WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: August 25, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
SECRET 25X1
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC-02968-88
25 August 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Di rector of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM:
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)
1. Intelligence Community representatives at the monthly warning
meeting on 23 August reached consensus on the following issues.
2. Warning Notes.
The Angolan and South African Governments are unified over their
respective positions in the negotiations for Cuban troop withdrawal
(CTW) and independence for Namibia. Luanda, E5Trecier, will probably
defer to Havana's lead on key issues. The current UNITA offensive is
not likely to affect the MPLA position on CTW because Luanda
perceives an agreement that ends South African aid to the insurgents
as a net benefit. There is surprising unanimity among South African
military and diplomatic officials, supported by President Botha,
about negotiating seriously, but Pretoria's position is likely to
harden in remaining talks over issues such as simultaneity on Cuban
and South African troop withdrawals, the status of SWATF, and
financial support to Namibia.
Barri ng national reconciliation in Angola, another FAPLA offensive
against UNITA is almost certain. An offensive planned for September
has been deferred, however, pending the outcome of negotiations on
CTW. Time and place for the next offensive will be influenced by
whether CTW is achieved and how it is implemented. With a CTW
agreement, a final Cuban effort against UNITA is unlikely. Without
a CTW agreement, Cuba probably will support another FAPLA offensive,
but rather than lead the fighting is more likely to maintain
positions along the Namibian border to inhibit South African
intervention. The continuing Cuban military buildup In Angola is
expanding Havana's capabilities and options.
SECRET
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DRV FROM MULTIPLE
1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
STAT
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
SECRET
The South African Government appears prepared to abandon IAEA
membership rather than be forced to accede to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty without guarantees--especiallyfrom the US,
the UK, and the USSR--that it will enjoy free and unfettered access
to the nuclear marketplace. Pretoria probably would quit the IAEA
rather than allow the General Conference meeting in Vienna next
month to vote for suspension.
Mengistu still seems firmly in control in Ethiopia. The Soviets are
unlikely to cut him off despite his commitment to a military rather
than political solution to the northern insurgencies. Arms
deliveries under existing agreements are continuing at a rapid
pace. Mengi stu's position could weaken if the next offensive
against Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents--likely to be mounted
between September and January--falters badly and senior military
officers sense that Soviet support for Mengistu is eroding.
Ethiopian-Sudanese talks are unlikely to reduce the support each
gives to insurgencies against the other.
South Africa is interested in distancing but not cutting itself off
from RENAMO insurgents in Mozambique while pursuing closer
cooperation with Maputo. Some aid to RENAMO may be continuing.
Maputo probably overestimates the extent of South African assistance
and, although skeptical of Pretoria's intentions, may have
unrealistic expectations; even a sharp cutback in South African
assistance would only affect the insurgency over time. A
Chi ssano-Botha summit probably will be linked to progress in
restoring the supply of electricity from Cabora Bassa to South
Africa, but increased RENAMO attacks, infiltration of South African
insurgents from Mozambique, or Frontline State pressure on Maputo
could disrupt Mozambi can rapprochement with Pretoria.
SECRET
2
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
25X
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
25X1
SECRET
4. South Africa-Angola: Support for Negotiating Positions. Discussion
led by CIA/ALA.
The MPLA regi me is in general agreement on CTW but arguments persist
over its duration. President Dos Santos reportedly favors a
two-year timetable, but the Cubans probably will call the shots and
Luanda will follow. The UNITA offensive is unlikely to affect the
negotiations on CTW. The Cuban/Angolan calculus is probably that
UNITA' s fortunes will wane once South Africa is out of Namibia. We
have no conclusive evidence on Cuban intentions to leave behind
military personnel following CTW. Regular, integrated Cuban combat
units are the greatest threat but are the units whose withdrawal
will be most easily monitored under a CTW settlement.
