SUPPORT TO STATE DEPARTMENT - POSSIBLE CHEMICAL ATTACKS ON IRAN OR IRAQ CAPITAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000400080012-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 17, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/24: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000400080012-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/24: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000400080012-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/24: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000400080012-7
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
NIC-01823-88
17 May 1988
SUBJECT: Support to State Department - Possible Chemical Attacks on
Iran or Iraq Capital
1. Attached is a warning paper forwarded to the Department of State in
response to a request from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security for a written assessment
of the likelihood that either Iran or Iraq will resort to chemical attacks on the other's
capital. There is Community consensus that the likelihood of such an attack is small,
but that the potential exists and may be increasing.
2. The Department asked for a statement in writing because of internal discus-
sions following a 28 April briefing at State by a member of my staff. Initially, there
were differences between Diplomatic Security and the Bureau for Near East/South
Asian Affairs over whether US dependents should be withdrawn or whether other steps
should be taken to protect US personnel there.
3. The issue now appears to be resolved, however. The Department is planning
to send a joint State/Defense technical team to Baghdad to survey the US Embassy for
possible installation of a chemical alarm system and suitability of other countermea-
sures (e.g., portable shelter, masks, suits, awareness briefings, etc.). We will keep you
informed of further developments.
Charles E. Allen
Attachment:
Warning Issue
25X1'
25X1
25X1
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NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution- Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL. . .- This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
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National Intelligence Council
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
13 May 1988
WARNING ISSUE
IRAN/IRAQ: Chemical Attacks on Cities?
The NIO for Warning is concerned over the possibility that either Iran or
Iraq will initiate chemical attacks on the other's capital and that the
victimized country will retaliate in kind.
While the likelihood of either side resorting to chemical attacks on
principal cities is assessed by the Intellience Community to be small--the
retaliatory capability of each providing a significant deterrent--the
potential for this low probability, but high impact, event exists. We are
unlikely to have warning of imminent attack.
Several factors and recent events prevent us from ruling out the
possibility of chemical attacks in which Western diplomats and other civilians
could be at risk, including:
o Extensive recent battlefield use of chemical munitions;
o Muted world response to the deaths of perhaps several thousand Kurdish
non-combatants in March, which has left the impression of low
international political cost arising from such attacks;
o The "war of the cities" using ballistic missiles--now in ceasefire after
more than 200 total strikes;
o Evidence that Iran is preparing its people for chemical attacks; and
o Unknowns about what is driving the decisionmaking of the two sides: Iraq
has behaved in an uncharacteristically decisive and aggressive way of
late; and we know that there is a heated debate in Tehran over how to
respond to recent military setbacks. Should radicals prevail, they might
opt for escalation by retaliating with chemical attacks against Iraqi
cities.
Both governments have chemical capable delivery systems. Iran has 125 and
250 kilogram bombs containing mustard and cyanide that can be delivered by F-4
and F-5 aircraft. Iraqi aircraft last bombed Tehran with conventional weapons
in late February, an action that led directly to the missile war of the
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/24: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000400080012-7 ?
cities. They also have bombs up to 500 kilograms for delivering mustard and
nerve agents from Soviet or French-built aircraft.
Iran might realize that in such an exchange it would suffer
disproportionally, while Iraq would have more difficulty denying chemical
attacks of Iranian cities than it has had in deflecting allegations of
chemical use on the battlefield. Nevertheless, as more nations acquire a
chemical capability, the threat of either intentional or unintentional
exposure of large civilian population centers to chemical attack increases,
especially in areas such as Iran and Iraq, where a demonstrated willingness to
use both chemicals and long-range delivery systems are present.
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
Warning Issue
FRAM! Charles E. Allen
NIO/Warning
7B 42 Headquarters
T icer esigno ion, room number, and
building)
VC/NIC
3. C/NIC
DDI Registry
Executive Registry
FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
I-79 EDITIONS
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
17 May 1988
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
iY
0/OD! REG
1 8 M
AY 1988
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Iq
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