COMMENT ON MONTHLY WARNING HIGHLIGHTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000400020004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 18, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Highlights of Monthly Warning Reports for
-------Apr-i_l_1988
F ?IA ' Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer
EXTENSION
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N40-01670-88
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DATE
12 May 1988 S-
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
18 May 1988
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
Chairman
SUBJECT: Comment on Monthly Warning Highlights
Attached are the NIOs' monthly warning notes and a summary of their
highlights by Nb/Warning, to which I wish to add some comments of my own.
Soviet Leadership
I personally believe that the Community tends at the present moment to
overrate Gorbachev's political strength. That tendency is reflected in the
warning note and the highlight. On the other hand, it is soberly resisted
in today's PDB (at TAB A). It looks to me like Gorbachev has failed to
create a mechanism that will "pack" the June party conference with
reformers. Hence, the conference will probably represent more of a
stalemate than the victory he originally planned in consolidating his power
base and advancing his program. At any time there could be a showdown in
the Politburo, such as Khrushchev faced in 1957 and 1964, whose outcome
would be hard to predict. More likely, however, Gorbachev faces a long
slogging struggle to enlarge his power base and to institutionalize his
reform program.
We tend to forget that Gorbachev really hasn't been at it very long.
With a far stronger power base in the party apparat and the military than
Gorbachev started out with, Khrushchev took four years to fully consolidate
his power and, even then, did so as a result of winning a showdown called by
his enemies in the Politburo. Moreover, he was removed by just such a power
play seven years later which, his son now tells us, he actually saw coming
several weeks in advance.
Gorbachev faces formidable obstacles to his success and threats to his
political survival. On balance, the odds still favor him. Even though he
lacks an institutional power base outside the Kremlin walls, the wholesale
support of the intelligentsia -- so important in the Russian context --
partly makes up for this. He is skillful and bold, but not rash. Most
important, his conservative opponents have fears and resentments but no
program or even sense of direction that can match his. If the party
conference is not the victory he planned on, he will doubtless come up with
another strategy, perhaps a series of "issue" plenums of the Central
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Committee at which he could make Politburo changes. He must fairly soon,
however, do two things to secure his Kremlin position for the long haul:
Remove Ligachev from the Secretariat and put his own man in charge of the
KGB.
The apparent leadership stalement suggests that, for the moment,
Gorbachev will avoid foreign policy initiatives that would be controversial
internally, e.g., announcing a large unilateral Soviet military troop cut in
Europe. The trouble is that you never know with this guy, so we and the
policymakers must remain prepared for such initiatives.
Korea
The deployment of SA-5s in North Korea adds a new dimension to the
warning problem there.
General
Warning meetings convened monthly by the NIOs are an excellent way to
keep the Community tuned up and focused. The monthly warning reports are
good devices for recording the evolution of Community thinking. But they
don't seem to be very timely devices for getting that thinking to you. I'm
going to look into fixing that.
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ritz . Ermarth
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NIC-01670-88
17 May 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Highlights of Monthly Warning Reports for April 1988
Herewith are summaries of key warning issues compiled by the NIO for
Warning from the monthly Intelligence Community meetings conducted by the NIOs
in March. The judgments expressed are those of the Community unless otherwise
noted. The NIOs' complete reports are attached.
USSR/US
The Moscow summit will occur in the midst of the most dramatic ferment in
the Soviet leadership in the last thirty years. Gorbachev has strong
incentives to force the leadership dispute with "Second Secretary" Ligachev to
a head before the party conference in late June.
o Gorbachev aims to bolster his authority in negotiations with the
President and to gain control of preparations for the conference.
o There is some chance--perhaps one in five--that Ligachev will beat back
this effort, casting a doubt on Gorbachev's ability to press his
foreign and domestic agenda.
US/NATO/Warsaw Pact
Once the INF treaty is ratified and the Moscow summit concluded, the arms
control spotlight will be on conventional force reductions in Europe. Under
the best of circumstances, however, an agreement is unlikely in the
foreseeable future.
o The Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority gives it most of the bargaining
chips. Even highly asymmetrical reductions would weaken NATO without
significantly diminishing Pact strength.
o In the absence of a NATO position, the West may be presented with a
superficially attractive offer that it must reject in the face of
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public opposition. The Pact may make its proposal public this fall,
when Moscow may figure that Washington will be distracted by the
election campaign.
Panama
Economic sanctions will be insufficient to force General Noriega from
power within the short-term. Noriega is resourceful enough to muddle
through. Subordinate commanders and the rank-and-file within the Panama
Defense Forces remain loyal and are unlikely to move against him.
o Even a massive US military reinforcement is unlikely, by itself, to
intimidate Noriega. He probably will increase pressure on US service
personnel as the crisis drags on. Attacks on Americans by Noriega's
leftist supporters cannot be ruled out.
Iran/US/Gulf Arab States
American military successes on 18 April have not intimidated Iran, but
Tehran's options for response, given its setbacks elsewhere, are narrowing.