The South African Government is surprisingly unified about
negotiating seriously, although President Botha may be concerned
about the rapid pace of progress. Pretoria's position is likely to
become more hardline as issues critical to South African interests
SECRET
3
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
SECRET 25X1
must be addressed in the context of CTW and implementation of UNSCR
435, including the status of SWATF, financial support for Namibia,
and the ANC presence in Angola. Nonetheless, South African public
opinion seems to be that if South Africa is to get out of Namibia,
now is the time. President Botha and his Foreign Minister
apparently believe that the conservative opposition has
overestimated white resistance to Namibian independence, and that
the issue would not necessarily be damaging in municipal elections
set for late October.
5. Angola: Another Offensive? Introduced by CIA/ALA.
The MPLA has been talking about another offensive against UNITA
since early this year. The Central Committee gave its approval
for a campaign against Mavinga and Jamba to be launched on
10 September. The plan was recently set aside, however, pending the
outcome of negotiations on CTW and Namibian independence. Barring
national reconciliation, another offensive is almost certain because
of Luanda's fixation with advancing toward Jamba. Meanwhile, Luanda
is preoccupied with the current UNITA offensive in central and
northern Angola and has redeployed units away from the Cuito
Cuanavale front.
Whether a CTW agreement is achieved and how one is implemented will
affect a decision on the timing and location (axis of advance) of
the next offensive, and the likely Cuban role. With a CTW/Namibian
settlement, Cuba probably would not seek a major role in an
offensive against UNITA. Without a settlement, however, Cuba would
look for ways to pressure Pretoria, such as by backing a FAPLA
offensive in the southeast. Rather than lead the fighting, Cuban
forces probably would be positioned to inhibit South African
intervention. The Cuban military buildup has been continuing,
resulting in expanded capabilities and options, but Castro probably
is reluctant to commit his forces to a costly counterinsurgency role
against UNITA.
6. South Africa-IAEA: Prospects for Suspension. Issue presented by
CIA/OGI.
M????
There have been no significant developments in the South African
nuclear program since September 1987, and no progress toward
including the Valindaba enrichment plant under safeguards. After
avoiding suspension from the IAEA last year by announcing that it
was prepared to discuss accession to the NPT, Pretoria did not
initiate talks until early this month in Vienna. It held separate
bilateral discussions and a quadrilateral meeting with the NPT
depository states, the US, the UK, and the USSR, in which it pressed
SECRET
4
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
SECRET
for assurances--which none of the depository states is in a position
to grant--of free and unfettered access to the nuclear marketplace
in return for accession to the NPT. In probably the clearest and
most categoric such statement ever made by a South African official,
Foreign Minister Botha announced in Vienna that South Africa has the
capability to produce nuclear weapons.
South Africa wants to remain in the IAEA for technical as well as
political reasons, especially access to technology for its two
nuclear power plants. In addition, South Africa is the world's
third largest producer of uranium. Pretoria nonetheless appears
prepared to abandon the IAEA rather than be forced into NPT
accession. The South Africans may believe that they can be
readmitted later, but the process would be difficult. The
opposition Conservative Party opposes the NPT, adding to Pretoria's
reluctance to accede to the treaty before important nationwide
municipal elections in late October. Even if South Africa acceded
to the NPT, it would give up little with respect to its nuclear
weapons capability.
The Soviet position on suspending South Africa from the IAEA General
Conference next month is unclear. Moscow probably will reserve
judgment until the last minute, but is unlikely to oppose suspension
again this year unless Pretoria signs the NPT. The US and UK oppose
suspension on the principal of universality of membership. The
Africa Group reportedly wants to propose suspension versus
expulsion, but the latter option technically does not exist. Should
South Africa be suspended, fallback safeguard agreements exist
bilaterally with France and the US outside the IAEA, but Pretoria
may find them politically difficult to maintain.
7. Ethiopia: Counterinsurgency and Regime Stability. Discussion led
by CIA/ALA.
The government's position in Eritrea has been relatively unchanged
since March, but EPLF activity reportedly is increasing and has
included unusual incidents of urban terrorism, such as car
bombings. Government forces apparently continue to hold Keren,
Asmara, and Mitsiwa. The regime continues to build its forces in
preparation for a dry season offensive that is likely to begin no
earlier than late September or later than January.
