MONTHLY WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING FOR MAY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100130010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 11, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
NIC# 03375-84
11 June 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH
FROM
SUBJECT
: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Monthly Warning and Forecast Meeting for May 1984
1. Summary of key warning issues:
Soviet intransigence towards the US continues to be evidenced
through vituperative propaganda, large Soviet military exercises,
highlighted deployments of submarines near U.S. coasts, a pressure
Olympics.
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Nicaragua
The main runway at Puente Huete will probably be completed by
October, but will lack support facilities. Additionally, construction at
Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas Airfields is progressing at a faster pace
than in the past. The Cubans may risk flying MIG aircraft to an airfield
despite inadequate facilities and defenses when POL is available.
Suriname
A crisis may be looming as a result of the near depletion of foreign
reserves and the need for harsher economic austerity measures. With
Prime Minister Udenhout increasingly undermined by Army Commander
Bouterse, Suriname may turn to Cuba for economic and military aid in the
event that violence returns to the country. In the absence of Brazilian
or Western aid, Cuba may see conditions as favorable for a return to
Suriname.
Philippines
The strong showing of the opposition parties in the recent elections
shattered the view of Marcos' invincibility, but also slowed the
political momentum of the extreme left who did not participate in the
elections. The Philippines most serious immediate problem is its
financial status. Austerity measures required by the IMF will be
difficult for Marcos to steer through the assembly when it convenes in
July. He probably cannot meet reform requirements before the end of the
year. The situation will be political and economic confusion.
Dominican Republic
President Blanco's prevention of a general strike on 9 May through
firmness and concessions to workers is a positive sign, but new unrest is
likely with IMF-mandated austerity measures.
Sudan
The internal political situation in Sudan remains tense. Opposition
to Nimeiri's Islamization and other policies is beginning to surface in
the military. If Nimeiri leaves the country during June as indicated in
recent reporting, coup plotters will have an opportunity to try to seize
the government. New instability in Sudan could presage responses from
Libya or Egypt which may lead to a request for US support in the region.
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2. Trend Commentary
Romani a
In October 1983, we observed that economic problems, lower living
standards, and a hard winter would likely cause additional popular unrest
resulting in demonstrations and strikes. Since then, following a severe
winter, the economy has declined further. There have been problems in
energy, transportation and food supplies. The regime is extremely
concerned about the mood of the industrial force, but the population has
remained generally quiescent. More frequent or larger occurances of
unrest would be our first indication that a popular breaking point was
approaching.
Dutch Decision on INF
The Dutch decision that effectively postpones an INF position puts
added importance on allied attitudes. CIA and INR analysts believe that
Italian Prime Minister Craxi's Lisbon statements on a weapons moratorium,
while probably a political mistake, reflect genuine Italian thinking that
a new initiative may be in order. These developments warrant close
attention for signs of new allied positions during the remainder of 1984.
Iran/Iraq
Despite Iran's logistical and military problems, an offensive during
the Ramadan period is possible. Iraq should contain the most likely
offensive in the Basra area.
Indi a
There is continued concern about violence in the Punjab state, and
the introduction of regular army forces reflects the high level of
government frustration. Recent Indian troop movements and other military
activities in the Kashmir may be exercises, but given India's internal
problems, may be indicative of a diversion, which would include an
incident involving Pakistan.
Cyprus
The trend is toward increasing instability due to Greek
reinforcements on the island, a poor Greek Cypriot performance in its
Security Council presentation, and a general belief that prolonged
stalemate is to the disadvantage of the Greek position.
The UN Security Council resolution on Cyprus marks a transition from
active diplomacy by the Secretary General and the disputants to a period
of stalemate and increasing tensions. The recent visit by a Soviet
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deputy foreign minister to discuss the problem with Greek Cypriots also
bodes for increasing instability as Greek Cypriots seem to be losing
international sympathy.
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