MEETING ON STRATEGIC WARNING AND THE DEFENSE GUIDANCE ILLUSTRATIVE PLANNING SCENARIO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300030023-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: September 28, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/05: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300030023-1
28 September 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Meeting on Strategic Warning and the Defense Guidance
Illustrative Planning Scenario
1. The undersigned chaired a meeting on 24 September at CIA Headquarters
to discuss a proposed new Defense Guidance Illustrative Planning Scenario.
The purpose of the meeting was to ensure that proposed National Intelligence
Officer for Warning (NIO/W) comments on the study are in general agreement
with the Intelligence Community.
2. NIO/W began the meeting by providing brief background on the study,
which was commissioned by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle and
placed under the aegis of John Bellinger, Director of Defense Guidance and
Program Planning. In August discussions with John Bellinger, NIO/W stated
that the written results of the study, drafted by a special group at DIA
chaired by probably would not be agreeable to CIA nor NSA and
were certainly not to him. NIO/W offered to produce a draft of about six
pages providing the basis for a defense guidance planning scenario useful to
OSD and generally in consonance with Intelligence Community estimates of
Soviet doctrine and US and Allied intelligence capabilities.
3. then commented that the genesis of the study dates back
to the start of the Gramm-Rudman period. He stated that the two scenarios
(Soviet attack against NATO and Soviet invasion of Iran) were pre-determined
and that his study was bounded accordingly.. In the case of the first, the
scenario called for, a quick strike to collapse the Central Region, with little
Soviet industrial mobilization prior to D-Day.
4. At this poin cknowled ed that the study was prepared
primarily using DIA's Research Directorate (DB)) resources, with little
coordination or input from JCS Support (JS) assets. He recommended that JS be
provided two weeks in which to append comments to the extant draft and later
recommended NSA be afforded the same opportunity.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/05: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300030023-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/05: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300030023-1 25X1
5. At this point in the meeting each person was asked to comment on the
study, focusing first on the Iran scenario and then the NATO segment. Except
for isolated details, CIA, NSA and DIA/JS representatives were in agreement
with the NIO/W draft prepared and circulated on 28 August. Regarding the
limited industrial mobilization inherent in the NATO scenario, most agreed
that, at a minimum, a caveat needs to be included in the study conveying the.
unlikelihood of a Soviet decision to attack 11 months hence without early
mobilization. Even if such a scenario were to prove true, the study needs to
take into account-the necessary Soviet trade-off to achieve covert or
restricted preparations at the expense of more limited force capabilities.-
Covert preparations become even more difficult as a result of the Stockholm
accords regarding on-demand on-site exercise monitoring.
6. The meeting ended with agreement that DIA/JS and NSA will examine the
study and provide appropriate written comments within two weeks. Another
meeting will be held in about a month to assess progress toward consensus.
All agreed the time and effort being put into ensuring accuracy are justified.
7. Attending the meeting were:
Mr. Dennis M. Nagy, Assistant Deputy Director for Research, DIA
RADM Thomas Brooks, Deputy Director for JCS Support, DIA
Chief, Operations Group A, NSA
Mr. Douglas J. MacEachin, Director of Soviet Analysis (DDI), CIA
(plus copy to each attendee)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/05: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300030023-1