In the wake of its Faw defeat and ongoing economic troubles, Tehran's major
immediate goal is to rally public support.
o The Community generally believes that a direct attack on US Naval
vessels in the Gulf is still unlikely, but confidence in this judgment
has diminished. The Iranians have a strong revenge motive.
o There is general agreement that terrorism will be the most likely
response against the US and Gulf Arab states.
North Korea
Despite the increased cause for concern stemming from recent events in and
involving North Korea--such as the airliner bombing, leadership changes, and
economic problems--the Community agrees that the threat has not increased
substantially in recent weeks. However, Pyongyang's erratic behavior and
warrant continued wariness.
o North Korea's handling of its fundamental problems could, over the
medium- and long-term, affect its strategy and tactics to the detriment
of stability on the peninsula.
Cees E. A len
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, aC20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM: Robert Blackwell
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: Warning Assessment -- USSR
NIC-01486-1/88
21 April 1988
1. Attached is the assessment prepared following the monthly NIO/USSR
Warning and Forecast Meeting held on 19 April 1988. Comments would be most
welcome.
2. The next warning meeting will be held on Tuesday, 16 May at 1400
hours in Room 7-E-62, CIA Headquarters. Please have your clearances passed
and call with your attendance plans by COB Friday, 13 May. PLEASE
NOTE: Due to the changes in the badging and entry procedures, anyone whose
name and clearances have not been received by this office the day preceeding
the meeting will not be admitted to the building. I solicit suggestions
regarding any topics or contingencies you feel we may be overlooking and
request that such recommendations be forwarded to me by COB, Wednesday, 4 May
1988.
This Memorandum is Unclassified
When Removed from Attachment
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Robert Blackwell
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C.20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC-01486/88
21 April 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Robert Blackwell
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: April Warning and Forecast Report
1. The Leadership Situation and the Reform Debate
A. Discussion
On 19 April, intelligence community representatives met to discuss the
exchange of polemics between party conservatives (the "Andreyeva letter" in
the 13 March Soviet Russia) and reformers (a full-page Pravda editorial
article on 5 and the implications of this confrontation for Gorbachev's
reform agenda.
There are some important differences within the community over the
origins and implications of this dustup, especially over the extent of
Second Secretary Ligachev's involvement with the Andreyeva letter.
But judging from the meeting there is substantial agreement on critical
issues: that the struggle between reformers and conservatives for
control of the party is reaching a decisive stage as the June party
conference approaches, that the Pravda editorial and subsequent
developments signify a major victory for Gorbachev and reform
proponents, and that Gorbachev is likely to move in the near term--if
indeed he has not done so already--to effectively neutralize Ligachev's
influence.
WHAT'S THE DISPUTE ABOUT? The radicalization of Gorbachev's agenda over
the last two years has produced a fundamental split in the party between
reformers (who want a decisive break with the command economy and rigidly
centralized political system Stalin created) and conservatives (who believe
tinkering will suffice and fear that Gorbachev's reforms are leading the
country toward disaster). This split has reached the Politburo, where
Ligachev's go-slow rhetoric has clearly established him as the conservative
alternative to Gorbachev. The blistering Pravda rejoinder to the Andreyeva
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letter indicates that the dispute has come to a head as the two sides jockey
for position in anticipation of the party conference.
WHO'S WINNING? Community analysts disagree on the extent of Ligachev's
opposition to Gorbachev and whether he was behind the Soviet Russia attack on
reform, as the Moscow rumor mill suggests. Even those who question Ligachev's
association with the Soviet Russia article, however, agree that it has been
used by Gorbachev and his allies as a pretext to launch a sweeping
counterattack on party conservatives and to attempt to neutralize Ligachev's
influence in the leadership. An incipient press campaign in support of
Gorbachev's agenda since 5 April, and spreading rumors of trouble for
Ligachev, suggest Gorbachev has scored a decisive victory.
OUTLOOK FOR THE NEAR TERM A decisive confrontation between conservatives
and reformers in the Central Committee and the Politburo now seems likely in
the run-up to the party conference. While conservatives remain powerful in
the party elite--especially in the regional apparatus that forms the core of
the Central Committee--the momentum now seems to be running in Gorbachev's
direction. Some sort of move to neutralize Ligachev (as well as reshape the
Central Committee) seems likely:
-- Gorbachev could attempt to remove Ligachev from the Politburo
altogether at a plenum preceding the conference.
-- As a compromise, Ligachev could be kicked upstairs to replace former
foreign minister Gromyko as President. Such a step, while effectively
circumscribing Ligachev's influence, could be more palatable to party
conservatives than an outright removal from the leadership.
-- Moves to effectively strip Ligachev of his "second secretary"
duties--relieving him of the important cadres and ideology
portfolios--could be sufficient to neutralize his authority and signal
the party ranks that those who attempt to undermine "perestroika" down
below will no longer find protection at the top. Gorbachev could
calculate that this solution would achieve his objectives while
promoting a healing process in the party in the months ahead.
If Gorbachev is able to neutralize Ligachev in some manner, it could allow
him to dominate proceedings at the party conference and give a powerful boost
to the efforts of reformers to launch a decisive attack on the underpinnings
of the Stalinist political and economic system. Given the magnitude of
Ligachev's apparent challenge, if Gorbachev fails now to clip his wings, it
will be a significant--perhaps fatal--political defeat.
