ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DCI TO THE CONGRESS: 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100070015-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 13, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: David R. Low, NIO/AL
13 February 1984
FROM David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT Annual Report of the DCI to the Congress: 1983
The following paragraphs respond to your memo of 7 Feb 84.
There are two thrusts to our input; first, issues of intelligence
process and our responses to them; and secondly, several
generalized substantive issues that we hope will fit into other
substantive inputs.
a. "In 19.78, the HPSCI was critical of the warning
capabilities of the intelligence community. They believed
that problems that can be addressed primarily with improving
technology generally overshadow attention to improving
analysis. Second, mechanisms did not ensure that analysts
ask all the pertinent questions or that they confront
reasonable alternative hypotheses. They also believed that
more needed to be done to reduce ambiguity in intelligence
judgments to ensure a higher confidence from policy and
decision makers.
"I shared the concerns of the House and have taken
steps to strengthen the warning process through a clear
delineation of responsibilities for the National
Intelligence Council and the establishment of a full-time
National Intelligence Officer for Warning. Substantively,
we have made major strides in ensuring that our analyses and
estimates examine alternyative scenarios, and that the
coordination process does not stifle dissent. We have
recognized that the warning equation includes both the
warners and those who are being warned, and we are trying to
ensure the best possible dialogue between the two
communities. Through the NIO for Warning and the National
Warning Staff we are conducting research into problems of
warning; we are developing a National Warning Training
Course.which we believe will be of value to both
intelligence analysts and personnel from the policy making
community; we are strengthening the confederation of
operations and intelligence centers in the Washington area,
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and have recognized that that confederation must include
representatives of agencies such as Treasury, Energy, and
FEMA, as the nature of possible national security
emergencies changes; and we are beginning to grapple with
the challenges of information handling and analyst support
systems. One of the major technology challenges of the
decade ahead will be developing the means to efficiently
convert the large quantities of data that we collect every
day into useful knowledge.
"We know that ambiguity in warning will never be
eliminated unless we wait for missiles to be fired before we
issue a warning. Therefore, we are focusing on early
warning -- making efforts to place economic, political,
terrorist, and technological developments in a better,
warning context. As you know, improving the human
intelligence network and improving bilateral intelligence
sources are two ways in which we have focused on earlier
warning. Putting the economic and political more firmly
into our assessments will allow us to make earlier judgments
based on incomplete but reasonable evidence that will
increase our decision making options and flexibility.
b. "There are several topics that have come to dominate
intelligence community attention and they will continue to
do so.
"Perhaps the key issue of the past three years, if not
the last decade, is the changing political and military
balance between the U.S. and the USSR. The Soviets have
established their superpower position solely through their
military strength. That is why the emphasis on military
spending and military application of technology will
continue and why the deployment of NATO's INF is so critical
in Soviet eyes. For a country with a history of vast
defensive measures, the Pershing II system represents a
strategic offensive threat that effectively reduces warning
time to a purely responsive mode. We believe INF deployment
is a truly unsettling event for the Soviets and we must he
alert to measures and perhaps calculated risks to counter
INF presence.
"We also continually evaluate Soviet and Cuban roles,
particularly in our hemisphere. Cuban activities as an
economically dependent surrogate of Soviet goals and
policies have been consistently troublesome. 'For Cuba,
despite setbacks such as in Grenada, export and
encouragement of instability is a basic ingredient of its
Soviet-client relationship. It is not likely to change in.
the near-term. Those efforts will continue and demand our
attention as we assess Cuba's strategic position and her
value along critical sea and air lines of communication, her
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potential to "hold" or neutralize forces that could best be
used elsewhere and her potential as a base of operations for
Soviet military and intelligence activities.
"Among the many issues that demand our priority
attention, we will continue to add resources to third-world
areas where instability offers potential advantage to our
adversaries or direct impact on our security interests. In
that light, we must also broaden our horizon to include
warning watches on places like Yugoslavia, the Philippines,
and Mexico and conditions in countries producing strategic
materials such as Nigeria where oil exports, economic
products and coups interrelate with our own economic well-
being.
"Thus, our tasks are even broader and more difficult
today if we are to properly assess the impact of activities
taken against use well beyond the narrow range of military
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49 S E C R E T 0
13 February 1984
SUBJECT: Annual Report of the DCI to the Congress: 1983
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - A/NI0/W
1 - NIO/W Chron
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