Insurgent activity in Tigray has increased in recent weeks. The
TPLF is harassing units of the Third Revolutionary Army, a poorly
trained conscript force that reoccupied garrisons in the region.
SECRET
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
SECRET 25X1
The TPLF tactic apparently is to stretch government forces. Some
reports indicate that the EPLF is actively assisting the TPLF with
supplies and coordination of military activity. This is a
significant development that raises the threat to the government.
President Mengistu reportedly is unhappy with the progress of the
counterinsurgency effort under the command of Legesse Asfaw.
Mengistu still seems firmly in control and there have been no
indications of coup plotting. The military supports a renewed
offensive. War weariness among troops is a serious factor, however,
and should the offensive falter badly--high casualties and few
gains--senior officers may reassess their support for Mengistu,
especially if they judge that military setbacks are eroding Soviet
support.
8. South Africa-Mozambique: Warming Relations. Introduced by State/INR.
South African policy has long been characterized by two
tracks--coercion and cooperation--run by the military and foreign
ministry, respectively. An apparent reassessment recently has led
Pretoria to emphasize a conciliatory approach toward Maputo,
motivated in part by the international focus on abuses by RENAMO and
South Africa's fear of continuing to be identified with the group.
In addition, RENAMO has made no significant military gains and has
had other embarassi ng political setbacks such as the assassination
of Evo Fernandes. Analysts noted that Pretoria's general
disenchantment with the SADF recently probably has also weakened any
military argument in support of RENAMO. The South Africans may also
genuinely believe that they can work with Chi ssano.
Nonetheless, Pretoria probably is interested in distancing itself
from but not cutting off RENAMO while it pursues closer cooperation
with Maputo. Mozambican containment of the ANC is still Pretoria's
primary goal, but it also wants to send the message to the regi on
that cooperation with South Africa yields positive results in
economic cooperation and development. CIA analysts noted that
Pretori a' s, tacti cs are not so profound a shift as to imply
abandonment of the coercive option, especially if Pretoria judges
SECRET
6
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/06/18 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1 el
SECRET
that Maputo is not doing enough to control the ANC. Moreover, most
of the same military players who favor coercion are still in place
in Pretoria. It is not clear to what extent the SADF has accepted
the roll-back of support for RENAMO. There are still some
indications of continuing supplies to the insurgents. Some SADF
elements, especially in military intelligence may be maintaining
links, perhaps independently.
Maputo is skeptical that improved relations will result in a
complete South African break with RENAMO. Chissano probably is
aiming for a reduction in levels of assistance that probably are
already lower than he believes to be the case. The Mozambicans are
interested in continued South African involvement in improving and
using Maputo harbor, increasing the employment of Mozambican migrant
workers, and rehabilitating the Cabora Bassa power lines. Chissano
appears ready to grant the summit that President Botha has long
sought, but will probably link it to progress on Cabora Bassa to
minimize the political impact.
The implications for RENAMO depend on the extent of the reduction in
South African assistance. Pretoria's aid, though not large, has
been vital and is not easily replaceable. Communications support,
for example, has been the key to RENAMO's command and control over
large areas. Even a sharp cutback in South African aid, however,
would only be felt over time. Chissano is likely to view continued
or increased RENAMO attacks as evidence of South African
involvement. Analysts were divided over whether RENAMO military
activity has already peaked or is merely at a plateau, but concluded
that the insurgents are less likely than ever to seize power
militarily. Nonetheless, the insurgency is likely to continue at a
significant level for a long time, even without South African
support. Although RENAMO recently has targeted Zimbabwe, the
insurgents may try to reassert themselves in Zambezia Province in
the wake of the Tanzanian withdrawal. Attacks on the Cabora Bassa
power lines cannot be ruled out unless a deal is struck with the
insurgents.
SECRET
7
STAT
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120013-1