HIGHLIGHTS OF MONTHLY WARNING REPORTS FOR AUGUST 1988
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120023-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 18, 2013
Sequence Number:
23
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 20, 1988
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120023-0.pdf | 98.97 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120023-0
:,--
National Intelligence Council
The Director of Central Intelligence
WastthigtomlIC200
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Charles E. Allen ,
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
NIC 03073-88
20 September 1988
SUBJECT: Highlights of Monthly Warning Reports for August 1988
Herewith are summaries of key warning issues compiled by the NIO for
Warning from the monthly Intelligence Community meetings conducted by the NIOs
in August. The judgments expressed are those of the Community unless
otherwise noted. The NIOs' complete reports are attached.
USSR/Afghanistan
The Soviet withdrawal is about half complete. We anticipate a lull in the
rate of withdrawals between now and the end of October, then the beginning of
another large exodus of Soviets. We anticipate continuing heavy use of air
power in Afghanistan and selectively against targets in Pakistan. Thus far,
the Soviets have withdrawn only about 10 percent of their fixed-wing air
assets from Pakistan.
Pakistan
There is a better than even chance that post-Zia Pakistan will remain
relatively stable over the next several months; elections scheduled for
mid-November are likely to be -held as planned and Pakistani foreign policy
wil1 not change in any substantial way
ilThere-iSeral,.:ig*ree-Meht th-aynbrfe:,of: t,heipAjor_lep.dersh,ip groups
could benefit from fomenting'prObleMS or sto00Th4A14-elettibh " '-
Ambitious individuals or religious, regional, or political fanatics,
however, might gain from causing turmoil.
o Analysts have little information on the cause of the crash and cannot
rule.out either accident or sabotage.
Iran/lrag/USSR
The ceasefire continues to hold with minor skirmishes on both sides.
Neither country is likely to break the ceasefire in the short term.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120023-0
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120023-0
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SUBJECT: Highlignts of Monthly Warning RepOrts for Atigust 1988
o The National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia notes
that Iraq's worst nightmare--Iran being in the position to stall
indefinitely during negotiations--appears to be coming true.
o [rag eventually will reach the point where it will begin to consider
breaking the ceasefire. The ceasefire presents both problems and
opportunities for Moscow.
o The main benefit, from Moscow's point of view, is that the ceasefire
will lead to a drawdown in the Western naval presence in the region.
Nicaragua
The Sandinistas will continue to push the insurgents into Honduras and
consolidate their control over the countryside. Continued food shortages in
Honduras will further complicate the efforts of the'rebel leadership to hold
their force together even in the near-term.
o The Sandinista buildup in the north continues as regime troops work to
push the insurgents into Honduras and dismantle the Resistance
infrastructure.
o Despite the increasing concentration of Resistance combatants in
Honduras, analysts see little likelihood of a cross-border incursion in
the near-term.
Chile
A narrow victory by either side will increase the likelihood of
post-election violence. A narrow Pinochet?win would almost certainly embolden
the far left to launch terrorist acts in an effort to unseat him.
:.o? Most analysts believe til4t?a6se'eow re'll'meAefeat.would prompt
take?over .attemOt by Pinochet.
o A minority opine that, rather than Stage a-Coup;'Pin0Ch-areSsured by
military officers--would adhere to the Constitution and call for direct
elections within a year.
NIO/W
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
I - NIO/W Chron
I - NIO/W Signer
20Sept88
SECRET
Charr en
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R00040017nn9fl_n
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