MONTHLY WARNING REPORTS FOR OCTOBER 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300110003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 13, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. ?0505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Reports for October 1986
1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:
Iran/Iraq
Recent reporting suggests that Iran is still planning to launch an
offensive before the end of the year. Growing differences within the regime
over war policy so far have not interrupted military preparations. DIA
believes that Iran's most likely course will be to mount a limited offensive
similar in scope to the attack on Al Faw last February. There is a greater
likelihood of Iranian attempts to pressure Iraq and the states supporting
Baghdad by staging air strikes and sabotage against Kuwaiti and other Gulf
ports and oil installations. Moreover, Iran's capability to interdict
international shipping in the Strait has increased with the deployment to the
area of helicopters and Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles.
Libya
There are growing indications that Qadhafi is returning to his pre-April
policies and asserting more active diplomatic and political efforts abroad.
He also is reinvigorating contacts with foreign terrorist groups, particularly
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in Africa and Latin America. Community representatives agree that although
the Karachi hijacking was an Abu Nidal operation, Libya was involved in the
incident.
Southern Africa
Pretoria will persist in its determination to cripple the United
Democratic Front by detaining its leaders and disrupting external funding.
The SAG however, probably will stop short of an outright ban on the-UDF. The
South Africans will also stage further covert and overt attacks against the
ANC presence in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia. In Angola, the Luanda
government has not deployed sufficient forces to launch a major offensive
against UNITA, and prospects for a significant break in the military contest
this year have receded.
Central America
Most Intelligence Community analysts continue to discount the possibility
that Cuba will deliver MIG-21s to Nicaragua before the end of the year,
primarily because of Cuban and Soviet reluctance to defy repeated US
warnings. A major Sandinista incursion into Honduras appears unlikely in the
next few weeks. There has been a moderate buildup of Sandinista forces along
the Honduran border opposite FDN concentrations in the Yamales salient, but
these deployments apparently are aimed at blocking the reinfiltration of FDN
personnel and at creating a capability for small cross-border probes and
harassment of FDN forces. The NIO/Warning notes that the Sandinistas are
almost continuously encroaching on Honduran sovereignty and may expand
operations into Honduras until stopped by force. In E1 Salvador, the
Sandinistas probably are giving the FMLN close advice and support in their
political action program designed to exploit the Duarte government's immense
problems in coping with the recent earthquake.
Eastern Europe
Severe economic decline and aging leaderships could generate a succession
crisis in one or more East European countries at any time. The most likely
candidates for political crisis in the near term are Romania and Hungary, with
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria next in line.
2. Trend Commentary:
Philippines
A potentially destabilizing test of strength between Aquino's supporters
and military and political elements backing Enrile and Laurel could be
triggered at any time. Miscalculation by one of the contenders will be the
most likely cause of a showdown, but moves by disaffected officers in the
military reform movement to force the removal of Enrile's opponents in the
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Cabinet or establish a de facto military junta cannot be excluded in the next
three months. Aquino's supporters would violently resist such moves.
Moreover, divisions within the officer corps and an erosion of discipline in
the ranks could contribute to a dangerous breakdown in public order.
Nicaragua
The trend toward more assertive Sandinista behavior probably will be
reinforced in the next few months by their perceived need to respond to
congressional approval of the Contra aid package and by the virtual collapse
of the Contadora process. The latter has obliged Managua to place greater
reliance on unilateral actions, such as the intensification of military
pressure on Contra bases inside Honduras in the last three months. The
near-term prospect is for growing Sandinista military and political pressures
on Honduras aimed at stimulating domestic opposition to the government's
policy of granting the Contras sanctuary and logistic and training
facilities. The Sandinistas will also be strongly influenced by their
expectation that the US will escalate pressures during the last two years of
President Reagan's term, including a break in diplomatic relations. If
Sandinista leaders come to believe that a break is imminent the ma take
reem tive action.
The Soviets in the coming three months will intensify their post-Reykjavik
drive to discredit US intentions and arms control policies in the US and in
Europe, hoping to reinvigorate West European anti-nuclear and anti-INF
movements, thereby forcing NATO governments to break with Washington on key
issues of arms control and nuclear strategy. The Gorbachev leadership will
seek to manipulate Administration positions on SDI and compliance with SALT II
limits to deepen transatlantic differences. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact
allies will take further initiatives to portray themselves as ready to
negotiate major reductions in conventional forces in Europe and to eliminate
chemical weapons. There will be some possibility of announcements of plans
for unilateral reductions in Soviet and East European armed forces in the next
three to six months, and perhaps limited withdrawals of Soviet ground forces
from East Germany and Hungary.
Arab Terrorism
Prospects for an upsurge in Syrian-backed Palestinian terrorism have
increased in the aftermath of the UK's decision to break diplomatic relations
with Damascus. Syrian behavior, moreover, may be more reckless and less
predictable in view of reports that Assad's health is precarious. The PLO's
claimed responsibility for the grenade attack at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem
on 15 October may signal a belief on Arafat's part that he must respond more
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forcefully to Jordanian and S rian attem is to undermine his osition and oust
him as PLO leader.
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It
will inspire a spiral of competitive terrorist actions in the Middle East and
Europe by the PLO and Arafat's rivals in radical Palestinian factions with the
ostensible purpose of defeating what they regard as a Jordanian-Israeli-US
plot."
3. NIO/Warning notes these additional areas of continuing warning concern:
Af hanistan/Pakistan--More aggressive Soviet and Afghan cross-border air
a acts an vio ations of Pakistan's airspace, together with intensified
Soviet exploitation of tribal restiveness, have confronted Islamabad with
growing problems.
South Korea--The political climate could spark serious violence at any time.
President Chun is said to be considering a declaration of martial law to deal
with opposition obstructionism and student violence, and his political
opponents believe Chun will soon crack down and arrest their National Assembly
members. In this atmosphere of suspicion and tension, major riots such as the
one in Inchon last May could precipitate a political crisis that North Korea
would be tempted to exploit.
An ola--There remains some risk of direct clashes between South African forces
an u an-Soviet military personnel.
Chad/Libya--The split within the Chadian rebel movement has created a
situation that may tempt either Qadhafi or Habre to take military initiatives
that could result in limited clashes.
Suriname--Head of state Bouterse's apparent rejection of domestic and foreign
efforts to arrange his resignation and exile could generate a coup from within
the military and a governmental collapse. Bouterse may seek to contain the
crisis by increasing repressive measures and appealing for Libyan military and
financial assistance.
Chile--Pinochet has temporarily strengthened his position by replacing the
Army member of the junta and restoring a state-of-siege. However, his
expressed intent to remain in office will bolster the cohesion of the moderate
opposition in pressing for decisive change before 1989.
India/China--The border dispute could lead to limited military clashes. Both
sites Have reinforced their troops in the area, and Beijing has made unusually
tough demands that India withdraw its forces and dismantle military posts in
Chinese territory. Gandhi will seek to avert escalation of the dispute, but
missteps or overreactions by local commanders could precipitate an exchange of
fire.
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