EAST ASIA NORTH KOREA: CRITICAL JUNCTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2014
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 26, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/04/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020004-3
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EAST ASIA
TO' -
NIO/W
26 August 1987
NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA: Critical Juncture
Provisions in the new draft constitution--which would restrict voter
eligibility and effectively ban Kim Dae Jung from running.for the
presidency--are obstacles that could lead to an impasse in negotiations to
establish ground rules for a presidential election late this year. Should
the current talks on constitutional reform falter, street demonstrations
,could erupt, and a breakdown of public order could result in the imposition
of martial law. Disorder will encourage North Korea to consider mounting
destabilization operations and foment anti-government riots and sabotage.
PHILIPPINES: Bolder Communist Insurgency
The NPA is gradually increasing its military operations and, since the
beginning of the year, has killed some 660 government troops. Recent
reporting indicates the communists plan increased violence leading up to the
November elections--apparently to intimidate local voters into supporting
Philippine Communist Party backed candidates. Statements by an NPA
spokesman--threatening US personnel--reflect a change in the NPA's
longstanding policy against targeting Americans and may presage future
attacks against US interests.
NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
Iran/Islamic States: Religious Violence
The chances of violence in early September in countries with large Shia
Muslim minority populations are abnormally great. The traditional time of
strife between Sunni and Shia during the festival of Muharram (26 August to 6
September) is nearly coincident with the 40-day memorial (9 September) of the
martyrdom of Iranian "pilgrims" in Mecca. Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
and Persian Gulf states are especially vulnerable at this time.
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN/USSR: Soviet Pressure
Soviet diplomatic initiatives and continued bombing and violations of
Pakistani airspace are maintaining pressure on Zia to stop providing aid to
the Afghan resistance and to reach an accommodation with Moscow.
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EGYPT: Prospects for Instability
In the face of economic deterioration and continued activity by religious
activists, President Mubarak will be hard-pressed to maintain control during
implementation of the newest IMF program. There are already indications that
Mubarak is unwilling to take the necessary steps needed to implement the
gradual economic restructuring required to prevent a future cutoff of IMF
funds. If Mubarak fails to adequately address Egypt's growing economic
crisis, extensive protests and labor strife could erupt, undermining
Mubarak's hold on the presidency.
INDIA/CHINA: Risk of Confrontation
Chinese initiatives since mid-July to defuse the border issue--and New
Delhi's conciliatory actions--have helped ease tensions along the Sino-Indian
border, but there have been no confirmed troop withdrawals from the border.
China may have relocated two more divisions to the disputed area and recently
may have moved some troops forward. Should Gandhi not compromise, the level
of tension is likely to remain high. A breakdown in the talks could result
in new military confrontations.
INDIA/PAKISTAN: Continued Uncertainty and Nuclear Weapons
Islamabad probably already has the capability
to produce a nuclear weapon within a few days to a few weeks of a decision to
do so. The Pakistani nuclear program enjoys widespread domestic support, and
external pressures against the nuclear program are not likely to dissuade
Pakistan from maintenance of the nuclear option. This has triggered Indian
reassessment of its nuclear weapons options that will further fuel tensions
In the subcontinent. Nb/Warning notes that we should be prepared for the
eventuality of a weapons test in the subcontinent.
INDIA/SRI LANKA: Indian Invasion?
India already has committed most of an infantry division to northern and
eastern Sri Lanka in recent weeks to help enforce the peace agreement
concerning the Tamil insurgency and has put another 15,000 troops on alert
for possible deployment. In addition to introducing a force that could
dominate the whole Sri Lankan Army, the Indians have obtained Colombo's
agreement to a virtual Indian veto of national security policy in Sri Lanka,
including access to external military assistance, internal security in the
north and east, and foreign ship visits. The growing Indian intervention may
be a predatory move against a smaller neighbor, belying earlier assurances of
nonintervention. It is not yet clear how far Prime Minister Gandhi intends
to go in seizing power over Sri Lanka, but his military commitment continues
to grow. Should President Jayewardene be deposed or an assassination attempt
succeed, Gandhi almost certainly would move on Colombo. US interests in the
country may be in jeopardy.
