THE SOVIET INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DILEMMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100090023-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: July 11, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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0
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
0
NIC #04003-84
11 July 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: The Soviet Information Technology Dilemma
VC/NIC and I have discussed on numerous occasions the impact of the
computer revolution on the Soviet Union, particularly the impact of the
personal computer. The attached analysis from Computerworld is an excellent
treatise and I commend it to your attention. In sum, it notes that the Soviet
Union and indeed the Bloc, need computer technology to remain economically
competitive, but at the same time full adoption of an information society is
counter to Soviet-style Marxist-Leninism.
David Y. McManis
Attachment:
a/s
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9 UNCLASSIFIED ?
NIC #04003-84
11 July 1984
SUBJECT: The Soviet Information Technology Dilemma
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Exec/Dir
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - A/NI0/W
1 - NIO/W Chrono
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UNCLASS IFIED
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9
IN DEPTH
Communism vs. the computer
Can the USSR survive the information age?
The hardware and software
gap between East and West is
about 10 to 12 years - some-
what less in robotics, consider.
ably more in office automa-
tion. The Soviet bloc follows, it
does not lead; the reasons are
ideological and structural.
By Rex Malik
The arrival of inexpensive digital information
technology poses a fundamental challenge to the
survival of the Soviet system. The USSR and its
associated countries cannot survive the large-
scale introduction of information technology in
any meaningful way and be recognizably the
same system that has evolved, in the case of the
USSR, over 70 years.
The main reason is this: The infrastructure
.necessary for the USSR to reap the benefits is
absent and cannot be created without a massive
administrative restructuring, which would be
ideologically and politically more than difficult.
In a recent broadcast from Moscow, the Soviet
commentator Boris Belitsky said that the "fifth-
`generation" computers the Soviet Union is set-
ting out to create "embody the most valuable
expertise built up by the computer industries of
many countries, which was carefully and criti-
cally reviewed by the computer designers of the
socialist countries [italics mine)" Once, more,
the Soviet Union Is setting out to copy, to follow
In a track set by others.
On. March 29, the Soviets announced that a
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IN DEPTH/USSR IN THE INFORMATION AGE
"centralized system of automated ac-
cess to foreign computer networks
and data banks has gone into service
in Moscow." Note the use of the
word -centralized.-
On Soviet television a week later,
the chairman of the Siberian Depart-
ment of the USSR Academy of Sci-
ences criticized the incompatibility
of two systems in different parts of
the Soviet Union, both built at about
the same time to do similar tasks.
One would expect centralized plan.
ning to eliminate incompatibility.
Within the last year, senior party
members and academicians have
made unusual public statements re-
flecting their recognition that com-
puting brings change:
? Electronics are changing the na-
ture of labor.
? It is an urgent socioeconomic
and important political task to intro-
9 0
duce electronic equipment and ml- are ideological and structural,
croprocessors into the national econ- Why should the challenge take
omy. different forms in the Soviet bloc
? The use of computer technology than elsewhere? What is inherent in
could eventually release 50% of the the technology that poses a threat to
productive work force and increase the continuance of the Marxist ideo-
production by 21S times. ... logical state system set up by Lenin
^ Most of the USSR's population and his inheritors?.
should acquire skills In handling Western European ascendancy
computer technology. was the product of two sets of
What is not at issue here is the forces, one of which gave rise to the
eventual capability of the Soviet bloc other. The first was an attitude of
to produce - if it so chooses - the mind, a product of the evolution of
right and appropriate technology, al- religion, philosophy, climate and Ian
though its hardware and software guage, which created a framework in
are likely to remain at least a decade which change became possible. The
behind that offered by the West. The second was its product, the industri-
gap between East and West is about al revolution.
