MONTHLY WARNING REPORTS FOR APRIL 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000400020005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 20, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
washillemok.20505
20 May 1988
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Reports for April 1988
1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:
USSR/US
The Moscow summit will occur in the midst of the the most dramatic ferment
in the Soviet leadership in the last thirty years. The NIO/USSR believes that
Party leader Gorbachev has strong incentives to force the leadership
dispute--between Gorbachev and his reformist allies and conservatives led by
"Second Secretary" Ligachev--to a conclusion before the visit. Gorbachev aims
to bolster his authority in negotiations with the President and to gain
control of preparations for the Party conference to be held in late June. A
decisive confrontation now seems likely. While conservatives remain powerful,
reformers have launched a powerful counterattack in Pravda against a
conservative challenge posed in an article in Soviet?Russia and retain the
initiative. There is some chance--probably less than one in five--that
Ligachev will beat back this effort; success would cast doubt on Gorbachev's
ability to press his foreign and domestic agenda. The summit may help
This review reflects consideration of inputs generated at warning meetings
conducted by the National Intelligence Officers with Community representatives
from all areas. As such, it represents a Community-wide review, but it is not
a formally coordinated Community product.
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Le)
Gorbachev achieve his goals by providing an occasion in which the Politburo
may want to pull together for a show of unity. If Gorbachev now fails to clip
Ligachev's wings, it will be a significant, and perhaps fatal, political
defeat.
USSR/Afghanistan/Pakistan
We should expect a Soviet propaganda campaign denouncing continued US and
other third country support for the mujahedin through Pakistan. The Community
is in general agreement that Pakistan is unlikely to unilaterally cut off
supplies to the mujahedin during the period of Soviet withdrawal; the
mujahedin will mute their opposition to the Geneva accord so long as supplies
flow. If the Soviet withdrawal becomes more difficult than expected, the
Soviets may launch air strikes against main supply bases in Pakistan to keep
supplies from reaching Afghanistan.
There is some divergence of opinion within the Community on the likelihood
of a cutoff of Soviet supply to the Kabul regime. State/INR believes there is
a significant possibility of a termination, while CIA and DIA note that
resupply of Soviet forces will be required until withdrawal is completed.
The
Soviets probably will help us by inviting the press to cover some departures.
However, while we will be able to confirm or refute a withdrawal, we will not
be able to tell with precision numbers of troops or units that have left in
any week.
Determination of the quantity of Soviet equipment turned over to the Afghans
will be difficult. The monitoring task will be further complicated by
continued Soviet resupply of their own forces during the withdrawal.
US/NATO/Warsaw Pact
Once the INF agreement is ratified and the Moscow summit concluded, the
arms control spotlight will be on conventional force reductions in Europe.
Under the best of circumstances, however, agreement is unlikely in the
foreseeable future. The gap between public expectations and prospects for
agreement will create major problems for the US and the NATO allies.
Sentiment in the Senate to link approval of a possible strategic arms
reduction pact to a conventional arms agreement would magnify the pressure.
The West has made little progress toward a common position while the East
almost certainly already has one. The Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority
give it most of the bargaining chips, which it can play at little cost to its
military capabilities. Even highly asymmetrical reductions--3:1 or even 4:1
in some categories--would weaken NATO without significantly diminishing Warsaw
Pact strength. The prospect of such an agreement would, howeyet --stimulate
strong public pressure on NATO governments to respond; a unila id-loviet
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reduction would have the same effect. In the absence of a NATO position, the
West may be presented with a superficially attractive offer that it must
reject in the face of public opposition; such a scenario would complicate the
maintenance of a NATO security consensus. The moment of truth could come with
a new Soviet/Warsaw Pact initiative this fall, when Moscow may calculate that
Washington's ability to exert a leadership role would be hindered by the
presidential election campaign.
Panama
Economic sanctions alone will be insufficient to force General Noriega
from power within the short-term. Subordinate military commanders and the
rank-and-file remain loyal and are unlikely to move against him. Economic
conditions and Noriega's finances will continue to deteriorate, but the
Community believes that Noriega is resourceful enough to muddle through.
