecasts
for_lituationc of a threaliahL-6A-tilre." According to some of the
consumers of warning intelligence in security policy circles, the pro-
vision of alternative hypotheses has been invaluable. A complaint or
lament often registered is that there have been too few instances over
the years where such alternative hypotheses have been offered. Our
experience on the Staff suggests that, although not impossible, it is
extremely difficult for the main intelligence organizations to systematically
provide such hypotheses. There is a certain normal inertia in bureaucracies
that tends to slow a change in opinion about political or political-military
events. It is clear, therefore, that some organization is needed to pro-
vide reasonable hypotheses not covered in other community publications to
provide alternative explanations and short-term forecasts for situations
of a threatening nature. Recent experience does, however, suggest that
whatever organization is expected to provide such hypotheses should be
autonomous from the main line intelligence production organizations, and
preferably have direct access to the DCI. It should not be encumbered
by an association with one or another production members of the intelligence
community.
5. Warning situations are by their very nature time-sensitive and are
not appropriate subjects for long, drawn out substantive negotiations
among members of the community. Among organizations, persuasiveness is
often equated with bureaucratic power rather than substantive attractiveness.
It is for this reason that whatever entity takes on the responsibility
of providing alternative hypotheses it must be clearly separate from
the other organizations and be able to publish the case for an alternative
hypothesis for the consumption of non-intelligence security policy
consumers. Over the past year and a half, conclusions of Strategic
Warning Staff analysis have almost always failed to persuade the community,
in a timely fashion, to address the issue of an alternative hypothesis
except when the Staff published on its own. The cases of the invasion of
Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war, both of which were correctly analyzed
by the Staff, but for which the analysis was not published outside the
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intelligence community, were cases where the security policy consumer
was not provided with alternative hypotheses in a timely manner. On the
other hand, the Staff's alternative hypotheses with respect to changes
in Soviet policy toward Iran and the Soviet's sense of urgency over the
events in Poland, received close attention by the intelligence community
and early attention by policymakers because of the Staff's published
conclusions which were distributed to the national security policymakers.
6. The 1\1191.1Lis_resp.04.sible for many other warning related activities of the
intelligence community that require him to be closely associated with research
and training efforts, production efforts, and coordination of warning
related matters within the whole community. It would seem a difficult challenge
indeed for the NIO/W to accomplish these cooperative functions while personally
engaging in the prUctIon of alternatiyg hvpotiferei?td?nose-uffered?by
the organiiatiOnsIvith which he 'must be associated. It has been useful,
we believe, for the Warning Staff to initiate these alternative analyses
that, although done with the approval of the NIO/W, are pot personally
apcjtecL? ? . The proposals of the Warning Working Group, if
mplemented, would probably make it difficult for the NIO/W to publicize
alternative hypotheses, as his own, without utting in jeopardy his clue work-
ing relationship with the intelligen e agencies.
7. The Strategic Warning Staff has been functioning well since its manning
level has again approached that authorized and would no doubt operate better
if the State Department filled its slot. The experience of the past year
has shown how important it is to have analysts assigned to the Staff who are
familiar with the political analysis community, the photo interpretation
community, the SIGINT community, and the military analysis community. Some
better balance and considerably more flexibility would accrue to the
Staff, should the State Department fill its slot. It has seemed important
that analysts on the Staff come from at least the three main intelligence
organizations; because of particular expertise, because of different bases
from which they approach the problem, and because of the ability to communicate
back with analysts of their parent agency. Although the Staff has not always
been provided with quality analysts, there has been a noticeable change
for the better since the current DCID 1/5 was promulgated in May 1979. Only
experienced analysts are of use to the Staff because warning is a predictive
action, almost like the detection of change yet to come. Inexperienced
analysts would have an inadequate basis for detecting or predicting such
change. The present staff includes nine substantive and four administrative
personnel. With the world in its current volatile condition, the Staff
would be hard pressed to sustain operations with fewer persons.
8. The location of the Strategic Warning Staff, or its follow-on, is important
only to the extent that it allows access to the flow of intelligence
information and the NIO/W. The Staff's effectiveness would probably be
improved by some sort of more direct access to the DCI. Location might have
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some bearing on said access. As implied earlier in this paper, it is
important, however, that the location of the Strategic Warning Staff not be
taken bv_the_intelligence community at Targe_aa_an_indjc4099 that the Staff,
by whatever_wis owned by some one of the agencies. We have -noticed
fair?exa-We that some of our coTtnigib-ns were thought of as DIA conclusions
simply because our mailing address is DIA/SWS; presumably the same problem
would occur if the Staff were moved to Langley. With respect to avoiding
the illusion that the Staff belongs to some a enc it mi ht better be
laced at the CommAity Headquarters
9. The warning function, as expressed in the DCID 1/5 and in the study by
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, might be better
performed with somewhat more publication by the Staff, by a closer
relationship with the NIO/W, and by a closer relationship of the NIO/W
with the DCI concerning the analysis done by the Staff. On the other hand,
the Staff's experience with the community when its conclusions were not
published suggests that, should the Staff no lono-r be involved in _publishing
as a separate entity, it is likely to become simply another current
intelltwire orgAr-Triatti;ThiThe that is unheard. AF?EFITaY466-11-aff for the
NIOJW,ihfendedio cover the Iii6F1a-, would be like a smaller version of the
old National Indications Center with less capability to provide either the
basis to act as a conscience of the community or good current intelligence.
The solution as recommended in the referenced NFAC memo seems costly in
analyst assets but not very valuable as an intelligence tool. It might
even be counterproductive if seen as a threat to the reporting responsibility
of other current intelligence organizations, preventing the NIO/W from
establishing and maintaining the close relationship intended by the DCID 1/5.
Our recommendation is to maintain an autonomous entity like the SWS, or
if that is unacceptable, abolish the SWS, create no follow-on entity, and
return the scarce analyst assets to the parent intelligence organizations.
Director, Strategic Warning Staff
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2T
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