10 to 12 years - somewhat less in We are now witnessing the pass-
robotics, considerably more in office ing of that order in its second sense.
automation. It is the first set of qualities, howev-
The Soviet bloc follows, it does Cr, that is likely to ensure that if
not lead, and the reasons for Its lags anyone can pass through in relative-
ly good order, it is the nations of
Western Europe and their descen.
dants and inheritors. For the cast of
mind that Europe's long evolution.
ary chain produced is essentially
adaptive. Even so, these are chal.
lenging times.
The Soviet bloc, as presently con.
stituted, cannot manage this traw,
tion - at least, not peacefully. And
if not peacefully? A repeat of the
social convulsions of 1848 is still ,'
possible, but whereas Western Eu-
rope could survive that, the Soviet
bloc probably could not. The chal. {
lenge that faces the Soviet bloc is
quite fundamental, and that chal-
lenge is caused by Information tech- -
nology, its requirements, Its applica-
tions and what it sets In train. The
growth of information technology i
The growth of informa-
tion technology is inimi.
cal to the continuation of
the industrial society.
That is the problem.
And the Soviet system
has the industrial soci-
ety at its heart.
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inimical to the continuation of the
industrial society. That is the prob-
lem. And the Soviet system has the
Industrial society at its heart.
We are talking here of Soviet-style
communism. We are not referring to
the USSR alone, but to the European
bloc of the USSR, Bulgaria, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania
and East Germany. In many matters,
these countries are best understood
as one bloc; and that is especially
true with the development of infor.
mation technology. The linking
structure is the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance, known as Co-
mecon. Strict Soviet-style commu-
niam, as described here, centers on
the USSR (notably Russia) and the
satellite countries in Eastern Europe.
To say that the bloc must be
looked at as a whole is not to imply
that it is a monolith. To a degree, the
different countries evince different
attitudes and behavior to the West
and to information technology. In
relative terms, the USSR is taking a
stricter, mo4oilthodox line, whereas
some of th?'e allites are being more
adventurglts and innovative. This is
not happeging with the encourage-
ment of Mdscow, only with its grudg.
ing acquiescence.
In Bulgaria and Hungary, especial.
ly, a new generation of management
is taking risks with a series of eco-
nomic reforms. In Hungary, planning
is indicative, not prescriptive. Man.
agers are increasingly accepting the
opportunities for decentralization.
Whereas in Hungary the managers
tend to act independently, albeit
with the tacit support of the party,
in East Germany the management
and party apparatchiks tend to favor
collaboration. The result is progress,
If somewhat slow. In contrast, the
USSR moves hardly at all.
Before we go any further, let me
make my obeisance to the year of
George Orwell, 1984. It is appropri.
ate that one does, for computerized
information technology is seen by
many in the West as an Orwellian
technology. They stress the power
that it can give its operators should
they choose to apply it to the
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IN DEPTH/USSR IN THE INFORMATION AGE
purposes of social control - and the
ability it can give the rulers to main-
tain surveillance of the ruled at a
more detailed level than previously
possible - and end by substituting
"will" for "can "
It does not follow that repression
and social control cannot work In
mass societies without computer
power. The USSR, among others,
managed quite effectively in that de-
partment long before the first com-
puter was brought into action. True,
It was not always thorough and ef-
fective, but capriciousness can be
Just as effective an instrument of
terror and work just as successfully
if not as finely. And sometijes it can
be cheaper. Computers have played
tittle part in getting the reputed
three million people lntt;}oviet labor
camps.
A Scenario is possil6$X which
computing in the Soviet bloc is used
primarily as an instrument of con-
trol, in the sense of police control.
But if this is all that it does, the
system has essentially conceded the
economic race. And this it cannot do,
The bloc is a political entity whose
ideological justification is economic,
and competitively so. To give up the
race would be unthinkable.
It is important to understand that
the challenge now facing the Soviet
bloc is not an immediately dramatic
one; forget Hollywood and High
Nam. The decline instead will be
gradual; the processes by which it
occurs are akin to erosion. And this
In turn could lead to political steps
that could have unfortunate conse-
quences for the Soviet bloc and for
We are on track for a highly dangerous situation.