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IRAN/IRAQ/GULF ARAB STATES: Collision Course
Saudi Arabia and Iran may be moving toward military conflict in the wake
of recent violence in Mecca and Iranian retaliatory moves. Iranian military
preparations and its specific inclusion of Bahrain and an emirate in Tehran's
list of direct enemies of Iran may be a harbinger of further actions against
the US in the region or, in the short run, an Iranian attempt to seize new
territory from the Gulf Arabs. Additionally, there would be serious
repercussions in the region should Iran carry out its plans to occupy
Kuwait's Bubiyan Island. The probability of a US combatant being involved in
hostilities in the region is higher than ever before.
IRAN/IRAQ: Internal Developments
Political stakes in the war are high. The potential for sudden collapse
of either government is out of proportion to actual or likely military
results. Military and civilian opposition to Husayn continues. Meanwhile,
in Iran, ..Khomeini seems to have lost some control over the power struggle
among his successors, and his death could lead to major instability within
the post-Khomeini government.
IRAN/LEBANON/MEDITERRANEAN: Revolutionary Guard Naval Threat
Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval forces in Lebanon apparently are
increasing and soon may present a new kind of threat to US and allied
maritime interests in the Mediterranean Sea. Israeli targets probably have
highest priority, but the Iranians might choose to retaliate for US or allied
actions in the Persian Gulf with attacks or mine laying in the eastern
Mediterranean.
KURDS/TURKEY/IRAQ/IRAN: Kurdish Rebellion
Continued Iranian support and manipulation of the Kurds, coupled with
increasing Iranian-assisted insurgent activity in the Kirkuk oil region, are
drawing Turkey closer to the conflict in the region.
Tehran's continued support of the Kurds is rapidly straining
Turkish-Iranian relations.
LIBYA: Domestic Troubles Ahead
In the wake of yet another embarrassing military defeat by Chad, Qadhafi
may face a dramatic increase in domestic opposition. Should Libyan forces be
driven from territory claimed as their own, Qadhafi's domestic popular and
military support is likely to erode further. Disaffected soldiers could
respond with another assassination attempt.
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SYRIA: Internal Struggle
Assad's poor health could leave him incapacitated at any time. In the
absence of a named successor, with new pressures in Lebanon, and with an
ever-deteriorating economic situation, the chances of a sudden change of
government continue.
TUNISIA: Increasing Instability
Bourguiba's campaign to suppress all political opposition is escalating
with harsher crackdowns on Islamic fundamentalists as demonstrations and
bombings become more frequent. Far from ensuring smooth succession, however,
the regime's efforts are drastically increasing discontent and ensuring
chaos, uncertainty and confusion when the succession crisis comes. The
Libyan threat almost certainly will increase in the post-Bourguiba period,
and Algeria too seems poised to influence the succession struggle.
WESTERN EUROPE
EAST GERMANY/WEST GERMANY/USSR: Honecker's Trip
The Soviets may use the 7-11 September visit of East German leader
Honecker to West Germany as bait for West German concessions on arms control
issues, particularly the Pershing lAs. Honecker's trip is a dramatic
development. Moscow scuttled a similar 1984 visit at the last minute and has
held rescheduling in abeyance since. Always worried when Germans get
together, the Soviets seem to have decided to satisfy Bonn's litmus test for
improved relations with the USSR -- closer intra-German ties. The trip
entails risks for the Soviets, however, including a strengthened and more
independent Honecker and revival of the "German Question". Such concerns
could yet threaten the trip if West German concessions appear unlikely.
GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS: Troubled Waters
Turkish allegations that the Greek Cypriot government has established a
training camp in southern Cyprus for Turkish separatist--plus efforts by the
Greek Cypriot government to obtain advanced weapons from France--are
increasing tensions in the Aegean. Each side apparently believes the US can
prevent war--an attitude that may encourage recklessness and lack of
restraint, which could trigger sudden confrontation through miscalculation
and escalation.
MALTA/LIBYA: Warming Relations
The Maltese government--which wrested control from the pro-Libyan
opposition party in May--may be debating the price for accepting Libyan
economic inducements.
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LATIN AMERICA
Brazil: Military Plotting
Increasing economic problems could lead to broad based
protests, providing a pretext for military intervention.
CHILE: Intransigence
Pinochet appears more determined than ever to maneuver to remain in power
beyond 1989. Having prepared plans for carrying out a major reshuffle of the
army to force his critics into early retirement, Pinochet now seems
determined to run as a civilian with junta backing. Pinochet's actions to
maintain control may precipitate a new crisis of confidence over his
leadership within the rank-and-file armed forces and middle class, fueling
momentum for decisive change before 1989.
HAITI: Storm Warning
The situation continues to deteriorate rapidly. Street violence and acts
of anti-Americanism will continue to endanger the safety of US citizens.