B. Warning
WARNING ISSUE The Moscow Summit will occur in the midst of the most
dramatic ferment in the Soviet leadership in the last 30 years. NIO/USSR
believes Gorbachev has strong incentives to force the leadership dispute to a
conclusion before the visit to bolster his authority in the negotiations with
the President and to gain control of preparations for the party conference at
the end of June. There is some chance--probably less than one in five--that
Ligachev will beat back this effort, casting doubt on Gorbachev's ability to
press his foreign and domestic agenda. But the odds are good that he will
succeed. Indeed, the summit may help him achieve his objective by providing
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an occasion in which the Politburo will want to pull together for a show of
unity.
2. Nationality Unrest
A. Discussion:
Intelligence community representatives discussed the aftermath of the
Soviet leadership's recent decisions on Armenian demands for the return of
Nagorno-Karabakh region in Azerbaijan. Moscow's use of carrots and sticks
--refusing to review the territorial status of Nagorno-Karabakh, offering
concessions in the cultural and educational sphere (for instance, improved
access to Armenian television for the predominantly Armenian population of the
region) and a show of military force--appear to have worked to defuse the
short-term crisis. The streets have been relatively quiet and the work
stoppages in the capital city of Nagorno-Karabakh effectively ended on 5
April. Over the long run, the community believes that the cultural
concessions Moscow has made so far will not be sufficient to satisfy the
Armenians and Soviet authorities will come under growing pressure to take more
substantial steps.
B. Warning and
WARNING: The upcoming 24 April anniversary of the 1915 massacre of
Armenians will provide a near term indication of the stability of the fragile
peace that currently prevails. The regime will probably allow Armenian
activists to march to the memorial commemorating the victims of the massacre.
They will attempt to use moderate leaders to control the participants but
there is still a risk of serious trouble.
3. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan
A. Discussion:
Some consolidation of forces in country is already underway in
preparation for the withdrawal. Moreover, it is increasingly clear that the
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Soviet troops will be withdrawn by unit or garrison, not by thinning as some
previously had speculated. Such military operations as are under way are
aimed either at clearing withdrawal routes of insurgent activity and/or a
final reprovisioning of the more remote Afghan garrisons. The requirements of
the withdrawal accords--which mandate the removal of 50% of the Soviet force
within the first three months--means that by 15 August the only Soviet forces
left in Afghanistan probably will be those in a triangle between Jalalabad,
Kabul and on the road north leading to the USSR. Community analysts believe
Soviet military advisors in the countryside will be withdrawn as the Soviet
units depart, but expect Moscow to try to maintain an advisory presence in
Kabul through the withdrawal and perhaps even afterward.
Reporting on Soviet intentions with regard to the provision of military
aid to the Kabul regime is mixed, with some Soviets intimating that there
won't be any need for new deliveries after May 15 and others suggesting that
Soviet military aid will continue, at least until the withdrawals are complete
and/or the regime falls. We already have good evidence that the Soviets will
be turning over some of the equipment and consummables they have stockpiled in
Afghanistan to Afghan forces as they withdraw.
B. Warning
Issues
WARNING ISSUES: NIO/USSR believes we should expect a Soviet propaganda
campaign denouncing continued assistance through Pakistan. If withdrawal
becomes more complicated than anticipated, the Soviets may launch air strikes
against main supply bases in Pakistan before the aid is shipped into
Afghanistan.
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Robert Blackwell
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SUBJECT: Warning Assessment--USSR
Outside Attendees
Inside Attendees
Robert Blackwell
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DIA
State
NSA
Commerce
NSC
DIA
USAF
DIA
NIO/USSR
A/NIO/USSR
A/NIO/USSR
ICS
ICS
DO/SE/RR
LDA
LDA
DO/NCD
SOVA
LDA
SOVA
SOVA
FBIS/AG
SOVA
SOVA
SOVA
ICS
NIC-01486/88
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National Intelligence Council
The Director of Central intelligence
wasmntoroc.20505
NIC #01478--88
22 April 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director for Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Walter L. Barrows
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT! Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)
1. Intelligence Community representatives discussed Ethiopia, chemical
warfare, Sudan, and Ivory Coast at the monthly warning meeting on 19 April.
There was consensus on the following warning notes
2. Warning Notes:
-- Continuing strong insurgent pressure in northern Ethiopia probably will
delay the government's planned counteroffensive for several months.
Meanwhile, the fighting and the government's hardline stance on foreign
famine relief operations will lead to serious starvation and spur
population movements to neighboring Sudan. We have not yet detected
plotting by disaffected military personnel against President Mengistu
but he has personally intervened to discipline and redirect his
demoralized troops and cannot indefinitely evade responsibility for the
course of the fighting. Further serious government setbacks would put
Mengistu in jeopardy; were army leaders to conclude that he "lost"
Eritrea, they probably would move against him. (see paragraph 4)
-- There is a "medium likelihood" that Libya will use lethal chemical
weapons in Chad. If so, the West may never learn of it because the
locale is remote and the evidence perishable. (paragraph 5)
-- Emergency food deliveries in southern Sudan will become even more
difficult soon as seasonal rains begin to wash away the roads.