Public expectations are now lower and many have adjusted to living on partial
paychecks. Even if large US military reinforcements are sent to Panama, they
are not likely to intimidate Noriega. If the US became more aggressive,
however, suggesting that a major military action was imminent, the Defense
Forces might reassess its support for Noriega. Noriega may be willing to
allow an increase in foreign, leftist influence in Panama in exchange for
diplomatic and financial support from countries like Cuba or Libya. He is
likely to increase pressure on US military personnel as the crisis drags on.
Attacks on Americans by Noriega's leftist supporters cannot be ruled out.
The NIO for Warning is concerned about the growing militancy of Panamanian
leftists personally loyal to General Noriega and believes they pose a
long-term threat to American interests in Panama. Numerous reports indicate
that leftists are receiving some paramilitary training, which will give them
skills to conduct terrorist attacks on Americans; one consequence could be the
formation of an insurgent group capable of mounting more sustained attacks
against US interests.
Iran/US/Gulf Arab States
American military successes on 18 April have not intimidated Iran, but
Tehran's options for response, in light of its setbacks elsewhere, are
narrowing. The Community generally believes that a direct attack on US Naval
vessels in the Gulf is still unlikely, but confidence in this judgment has
diminished; there is a strong revenge motive and recent setbacks may tempt the
Iranians to strike out more aggressively.
but
there is general agreement that terrorism will be the most likely Iranian
response against the US and Gulf Arab states. CIA believes that terrorism
still will be used selectively to achieve specific goals. State/INR notes an
apparent trend toward a more aggressive policy and believes that more attacks
may result. DIA analysts acknowledge this possibility but believe that Iran
does not now pose a threat to the vital interests of the US or neighboring
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states. In the wake of its loss of the Faw peninsula and ongoing economic
troubles, the Community believes that Tehran's major immediate objective is to
rally public support; most analysts judge that it will be only partially
successful.
North Korea
Despite the increased cause for concern resulting from recent events in
and involving North Korea--such as the airliner bombing, ministerial changes,
and economic troubles--the Intelligence Community believes that the immediate
threat posed by North Korea has not increased substantially in recent weeks,
North Korea is beset with
fundamental difficulties that will not be resolved easily and could, over the
medium- to long-term, affect its strategy and tactics to the detriment of
stability on the peninsula. These include: severe economic troubles; the
looming succession; and the blow to its prestige if the Seoul Olympics proceed
successfully. In wrestling with these challenges, the North Koreans could
become more hostile and step up military pressure or boost terrorism to
disrupt the Olympics. They could cut their losses by accepting the games and
recouping a little by successfully holding the World Youth Games next year.
They might resume negotiations with the South and seek to reduce tensions.
Finally, internal events could spin out of control, forcing Pyongyang either
to turn inward or move toward collapse or reform. Ascertaining which way this
pariah will move will require much more information than we now have.
2. Trend Commentary:
Nicaragua
The Community generally believes that the current impasse between Managua
and the Resistance is likely to be overcome and that the prospects for a
cease-fire accord are good. Most analysts believe that the Sandinistas will
make tactical concessions on issues like local elections and that insurgent
negotiators also will be flexible. A minority of the Community believes,
however, that the unity of the Resistance will break down, ending the talks.
As a result, fighting would resume, but with only a markedly reduced number of
insurgents--3,000 to 5,000--in the field. The NIO/Latin America believes that
prolonged negotiations will exacerbate splits within the Resistance and that
the Sandinistas could launch a pre-emptive offensive against rebel units in
the cease-fire zones if talks appear to be failing.
Peru
President Garcia's relations with the military have reached a new low, and
three separate groups are conspiring against his government. The military
opposes both his arming of the paramilitary wing of the ruling party and
machinations aimed at extending his term. Tensions with the military seem
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certain to limit Garcia's ability to launch new initiatives. Coup plotting
remains tentative, but a misstep by Garcia could galvanize military and
civilian support for his ouster. Such an effort might be resisted by the
ruling party's paramilitary apparat--now numbering some 6,000--and result in
widespread fighting.
