BI-WEEKLY WARNING SUPPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300030017-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: October 20, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, (IC 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 04346-87
20 October 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Bi-Weekly Warning Support
1. Attached is my bi-weekly warning review list which is intended to
keep true warning issues in sight during periods when current events do not
necessarily require continual reporting. The effort is a joint one, taking
into account the views of other NIOs as well as Intelligence Community
perceptions developed during regular warning meetings.
2. I would be pleased to provide you with amplification of any item.
Attachment
Bi-Weekly Warning Review
CL BY SIGNER
DCL OADR
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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
NIO/W
20 October 1987
IRAN/GULF ARAB STATES/US: Collision Course
The US helicopter attack on three Iranian gunboats on 8 October and
the 19 October destruction of an oil platform have strengthened the
likelihood of Iranian reprisals against US naval vessels in the Gulf or
eastern Mediterranean and attacks on American personnel in the Middle East
and Western Europe. Pressures in Tehran for retaliation against the US will
also build as the Iraqi anti-shipping campaign squeezes the oil flow. An
Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander already has called publicly for an
attack on a US Navy frigate
In
addition, the Iranians continue to plan attacks on oil and harbor facilities
of Gulf Cooperation Council states and have moved boats to Khark Island--a
staging area for major attacks. Iran's strategy evidently aims at
influencing US congressional and public opinion in a way that will oblige the
Administration--on the Lebanon precedent--to withdraw US forces from the
Gulf. This strategy was summarized by Prime Minister Mousavi, when he warned
on 6 September that the US should withdraw "rather than go any farther down
into the quagmire it has created for itself." Mousavi predicted that,
"However long the US may linger in the Gulf, it will eventually pull out and
let the (Gulf) states bear the consequences of their hostility toward Iran."
As hostilities in the Gulf escalate, the Gulf Arabs will become more
demanding of US support or threaten the consequences of their separate
accommodation with the Ayatollah or the Soviets.
IRAN/LIBYA: More Naval Threats
Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval forces in Lebanon may present a new
kind of threat to US and allied maritime interests in the Mediterranean Sea
encountered a mine oft southern Lebanon
alleged to be similar to those used recently in the Persian Gulf while
Lebanese found three others; a Revolutionary Guard commander claimed at about
the same time that his .contingent already had laid near Tyre. In
addition, Libya may try to lay mines off the Suez all cases, the
minelaying is likely to be covert. It may be difficult to prove
responsibility, since we cannot count on catching those minelayers red-handed.
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AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN/USSR: Soviet Pressure
Soviet diplomatic initiatives, violations of Pakistani ground and
airspace, and possibly financial inducements are maintaining pressure on
President Zia to stop providing aid to the Afghan resistance and to reach an
accommodation with Moscow. Some cross border attacks on Afghans in Pakistan
continue, and harassment attacks against Pakistani civilian targets are
contributing to wearing down Pakistani domestic support of the war. In an
effort that will boost pressure further, Moscow proposed a shorter timetable
for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan during talks last month in Geneva.
INDIA/CHINA: Risk of Confrontation
Chinese initiatives since mid-July to defuse the border issue--and New
Delhi's conciliatory actions--have helped ease tensions along the Sino-Indian
border; there also have been some troop withdrawals from the border.
However, a breakdown in talks scheduled in Beijing for 16-18 November could
result in new confrontations despite the impending onset of winter weather.
In addition, the current turmoil in Tibet could complicate the strategies of
both countries.
INDIA/PAKISTAN: Continued Uncertainty and Nuclear Weapons
f a decision to do so. The Pakistani nuclear
program enjoys wiaespreaa domestic support, and external pressures against
the nuclear program are not likely to dissuade Pakistan from maintenance of
the nuclear option. This has also triggered Indian reassessment of its
nuclear weapons options that will further fuel tensions in the subcontinent.
INDIA/SRI LANKA: Indian Imperialism?
India's intervention in Sri Lanka seems to reflect Rajiv Gandhi's
adoption of a doctrine--formulated by his mother and reaffirmed recently in
writing--asserting an Indian right and responsibility to protect ethnic
Indians anywhere, even when they resist protection. India committed most of
an infantry division plus police forces to northern and eastern Sri Lanka to
help enforce a peace agreement concerning the Tamil (ethnic Indian)
insurgency before the outbreak of fighting with Tamil militants. New Delhi
continues to increase its troop strength, which now numbers nearly 20,000.
In addition to introducing a force that could dominate the whole Sri Lankan
Army, the Indians have obtained Colombo's agreement to restructure the Sri
Lankan state and to a virtual Indian veto of national security policy in Sri
Lanka. It is not yet clear how far Gandhi intends to go in establishing
dominance over Sri Lanka, but Tamil resistance to the Indian invasion will
complicate any plans to withdraw and make a long stay likely. The
instability in Fiji between the native Fijians and the ethnic Indians may
soon be another case for Indian intervention using the Navy to "protect"
ethnic Indians.