(paragraph 6)
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DISCUSSION
4. Ethiopia. CIA/ALA began the discussion by recounting recent insurgent
gains in Eritrea and Tigray Provinces.
-- Surprised government forces have adopted a defensive posture in the
north while beginning to bring in forces from the Ogaden and elsewhere.
Needing all available troops to confront the rebels, the Ethiopian
government has negotiated with Somalia to ease tensions along their
common border, stepped up recruitment; and recalled army veterans. The
Soviet Union has loaned about 15 more air transports and offered more
advisers. Addis Ababa almost certainly is apprehensive about army
morale and discipline.
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Alarmed at the Ethiopian government's demand that all foreign relief
workers leave the north, US officials appealed to Moscow to persuade
Mengistu to rescind the order. However, the Soviet preliminary
response has offered no encouragement. Nonetheless, a few UN officials
have been allowed to remain, so UN trucks will continue to move food
and UN officials will try to ensure that Ethiopian officials do not
deny food to those they suspect of sympathizing with the rebels.
Meanwhile, we still do not see the expected major population movements
to Sudan, probably because both Khartoum and the Ethiopian insurgents
are opposed to them.
Several representatives voiced additional warnings.
noted that Ethiopian army regulars--rather than conscripts or
militia--have suffered most of the recent casualties. This adds to the
likelihood that army discipline and morale may deteriorate in the weeks
ahead, noted that Ethiopia has asked Sudan to restrain the EPLF,
but that Mengistu probably has an inflated expectation of Khartoum's
influence with the rebels. Finally, Ethiopia might ask Cuba for more
troops, possibly to replace Ethiopian troops in the Ogaden now needed
in the north. Cuba could have difficulty complying, however, because
it has sent several thousand more troops recently to Angola, and
President Castro seems preoccupied with that situation.
5. Chemical Warfare. CIA/OSWR provided a detailed review of the
allegations, evidence, and prospects for chemical warfare in Africa.
Libya- - has acquired a chemical
warfare capability. Tripoli has a factory that produces chemical
weapons and possibly biological agents. It apparently tried at least
once to use chemical weapons against the Chadians, but the effort
reportedly failed and killed Libyans instead. Libyan troops are not
properly trained or equipped to employ chemical weapons. Although any
use is risky, the Libyan forces still might try. One option might be
to lay barriers of mustard agent which last one month or more. Chadian
troops are ill-prepared to counter chemical warfare.
Ethiopia probably has used fuel-air explosives in Eritrea, and we
expect it to use riot control gas and napalm. Less than 10 percent of
Ethiopian troops have protective gear, and Eritreans are improvising
with goggles and charcoal-filled tubes for breathing--which can be
effective. We have no evidence that Ethiopia possesses a chemical
warfare capability, and it would run counter to Soviet practice for
Moscow to provide it to a client.
Sudan has some napalm and riot control agents, which it may use against
the southern insurgents. Neither the army nor the SPLA rebels have
provided more than 2 or 3 percent of their personnel with protective
gear.
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We have recorded about 600 allegations, mainly in the press, of
chemical weapons use in Angola since 1978 but cannot document any of
them. Until about 1984, most accounts accused South Africa of using
chemicals against Angolan government troops and?FriUr:ri?r)oison food and
water. The claims were plausible because South Africa had been the
second-leading producer of chemical weapons among the Western allies
during World War II. Pretoria has used herbicides to clear a strip
along the northern Namibian border, and it has a pesticide plant
capable of producing tons of chemical agents daily. Cuba thus sent a
laboratory to test samples found in Angola, but most turned out to be
white phosphorus. Since about 1984, Pretoria and the UNITA insurgents
have been accusing Luanda and its allies of using chemical warfare.
Pretoria helped a Belgian investigator to go to Angola, but his claimed
evidence seems specious. Nevertheless, South Africa has begun to equip
its troops with protective gear, and its public statements claiming
that the Soviets have used chemical warfare in Angola probably are
meant to "reserve the right" for Pretoria to retaliate in kind.
6. Sudan. CIA/NESA led the discussion of the extent of famine in southern
Sudan.
We know little about the scale of starvation in the countryside, but
one indicator is reported population movements to Juba, Khartoum,
southern Darfur and Kordofan Provinces, and to Ethiopia. The severely
malnourished arrivals are dying at rates varying among the different
camps from 2 to 8 per-10,000 people each day. Moreover, meningitis
reportedly has broken out, and vacinations so far have been limited to
Khartoum. While conditions worsen, the UN has pulled its personnel out
of the southern city of Juba because of the heightened insurgent
threat.
-- The rebel movement has agreed to cooperate with the International Red
Cross in delivering food, but the government in Khartoum continues to
drag its feet.
7. Ivory Coast. State/INR led the discussion of political stability in the
Ivory Coast.
-- President Houphouet-Boigny has not lost control and, despite his age,
probably will remain in power at least until his current term expires
in 1990. Constitutional provisions for selecting a successor probably
would be followed if the President died in office, and all likely
successors appear to be pro-Western moderates. Moreover, Ivory Coast
has a history of stability, with an apolitical military and relatively
little ethnic tension.