Honduras
President Azcona's position appears safe for now, but further large-scale
demonstrations like that at the US Embassy could prompt civilians to try to
force his resignation. Pressure from the military, which is resentful toward
Washington, may force the President to be less accommodating to the US in
coming months. Popular reaction to drug kingpin Matta's illegal extradition
has given the traditionally weak political left an issue to galvanize anti-US
sentiment, increasing the prospect for further demonstrations and attacks on
US property.
Libya
Colonel Qadhafi's recent efforts to convince Libya and the world of his
good intentions do not represent a change of heart; the Intelligence Community
believes that there have been no basic changes in his foreign policy goals.
Qadhafi's loosening of dictatorial constraints domestically, release of
political prisoners, and gestures of good will abroad are aimed at strengthen-
ing his political position, shoring up his support within the Libyan military,
and reducing his international isolation. Qadhafi continues to work against
US interests around the world and Libyan support for terrorism shows little
sign of change. He may have become a greater challenge to US interests by
pursuing hts basic goals more effectively.
Ethiopia/Sudan
Continuing, strong insurgent pressure in northern Ethiopia probably will
delay the jovernment's planned counteroffensive for several months. Meanwhile,
fighting and the government's order that foreign relief workers leave the
north will lead to starvation and spur population movements to Sudan, where
malnourished arrivals are dying at rates of 2 to 8 people per 10,000 in the
refugee camps and meningitis reportedly has broken out. Medicine is in short
supply and UN relief workers have been driven away by insurgent threats. We
have not yet detected military plotting by disaffected military personnel
against President Mengistu, but he has intervened personally to discipline and
redirect his demoralized troops and cannot indefinitely evade responsibility
for the course of the fighting. Further serious setbacks would put Mengistu
in jeopardy; if he "loses" Eritrea, the military probably will move against
him.
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Africa/Chemical Weapons
The use of chemical munitions in Africa has been minimal but could grow.
Libya- -has a chemical warfare capability.
It has a factory that produces chemical, and perhaps biological, agents and
has used chemicals against Chad at least once; the effort backfired and
instead killed Libyans. The Community believes there is a medium likelihood
that Tripoli will use chemical weapons against Chadians again.
We cannot confirm any of the approximately 600 allegations of chemical
weapons use in Angola received since 1978. Until about 1984, most accounts
accused South Africa of using chemicals; we can confirm only the use of white
phosphorous and pesticides to clear border land along the Namibian/Angolan
border. Since 1984, Pretoria and the UNITA rebels have been accusing the
Luanda government and its allies of using chemicals and Pretoria has begun to
equip its troops with protective gear. Its claims that the Soviets have used
chemical warfare in Angola probably are designed to "reserve the right" to
retaliate in kind.
Ivory Coast
There probably is some truth to recent reports of plotting by army
officers against President Houphouet-Boigny and ethnic tensions could grow to
infect the military. The worst situation probably would be a lengthy incapaci-
tation of the aged president coupled with a marked economic downturn. There
are no constitutional provisions for replacing a disabled president and
economic problems already include are considerable. The inevitable jockeying
for power by aspirants to presidency, against a backdrop of major economic
grievances, could turn violent.
USSR
There were no major demonstrations or unrest on 24 April--the anniversary
of the Turkish slaughter of Armenians in 1915 and a possible flashpoint for
unhappiness with Soviet nationalities policy. However, the Community believes
that the cultural concessions Moscow has made so far will not be sufficient to
satisfy the Armenians and that Soviet authorities will come under growing
pressure to take more substantial steps.
Terrorism
There may a resurgence in terrorism by the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO).
Sabri Al-Banna, its head, has threatened to retaliate for the attack in mid-
February on PLO representatives in Limasol, Cyprus, for the murder ad Abu
Jihad, and for Israeli attacks on ANO camps in Lebanon. While the ANO is
focusing on Israel, it could target the US because of close US/Israeli ties.
The NIO for Counterterrorism regards the likelihood of attacks on 'US interests
by the ANO this summer as high.
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There are differences within the Community over the terrorist threat to
the Olympics. DIA assesses the threat from North Korea as medium and from
Middle Eastern and other groups as low. CIA analysts, on the other hand,
believe there are many factors inhibiting North Korean attacks.