The way we have chosen to go presents.,E)ie soviet
leviathan with some very stark choices which,
however it wriggles, it will eventually have to make.
ourselves. Given that we seem to be
able to steer through the escalation
of nuclear weapons and still remain
at peace, one can see a situation
arising in which the Soviet system is
relegated to the second division of
economic power, a supplier of raw
materials and not much else. What-
ever one may believe about the
USSR, that is not a postulate that
any of its people (let alone their
leaders) would be willing to accept.
Yet it remains clear that informa-
tion technology will bite deepest and
have its most profound effects in
"free" societies, which have a tradi-
tion of a relatively unfettered free-
dom of inquiry, a freedom from di-
rection as to where intellectual
curiosity may take you and the indi-
vidual freedom to acquire the skills
that individuals themselves consider
important. It will flourish best in
societies in which, as John Milton
put it more than three centuries ago,
there is "an open market of ideas."
Broad range
Information technology? That
should be read as covering digital
electronics and ranges from comput-
ing in all forms and applications to
cable and satellite technology; from
advances in 1/O devices and proce-
dures, which will make even cheaper
electronics possible, to developments
in high-speed, very large-scale inte-
gration. Also included: advances in
software, development of abstract
theories of mathematics to give our-
selves a better grip on reality and
research In practical applications of
cognitive psychology and systems
development, This last gives us the
likelihood of a technology with a
"human face," one that can be seri-
ously applied to the are of the sick,
the disturbed and the elderly, as well
as giving powerful data tool combi-
nations to expand the performance
of the rest of us.
There may be, even in the Organl-
sation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), a mix of atti-
tudes to the application of the tech-
nology. But we have enough experi-
ence (and evidence) of behavior,
even in its sometimes still surprising
Primitive state, to have some india-
tions of the main thrusts. They an'
be briefly summarized. Those people
who have or can obtain access to the
technology want it to do the hard
the dull, the boring, t)te routine
work, while extending their own
control and providing greater per-
socal interest. Properly applied and
used. It is an immense amplifier of
human ea Lability. The people - at
whatever level - want this without
any lop of status, income or career
prospects.
The way information technology
Is now developing is Inimical to the
continuation Of the structure of the
Soviet bloc (and there is little poesl-
bllityAf turning back) because the
technology to not neutral. The cons-
quences may Seem surprising. We are
on track for a highly dangerous situ-
ation. The way we have chosen to go
prpentS the Soviet leviathan with
lope very stark choices which, how-
ever ittirrlggles,'it viie evemually
have to make. -
in a market-based environment,
where investment and other business
decisions are made from the bottom
up (in Its broadest sense) and the
"people" may not initiate but still
have the power of rejection, one can
say: that, however imperfect the
system, it has enough plasticity to
reshape itself as change occurs. A
key factor here is the extent to
which the society generates new
wealth and provides mechanisms to
distribute it.
No such adaptation in possible in a
top-down economy without the con-
sent of those at the top. Now there
are good reasons why this support
will be difficult to obtain, why it
would not be forthcoming, unless the
Soviet bloc were to face the sort of
convulsion experienced by China af-
ter the cultural revolution, the death
of Mao Tse-tung and the rise of Deng
Xipopi ng. And even there, it should
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be observed, change is slow and
patchy.
The choice is fundamental: Reject
or adapt and cease to be Marxist-
Leninist, Soviet-style. If the choice is
the former, face the possible erosion
of Comecon's economic position;
though its resources will still contin-
ue to grow, they will not grow at a
rate commensurate to that of the
politically competitive industrialized
societies. The effect of that, in turn.
may well be to tip irrevocably the
balance abroad against communism,
Soviet-style, as a model for others to
follow. It will be increasingly seen as
an interesting experiment, if a costly
one, but one that has failed: in the
long scheme of things a very expen-
sive and irrelevant sidetrack.