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-- Nonetheless, there probably is some substance to recent reports of
plotting among army officers, and ethnic tensions could grow to infect
the military. The worst possible situation probably would be a
prolonged incapacitation of Houphouet coupled with a marked economic
downturn. There are no constitutional provisions for replacing a
disabled president, and economic problems already include a shrinking
GNP, an insufficient IMF package of assistance, and a growing need to
, reduce government salaries. Under the worst-case scenario, the
inevitable jockeying for power by aspirants to the Presidency against a
backdrop of economic grievances could turn violent.
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Walter L. Barrows
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC-01477-88
21 April 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Marten van Heuven
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: Special Warning and Forecast Report:
Conventional Arms Control in Europe
1. Once the INF agreement is ratified and the Moscow summit concluded,
the spotlight will be on conventional force reductions in Europe. Yet even
under the best of circumstances, agreement on conventional arms control is
unlikely in the foreseeable future. The gap between public expectations
and the real prospects for agreement will create major problems for the
United States and its West European allies. Sentiment in the Senate to
link approval of a possible US-Soviet START (strategic arms reduction)
agreement to conventional reductions would magnify the pressure.
2. The most optimistic scenario would have new Conventional Stability
Talks (CST) beginning in late summer or early fall, with the long-stalled
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks disbanding then or soon
thereafter. Even this early timetable -- which itself depends on the prior
conclusion of the Vienna CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe) talks with adequate human rights provisions -- will leave East and
West a long way from agreement. With a broader mandate and many more
players than MBFR, the new conventional talks will face even more daunting
substantive and procedural obstacles.
3. The West has made little progress toward a common position. The
French have strong and different views of their own -- not so much over
substantive positions (which are not so far from ours) as over their
insistence on a multinational, CSCE-like forum assuring French independence
from a joint NATO posture. These differences are now being aired in a
confidential "Quint" of NATO's High Level Task Force (consisting of the US,
the UK, France, West Germany, and Italy). Even assuming eventual agreement
in the Quint, there are contentious issues affecting other NATO members:
Turkey, for example, wants assurances that the eventual zone of reductions
takes into account contiguous Soviet territory.
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4. The East, by contrast, almost certainly has a position ready to be
tabled as soon as the new talks begin, if not before. And the Warsaw
Pact's numerical superiority in tanks, artillery, and other major items
gives it most of the bargaining chips, which it can play with little cost
to its military capabilities. Even highly asymmetrical reductions -- on
the order of 3:1 or even 4:1 in some categories -- would weaken NATO
without significantly diminishing Warsaw Pact strength. But the prospect
of such an agreement would stimulate strong public pressure on NATO
governments to respond -- particularly if progress on nuclear reductions
was seen to be held up by a deadlock on conventional forces. A unilateral
Soviet reduction would have a similar effect.
In the absence of an agreed NATO position, the West may well be
presented with a superficially attractive Warsaw Pact offer that
it must reject in the face of considerable public opposition.
Such a scenario would further complicate the maintenance of a NATO
security consensus.
5. To date, conventional arms control has been been accorded low
priority by Western governments preoccupied with nuclear arms negotiations
and other issues, with the result that NATO is ill-prepared for the coming
CST round. The moment of truth may come with a new Soviet/Warsaw Pact
initiative some time in the fall, when our ability to exert a leadership
role will be hindered by the presidential election campaign.
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NIO/EUR Warning and Forecast Report - 20 April 1988
Marten van Heuven
ATTENDEES
CIA
NIO/EUR
ANIO/EUR
DI/EURA
DI/EURA
DI/SOVA
DI/SOVA
NPIC
DI/EURA
DI/EURA
FBIS/AG
DDO/NC
EURA/SI/PM
DI/EURA
DI/EURA
DI/EURA
DI/EURA/F
NIO/GPF
ANIO/USSR
DI/SOVA/RIG
DI/EURA/SI/PM
DI/EURA/IA/POPB
OTHERS
State/INR/SEE
AC DA
DIA/DAH-4
Navy/ONI
Army Intelligence
NSA/G-5
NSA/G509
NSA/A314
HQMC/INTE
DAMI-FII
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National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA:
FROM:
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC 01500-88
23 April 1988
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Martin W. Roeber
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting
April 1988
1. The following four countries were discussed and major judgments
of the Intelligence Community were that:
Economic sanctions alone will be insufficient to force
Panamanian military commander Noriega out of power within
the next thirty days; subordinate commanders remain loyal
and unlikely to move against him. Even a massive US
military reinforcement in Panama is unlikely by itself to
bluff Noriega.
The current impasse in Nicaraguan peace talks between the
Sandinistas and the Resistance probably will be overcome and
a tentative accord eventually reached. Prolonged
negotiations, however, are likely to split the insurgent
movement and delays in resupply will erode the integrity of
units inside Nicaragua.
The Honduran military is unlikely to force President Azcona
from office in the wake of strong public reaction to the
illegal extradition of drug-trafficker Matta, even though
the President's position has been seriously eroded. Anti-US
sentiment among commanders has grown, discouraging pro-US
military officers from speaking out, for example, against
the Foreign Minister's efforts to reach a bilateral accord
with Managua.