3. The NIO for Warning notes these additional areas of warning concern:
Iran/Iraq
The NIO for Warning is concerned over the possibility that either Iran or
Iraq will initiate chemical attacks on the other's cities, and that the
victimized country will retaliate in kind. Recent events suggest that the
likelihood of such attacks is growing. Western diplomats and other personnel
could be at risk. Some diplomatic missions in both Baghdad and Tehran are
purchasing protective equipment.
The extensive battlefield use of chemical munitions and the muted world
response to the deaths of perhaps several thousand Kurdish civilians in March
has reduced the prospective international political cost of such attacks. The
increasingly mundane "war of the cities" using ballistic missiles--now
suspended after over 200 total strikes--is a another indication that
unrestricted attacks on population centers away from the battlefield can be
conducted with low political cost. Either side could strike first. The
animosity levels on both sides, accompanied by political struggles within
Iran, particularly, could lead to a decision to strike, probably with chemical
bombs delivered by aircraft. Both governments are already preparing their
people for chemical attacks. First usage probably would be justified as
"retaliation" against previous provocations. We are unlikely to have warning
of imminent attack.
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe, as evident by on-going large-scale strikes in Poland, lies
fitfully wfthin the Soviet orbit; chronic internal problems, exacerbated by
Communist party inertia, impending leadership successions, and the unsettling
calls for reform coming from Gorbachev in Moscow, suggest that the next few
years will be difficult for the Soviet Union's six Warsaw Pact allies in
Eastern Europe. While conditions are different in each country, economic
troubles and popular demands seem certain to increase throughout the region.
There is real potential for major unrest in Poland and Romania, as well as
generally growing instability in Hungary, that soon could require major US
policy responses similar to those during the Polish crisis of the early
1980s.
The problems of the region are manifold.
o The economies are in serious trouble. Growth is slowing or negative.
Balance of payments deficits and debt service difficulties threaten
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most of the countries. Living standards are growing modestly at best.
In Romania, basic necessities are in short supply. Austerity measures
in Poland and Hungary are cutting consumption. On top of domestic
troubles, Moscow is pressuring the regimes to step up deliveries of
high quality goods to support party leader Gorbachev's economic
program, an action that is eroding hard currency export prospects and
syphoning off goods and services needed at home.
o Succession struggles may loom . Only Poland's Jaruzelski and
Czechoslovakia's Jakes are under 70. Hungary's Kadar and Romania's
Ceausescu apparently have serious ailments. East Germany's Honecker
and Zhivkov of Bulgaria--both over 75--periodically are rumored to be
on the verge of stepping down.
o Several of the Communist parties are weak or divided. Hungary's is
losing members and coherence. Ceausescu purposefully has kept his
party weak as part of his cult of personality. Poland's party has not
recovered fully from its near disintegration in the early 1980s. Even
East Germany's orthodox party is beset from within by younger members
who, heeding Gorbachev's calls for democratization in the USSR, want
reform.
o The people want better lives. Popular demands for political
liberalization and higher living standards are on the rise in much of
Eastern Europe just as the regimes' ability to satisfy the demands
appear too economically costly and politically dangerous.
o The governments are immobilized on questions of reform. They largely
are waiting for the drama of Gorbachev-versus-the-conservatives to play
out in Moscow before committing themselves to major policy initiatives
at home.
Cumulatively, these pressures will heighten popular unrest. There will be
increased anti-regime activism. Human rights, environmentalist, church, and
other groups are likely to grow more assertive. None of these developments
will threaten immediately party rule or Soviet influence directly, but
collectively they weaken regime authority, undermine economic recovery, and
lay the groundwork for more serious challenges.
The NIOs for Warning and Europe believe that the potential for serious
instability exists in at least Poland and Romania within the next two to three
years. Significant instability in Hungary is also possible. The likelihood
of system-wrenching change is much less elsewhere.
In Poland, major new outbreaks of anti-regime protest are likely within
two years. Prominent opposition figures warn that a new wave of protests will
be more violent than during the Solidarity period. Regime handling of the
ongoing, economically-motivated strikes at steel mills will determine largely
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whether the strikes spread and the unrest is generalized. We expect that the
government will be able to weather this immediate problem, but the basic
complaints that sparked the strikes will remain. The regime has failed to
achieve national reconciliation, has little popular support, and has been
forced to impose severely unpopular but economically sound austerity
measures. Moscow again will be loathe to intervene directly; it knows the
deep antipathy of Poles for the Soviets, their historical willingness to fight
even for losing causes, and Poland's strategic position on the lines of
communications to Soviet forces in East Germany.