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IRAN/IRAQ: Developments on the Ground
against Iraq in the near future. The Iraqi military recall of reservists
born in 1945--and placing reservists born in 1943 and 1944 on standby
status--indicate Iraq is becoming increasingly hard-pressed to replace
casualties. No matter the military outcome of a new offensive, the potential
for sudden collapse of either government is out of proportion to actual or
likely military results. Iraqi President Husayn still faces domestic
military and civilian opposition and is vulnerable to assassination.
Meanwhile in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini's death could lead to major instability
within any successor government.
LIBYA/CHAD: Chemical Warfare
Colonel Qadhafi is embarked on a program to acquire an offensive chemical
warfare capability and has had some success. Libya probably has received
limited Quantities of chemical bombs and artillery shells from Iran and will
We should be
prepared for additional use of chemical agents already in stockpile in Libya
against Chad.
KURDS/TURKEY/IRAQ/IRAN: Kurdish Rebellion
Kurdish separatist activity is continuing in southeastern Turkey, drawing
Ankara closer to border conflict. In May, Iran conducted a raid inside
Turkey following two Turkish raids against Kurdish targets in Iran.
Kurdish camps located in Iran and states that
Iranian irregulars recently captured while infiltrating intended to attack
Iraq's pipeline through Turkey. Tehran's continued support of the Kurds is
seriously straining Turkish-Iranian relations. A recent Kurdish attack in
Istanbul--the first in a major city since 1980--could boost pressures on
Prime Minister Ozal to launch more preemptive strikes against Kurdish camps
in Iran.
SYRIA: Internal Struggle
President Assad's poor health could leave him incapacitated at any time.
In the absence of a named successor, with new pressures in Lebanon, and with
an ever-deteriorating economic situation, any successor could become
overwhelmed with key issues, leading to governmental instability and sudden
change
TUNISIA: Increasing Instability
Ailing President Bourguiba's appointment of former Interior Minister and
regime strongman Ben Ali as Prime Minister probably is a sign that the
succession process has begun. Ben Ali's appointment probably is designed to
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provide stable government while the political process produces a longer-term
successor. Although two Islamic fundamentalists were hanged last week, the
moderate sentences given most of the 700 other defendants probably are
intended to limit tension after the past months of heightened internal unrest
and tightened security. Nevertheless, Islamic fundamentalists have promised
retaliation for executions. In addition, the Libyan threat almost certainly
will increase in the post-Bourguiba period, and Algeria too seems poised to
influence the succession struggle.
WESTERN EUROPE
WEST GERMANY: Pressures on Defense Policy
Chancellor Kohl's decision to scrap the Pershing lAs marked a turning
point in Bonn's security policy. The Christian Democrats have decided that
they will be champions of arms control--an increasingly popular stance among
many segments of the German population--and will not concede that ground to
either the Free Democrats or the Social Democrats. The government may also
be debating how to improve conventional capabilities as Soviet and US nuclear
weapons are withdrawn. Public statements indicating that nuclear weapons
hold the only key to defense, according to some influential Bundestag
members, are working against efforts to improve conventional defenses.
Meanwhile, working against such efforts, the Soviets continue their "peace
offensive" in West Germany. In addition, the Soviets, by allowing the recent
much desired visit by East German leader Honecker to the Federal Republic,
are hoping to demonstrate a lowered threat to West Germans.
GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS: More Tension
Another crisis may be brewing. Frequent reports of Greek troop
redeployments, new tensions over Cyprus, and ongoing issues such as rights to
the Aegean seabed, militarization of islands, and differences over air and
sea navigation rights point to heightened tensions. Whether the Greek
actions are for domestic consumption or to affect US/Aegean relations is not
clear, but the effect is to heighten tensions with the Turks. Both countries
may move toward confrontation because they believe the US will act to prevent
war.
EAST ASIA
SOUTH KOREA/NORTH KOREA: Rocky Road to December
Agreement by the major parties on a new draft constitution sets the stage
for a presidential election late this year, but hardliners on both sides
continue to oppose the pact. The radicals are likely to instigate street
demonstrations. Additional, perhaps greater, unrest could result from labor
strife. There appears to be general popular belief that a major breakdown in
order could occur before December. A collapse of public order could yet
result in the imposition of martial law.
Disorder would encourage North Korea to attempt
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actively to capitalize on anti-government riots and mount some sabotage
operations. Moreover, the Chinese evidently want the US to know that North
Korea intends to disrupt the Seoul Olympics.
PHILIPPINES: Who's Next?
President Aquino's support continues to weaken. A rally late last month
in Manila drew a scant 3,000 people, for example, and both civilian and
military opposition is growing. Meanwhile, the communist New People's Army
is stepping up attacks on bridges, possibly signaling a shift in tactics
toward sustained attacks on economic targets. Continued guerrilla successes,
aided by splits within the military, will accelerate political polarization
and encourage opponents of Aquino to increase their efforts to organize a
broad coalition that can force her from office, possibly by the end of the
year. Aquino's efforts to impose censorship on the news media,
unsatisfactory leadership within the military, continued decline of the
economy and threats to impose martial law--all amidst rumors of a coup-- will
critically damage Aquino's democratic credentials and may bring about her
early downfall. At present, the more likely beneficiaries are the communist
New People's Army and other insurgent movements.