Shortages of food, fuel, and water--plus harsh military reactions--will
increase the likelihood of a governmental collapse before the presidential
elections scheduled to be held in November. Namphy's private contention that
Haiti needs a return of strongman rule seems almost certain to imperil the
elections.
NICARAGUA/HONDURAS: Continuation of Hostilities
Nicaragua continues to maintain a limited presence inside Honduran border
regions, thereby keeping pressure on the Honduran government to restrict
rebel activities. Honduras is likely to seek concessions and further
reassurances of support from the US, as Managua steps up activities in border
regions. Nb/Warning notes that the potential for Sandinista forces inside
Honduras to fire on US military personnel continues.
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PANAMA: Breakpoint
Last week's general strike was less than successful, but the opposition
could yet unify and force Noriega's resignation. Noriega under siege will
continue his demagogic campaign against the US, crack down roughly on the
opposition and, if necessary, install a military junta. The strife has
contributed to the flight of some 10 percent of the banking system's assets,
increasing already considerable strains on the economy and leading foreign
bankers to reassess their positions in Panama. As the crisis evolves, there
will be an ever increasing risk that Noriega will target more sensitive US
interests in Panama for subversion.
COLOMBIA/VENEZUELA: Border Dispute
Colombia and Venezuela again are squabbling over control of the oil rich
Golfo de Venezuela. A military clash appears unlikely, but Colombian
President Barco has asked the US to speed delivery of a TOW missile shipment.
A major incident would complicate cooperation in counterinsurgency and
antinarcotics operations.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
ANGOLA: Prospects for Clash with South Africa
The risk of direct South African-Cuban clashes appears to be growing, as
the Angolan government continues its measured two-front offensive against
UNITA positions in southeast Angola. Should the South Africans in
thp rnnflict and strike Cuban stronaholds, Cuban contingency plans
all for retaliatory airstrikes
against South African airbases in Namibia, thus increasing the chances for
escalation.
SOUTH AFRICA/FRONTLINE STATES: Confrontation
Conservative electoral gains and deep divisions within the Afrikanner
community have revealed increased domestic polarization that has further
undermined the influence of moderate blacks and whites who seek compromise.
Pretoria's gambit to co-opt South African blacks with a new constitution that
allows for urban black participation in government--but which does not
recognize the concept of one man, one vote--will not provide meaningful
political power to blacks, nor satisfy their demands for full political
representation. In extending the emergency decree to a quasi-permanent
condition and stifling legitimate dissent the government has demonstrated its
authority can be perpetuated only by force. Externally, until Pretoria's
increasingly coercive measures against the Frontline States subside, there
will be greater opportunities for both the West and the East to capitalize on
the Frontline States' heightened sense of vulnerability. President Botha may
be seeking a relaxation in tensions to facilitate his reform program as well
as gain favorable publicity in the West.
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SUDAN/ETHIOPIA: State of Emergency
Prime Minister Sadiq faces increasing challenges to his authority as the
economy worsens and the military stalemate with the southern insurgency
continues. The breakup of his cabinate coalition adds to his immediate
problems. These developments, plus' further reductions in US aid and a cutoff
of US security assistance--as required by the Brooke Amendment--will
encourage senior military officers to overthrow the civilian government.
SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE
EASTERN EUROPE: Under Pressure
To various degrees, the regimes are under increasing pressures:
Growing economic and political problems, coupled with Gorbachev's
glasnost campaign and Soviet trade demands, have had unsettling
effects on the aging East European leaderships. Prospective
succession dilemmas, particularly in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are
adding to the potential for instability. In Hungary, strikes and
demonstrations may grow as the impact of recent economic austerity
measures are felt this fall.
Pressures also are great in Romania, where the continuing debt
problems and economic mismariaTJFEFf have exacerbated already abject
living conditions. Poor nutrition and worsening sanitary conditions
are contributing to new outbreaks this summer of diseases like
cholera. Popular discontent may reach its peak in late winter, when
consumer goods supplies are lowest.
USSR: Massive Need for Hard Currency
The Soviets face substantial reductions in hard currency earning from oil
this year at a time of increasing need for imports for modernization. Moscow
increasingly will: rely on Western credit markets; squeeze oil supplied to
Eastern Europe to try to barter it on the international market; sell more
gold; and try to promote new exports--arms, vehicles, metals, and shipping
services--at bargain prices to gain needed hard currency.
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