BI-WEEKLY WARNING SUPPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300030014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 3, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/05: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300030014-1
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NIC 04548-87
3 November 1987
.MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Bi-Weekly Warning Support
1. Attached is my bi-weekly warning review list which is intended to
keep true warning issues in sight during periods when current events do not
necessarily require continual reporting. The effort is a joint one, taking
into account the views of other NIOs as well as Intelligence Community
perceptions developed during regular warning meetings.
2. I would be pleased to provide you with amplification of any item.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
Attachment
Bi-Weekly Warning Review
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NIO/W
3 November 1987
NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
IRAN/GULF ARAB STATES/US: Collision Course
Iranian attacks against US naval vessels in the Gulf or eastern
Mediterranean and on American personnel elsewhere are likely. President
Khameini has declared that Iran will take "decisive retaliatory action." An
Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander has called for an attack on a US Navy
frigate
the Revolutionary Guards Navy has contingency pans o a ac a
US ship with 100 small boats. Pressures in Tehran for retaliation will also
build as the Iraqi anti-shipping campaign squeezes the oil flow. In
addition, the Iranians continue to plan attacks on oil and harbor facilities
of Gulf Cooperation Council states and are reinforcing their own islands,
apparently against possible US attack. Iran's strategy evidently aims at
influencing US congressional and public opinion in a way that will oblige the
Administration--on the Lebanon precedent--to withdraw US forces from the
Gulf. This strategy was summarized by Prime Minister Mousavi, when he warned
on 6 September that the US should withdraw "rather than go any farther down
into the quagmire it has created for itself." Mousavi predicted that,
"However long the US may linger in the Gulf, it will eventually pull out and
let the (Gulf) states bear the consequences of their hostility toward Iran."
New Saudi assertiveness is likely to accelerate escalation following any
Iranian attacks against the Saudis. As hostilities in the Gulf escalate, the
Gulf Arabs will become more demanding of US support.
IRAN/LIBYA: More Naval Threats
Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval forces in Lebanon may present a special
kind of threat to US and allied maritime interests in the Mediterranean Sea
ncoun ere a mine o southern Lebanon
a ege to be simi ar o -those used recently in the Persian Gulf while
Lebanese found three others; claimed at about
the same time that his contingent already had laid near Tyre. In
addition, Libya may try to lay mines off the Suez Canal. In all cases, the
minelaying is likely to be covert. It may be difficult to prove
responsibility, because we cannot count on catching those minelayers
red-handed.
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AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN/USSR: Soviet Pressure
Soviet diplomatic initiatives, violations of Pakistani ground and
airspace, and possibly financial inducements are maintaining pressure on
President Zia to stop providing aid to the Afghan resistance and to reach an
accommodation with Moscow. Some cross border attacks on Afghans in-Pakistan
continue, and harassment attacks against Pakistani civilian targets are
contributing to wearing down Pakistani domestic support of the war. In an
effort that will boost pressure further, Moscow proposed a shorter timetable
for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan during talks last month in Geneva.
INDIA/CHINA: Risk of Confrontation
Chinese initiatives since mid-July to defuse the border issue--and New
Delhi's conciliatory actions--have helped ease tensions along the Sino-Indian
border; there also have been some troop withdrawals from the border.
However, a breakdown in talks scheduled for 16-18 November could result in
new confrontations despite the impending onset of winter weather. In
addition, the possibility of more turmoil in Tibet could complicate the
strategies of both countries.
INDIA/PAKISTAN: Continued Uncertainty and Nuclear Weapons
program enjoys wi esprea domestic support, and external pressures against
the nuclear program are not likely to dissuade Pakistan from maintenance of
the nuclear option. This has also triggered Indian reassessment of its
nuclear weapons options that will further fuel tensions in the subcontinent.
INDIA/SRI LANKA: Indian Imperialism?
India's intervention in Sri Lanka seems to reflect Rajiv Gandhi's
adoption of a doctrine--formulated by his mother and reaffirmed recently in
writing--asserting an Indian right and responsibility to protect ethnic
Indians anywhere, even when they resist protection. India committed most of
an infantry division plus police forces to northern and eastern Sri Lanka to
help enforce a peace agreement concerning the Tamil (ethnic Indian)
insurgency before the outbreak of fighting with Tamil militants. New Delhi.
continues to increase its troop strength, which now numbers over 20,000. In
addition to introducing a force that could dominate the whole Sri Lankan
Army, the Indians have obtained Colombo's agreement to restructure the Sri
Lankan state and to a virtual Indian veto of national security policy in Sri
Lanka. It is not yet clear how far Gandhi intends to go in establishing
dominance over Sri Lanka, but Tamil resistance to the Indian invasion, dozens
of fatalities, and the recent escape of hundreds of Tamil fighters from
India's cordon around Jaffna will complicate plans to withdraw and make a
long stay more likely.
a decision to do so. The Pakistani nuclear
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INDIA/FIJI: More Imperialism?