The core notion at the heart of
communism is that it will in the end
provide a better life than that ulti-
mately offered by other systems.
This notion can still be held to,
though the system has to find more
excuses why it has not happened
yet. But, increasingly, this tenet will
be seen to be a delusion. And the
Soviet people might well find out,
which they have not as yet been
officially and willingly allowed to,
that their advances, where compara-
ble to those made by others, have
been bought at a much higher price
than those others have had to pay.
The best that will be able to be said
for communism, Soviet-style, will be
that it is of no more validity and
importance than the idea that the
application of almost any skill to the
solution of a problem is better than
no skill at all.
Ironically, the Soviet system's
large-scale dependence upon techno-
logical advances in Europe, the U.S.
and Japan means that there is a
growing constituency that somehow
or other has access to foreign materi-
al. Electronics engineers, software
specialists, telecommunications pro-
fessionals, process control engineers.
chemists of almost all kinds - all
must have access to this literature if
they are to keep up (even if it has
first to be translated, usually by offi-
cial, centralized agencies).
Yet internal network and data
base technology is still in its infancy.
The routine inquiries made by aca-
demics and scientists in Europe and
North America using packet-
switched communications networks
are not routine in the Soviet Union.
Some networks do exist. The State
Committee for Science and Technol-
ogy operates Viniti for general tech-
nical data and Patent for patents.
These systems seem to work moder-
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ately well, if in a passive mode, and
with understandably strict condi-
tions of access (easy to arrange if
you restrict the number of termi-
nals). Another network, called Aca-
demnet, is scheduled to become oper-
ational within the next year or so.
But experience teaches us that the
process of interconnecting research
institutions and penetrating the re-
search community is surprisingly
difficult and has a long learning
curve.
Within information technology,
the digital computer lies at the core
of the challenge. To consider what
one can perhaps call, in a shorthand
phrase, the case of "communism vs.
the computer," we must briefly con-
sider some crucial aspects of the so-
cieties being developed in the OECD
countries in which computing is en-
demic and intrinsic, for they could
no longer run without it.
There is no agreement in any de-
tail about the changes that informa-
tion technology is likely to bring
about or make possible in society.
For there are a number of schools of
thought, and much of the writing is
overlaid with special pleading not
just about what might be or could be,
but about what ought to be. Politics,
philosophy and national viewpoints
intrude (why should one expect any-
thing different?). All that there is
general agreement on is that infor.
mation and its electronic handling
are central to the structures and pro-
cesses of the evolving societies in the
West. And only those societies are in
a position to pose the question: How
do we get out of here?
The key words are information
and electronic handling, and we need
to disentangle them as much as pos.
sible. Let us now take our first push
at considering information. I am not
putting forward the proposition that
information displaces the uses of en-
ergy and other machines, rather that
it takes its place within the basic
equation about what is required to
make a modern society run. This can
mean a major readjustment about the
way one thinks about the economy at
its most basic structural level.
It means not simply a major read-
justment in the way we think, but
also in the way we act. The evolution
of work in the 20th century has been
toward less and less human muscle
power and morednd more knowl-
edge. That k w ledge is based on
transmittable ation which, in
turn, is based on data (which will
have the aatgp meaning and value to
a task, irres{iective of who is doing
it, which is another principle of
great power).
Where does the Soviet bloc stand
on these trends? It is not surprising
- it is part of my thesis - that no
meaningful figures are accessible.
However, we can make Intelligent
guesses, especially about the USSR.
At the start of the 1980s, the USSR
had a population about 20% larger
than that of the US. and a gross
national product lea than half the
size. Yet:
^ The USSR employs roughly
twice as many people as, the US. in
the manufacturing industry.
^ In industrial manufacturing,
more than half its employed labor
force is engaged in unskilled or semi-
skilled physical labor, as opposed to
10% to 20% (a figure that is steadily
falling) in OECD countries.
? There were probably 15 times
as many information workers pro-
viding financial, Insurance and
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