TERRORISM WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300110022-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: September 26, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300110022-3
Lcn[rai Intelligerm
shington. D.C. 05y
- it 111gencc Council
NIC 04469-86
26 September 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central
Deputy Director Intelligence
Charles E. Alle
n
National Intelligence Officer for
SUBJECT; Counterterrorism
Terrorism Warning and Forecast Report
Representatives of the Intelli
Pan gence Community met
wing issues;
Am 73 hija following cking and terrorism in Nicara on 19 September p of
1986 to
Libyan-sponsored terrorism, ul massacre, 15 Ma Y and Honduras'
?
highlights. Y Org anization,
Attached is CBW terrorism, and terrori
my report. ~-related imagery
Attachment
As stated
axles E. Gen~~~.
25X1
of Central Intelligence
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Discussion Items
1. Terrorism in Nicaragua and Honduras
DIA presented.an excellent overview of the terrorist organizations, their
objectives, and targets. The primary Sandinista objective is survival of the
revolution. Because of continued US funding for the anti-Sandinistas, it is
almost certain that Sandinista rebel leaders are contacting radical
associates, including Hondurans, making contingency plans, and assessing the
capability of various groups to carry out subversive acts including acts of
terrorism. Because the Sandinistas know that the US will hold them
responsible for anti-US activity, they will be cautious in target selection.
The most likely targets will be those involved in supporting the US
anti-Sandinista efforts and only as a last resort will they target US assets
directly. DIA believes the Sandinistas have a well thought out and tightly
controlled policy towards sponsorship of terrorism.
Honduran radical groups share several common characteristics: chronic
debilitating factionalism, lack of popular support, ineptness, maintenance of
ties with Cuba and Nicaragua, and all are violently anti-American. All
Honduran groups have suffered serious setbacks in recent years. Before they
initiate major terrorist actions, we should see some of the following
indicators: training, robberies, or kidnapping for extortion. Probable
targets include anti-Sandinistas in Honduras; Honduran individuals and
facilities supporting anti-Sandinista activities, and as a last resort, direct
US targets. DIA believes that factionalism among the radical groups precludes
sustained terrorist activity. Cuba provides some funding for Honduran
groups. While we do not see an immediate Sandinista threat directed against
US forces, we cannot rule out action by some radical group seeking to attract
attention from a potential sponsor. There are many US targets in Honduras
from which to choose.
2. Pan Am 73 Hijacking
CIA reviewed the status of our assessment of the identity hijackers.
date there is no clear evidence of who sponsored this attac To
k.
Al-Turki, the alleged
Lib
yan arrested by the Pakistanis, claims to have had a support role,
providing weapons to the others after they arrived. It is a common practice
role. The extent of Libyan involvement is still unresolved. _Thereyis'aufair
likelihood of hostage takin or another hijacking as an attempt to secure
release of the imprisoned hijackers.
3. Istanbul. Massacre
CIA reviewed the state of investigation. The attack left 22 killed, six
seriously injured, and scores wounded. There is no smoking gun to indite any
group, although it strongly resembles prior ANO attacks in Vienna, Rome, and
Brussels. The attack was well planned and organized. elieve the
SECRET)
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? 1
Lerrorists were in Istanbul at least two weeks prior to the attack and that
snuggled in via diplomatic pouch. While the use of suicide
--~ ,c6e terrorists and two of the Pan Am 73 hijackers appe to be a
in Palestinian terrorism, we recall that suicide belts were used
uy Palestinian terrorists in attacks on Israeli kibbutzim some years ago. It
i.::. iiUt clear that the Istanbul attackers deliberately detonated the belts.
4. 15 May Organization
INR addressed the question of whether the 15 May Organization was back in
bu, 'iness, possibly with a new leader.
ui-escent be inning While the group was relatively 1984, q 19ie aent beg We goinimide1 the 15 May-type devices began to appear possibility the group itself was defunct but
sharing its. technology. The arrest by Morocco in August of four Arabs with
15 May-type devices added a new wrinkle to the issue.,
alleged loyalty to Col. Hawari, a top PLO security officiae
ls and closerrorists
confidant of Arafat. The roles of Hawari and another 15 May operative, Abu
Zuhajr, in directing recent attacks are not clear.
5. Update on Libya
CIA noted that since mid-summer, we have seen increasing signs of
confidence on the part of Qadhafi. His operatives have begun to travel and
are heading to vulnerable locations. We have reports of arms shipments being
transferred. In some areas Libyans have been given a carte blanche to attack
Americans if the United States should again attack Libya; this may be a
worldwide order. All of this coincides with an increasingly strident
Qadhafi.
CIA concludes that Libyan operatives are actively seeking targets and the
US is high on its list. We expect terrorist attacks in the not too distant
SECRET)
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7. CBW Terrorist Threat
CIA reviewed the evidence that terrorist groups may be looking towards use
of chemical or biological materials as new weapons of terror. The briefer
previewed the Key Judgments of an SNIE.on the subject. Coordination on the
draft is scheduled for 1 October.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300110022-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300110022-3