The instability in Fiji between the native Fijians and the ethnic Indians
could become another case for Indian intervention using the Navy or even
troops transported by air to "protect" ethnic Indians. Any decision to act
probably will be affected by Indian progress, or lack thereof, in Sri Lanka.
IRAN/IRAQ: Developments on the Ground
against Iraq in the near future. The ragi military recall o reservis s
born in 1945--and placing reservists born in 1943 and 1944 on standby
status--indicate Iraq is becoming increasingly hard-pressed to replace
casualties. No matter the military outcome of ,a new offensive, the potential
for sudden collapse of either government is out of proport.ion to actual or
likely military results. Iraqi President Husayn still faces latent domestic
military and civilian opposition and is vulnerable to assassination.
Meanwhile in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini's death could lead to major instability
within any successor government.
LIBYA/CHAD: Chemical Warfare
Colonel Qadhafi is embarked on a program to acquire an offensive chemical
warfare capability and has had some success. Libya probably has received
limited quantities of chemical bombs and artillery shells from Iran and will
We should be
prepared for additional use of chemical agents already in stockpile in Lib a
against Chad.
KURDS/TURKEY/IRAQ/IRAN: Kurdish Rebellion
Kurdish separatist activity is continuing in southeastern Turkey, drawing
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Ankara closer to border conflict. In May, Iran conducted a rai
d inside
Turkey following two Turkish raids against Kurdish targets in I
ran.
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Kurdish camps located in Iran and states that 25X1
ranian irregulars captured while infiltrating intended to attack Iraq's 25X1
pipeline through Turkey. Tehran's continued support of the Kurds is
seriously straining Turkish-Iranian relations. A recent Kurdish attack in
Istanbul--the first in a major city since 1980--could boost pressures on
Prime Minister Ozal to launch more preemptive strikes against Kurdish camps
in Iran.
SYRIA: Internal Struggle
President Assad's poor health could leave him incapacitated at any time.
In the absence of a named successor, with new pressures in Lebanon, and with
an ever-deteriorating economic situation, any successor could become
overwhelmed with key issues, leading to governmental instability and sudden
change.
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TUNISIA: Increasing Instability
Ailing President Bourguiba's appointment of former Interior Minister and
regime strongman Ben Ali as Prime Minister probably is a sign that the
succession process has begun. Ben Ali's appointment probably is designed to
provide stable government while the political process produces a longer-term
successor. Although two Islamic fundamentalists were hanged last month, the
moderate sentences given most of the 700 other defendants probably are
intended to limit tension after the past months of heightened internal unrest
and tightened security. Nevertheless, Islamic fundamentalists have promised
retaliation for executions. In addition, the Libyan threat almost certainly
will increase in the post-Bourguiba period, and Algeria too seems poised to
influence the succession struggle.
SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE
YUGOSLAVIA: More Financial Troubles
Belgrade has worsening payments problems and little prospect that it can
solve them any time soon. After failing to make scheduled payments twice
since June, the Yugoslavs face new rounds of rescheduling negotiations with
both banks and Western governments this month. The banks, especially, are
likely to be cool to requests for new lending in light of other debtors'
problems and the Yugoslavs' insistence earlier this year that they had no
financial troubles. With export prospects poor, Yugoslavia probably will
have financing gaps of $1 billion or more annually for the rest of the decade.
YUGOSLAVIA: Other Troubles
Endemic Yugoslav problems are deepening. The likelihood of widespread
violence in Kosovo is greater now than at any time since the 1981 riots as
Serbs have mounted frequent demonstrations against the Albanian majority in
Kosovo. Yugoslav Army troops already have been harassed; such incidents may
spark an escalating cycle of reprisal and reaction that could overwhelm local
security forces. Problems are exacerbated by the fragmented Serbian
leadership in Belgrade, which has become blatantly Serbian chauvinist--a
trend that could accelerate centrifugal forces throughout the federation.
Meanwhile, the federal government is weakening and regional economic
disparities are growing.
EASTERN EUROPE: Under Pressure
To various degrees, the regimes are under increasing pressures:
-- Growing economic and political problems, coupled with Gorbachev's
glasnost campaign and Soviet trade demands, have had unsettling
effects on the aging East European leaderships. Prospective
succession dilemmas, particularly in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are
adding to the potential for instability.
