MONTHLY WARNING REPORTS FOR MARCH 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300050004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 10, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
10 April 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Reports for March 1987
1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:
USSR/US
NIO/USSR concurs with the majority judgment of the Intelligence Community
that the Gorbachev regime has good political, economic, and military reasons
to conclude an INF agreement; that it wants to sign an agreement with this
administration; and that it is not going to let US demands on verification and
shorter range systems block such an accord. NIO/USSR further notes that on
balance, the Intelligence Community believes Moscow judges the military,
benefits of a zero-zero INF agreement to outweigh the costs. Confidence in
the ability to verify an INF accord will not be high unless the US is able to
reach an agreement with the Soviets on baseline figures for the existing SS-20
force and on procedures for dismantling and destruction.
Western Europe
NIO/USSR notes that as the Allies increasingly realize that a zero-zero
INF agreement could lead the Soviets to rely more on intercontinental systems
for theater targets, pressures from West European capitals may mount for
movement in the START negotiations--and hence for efforts to find some common
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ground with Moscow on SDI. Furthermore, implementing a verification agreement
on INF may prove difficult with the Europeans. While agreeing in principle to
on-site inspections, they could bargain hard on the maximum number of annual
inspections to be allowed.
USSR/West Germany/Berlin
A dramatic Soviet statement on the German question could undercut a
proposed US initiative on Berlin, particularly if timed to coincide with
President Reagan's visit there. Such a Soviet move would muddy the waters of
political debate in Germany and could strain US-FRG relations by raising
doubts about where Washington stands on the German question.
Greece/Turkey/Aegean
The risk of new Greek-Turkish incidents--spurred by the Aegean oil dispute
as well as US Congressional hearings on military assistance for Greece and,
Turkey--is high. Greece has deployed two-thirds of its major naval units from
Salamis. A premeditated attack is unlikely by either side, but the risks have
increased of unintentional confrontation and potential escalation.
China/India
The Chinese may initiate a border skirmish soon. In response, a variety
of Indian domestic pressures may prevent Gandhi from backing down, and with an
aggressive Indian commander in the area, escalation is a real possibility. If
India suffers a defeat or embarrassment, NI0/NESA notes that Gandhi may
finally commit India to developing nuclear weapons as the ultimate defense of
India.
Pakistan/US
The US military aid package does not give the US sufficient leverage to
deter Pakistan from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Islamabad does not
believe it has reached the point where it must choose between its nuclear
program and US assistance.
Angola
The potential for new fighting between South Africa and Angolan/Cuban
forces, especially in the air, is growing. NIO/Africa notes that South
Africa's airpower advantage has been eroding in recent years, and Pretoria
probably will do something in the coming months to assert its superiority.
To embarrass the government, Sendero Luminoso increasingly appears to be
attacking foreign interests in Peru when President Garcia is visiting abroad.
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Brazil
Deteriorating economic conditions in Brazil will likely spark additional
labor unrest and could prompt military intervention. The stress of the
situation also may adversely affect Sarney's emotional and physical health and
cause him to resign, notes NI0/Latin America.
Suriname
The military stalemate continues, but the insurgents are maintaining the
battlefield initiative. Bouterse's support in the military is uncertain, and
NI0/Warning notes that the chances of governmental collapse are growing.
Bouterse probably is anxious for Libyan aid but fears US retaliation. At
present, Bouterse will not leave on his own and Brunswijk probably lacks the
backing to replace him if he does leave office.
2. Trend Commentary
Western Europe: Allied Views on INF
The gap between public and private positions taken on INF by West European
leaders will continue to widen. Intra-European security consultations also
will expand. Meanwhile, Moscow is likely to keep the pressure on West
European leaders by launching new "peace initiatives", such as a unilateral
withdrawal of one or two Soviet divisions from Czechoslovakia.
Syria/Lebanon/Israel
Syria's primary motivation for intervention in Lebanon--to save the Amal
militia and contain the Palestinians in their camps--runs the risk of an
open-ended commitment that would severely strain Syria economically and
operationally. There are no indications of an agreement between Iran and
Syria regarding the southern suburbs. With neither Syria nor Iran in control
of events, and in the absence of an agreement between the two on the status of
Hizballah, violence is likely to spiral. Israel is not likely to view these
developments as unalloyed benefits; movement of Hizballah elements into
southern Lebanon would not be viewed as good for Israel and the Army of South
Lebanon.
China
The experiences of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union show that China's
economic reforms are likely to encounter serious difficulties in the future.
The current power struggle over Hu Yaobang's successor could overshadow reform
efforts. NI0/East Asia notes reforms will slow down or cease. The impact on
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the US is uncertain despite Chinese assurances that their opening to the
outside world will continue. There could be continuing difficulty for US
economic interests, such as investment, negotiating a bilateral investment
treaty, resolving textile issues, and other trade and economic questions.
Liberia
Coup plotting in Liberia will continue; although Doe is secure in the next
few months, the economy in shambles will add ever increasing pressure on Doe.
Friction with the US over its provision of 17 operational experts to the
Liberian government is likely. Doe probably will try to extort funds from
foreign mining companies in Liberia before turning to more desperate measures
such as seeking Bloc aid.
Nicaragua/Central America
If the current round of unity talks concerning a Central American peace
plan collapse, NIO/Latin America notes that this will seriously damage the
international image of the Nicaraguan resistance and threaten continued
external support. To split the Core Four and place the US on the defensive,
Nicaragua may agree to accept an unmodified version of Costa Rican President
Arias' peace plan.
3. NIO/Warning notes these additional areas of continuing warning concern:
Chile--The extent of the repercussions to Pinochet from the recent papal visit
is ont fully clear, but a likely outcome is galvanizing the political
opposition and fueling momentum for decisive change before 1989.
Iran/Iraq/Gulf States--Iran's preparation of the Silkworm antiship cruise
missile launch sit es covering the Strait of Hormuz increases the already high
risk--given errors in target acquisition and discrimination--of an Iranian
attack on even an American or Soviet combatant on escort duty in the Gulf.
Libya--The political and psychological repercussions of Libyan defeats in Chad
may not reach their full effect for several months, but Qadhafi's chances of
clinging to power will lessen in the face of likely public discontent)
Malta/Libya--Political tensions will rise sharply as 9 May's bitterly fought
election contest approaches. In a clean election, the pro-West party looks
likely to win but the pro-Lib an Labor party's control of the electoral
machinery indicates it will narrowly win.7
Niger/Libya--Increased Libyan meddling and subversion--spurred by Qadh afi's
ire at French and US assistance to Chad--is likely.
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South Korea--The potential for a major upheaval lacks only a violent
catalyst. Missteps by either President Chun, military hardliners, or
provocateurs within the ranks of the political opposition could bring a
breakpoint at any time.
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