MONTHLY FORECAST AND WARNING REPORT -- USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100150016-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: November 15, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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National Intelligence Council
NIC #06498-84
15 November 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: John Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: Monthly Forecast and Warning Report -- USSR
1. The Soviet Dilemma in Afghanistan:
A. Discussion
After five years in Afghanistan the Soviets have made little
progress against the insurgents, and the Babrak Karmal regime
remains as dependent as ever on the continued Soviet military
presence. The urban security situation -- particularly in Kabul --
is not better and may be worse. Soviet and Afghan officers, East
European diplomats, and.others acknowledge all this and more: we
have steady reports of Soviet military morale problems in
Afghanistan; alcoholism and the use of hashish by Soviet soldiers
are common; and there appears to be some civilian grumbling in the
USSR. While the Soviet military in Afghanistan once put its best
foot forward in reporting to Moscow, the problems of the enterprise
are now well known and regularly reported.
Analysts agree that no negotiated agreement is in sight,
Soviet military withdrawal is virtually out of the question, and
that for logistical reasons alone the Soviets remain unlikely to
escalate their military presence to the 200,000-300,000 level
minimally required for more rapid progress. Rather the Soviets are
thought likely to be relying on a favorable outcome in the long
term and, meanwhile, focussing on:
o Improving the capabilities and mix of their forces in
Afghanistan at roughly present levels.
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
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o Pacification and cooptation of selected rural areas.
o Sovietization and cadre development (by bringing Afghan
children to the USSR for long periods, etc.).
Analysts anticipate the deployment of a greater number of
internal security troops and possibly the introduction of an
internal passport system (although one doubts how it could work
amidst so much disorder). The Soviets are thought unlikely to
escalate their troop deployments by more than 30 percent in the
near future, however. Nor does the Community believe the Soviets
will seriously threaten to invade Pakistan in the near term,
because of the very large military commitment it would require,
accompanying logistical problems, and multifold international
complications.
There nevertheless is disagreement about whether the Soviets
will let things ride as they are and depend on marginal initiatives
indefinitely or take some dramatic escalatory or other new action
in the future. NI0/USSR and the SOVA analyst believe new Soviet
leaders might be more inclined to adopt a different policy course
than current leaders, who presumably have more invested in the
present Soviet strategy. The Soviets have the physical and
manpower resources to continue the present commitment
indefinitely. But it is open question whether they can sustain the
political/psychological frustrations involved.
2. Prospects for Sino-Soviet Relations:
A. Discussion
Although the atmospherics of Sino-Soviet relations have
recently improved, both sides are less optimistic about the
likelihood of significantly improved relations than they were a
year ago. The Soviets show no signs of satisfying China's
principal concerns -- Soviet broader deployments, engagement in
Afghanistan, and support for Vietnam in Kampuchea -- and are
beating Beijing over the head on PRC relations with the US and
Japan.
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Beijing nevertheless may be prepared to further expand trade
relations and exchanges, and Soviet First Deputy Premier Arkhipov
may visit China before the year is out. The occurrence of the
visit, and its content, will provide important indications of
likely developments in the coming year. Analysts, though, believe
the fundamental differences between the two sides will remain
intractable. The SOVA and State analysts in fact disagree about
whether China is even on the Soviet front burner. The former
believes the Soviets merely tend to China, have no expectation that
they can significantly improve relations, and consequently do not
give strong attention to China in their planning councils.
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