LATIN AMERICAN WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING JANUARY 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 27, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300040010-4
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council NIC 00372-87
27 January 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting
January 1987
1. The following items were discussed at the Intelligence
Community's Warning and Forecast Meeting held on 21 January 1987.
Suriname
2. The military situation is at a stand-off after the Army's recent
counterinsurgency sweeps in the northeast, but rebel activity in the area
over the past few months has now created a serious economic problem for
the Bouterse government. The Suralco bauxite refinery, Suriname's
largest source of foreign earnings, is planning to close as a result of
the guerrilla threat in that area. The loss of jobs and revenues would
add a major burden to the already depressed economy. The Bouterse
government, therefore, is under pressure to take decisive military action
against the insurgents at the risk of triggering charges of new human
rights violations. At the same time, it needs to project an image of
moderation, and continued movement toward democracy.
WARNING ISSUE: The economy could spiral downward following a Suralco
closing, thereby placing the Bouterse government under considerable labor
and political pressure. Under such circumstances, Bouterse may turn to
Libya for aid. Libya would probably attempt to extract concessions, such
as use of Surinamese territory to support leftist revolutionary movements
in the region and a more assertive anti-Western foreign policy.
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-- Will Bouterse turn to Libya for financial assistance?
-- Is Libya likely to provide aid this time, given its poor track
record in recent years?
El Salvador
3. The business sector has seized upon the recent tax package as an
opportunity to challenge the President. Their efforts to enlist the left
in this effort were unsuccessful. While some military officers were in
sympathy with business, the high command managed to keep them all in line
behind the President. For now, the President is in control and will
probably weather this challenge from the extreme right--the first in two
years. Meanwhile the extreme left is attempting to increase the pressure
on Duarte by mobilizing leftist labor unions and increasing its
propaganda efforts. Renewed attacks on the coffee crop and
transportation stoppages are also hurting the government economically.
WARNING ISSUE: The extreme right and extreme left are both focusing
on El Salvador's unfavorable economic prospects as the President's most
vulnerable point. Attacks on his policies from both ends of the
political spectrum are likely. If they should cooperate, the pressure on
the President would increase, but the key will continue to be military
support for the President.
Nicaragua
4. Some 8,000 Contras are now in Nicaragua and more should be
entering in the near future. As a result, the Sandinistas have had to
redeploy forces away from the northwest border in order to cope with
increased rebel activity in central Nicaragua. With an improved
logistical support system, the Contras feel they are in a better position
than they have been in the past. Rebel planning for more aggressive
action--with perhaps a "spectacular"--is now underway. The EPS now has a
strength of 70,000-80,000, but it is noteworthy that they have not called
up the Reserves as yet.
5. Prospects for Nicaragua's domestic political opposition parties
remain bleak despite their recent efforts to regain some political
space. Attempts to win recognition and support from abroad have likewise
shown little promise. The government is unlikely to restrict them
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300040010-4
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further since they represent no real threat yet they lend a measure of
credibility to the Sandinista claim that Nicaragua is still an open
society.
6. Assistance to Nicaragua from the Bloc is expected to remain at
its current high level for the near future. More--and improved--air
defense weapons will probably be the only departure from the present
patterns.
WARNING ISSUE: With their improved logistical system in place, will
the Contras be able to strike at more visible targets, particularly on
the Pacific coast? Can the Sandinistas deal with more frequent and more
dispersed attacks without calling up the reserves? Will the Bloc have to
increase its military and economic support to keep the Sandinistas afloat?
Robert D. Vickers, r.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300040010-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300040010-4
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Participating in the NI0/Latin America Warning Meeting of
21 January 1987 were representatives of the following agencies:
DIA: DIA/DE3
DIA/DB3C1
DIA/DB3C2
DIA/DB6D2
DIA/DB5C2
DIA/OA-5
JSI-4B
National Security Agency
Department of State/INR
Department of the Navy/ONI
Department of the Air Force/AFIS-INOL
CIA Participants:
ALA
OGI
OIA
CRES
LDA
OIR
DO/LA
DO
DO
DO/EPS
NIO/W
ICS/HC
NPIC
FBIS
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300040010-4