In Romania, continuing harsh austerity, coupled with Ceausescu's failing
health, could produce serious instability. His death or ouster would trigger
a power struggle and invite East/West competition over the post-Ceausescu
leadership. A prolonged struggle or widespread violence could lead the
Romanian military to step in; in extremis, Moscow could intervene militarily.
Unrest in Hungary would come from a combination of much lower living
standards and dashed hopes for political reform. A repeat of 1956 is
unlikely, but scattered strikes, sabotage, and demonstrations are probable
this year as austerity measures cut purchasing power, unemployment grows, and
the party fails to address popular concerns.
As the East European societies evolve, they will pose continuing problems
for Moscow and concerns for Washington. The de-homogenization of the empire,
combined with popular desires for variants of the Soviets' own reforms, could
unleash calls for change that will be disquieting for the leaderships. The
resulting divisions also could strengthen Gorbachev's conservative critics at
home. While Washington has little power to influence events directly,
significant. upheaval would require a US policy response. Possible concerns
include: the amelioration of violence, human rights violation, and trade
issues including credits and Most Favored Nation trade status. Moreover, a
prolonged crisis probably would spill over into bilateral US/Soviet relations,
perhaps affecting negatively such issues as arms control.
Pakistan
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has major domestic and foreign
implications for Pakistan. The NIO for Warning believes that a number of
these could adversely affect the stability of the Islamabad government and
that they could seriously affect US interests in South Asia.
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o Pakistan will be less able to justify US military aid. Islamabad has
argued that it needed help to defend against the Soviets in Afghanistan
although it mainly wanted the weapons to counter the Indian threat.
Pakistan will be unhappy about a cutback in deliveries of key items
such as F-16 aircraft.
o Pakistan will suffer economically. The large increase in direct US
economic assistance in the 1980s was based in part on Islamabad's
cooperative position on Afghanistan--a reason that will diminish. The
mujahedin support effort of as much as $1 billion annually from several
sources also was an economic shot in the arm for Pakistan that will
decline as the Soviets withdraw. Economic woes are certain to increase
domestic political tensions and pressure on the government.
o Finally, there are likely to be disagreements over implementation of
the Geneva accords.
The changing power alignment in South Asia will have other effects
negative for Pakistan.
o India--increasingly viewed in the region as an imperialist power--could
see any cooling in the US-Pakistani relationship as an opportunity to
increase military pressure on Islamabad. New Delhi was militarily
aggressive toward Pakistan in early 1987, challenged China in the
northeast through much of 1987, and has a major expeditionary force in
Sri Lanka. India's defense budget is growing significantly and New
Delhi is acquiring new Soviet weapons, including MIG-29s and nuclear
submarines. The Pakistanis fear a rekindled Indian threat and will be
critical of the US for not moving to counter it.
o The Soviet effort to encourage creation of ethnicly-based autonomous
regions in Afghanistan could encourage Pakistani Pushtuns to more
vigorously seek independence and unification with Afghan Pushtuns as
well as stir nationalist feelings among other Pakistani ethnic groups.
o A fundamentalist Islamic Republic of Afghanistan could help foment
religious dissent against the secular government of President Zia.
o In the absence of an end to the fighting and a major international
assistance effort to rebuild war-torn Afghanistan, the several million
Afghans in camps in Pakistan may only dribble back, maintaining the
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economic and political burden on Pakistan and increasing the
fundamentalist threat.
0 Partial resolution of the Afghan war could, by reducing a unifying
external threat, rekindle domestic Pakistani political disputes and
generate a political crisis that could topple Zia.
These potential challenges to Pakistan bode poorly for the long-term
stability of Pakistan. US economic assistance can help lessen the financial
strain, but serious political differences over key issues like nuclear
proliferation are likely to result in a difficult bilateral relationship in
the near and mid-term.
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