FORECASTING AND WARNING MEETING REPORT 19 JULY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100140032-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: July 20, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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National Intelligence Council
SECRET 1P
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC 04183-84
20 July 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Forecasting and Warning Meeting Report,
19 July 1984
1. Iran-Iraq. Although Iran continues to maintain a state of
preparedness for another assault against Iraq, there are continuing
indications of delay based on political decisions from Tehran. Iran's
military preparations include a readiness to cross the Shatt Al-Arab.
Given the nature of Iraqi defenses, however, and the extensive flooding
in the area, any Iranian attack would be likely to incur very high
casualties.
Discussions in Tehran probably hinge more on how and when to
launch an attack rather than whether an attack should be made.
The air war in the Gulf continues with Iraqi attacks on Iranian
shipping and Iranian measured responses.
Despite numerous reports of forthcoming diplomatic activity to
end the war, no significant steps have been taken and we doubt that
mediation will bring results. Iran may wish to use mediation offers as
a means to entice the Gulf states into pressuring Iraq to stop the air
war.
Iran has at least three options:
-- Maintain the war in a twilight zone of no peace, no war.
-- Seek a negotiated settlement in which the fall of Saddam
Husayn would be the key goal.
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-- Launch an attack against Iraq and escalate the conflict in
the Gulf.
Iran has been sobered by numerous recent events such as the
Saudi shootdown of an Iranian plane, the lack of success in Iran's land
war, Iran's failure to generate meaningful terrorism inside Iraq, and
Iraq's near conclusion of a new pipeline agreement.
It is important to remember that Iran has many long-range goals
in its struggle for dominance in the Gulf that will continue to exist
even should the war wind down.
The Community recognized that the situation is quite fluid at
the moment and we have little clear indication of Iran's probable course
of action.
2. Tunisia. The bread riots in Tunisia in January vented a
considerable amount of public dissatisfaction but the underlying causes
of dissatisfaction remain. Unemployment is high, worker remittances
from abroad are diminishing, tourism is dropping, the budget is
distributing largesse unequally through the country, and corruption
remains high. Bourguiba's ruling party, once the symbol of nationalism
and independence, is now a symbol of corruption, cronyism, and
stagnation. The rifts between the haves and the have-nots is growing.
Bourguiba himself, so long part of the solution of Tunisia's
problems, is now more the source of such problems. He is increasingly
senile, out of touch with the present situation and is blocking efforts
at major reform. He is still in charge for better or for worse and
because of his stature, is unlikely to be removed. There is no one of
sufficient standing in Tunisia to fill his shoes.
The government is devoting more time to finding scapegoats for
Tunisia's problems than to finding solutions. A recent pact between the
labor unions and the government may help to contain labor strikes in the
near term. The situation still remains potentially explosive, and
student demonstrations this fall--especially if badly handled by
security forces--could unleash further major unrest. At the moment
there is no specific immediate issue which could serve to spark trcuble
in the months ahead.
The major actor in any disorders would be Islamic
fundamentalists. Libya's influence on domestic politics is decidedly
limited. The military--once a reliable instrument in quelling
disorder--cannot be counted on to serve the regime in this capacity
indefinitely.
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3. PLO. The recent Aden agreement signed between the PFLP, DFLP,
and Arafat marks a significant step in tightening the PLO's hold on
Arafat's activities. The emphasis is now on collective leadership, lack
of communication with Egypt, and discouragement of peace talks with
Jordan. Despite these strictures, Arafat is still likely to exercise
some personal independence of action. He has survived recent struggles
and still maintains leadership. All indications are that Arafat still
wishes to avoid a major split in the PLO at all costs.
Arafat's differences with Syria are harder to bridge.
President Assad has recently met with senior Arafat lieutenants but will
not be willing to meet Arafat until they are certain he will restrict
his activities in accord with recent agreements. Syria likewise has had
limited success in winning acceptance of the Syrian controlled rebels
among Arab states.
In any case the prospects for Arafat providing King Hussein
with any meaningful mandate for negotiation with Israel is extremely
unlikely.
The PLO continues to infiltrate into Beirut. Current figures
suggest some 2,000 Palestinian fighters in the Beirut area. This time,
however, there is far greater suspicion and concern for PLO activities
among most Lebanese factions than ever before. Syria likewise does not
wish to see the PLO run uncontrolled.
If the PLO refuses to enter negotiations with Israel, with or
without Hussein, it will need some other viable policy. Since the
military option is increasingly unrealistic, a return to terrorism is a
distinct possibility. PLO politics are likely to remain loose, however,
and each of the various factions will probably continue to pursue their
own goals while avoiding a formal break in the organization.
Graham E. Fuller
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