LATIN AMERICA
BRAZIL/ARGENTINA: Tougher Stances on Debt
Brazil and Argentina may soon be taking significantly tougher stands on
repayment of their international debt, threatening more confrontations and,
ultimately, the solvency of major US banks. The recent mid-term election
defeat of Argentine President Alfonsin's party by the Peronists will increase
pressure on him to adopt a harder line on repayments; he recently closed the
nation's banks to prepare for domestic bank reform. Brasilia continues to
insist on "alternative" approaches to the debt problem--all of which probably
will be costly to the banks. Continuing balance of payments problems in both
countries make early resolutions unlikely. The chances of declarations of
debt moratorium are increasing even though Brazil's efforts to organize a
debtors' cartel are likely to fail.
BRAZIL: Political Turmoil
President Sarney's ruling coalition has collapsed, and his efforts to
break the political impasse may have set the stage for new challenges to his
leadership. Sarney wants to keep the presidential system of government in
the new constitution despite prevailing sentiment in the Constituent Assembly
for a parliamentary system. Meanwhile, the economy remains troubled and
Finance Minister Bresser's recent failure to secure a solution to Brazil's
debt crisis is triggering more accusations. In addition, military discontent
is rising. Pamphlets are circulating that criticize Sarney's leadership and
demand pay increases. The next few months will be critical as Congress
debates the constitution. Increasing economic problems could lead to broad
based opposition, providing a pretext for military intervention.
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CHILE: Intransigence
General Pinochet appears more determined than ever to maneuver to remain
in power beyond 1989. Having prepared plans for carrying out a major
reshuffle of the army to force his critics into early retirement, Pinochet
now seems determined to run as a civilian with junta backing. Pinochet's
actions to maintain control may precipitate a new crisis of confidence over
his leadership within the rank-and-file armed forces and middle class,
fueling momentum for decisive change before 1989.
HAITI: Descent Into Anarchy
The situation continues to deteriorate. A second presidential candidate
was gunned down last week. Street violence and acts of anti-Americanism will
continue to endanger the safety of US citizens. Radical Catholic priests and
communists are actively involved in anti-government activities. Economic
problems--plus harsh military reactions--increase the likelihood of a
governmental crisis before the presidential elections scheduled to be held in
November. Even General Namphy seems to yearn for a return to strongman rule.
PANAMA: Stalemate
Anti-government protests are tapering off, but the opposition could yet
unify and force Noriega's resignation. General Noriega under siege would
increase his demagogic campaign against the US, crack down roughly on the
opposition and, if necessary, install a military junta. As the crisis
evolves, there will be an ever increasing risk that Noriega will target more
sensitive US interests in Panama for subversion. Deliberate harassment of US
citizens is increasing.
SOUTHERN AFRICA
SOUTH AFRICA: Confrontation
Conservative electoral gains and deep divisions within the Afrikanner
community nave revealed increased domestic polarization that has further
undermined the influence of moderate blacks and whites who seek compromise.
In extending the emergency decree to a quasi-permanent condition and stifling
legitimate dissent, the government has evidently demonstrated that its
authority can be perpetuated only by force. Externally, until Pretoria's
increasingly coercive measures against Frontline States subside, there will
be greater opportunities for both West and East to capitalize on the
Frontline States' heightened senses of vulnerability.
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SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE
EASTERN EUROPE: Under Pressure
To various degrees, the regimes are under increasing pressures:
Growing economic and political problems, coupled with Gorbachev's
glasnost campaign and Soviet trade demands, have had unsettling
effects on the aging East European leaderships. Prospective
succession dilemmas, particularly in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are
adding to the potential for instability. In Hungary, strikes and
demonstrations may grow as the impact of recent economic austerity
measures are felt this fall. Even the normally docile legislature
appears restive over austerity proposals.
Pressures are especially great in Romania, where continuing debt
problems and economic mismanagement have exacerbated already abject
living conditions. Poor nutrition and worsening sanitary conditions
are contributing to new outbreaks of diseases like cholera. Popular
discontent may reach its peak in late winter, when consumer goods
supplies are lowest. Elements in the security services are
disaffected. Should they decide to move against the ailing
Ceausescu, we may have little additional warning. Moscow would seek
to draw Bucharest back to the fold.
A wild card is popular reaction to Gorbachev's political reforms. He appeals
both to younger party functionaries and apolitical persons seeking greater
personal freedoms. Over the long haul, the unintended erosion of party unity
and popular demands are destabilizing and could lead to system-shaking unrest.
YUGOSLAVIA: More Financial Troubles
Belgrade has worsening payments problems and little prospect that it can
solve them any time soon. After failing to make scheduled payments twice
since June, the Yugoslays face new rounds of rescheduling negotiations with
both banks and Western governments late this month and in November. The
banks, especially, are likely to be cool to requests for new lending in light
of other debtors' problems and the Yugoslays' insistence earlier this year
that they had no financial troubles. With export prospects poor, Yugoslavia
probably will have financing gaps of $1 billion or more annually for the rest
of the decade.
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