REPORT ON 19 MARCH 1987 NIO/NARCOTICS WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300050012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 6, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #01558-87
6 April 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: William R. Kotapish
National Intelligence Office for Narcotics
SUBJECT: Report on 19 March 1987 NIO/Narcotics Warning and
Forecast Meeting
Representatives of the Intelligence Community and appropriate law
enforcement representatives met on 19 March 1987 to discuss the following:
Colombian insurgencies and implications for counternarcotics programs; Latin
American media reaction to Operation Blast Furnace; and the Community
response on narco-terrorism in compliance with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986.
William R. Kotapish
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National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics
Intelligence Coordination and Strategy Meeting
19 March 1987
Narco-Terrorism
1. The NIO/Narcotics briefed the meeting on the Community's draft
response for the FBI on combating narco-terrorism. This draft memorandum,
following coordination with the intelligence components of the law
enforcement community, will be sent to the Attorney General to satisfy
Section 2014 of the International Narcotics Control Act of 1986, Public Law
No. 99-570.
2. In meeting the recommendation advocated in the draft paper discussed
above, the NIO/Narcotics and NIO/Counterterrorism will jointly form an ad
hoc task force to access the current state of intelligence collection,
analysis, data retention and data retrieval on the narco-terrorism target.
The findings of this ad hoc review will be forwarded to the National Drug
Enforcement Policy Board.
Colombia: Developments in the Insurgency and Implications for
Counternarcotics Programs
3. IA/ALA, briefed the meeting on this complex
issue. a emphasized a major dilemma Colombian President Barco faces in
maintaining pressure on drug traffickers without risking a major clash with
insurgents involved in the drug tradej etailed the problems
Barco has encountered in building up the capabilities of his security
forces. For the benefit of those attending this meeting, an outline of
report.
excellent briefing is included as an attachment to this
Latin American Media Reaction to Operation Blast Furnace
4. CIA/FBIS, briefed the meeting on this issue.
South American media coverage of the U.S.-Bolivian antidrug Operation Blast
Furnace beginning in July 1986 ranged from moderate to heavy; reaction
ranged from tacit support to strong disapproval. The Uruguayan media was
not reviewed, and Venezuela ignored the operation. None of the countries
voiced a need for additional joint operations involving U.S. military
SECRET
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forces. Most saw the drug problem as a consumer country problem and felt
that international cooperation, including drug agreements with the United
States and among the Latin American countries, was a necessity. Criticism
of the joint military operation was generally in the context of the
violation of national sovereignty, the futility or "ineffectiveness" of the
military effort (mentioned in Ecuador, Chile and Colombia), and the idea of
"we can do it on our own and with our own resources" (Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay).
Community Report
5. Following are comments from representatives of the narcotics
intelligence community:
o State reported on the certification process, noting that
certification was withheld from Iran, Afghanistan and Syria.
State noted that strong sentiment existed on the Hill for
overriding the certification of Mexico, Panama and the Bahamas.
o Customs reported on threats to US Customs personnel in Bogota,
Colombia.
o US Coast Guard reported on a recent USCG survey which
indicated that the availability of domestic marijuana in the
US had increased and that cocaine availability had also
increased with prices remaining steady.
Attachment
As Stated
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NIO/Narcotics Warning Meeting
19 March 1987
COLOMBIA: Developments in the Insurgency and Implications
for Counternarcotics Programs
I. Defining the insurgency.
-- Complex phenomenon rooted in tradition; groups began to
form in late 1949, beginning of La Violencia. Today,
several major groups, best known of which are Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), M-19.
-- Major groups:
-- FARC, armed wing of PCC, 1966. Conservative estimate
3,500-4,500, plus at least 5,000 supporters. Military
estimates 7,500--surge factor. Maintains nominal truce
with government, first negotiated by Betancur in 1984.
-- Other groups outside truce; some originally signed, later
rejected; others never signed. Formed alliance in late
1985, National Guerrilla Coordinator (CNG). CNG has been
active since; concentrating on economic targets.
-- M-19. Nationalist, anti-US; 1974. Despite losses, still
dangerous. probably 1,000 strong. 25X1
Founder of UNG and America BN, which is still fighting in
SW CO. However, has apparently lost CNG leadership to:
-- National Liberation Army (ELN). Formed with Cuban help,
1963. Has grown rapidly during past two-three years.
Probably 1,000 combatants; hard-line Marxist-Leninist;
violently anti-US. Since pipeline finished March 1986,
has attacked aggressively. Group to watch.