Civil-military tensions in Peru have increased substantially
and while a coup in the near term is not probable, a misstep
by President Garcia could galvanize opposition to him and
prompt his ouster.
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2. Panama:
Financial Issues:
Some money is almost certaintly coming td the government in the
form of taxes and other payments and possibly undetected small loans
but, on balance, the Intelligence Community sees no external
"financial savior" for Panama. Economic conditions and Noriega's
ability to meet his financial obligations will continue to
deteriorate. Loans, such as the possible $20 million from Libya,
will provide only short-term relief.
Nonetheless, the Intelligence Community believes it has
consistently underestimated Noriega's resourcefulness. Even without
external assistance, the majority of analysts believe he will "muddle
through," albeit with gradually diminishing resources. In addition,
the analysts agreed that economic deterioration alone will not force
him out. Indeed, some speculated that public expectations have been
lowered and that many Panamanians have made adjustments to live with
partial paychecks.
The Military
The Intelligence Community believes that the military institution
remains unified and analysts see little prospect over the next thirty
days for a move against Noriega.
As committed careerists, key commanders, although probably
restless, remain loyal to the institution.
While the rank-and-file are also unhappy over the lack of
full paychecks, Noriega has provided them with additional
credit at the well-stocked commissary, which has eased
financial distress.
Discipline within the military, including the police, is
excellent.
The loyalty of the captains and majors who control troops
remains strong.
The civilian opposition has been unable to mount any
substantial or sustained demonstrations.
Increased US military presence alone--even if totalling thousands
of troops--will not shake the regime. However, if US military
dependents were moved onto military bases and the US became more
aggressive in challenging the PDF, suggesting that major military
action was imminent, then the PDF could be forced to reassess its
support for Noriega.
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Even though Noriega seems well entrenched, the Intelligence
Community believes that he might be willing to leave under the proper
circumstances. Key to Noriega is that he is able to remain in Panama
and is given guarantees of his personal safety. One possible
agreement would include Noriega's departure from the PDF in August,
which would mark his traditional retirement date.
On the Cuban presence, the analysts agreed that it is highly
unlikely that Havana has sent more than a few dozen personnel, some
for military training and others for press and propaganda
manipulation. There were some differences over the implications of
this Cuban presence for PDF unity, however, with some arguing that it
made little difference and others suggesting it was raising
concerns.
WARNING ISSUES:
Noriega may be willing to allow an increase in foreign leftist
influence in Panama in exchange for financial and diplomatic
support.
Noriega is likely to increase pressure on US military personnel
as the crisis drags on and although he has thus far blocked
violent actions against the US, random attacks by his leftist
supporters cannot be ruled out.
3. Nicaragua
The Intelligence Community believed that the current impasse is
likely to be overcome and that prospects for a cease-fire accord remain
good. Both sides have staked out tough initial positions, the insurgents
to placate hardliners in the Resistance and the Sandinistas to sow
disunity among the insurgents and mollify their own followers who might
question direct talks.
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A minority of analysts were less optimistic about a cease-fire. They
argued that the unity of the Resistance will break down quickly and end
prospects for a full agreement. As a result, fighting would resume,
although only 3,000 to 5,000 combatants would be likely to renew the
struggle.
The cease-fire zones under negotiation offer both advantages and
disadvantages to the Resistance forces. Their size is equivalent to
El Salvador and this will prevent "sealing" by regime forces and they are
located in traditional rebel operating areas. On the negative side:
their relative underdevelopment, remoteness, and lack of population or
overland transportation. Such problems, combined with heavy rainfall,
will make movement difficult.
WARNING ISSUES
Prolonged negotiations with the Sandinistas will exacerbate
splits within the Resistance.
The Sandinistas could launch a preemptive offensive against
insurgent units in the cease-fire zones if peace talks appear to
be failing.
4. Honduras
Although the strong public reaction to the illegal extradition of
drug dealer Manual Matta has shaken civil-military relations, it is
unlikely to provoke a coup. Nonetheless, the backlash has strained
relations with the armed forces and further weakened an already unpopular
President Azcona, and the Intelligence Community cannot rule out the
possibility that he could be replaced constitutionally or that he might
decide to resign. In addition, the affair further eroded the credibility
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of the United States within the Honduran military. Washington's
pressures on Tegucigalpa have angered the high command which sees the
incident as an example of capricious behavior. The military is also
angered by continued accusations of Honduran military involvement in drug
trafficking. Indeed, if anything, the affair may have strengthened the
position of those reputedly involved in trafficking. For example, the
Intelligence Community sees little likelihood that police commander and
rumored trafficker Leonel Riera, who delayed responding to US Embassy
calls for assistance, will be replaced unless Commander-in-Chief Humberto
Regalado is also forced out. Furthermore, backlash against Washington
may discourage those who oppose Foreign Minister Lopez Contreas'
initiative to sign a bilateral accord accommodation with Managua from
speaking out for fear of appearing subservient to US interests.