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Pressures are especially great in Romania, where continuing debt
problems and economic mismanagement have exacerbated already abject
living conditions. Poor nutrition and worsening sanitary conditions
are contributing to new outbreaks of diseases like cholera. Popular
discontent may reach its peak in late winter, when consumer goods
supplies are lowest. Even elements in the security services are
disaffected.
A wild card is popular reaction to Gorbachev's political reforms. He appeals
both to younger party functionaries and apolitical persons seeking greater
personal freedoms. Over the long haul, the unintended erosion of party unity
and popular demands are destabilizing and could lead to system-shaking unrest.
GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS: More Tension
Another crisis may be brewing. Frequent reports of Greek troop
redeployments, new tensions over Cyprus, and ongoing issues such as rights to
the Aegean seabed, militarization of islands, and differences over air and
sea navigation rights point to heightened tensions. Whether the Greek
actions are for domestic consumption or to affect US/Aegean relations is not
clear, but the effect is to heighten tensions with the Turks. Both countries
may move toward confrontation because they believe the US will act to prevent
war.
EAST ASIA
PHILIPPINES: Attacks on Americans
The attacks on US personnel near Clark Air Base last week may signal a
major escalation in the New People's Army's declared intent to "intensify the
revolutionary war."
facilities throughout the islands. Whatever the intent of the Communists, US
personnel are already targets of increasingly strident anti-American moves by
several sectors of the Philippine political spectrum.
ores a ow more frequent and widespread attacks on us personnera-nd
PHILIPPINES: Who's Next?
President Aquino's support continues to weaken. Meanwhile, the communist
New People's Army is stepping up attacks on bridges, possibly signaling a
shift in tactics toward sustained attacks on economic targets. Continued
guerrilla successes, aided by splits within the military, will accelerate
political polarization and encourage opponents of Aquino to increase their
efforts to organize a broad coalition that can force her from office,
possibly by the end of the year. Aquino's efforts to impose censorship on
the news media, unsatisfactory leadership within the military, continued
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decline of the economy and threats to impose martial law--all amidst rumors
of a coup-- will critically damage Aquino's democratic credentials and may
bring about her early downfall. At present, the more likely beneficiaries
are the communist New People's Army and other insurgent movements.
BRAZIL/ARGENTINA: Tougher Stances on Debt
Brazil and Argentina may soon be taking significantly tougher stands on
repayment of their international debt, threatening more confrontations and,
ultimately, the solvency of major US banks. The recent mid-term election
defeat of Argentine President Alfonsin's party by the Peronists will increase
pressure on him to adopt a harder line on repayments; he recently closed the
nation's banks to prepare for domestic bank reform. Brasilia continues to
insist on "alternative" approaches to the debt problem--all of which probably
will be costly to the banks. Continuing balance of payments problems in both
countries make early resolutions unlikely. The chances of a debt moratorium
are increasing even though Brazil's efforts to organize a debtors' cartel are
likely to fail.
CHILE: Intransigence
General Pinochet appears more determined than ever to maneuver to remain
in power beyond 1989. Having prepared plans for carrying out a major
reshuffle of the army to force his critics into early retirement, Pinochet
now seems determined to run as a civilian with junta backing. Pinochet's
actions to maintain control may precipitate a new crisis of confidence over
his leadership within the rank-and-file armed forces and middle class,
fueling momentum for decisive change before 1989.
HAITI: Grim Prospects
The transition to civilian rule remains on track, but the election itself
is likely to be inconclusive. A decision by the electoral commission to ban
former Duvalierists is likely to lead to rightist violence while assaults on
leftist candidates probably will provoke retaliation by leftists. Military
plotting will persist and intensify as the elections approach. Any winner
will face massive economic, social, and political problems. Street violence
and acts of anti-Americanism will continue to endanger the safety of US
citizens--officials and tourists alike.
PANAMA: Noriega Strikes Back
As anti-government protests taper off and he consolidates his position,
General Noriega is increasing his demagogic campaign against the US and is
cracking down roughly on the opposition. As the crisis evolves, there will
be an ever increasing risk that Noriega will target more sensitive US
interests in Panama . Deliberate harassment of US citizens, including
Embassy officers, is increasing.
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SOUTH AFRICA: Confrontation
Conservative electoral gains and deep divisions within the Afrikanner
community have revealed increased domestic polarization that has further
undermined the influence of moderate blacks and whites who seek compromise.
In extending the emergency decree to a quasi-permanent condition and stifling
legitimate dissent, the government has evidently demonstrated that its
authority can be perpetuated only by force. Externally, until Pretoria's
increasingly coercive measures against Frontline States subside, there will
be greater opportunities for both West and East to capitalize on the
Frontline States' heightened senses of vulnerability.
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