-- National People's Army (EPL). Armed wing PCC/ML; 1967.
450-600, but recent reporting suggests expanding.
-- Impact of truce: Before then, violence cyclical, proportion
fairly constant. Truce disrupted balance; groups--esp FARC--
have expanded. Violence increasing; both sides buying time.
Important factor: political legitimization of FARC through
creation/participation of Patriotic Union, which won minority
congressional rep last year.
-- All major groups linked to some extent, but best documented
with FARC. 25X1
seven fronts in major coca-growing areas. Protects 2bAl
and taxes drug producers; occasional cultivation, role as
middleman. Extent unknown; at least one instance lab/camp.
-- FARC dominant in SE CO where major labs located. Poses major
problems for drug enforcement--mil/pol role, mil action;
police often outgunned.
-- M-19. drug involvement, arms trafficking. 25X1
Palace of Justice; may have taken payoffs to destroy records.
Appears to be active in MJ shipments lately. Disturbing:
M-19/CNG have contracted with major 25X1
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-- ELN.
cocaine/arms traffic, VE border.
involved---in
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-- EPL. Last year ambushed police patrol on
lab search near EC border.
III. Recent developments/trends in insurgency.
-- Truce with FARC increasingly deteriorating; tension growing.
FARC has stepped up attacks on military/police (by order),
thrown series of challenges at government. UP has declared
independence to protect political gains, but strategy only.
UP/FARC closely identified; UP won votes through intimidation
last year.
-- Point of contention: mayoral elections, first time, 1988.
FARC/UP want to consolidate control; Barco wants disarmament
before elections. Face-off; has become battle of nerves.
-- Other factor: lab raids. Barco says no areas off limits; UP
as re ortedl warned off.
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Per
press, UP to 25X1
meet with Barco again yesterday. Tension rising.
-- Indicative comment: Barco 125X1
gov't no longer says truce, but ceasefire. Army everywhere.
-- At same time, increasing unity in insurgency; CNG, with help
from Castro, has apparently resolved conflicts. Leaders of
FARO and CNG making progress toward united front; likely to
see open politic
al
alliance within year. P
lans for 'oint
military offensi
ve
this ye
ar, Feb/Mar;
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FARC may be prep
ar
ing to j
oin ELN/CNG in at
tacks on mayor oil
facilities--refinery, Barrancabermeja.
IV. Important factor: security forces capabilities.
-- Barco hurrying to improve limited counterinsurgency, antidrug
capabilities. Has approved unprecedented $156 million emerg
appropriation, authorized creation of new mil units. Mil
leaders shopping for new equipment. Army estimates will
need 15,000 more troops if truce breaks down; long-term plans
to expand Army to 100,000.
-- Meanwhile, race with time. New defense plan attempts to mass
gov't troops against groups outside truce in areas where most
active--major challenge for widely scattered troops, serious
mobility problems. Critical lack of helos.
-- Sec forces fully engaged against CNG--ELN in NE oil region,
M-19 in SW CO, EPL joining in. Streched thin already; not
capable of taking on FARC, which mil believes has weapons as
good as or better than Army.
V. Implications for antidrug efforts.
-- Major problem is FARC involvement in drug processing, SE
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jungle. Barco walking knife edge.
-- FARC will continue testing, but will try to prolong truce as
long. as UP maintains credibility. While in effect, Barco
will have to continue reactive, ad hoc tactics against both
insurgents and trafs associated with them. Point: Llanos.
-- Barco will not halt erad or drug ops in cities; drive to elim
corruption continues. Despite brave words, may continue to
delay strikes at FARC-controlled labs to try to forestall
truce break. Will try to show resolve without sparking
major conflict.
-- Continued public support; media keeping heat on trafs.
Don't expect pressure against drug enforcement.
-- Barco will continue drive to improve counterinsurg/antidrug
capabilities; already turning to US. Concern over growing
power of trafs--esp insurgent drug inv--may make him more
receptive to US mil assistance, such as training, equip, poss
greater advisory presence.
-- On extradition, Barco firm, but pressure mounting against.
extradition 25X1
efficient, trafs afraid of it, serves both countries. Future
uncertain, but think Barco will keep fighting.
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Andean Parliament recommending 25X1
unified policy/legal approach, regional strike force. Looks
promising for more cooperation--in long term, only hope.
-- Short term: outlook grim. Barco genuinely committed, but
formidable political/logistic obstacles to improvements.
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