WARNING ISSUES:
While Azcona's position seems safe for now, further large-scale
demonstrations could prompt civilians to try to force his
resignation.
Pressure from the military--resentful toward Washington--may
force the President to be less accommodating to US interests in
the coming months.
Popular reaction to Matta's illegal extradition has given the
traditionally weak left an issue to galvanize latent anti-US
sentiment in Honduras, increasing the prospect for further
demonstrations and attacks on US property.
5. Peru
President Garcia's relations with the military have reached a new
low.
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Garcia has shown an ability to defuse military
tensions in the past, and he is showing indications that he is again
taking steps to placate or otherwise deal with commanders. The
Intelligence Community believes, however, that any precipitous moves by
Garcia--such as trying to extend his term by fiat, or pressing for
punishment of troops involved in the 1986 massacre of guerrillas
imprisoned in Lima, would galvanize military sentiments against him, and
dramatically increase the likelihood of a coup.
WARNING ISSUE: but a misstep by
Garcia could galvanize military and civilian support for his ouster.
Such an effort might be resisted by the ruling party's paramilitary
apparat and result in widespread fighting.
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Participating in the NIO/Latin America Warning Meeting of
29 April 1988 were representatives of the following agencies:
Defense Intelligence Agency:
DIO/DIA
DIA/DE3
DIA/DB3C2
DIA/DB3C1
DIA/DB5C
DIA/DX-5
DIA/OA-5
DIA/JSI-4B
DIA/CAJIT
DOD/JCS
National Security Agency
Department of State/INR
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
CIA Participants:
ALA
OGI
OIA
LDA
OIR
DO/L
DO/CATF
DO/EPS
DO/NC
NIO/W
NP IC
FBIS
NIC/AG
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, aC20505
NIC #01492-88
25 April 1988
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Daniel K. Webster
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia
SUBJECT NESA Warning and Forecast Report, 21 April 1988
Iran
1. The discussion focused on likely Iranian actions in the aftermath of
the 18 April clashes. Analysts generally agree that the US military
successes have not intimidated Iran, but Iranian options for response are
narrowing. We believe a direct attack on US naval vessels in the Gulf is
still unlikely, but our confidence in this judgment has diminished for three
reasons.
There is certain to be a strong Iranian desire to revenge their
18 April losses.
Tehran is suffering a series of setbacks, militarily and
economically, and may be now more tempted to react aggressively.
2. There is general agreement that terrorism will be the most likely
Iranian response in the current situation against both US and GCC targets.
CIA believes that increased terrorism will still be employed on a selective
basis designed to accomplish specific policy objectives. State/INR notes an
apparent trend toward a more aggressive policy by Tehran and believes that a
large scale aggressive pattern of action may result. DIA acknowledged this
possibility but believes Iran does not have the capability to pose a major
threat to the vital interests of the US or neighboring states at this time.
3. The recapture of the Faw Peninsula by Iraq has been a significant
military and psychological defeat for Tehran. The Iraqis were able to
achieve strategic surprise in their attack, perhaps aided by Iranian
complacency brought on by the lack of offensive Iraqi activity in the past.
The recapture of Faw serves effective notice that the Iraqi army is indeed a
force to be reckoned with and may require Iran to devote more attention and
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resources to its defensive,positions along the front. (The Iraqi victory
also appears to underline the inhibiting effect that Baghdad's political
decisionmaking has had on Iraqi military capabilities.)
4. Tehran's major objective in the immediate future must be to rally
new public support in the wake of its recent defeats. Most analysts believe
it will be able to do this only to a limited degree. It is doubtful whether
Tehran can achieve the "national mobilization" that the Iranian leadership
is now calling for.
Afghanistan
5. There has been surprisingly little reaction to the Geneva accords
from the major parties involved in the war. Pakistan and the Soviet Union
appear generally satisfied with the accords. The Mujahedin are not happy
with the Geneva agreement but have not been as outspokenly opposed as might
have been expected. They have been assured by Islamabad that the supply
effort will be continued and they will moderate their opposition to the
Geneva accords so long as supplies continue to flow. Kabul's reaction to
the agreement has been rather mild and there are not yet signs of panic
within the PDPA. However, some reporting indicates the probability of
military defections to the Mujahedin in the near future.
6. There is some divergence of views among the analysts on the
likelihood of a cutoff of Soviet supply to the Kabul regime. State INR
believes there is a significant possibility that Soviet supplies will be
terminated. CIA and DIA are less optimistic and note that continued
resupply of Soviet forces will be required until withdrawal is completed.
It will be very difficult to tell whether supplies shipped into Afghanistan
are intended for Soviet or Afghan forces during the withdrawal period.
There is some possibility that supplies of consummables already in country
could sustain the Afghan army for up to two years at recent rates of
expenditure.
7. Analysts are in general agreement that Pakistan is unlikely to
unilaterally cut off susslies to the Mu'ahedin durin the seriod of Soviet
withdrawal.
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8. Kabul's political reorganization of the northern provinces is not
seen as a Soviet attempt to partition the country following withdrawal.
Such a strategy would leave the Soviets with many of the same liabilities
they now have and with none of the gains that a complete withdrawal would
bring. Rather, community analysts believe that the reorganization in the
north is more likely a last ditch effort by Kabul to consolidate its hold on
at least a portion of the country. It is similar to other initiatives that
Kabul has tried--unsuccessfully--in the past.
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Libya
9. Qadhafi's recent efforts to convince Libya and the world of his good
intentions do not represent a real change of heart. His loosening of
dictatorial constraints domestically and his gestures of good intentions
? abroad are aimed at strengthening his political position and reducing his
international isolation. He has recently announced new policies of
releasing political prisoners, allowing more foreign travel by Libyan
citizens, permitting greater private economic activity, and curbing
oppressive practices of the security services. These policies are aimed at
reducing opposition to his rule among the Libyan population and shoring up
his support in the military.
10. Domestically he seems to have had some success.
report less disenchantment among the population. Effective internal
opposition to his rule has probably declined as a result. His apparent
withdrawal of total support for the revolutionary committees may well be a
reflection of his desire to use revolutionary committee members as a
scapegoat for his own failed policies. A number of revolutionary committee
members have been murdered in recent weeks and rumors abound that several
leaders of the revolutionary committee have been arrested.
11. In foreign affairs, Qadhafi also appears to be making some gains.
He has announced plans to improve relations with neighboring states and his
release of foreigners jailed in Libya has gone a long way toward improving
his image with some European states. If he continues on his present course,
community analysts believe it likely that he will succeed to a significant
degree in reducing Libya's international isolation. Economic sanctions
imposed in 1986 will likely decrease and there is already evidence that
Italy is interested in improving relations with Libya. Qadhafi is making a
similar effort to improve his relations in Africa, most notably with Niger,
Sierra Leone and Nigeria.
12. Analysts are unanimous, however, in their assessment that there
have been no basic changes in Qadhafi's foreign policy goals. He continues
to attempt to work against US interests around the world and Libyan support
for terrorism shows little sign of change. With his basic goals intact, but
pursued through more effective means, Qadhafi may, in fact, be a greater
challenge to US interests. Effective reduction of opposition at home will
help ensure his survivability and increasing acceptance abroad will give him
greater flexibility to pursue his anti-US agenda.
Daniel K. Webster
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The Director of Ceiiiral Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #01527-88
26 April 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: 13 April 1988 East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting:
North Korea
1. Despite the increased cause for concern resulting from recent events
in and involving North Korea--such as the bombing of a South Korean airliner;
changes in the North's senior leadership, including the replacement of the
Defense Minister; and reports of increasing food shortages and corresponding
disgruntlement--analysts from throughout the Intelligence Community agree that
the immediate threat posed by North Korea has not substantially increased in
recent weeks.
continued wariness by the South, as well as by the United States, is
warranted.
2. Pyongyang's goal of reunification with the South on the North's terms
has not changed, but its tactics for achieving this goal have been flexible.
In the past, North Korea has resorted to terrorism, shooting incidents along
the DMZ, agent infiltration, assassinations and, somewhat paradoxically,
serious negotiations. In the nearterm, we can expect that this "broken field
runner-type" of approach will continue.
3. Nevertheless, North Korea is now beset by some fundamental
difficulties that will not be easily resolved and that, over the medium to
longterm, could affect its strategy and tactics to the detriment of stability
on the peninsula:
-- North Korea's economy, already a disaster, continues to deteriorate, a
situation which the top leadership may not fully appreciate.
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-- While South Korea's leadership succession appears to be going smoothly,
the situation for the North remains highly uncertain. The dynastic
transition from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il could become troubled.
-- The ability of the South Koreans to successfully hold the Olympics will
be a major blow to North Korea's self-image and international
prestige.
4. In wrestling with these challenges, North Korea, with respect to its
nearterm tactics towards the South, could adopt any of three general
approaches. It could:
Become more hostile and step up military pressure or the use of
terrorism. Incidents along the DMZ or seaborne infiltration of agents
could be increased, and/or efforts could be made to bomb hotels and
other tourist facilities in order to frighten people away from the
Olympics. (They will probably not attack Olympic facilities during the
games because the Soviets, Chinese, and other friends will be in
attendance.) We believe, however, that the chance of immediate
large-scale military operations against the South is low. Although
training activity in the North Korean armed forces, especially at the
lower echelons, has been intensified in the past few months; the size
of the armed forces reportedly has been reduced by 150,000, and there
are some reports of reductions in the North's defense budget.
-- Try to cut its losses by accepting the Olympics as a fait accompli,
keep a low profile, and try to reclaim some prestige by gliccessfully
holding the World Youth Games next year.
-- Try to resume negotiations with the South in an effort to get some of
the events moved to the North (unlikely now that time is so short), and
pursue tension-reducing negotiations on other fronts.
5. Internal challenges to the North could make it more obstreperous and
dangerous over the longterm. Or, conversely, internal events could spin out
of control, forcing Pyongyang to turn inward and move toward either collapse
or reform.
In several respects North Korea is becoming more exposed to the outside
world. More Korean expatriates and other visitors are visiting the
motherland, and gradually more Koreans are traveling abroad through diplomatic
missions and cultural activities.
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